THIS BOOK IS PRESENT
IN OUR LIBRARY
THROUGH THE
GENEROUS
CONTRIBUTIONS OF
ST. MICHAEL'S ALUMNI
TO THE VARSITY
FUND
Story of The Great War
History of the European
War from Official Sources
COMPLETE HISTORICAL RECORDS OF EVENTS TO DATE.
ILLUSTRATED WITH DRAWINGS, MAPS, and PHOTOGRAPHS
T'refaced by
WHAT THE WAR MEANS TO AMERICA
MAJOR GENERAL LEONARD WOOD, U. S. A.
NAVAL LESSONS OF THE WAR
REAR ADMIRAL AUSTIN M. KNIGHT, U. S. N.
THE WORLD'S WAR
FREDERICK PALMER
THEATRES OF THE WAR'S CAMPAIGNS
FRANK H. SIMONDS
THE WAR CORRESPONDENT
ARTHUR RUHL
FRANCIS J. REYNOLDS
Former Reference Librarian of Congress
edited by
ALLEN L. CHURCHILL
Associate Editor, The New International Encyclopedia
FRANCIS TREVELYAN MILLER
Editor in Chief, Photographic History of the Civil War
O L L I E R
NEW YORK
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Ax:rjinA . ^ERDUN ' THE
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The
STORY OF THE
GREAT WAR
BATTLE OF JUTLAND BANK • RUS-
SIAN OFFENSIVE • KUT-EL-AMARA
EAST AFRICA • VERDUN • THE
GREAT SOMME DRIVE • UNITED
STATES AND BELLIGERENTS
SUMMARY OF TWO YEARS' WAR
VOLUME
COLLIER y SON • NEW YORK
Copyright 1916
Br P. F. Collier & Sow
CONTENTS
PART I.— AUSTRIAN PROPAGANDA
CHAPTER PA«a
I. Austrian Ambassador Implicated in Strike Plots — His
Recall — Ramifications of German Conspiracies . . 9
II. The Plot to Destroy Ships — Pacific Coast Conspiracies
— Hamburg-American Case — Scope of New York In-
vestigations 15
III. Von Rintelen's Activities — Congressman Involved —
Germany's Repudiations — Dismissal of Captains Boy-
Ed and Von Papen 22
IV. Great Britain's Defense of Blockade — American
Methods in Civil War Cited 28
V. British Blockade Denounced as Illegal and Ineffective
BY THE United States — The American Position . . 35
VI. Great Britain Unyielding — Effect of the Blockade —
The Chicago Meat Packers' Case * 44
VII. Seizure of Suspected Ships — Trading "With the Enemy
— The Appam — The Anglo-French Loan — Ford Peace
Expedition , . 49
■^III. American Pacificism — Preparedness — Munition Safe-
guard .... 54
PART II.— OPERATIONS ON THE SEA
IX. Naval Engagements in Many Waters 59
X. Minor Engagements and Losses 6€
XI. The Battle of Jutland Bank — Beginning 70
XII. Some Secondary Features of the Battle 89
XIII. Losses and Tactics 94
XIV. Death op Lord Kitchener — Other Events of the Second
Year 108
PART III.— CAMPAIGN ON THE EASTERN FRONT
XV. The Eastern Front at the Approach op Spring, 1916 . 116
XVI. The Russian March — Offensive from Riga to Pinsk . 122
XVII. Resumption op Austro-Russian Operations 133
1
CONTENTS
CHAPTER
XVIII.
XIX.
XX.
XXI.
XXII.
XXIII.
XXIV.
XXV.
XXVI.
XXVII.
XXVIII.
XXIX.
XXX.
XXXI.
XXXII.
XXXIII.
XXXIV.
XXXV.
XXXVI.
XXXVII.
PART III.— CAMPAIGN ON THE EASTERN
FRONT — Continued
PAGB
Thaw and Spring Floods 141
Artillery Duels 149
The Great Russian Offensive 154
The Russian Reconquest of the Bukowina .... 162
In Conquered East Galicia 173
The German Counteroffensive Before Kovel . . . 178
Progress of the Bukowinian Conquest 183
Temporary Lull in the Russian Offensive .... 188
Advance Against Lemberg and Kovel 192
The Germans* ^tand on the Stokhod 198
Increased Strength of the Russian Drive .... 207
PART IV.— THE BALKANS
Holding Fast in Saloniki 212
Military and Political Events in Greece .... 216
PART v.— AUSTRO-ITALIAN CAMPAIGN
Resumption of Operations on the Italian Front . . 229
The Spring of 1916 on the Austro-Italian Front , . 235
The Austrian May Drive in the Trentino .... 244
The Rise and Failure of the Austro-Hungarian Drive 255
The Italian Counteroffensive in the Trentino . . 265
Continuation of the Italian Counteroffensive . . 276
Minor Operations on the Austro-Italian Front in
Trentino Offensive 283
PART VI.— RUSSO-TURKISH CAMPAIGN
XXXVIII. Russian Successes After Erzerum ....
292
PART VII.— CAMPAIGN IN MESOPOTAMIA
AND PERSIA
XXXIX. Renewed Attempt to Relieve Kut-el-Amara .... 307
XL. The Surrender of Kut-el-Amara 318
XLI. Spring and Summer Trench War on the Tigris . . . 326
XLII. Russian Advance Toward Bagdad 330
XLIII. Turkish Offensive and Russian Counteroffensive in
Armenia and Persia 335
CONTENTS 3
PART VIII.— OPERATIONS ON THE WESTERN
FRONT
CHAPTER PAGH
XLIV. Renewal of the Battle of Verdun 340
XLV. The Struggle for Vaux Fort and Village — Battle of
MoRT Homme 348
XLVI. Battle of Hill 304 and Douaumont — The Struggle at
Fleury 361
XL VII. Spring Operations in Other Sectors . . . . . .371
XLVIII. Battle of the Somme — Allied Preparations — Position
OF THE Opposing Forces . . .... . . . 377
XLIX. The British Attack 382
L. The French Attacks North and South of the Somme 387
LI. The British Attack (Continued) . . . . . . . 392
LII. The Second Phase of the Battle of the Somme ... 401
PART IX.— THE WAR IN THE AIR
LIII. The Value of Zeppelins in Long-Distance Reconnoiter-
iNG — Naval Auxiliaries 412
LIV. Aeroplane Improvements — Giant Machines — Technical
Developments 418
LV. Losses and Casualties in Aerial Warfare — Discrep- '
ANCiEs in Official Reports — "Driven Down" and
"Destroyed" 424
LVI. Aerial Combats and Raids 427
PART X.— THE UNITED STATES AND THE
BELLIGERENTS
LVII. War Cloud in Congress 433
LVIII. The President Upheld in Armed-Merchantmen Issue —
Final Crisis with Germany ........ 439
LIX. The American Ultimatum — Germany Yields .... 449
Two Years of the War. By Frank H. Simonds
The German Problem 461
The Belgian Phase 463
The French Offensive 466
The Battle of the Marne 469
The End of the First Western Campaign 472
The Russian Phase 476
4 CONTENTS
Two Years of the War. By Frank H. Simonds — Continued page
Tannenberg and Lemberg 476
Warsaw and Lodz 479
The Galician Campaign 480
The Battle of the Dunajec 481
Russia Survives 484
The Balkan Campaign 484
In the West 487
Italy 488
Verdun .488
The February Attack 490
Later Phases 491
Gettysburg 493
The Austrian Offensive 494
Germany Loses the Offensive 495
The Russian Attack 496
The Battle of the Somme 499
GoRiziA 499
As THE Third Year Begins 501
The Second Anniversary of the War. Statements from the
British, French, and German Ambassadors to the United
States 503
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS
Jutland . Frontispiece
OPPOSITE PAOa
Queen Mary, British Battle Cruiser 78
Earl Kitchener 110
Austrian 30.5-Centimeter Gun 158
Austrian Intrenchment High on a Mountain 238
German Crown Prince Giving Crosses for Valor 350
French Aviation Camp Near Verdun 366
U-C-5, German Mine-Laying Submarine 446
Motor-Mounted French 75's 494
LIST OF MAPS
PAGB
Expansion op the War — Dates on Which Declarations op War
Were Made (Colored Map) Front Insert
Battle of Jutland Bank, The
Plate I — Distribution of Forces 74
Plate II — Running Fight to the Southward 77
Plate III — Running Fight to the Northward . . . , 79
Plate IV — British Grand Fleet Approaching from North-
west 81
Plate V — British Grand Fleet Coming into Action . . 83
Plate VI — Jellicoe and Beatty Acting Together to "Cap"
German Fleet 85
Plate VII — Jellicoe and Beatty Pass Around the German
Flank, "Capping" It 86
Plate VIII — British Forces Heading Off to Southward to
Avoid Attack During Darkness 88
Plate IX — Movement of Forces 103
Plate X — Movements of Jellicoe's Forces on May 31 . . 105
Plate XI — What Von Scheer Should Have Done .... 106
Eastern Battle Front, August, 1916 119
Russian Offensive from Pinsk to Dubno, The 157
Russian Offensive in Galicia, The 175
Italian Front, The 241
Austrian Offensive, May, 1916, Detail of .263
GoRiziA 272
Kut-el-Amara 322
Russians in Persia, The 333
Russians in Armenia, The 838
Western Battle Front, August, 1916 343
Four Zone Maps (Colored) Opposite 344
Verdun, First Attack on 346
Verdun, Northeast District in Detail 352
Verdun, Northwest District in Detail 356
Mort Homme Sector in Detail 364
Verdun to St. Mihiel ••••••.. 366
7
8 LIST OF MAPS
PAGl
Verdun Gain up to August, 1916 369
Sector Where Grand Offensive was Started 379
English Gains, The 394
French Gains, The 406
Two Years of the War
August 18, 1914, When the Belgian Retreat to Antwerp
Began 465
August 23, 1914, After the Allies Had Lost All the First
Battles 467
September 6, 1914, The Battle of the Marne 471
September 20, 1914, The Deadlock ......... 473
November 15, 1914, The End of the Western Campaign . 475
October 24, 1914, The Battle of the Vistula 478
October 1, 1915, At the End op the Russian Retreat . . 483
The Conquest op Serbia, December, 1915 485
The Russian Spring Offensive, 1916 497
Austro-Italian Campaigns, May to September, 1916 . . 500
PART I— AUSTRIAN PROPAGANDA
CHAPTER I
AUSTRIAN AMBASSADOR IMPLICATED IN
STRIKE PLOTS — HIS RECALL — RAMIFICA-
TIONS OF GERMAN CONSPIRACIES
PUBLIC absorption in German propaganda was abating when
attention became directed to it again from another quarter.
An American war correspondent, James F. J. Archibald, a pas-
senger on the liner Rotterdam from New York, who was sus-
pected by the British authorities of being a bearer of dispatches
from the German and Austrian Ambassadors at Washington, to
their respective Governments, was detained and searched on the
steamer's arrival at Falmouth on August 30, 1915. A number
of confidential documents found among his belongings were
seized and confiscated, the British officials justifying their action
as coming within their rights under English municipal law. The
character of the papers confirmed the British suspicions that
Archibald was misusing his American passport by acting as a
secret courier for countries at war with which the United States
was at peace.
The seized papers were later presented to the British Parliar
ment and published. In a bulky dossier, comprising thirty-four
documents found in Archibald's possession, was a letter from
the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at Washington, Dr. Dumba,
to Baron Burian, the Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister. In
this letter Dr. Dumba took "this rare and safe opportunity*' of
"warmly recommending" to the Austrian Foreign Office certain
proposals made by the editor of a Hungarian-American organ,
the "Szabadsag," for effecting strikes in plants of the Bethlehem
a
10 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
Steel Company and others in the Middle West engaged in making
munitions for the Allies.
The United States Government took a serious view of the let-
ter recommending the plan for instigating strikes in American
factories. Dr. Dumba, thrown on his defense, explained to the
State Department that the incriminating proposals recommended
in the document did not originate from him personally, but
were the fruit of orders received from Vienna. This explana-
tion was not easily acceptable. The phraseology of Dr. Dumba
far from conveyed the impression that he was submitting a re-
port on an irregular proposal inspired by instructions of the
Austrian Government. Such a defense, however, if accepted,
only made the matter more serious. Instead of the American
Government having to take cognizance of an offensive act by an
ambassador, the Government which employed him would rather
have to be called to account. Another explanation by Dr. Dumba
justified his letter to Vienna on the ground that the strike pro-
posal urged merely represented a plan for warning all Austrians
and Hungarians, employed in the munition factories, of the
penalties they would have to pay if they ever returned to their
home country, after aiding in producing weapons and missiles of
destruction to be used against the Teutonic forces. This defense
also lacked convincing force, as the letter indicated that the aim
was so to cripple the munition factories that their output would
be curtailed or stopped altogether — an object that could only be
achieved by a general strike of all workers.
The Administration did not take long to make up its mind that
the time for disciplining foreign diplomats who exceeded the
duties of their office had come. On September 8, 1915, Austria-
Hungary was notified that Dr. Konstantin Theodor Dumba was
no longer acceptable as that country's envoy in Washington. The
American note dispatched to Ambassador Penfield at Vienna for
transmission to the Austrian Foreign Minister was blunt and
direct. After informing Baron Burian that Dr. Dumba had
admitted improper conduct in proposing to his Government plans
to instigate strikes in American manufacturing plants, the
United States thus demanded his recall :
AUSTRIAN AMBASSADOR'S RECALL 11
*'By reason of the admitted purpose and intent of Dr. Dumba
to conspire to cripple legitimate industries of the people of the
United States and to interrupt their legitimate trade, and by
reason of the flagrant violation of diplomatic propriety in em-
ploying an American citizen, protected by an American passport,
as a secret bearer of official dispatches through the lines of the
enemy of Austria-Hungary, the President directs us to inform
your excellency that Dr. Dumba is no longer acceptable to the
Government of the United States as the Ambassador of His Im-
perial Majesty at Washington."
Dr. Dumba was not recalled by his Government until Septem-
ber 22, 1915, fourteen days after the American demand. Mean-
while Dr. Dumba had cabled to Vienna, requesting that he be
ordered to return on leave of absence "to report." His recall was
ostensibly in response to his personal request, but the Adminis-
tration objected to this resort to a device intended to cloak the
fact that he was now persona non grata whose return was really
involuntary, and would not recognize a recall "on leave of ab-
sence." His Government had no choice but to recall him officially
in view of the imminent contingency that otherwise he would
be ousted, and in that case would be denied safe conduct from
capture by an allied cruiser in his passage across the ocean.
His request for passports and safe conduct was, in fact, dis-
regarded by the Administration, which informed him that the
matter was one to be dealt directly with his Government, pend-
ing whose official intimation of recall nothing to facilitate his
departure could be done. On the Austrian Government being
notified that Dr. Dumba's departure "on leave of absence"
would not be satisfactory, he was formally recalled on Septem-
ber 28, 1915.
The seized Archibald dossier included a letter from the Ger-
man military attache. Captain Franz von Papen, to his wife, con-
taining reference to Dr. Albert's correspondence, which left no
doubt that the letters were genuine :
"Unfortunately, they stole a fat portfolio from our good Albert
in the elevated (a New York street railroad). The English
secret service of course. Unfortunately, there were some very
12 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
important things from my report among them such as buying up
liquid chlorine and about the Bridgeport Projectile Company, as
well as documents regarding the buying up of phenol and the
acquisition of Wright's aeroplane patent. But things like that
must occur. I send you Albert's reply for you to see how we
protect ourselves. We composed the document to-day."
The "document" evidently was Dr. Albert's explanation dis-
counting the significance and importance of the letters. This
explanation was published on August 20, 1915.
The foregoing disclosures of documents covered a wide range
of organized German plans for embarrassing the Allies' dealings
with American interests; but they related rather more to ac-
complished operations and such activities as were revealed to be
under way — e. g., the acquisition of munitions combined with
propaganda for an embargo — ^were not deemed to be violative of
American law. But this stage of intent to clog the Allies' facili-
ties for obtaining sinews of war, in the face of law, speedily grew
to one of achievement more or less effective according to the suc-
cess with which the law interposed to spoil the plans.
The autumn and winter of 1915 were marked by the exposure
of a number of German plots which revealed that groups of con-
spirators were in league in various parts of the country, bent on
wrecking munition plants, sinking ships loaded with Allies' sup-
plies, and fomenting strikes. Isolated successes had attended
their efforts, but collectively their depredations presented a seri-
ous situation. The exposed plots produced clues to secret Ger-
man sources from which a number of mysterious explosions at
munition plants and on ships had apparently been directed. Pro-
jected labor disturbances at munition plants were traced to a
similar origin. The result was that the docket of the Federal
Department of Justice became laden with a motley collection of
indictments which implicated fifty or more individuals concerned
in some dozen conspiracies, in which four corporations were also
involved.
These cases only represented a portion of the criminal infrac-
tions of neutrality laws, which had arisen since the outbreak of
the war. In January, 1916/ ^ inquiry in Congress directed the
AUSTRIAN AMBASSADOR'S RECALL 13
Attorney General to name all persons "arrested in connection
with criminal plots affecting the neutrality of our Government."
Attorney General Gregory furnished a list of seventy-one indicted
persons, and the four corporations mentioned. A list of merely
arrested persons would not have been informative, as it would
have conveyed an incomplete and misleading impression. Such a
list, Mr. Gregory told Congress, would not include persons in-
dicted but never arrested, having become fugitives from justice ;
nor persons indicted but never arrested, having surrendered ; but
would include persons arrested and not proceeded against. Thus
there were many who had eluded the net of justice by flight and
some through insufficient evidence. The seventy-one persons
were concerned in violations of American neutrality in connec-
tion with the European war.
The list covered several cases already recorded in this history,
namely :
A group of Englishmen, and another of Montenegrins, in-
volved in so-called enlistment "plots" for obtaining recruits on
American soil for the armies of their respective countries.
The case of Werner Horn, indicted for attempting to destroy
by an explosive the St. Croix railroad bridge between Maine and
New Brunswick.
A group of nine men, mainly Germans, concerned in procuring
bogus passports to enable them to take passage to Europe to act
as spies. Eight were convicted, the ninth man, named Von
Wedell, a fugitive passport offender, was supposed to have been
caught in England and shot.
The Hamburg-American case, in which Dr. Karl Buenz, for-
mer German Consul General in New York, and other officials or
employees of that steamship company, were convicted (subject to
an appeal) of defrauding the Government in submitting false
clearance papers as to the destinations of ships sent from New
York to furnish supplies to German war vessels in the Atlantic.
A group of four men, a woman, and a rubber agency, indicted
on a similar charge, their operations being on the Pacific coast,
where they facilitated the delivery of supplies to German cruis-
ers when in the Pacific in the early stages of the war.
14 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
There remain the cases which, in the concatenation of events,
might logically go on record as direct sequels to the public di-
vulging of the Albert and Archibald secret papers. These in-
cluded :
A conspiracy to destroy munition-carrying ships at sea and to
murder the passengers and crews. Indictments in these terms
were brought against a group of six men — Robert Fay, Dr. Her-
bert 0. Kienzie, Walter L. Scholz, Paul Daeche, Max Breitung,
and Engelbert Bronkhorst.
A conspiracy to destroy the Welland Canal and to use Ameri-
can soil as a base for unlawful operations against Canada.
Three men, Paul Koenig, a Hamburg-American line official, R.
E. Leyendecker, and E. J. Justice, were involved in this case.
A conspiracy to destroy shipping on the Pacific Coast. A Ger-
man baron, Von Brincken, said to be one of the kaiser's army
officers ; an employee of the German consulate at San Francisco,
C. C. Crowley; and a woman, Mrs. Margaret W. Cornell, were
the offenders.
A conspiracy to prevent the manufacture and shipment of
munitions to the allied powers. A German organization, the
National Labor Peace Council, was indicted on this charge, as
well as a wealthy German, Franz von Rintelen, described as an
intimate friend of the German Crown Prince, and several Amer-
icans known in public life.
In most of these cases the name of Captain Karl Boy-Ed, the
German naval attache, or Captain Franz von Papen, the Grerman
military attache, figured persistently. The testimony of in-
formers confirmed the suspicion that a wide web of secret in-
trigue radiated from sources related to the German embassy and
enfolded all the conspiracies, showing that few, if any, of the
plots, contemplated or accomplished, were due solely to the in-
dividual zeal of German sympathizers.
A— War St S
THE PLOT TO DESTROY SHIPS 15
CHAPTER II
THE PLOT TO DESTROY SHIPS — PACIFIC COAST
CONSPIRACIES — HAMBURG-AMERICAN
CASE — SCOPE OF NEW YORK
INVESTIGATIONS
rpHE plot of Fay and his confederates to place bombs on ships
J- carrying war supplies to Europe was discovered when a
couple of New York detectives caught Fay and an accomplice,
Scholz, experimenting with explosives in a wood near Wee-
hawken, N. J., on October 24, 1915. Their arrests were the out-
come of a police search for two Germans who secretly sought to
purchase picric acid, a component of high explosives which had
become scarce since the war began. Certain purchases made
were traced to Fay. On the surface Fay's offense seemed merely
one of harboring and using explosives without a license; but
police investigations of ship explosions had proceeded on the
theory that the purchases of picric acid were associated with
them.
Fay confirmed this surmise. He described himself as a lieu-
tenant in the German army, who, with the sanction of the Ger-
man secret information service, had come to the United States
after sharing in the Battle of the Marne, to perfect certain mine
devices for attachment to munition ships in order to cripple them.
In a Hoboken storage warehouse was found a quantity of picric
acid he had deposited there, with a number of steel mine tanks,
each fitted with an attachment for hooking to the rudder of a
vessel, and clockwork and wire to fire the explosive in the tanks.
In rooms occupied by Fay and Scholz were dynamite and trinitro-
toluol (known as T-N-T), many caps of fulminate of mercury,
and Government survey maps of the eastern coast line and New
York Harbor. The conspirators' equipment included a fast motor
boat that could dart up and down the rivers and along the water
front where ships were moored, a high-powered automobile, and
four suit cases containing a number of disguises. The purpose of
B— War St. S
16 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
the enterprise was to stop shipments of arms and ammunitions
to the Allies. The disabling of ships, said Fay, was the sole aim,
without destruction of life. To this end he had been experiment-
ing for several months on a waterproof mine and a detonating
device that would operate by the swinging of a rudder, to which
the mine would be attached, controlled by a clock timed to cause
the explosion on the high seas. The German secret service, both
Fay and Scholz said, had provided them with funds to pursue
their object. Fay's admission to the police contained these state-
ments :
"I saw Captain Boy-Ed and Captain von Papen on my arrival
in this country. Captain Boy-Ed told me that I was doing a
dangerous thing. He said that political complications would re-
sult and he most assuredly could not approve of my plans. When
I came to this country, however, I had letters of introduction to
both those gentlemen. Both men warned me not to do anything of
the kind I had in mind. Captain von Papen strictly forbade me
to attach any of the mines to any of the ships leaving the harbors
of the United States. But anyone who wishes to, can read be-
tween the lines.
"The plan on which I worked was to place a mine on the rudder
post so that when it exploded it would destroy the rudder and
leave the ship helpless. There was no danger of any person being
killed. But by this explosion I would render the ship useless and
make the shipment of munitions so difficult that the owners of
ships would be intimidated and cause insurance rates to go so
high that the shipment of ammunition would be seriously
affected, if not stopped."
The Federal officials questioned the statement that Fay's de-
sign was merely to cripple munition ships. Captain Harold C.
Woodward of the Corps of Engineers, a Government speciahst
on explosives, held that if the amount of explosive, either trinitro-
toluol, or an explosive made from chlorate of potash and benzol,
required by the mine caskets found in Fay's possession, was fired
against a ship's rudder, it would tear open tht stern and destroy
the entire ship, if not its passengers and crew, so devastating
would be the explosive force. A mine of the size Fay used, three
THE PLOT TO DESTROY SHIPS 17
feet long and ten inches by ten inches, he said, would contain
over two cubic feet :
"If the mine was filled with trinitrotoluol the weight of the
high explosive would be about 180 pounds. If it was filled with a
mixture of chlorate of potash and benzol the weight would be
probably 110 pounds. Either charge if exploded on the rudder
post would blow a hole in the ship.
"The amount of high explosive put into a torpedo or a sub-
marine mine is only about 200 pounds. It must^ot be forgotten
that water is practically noncompressible, and that even if the
explosion did not take place against the ship the effect would be
practically the same. Oftentimes a ship is sunk by the explosion
of a torpedo or a mine several feet from the hull.
"Furthermore, if the ship loaded with dynamite or high ex-
plosive, and the detonating wave of the first explosion reaches
that cargo, the cargo also would explode. In high explosives the
detonating wave in the percussion cap explodes the charge in
much the same manner in which a chord struck on a piano will
make a picture wire on the wall vibrate if both the wire and the
piano string are tuned alike.
"Accordingly, if a ship carrying tons of high explosive is at-
tacked from the outside by a mine containing 100 pounds of
similar explosive, the whole cargo would go up and nothing would
remain of either ship or cargo."
Therefore the charge made against Fay and Scholz, and four
other men later arrested, Daeche, Kienzie, Bronkhorst, and Brei-
tung, namely, conspiracy to "destroy a ship," meant that and all
the consequences to the lives of those on board. Breitung was a
nephew of Edward N. Breitung, the purchaser of the ship Dacia
from German ownership, which was seized by the French on the
suspicion that its transfer to American registry was not bona fide.
The plot was viewed as the most serious yet bared. Fay and
his confederates were credited with having spent some $30,000
on their experiments and preparations, and rumor credited them
with having larger sums of money at their command.
The press generally doubted if they could have conducted their
operations without such financial support being extended them in
18 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
the United States. A design therefore was seen in Fay's state^
ment that he was financed from Germany to screen the source ol
this aid by transferring the higher responsibiUty in toto to official
persons in Germany who were beyond the reach of American
justice. These and other insinuations directed at the German
Embassy produced a statement from that quarter repudiating
all knowledge of the Fay conspiracy, and explaining that Hi
attaches were frequently approached by "fanatics" who wantec
to sink ships or destroy buildings in which munitions were made.
A similar conspiracy, but embracing the destruction of rail-
road bridges as well as munition ships and factories, was later
revealed on the Pacific Coast. Evidence on which indictments
were made against the men Crowley, Von Brincken, and a
woman confederate aforementioned, named Captain von Papen,
the German military attache, as the director of the plot. The
accused were also said to have had the cooperation of the German
Consul General at San Francisco. The indictments charged
them, inter alia, with using the mails to incite arson, murder,
and assassination. Among the evidence the Government un-
earthed was a letter referring to "P," which, the Federal officials
said, meant Captain von Papen. The letter, which related to a
price to be paid for the destruction of a powder plant at Pinole,
Cal., explained how the price named had been referred to others
"higher up." It read:
"Dear Sir : Your last letter with clipping to-day, and note what
you have to say. I have taken it up with them and 'B' [which
the Federal officials said stood for Franz Bopp, German Consul
at San Francisco] is awaiting decision of 'P' [said to stand for
Captain von Papen in New York] , so cannot advise you yet, and
will do so as soon as I get word from you. You might size up the
situation in the meantime."
The indictments charged that the defendants planned to de-
stroy munition plants at Aetna and Gary, Ind., at Ishpeming,
Mich., and at other places. The Government's chief witness,
named Van Koolbergen, told of being employed by Baron von
Brincken, of the German Consulate at San Francisco, to make
and use clockwork bombs to destroy the commerce of neutral
THE PLOT TO DESTROY SHIPS 19
nations. For each bomb he received $100 and a bonus for each
ship damaged or destroyed. For destroying a railway trestle in
Canada over which supply trains for the Allies passed, he said he
received first $250, and $300 further from a representative of the
German Government, the second payment being made upon his
producing newspaper clippings recording the bridge's destruc-
tion. It appeared that Van Koolbergen divulged the plot to the
Canadian Government.
The three defendants and Van Koolbergen were later named in
another indictment found by a San Francisco Federal Grand
Jury, involving in all sixty persons, including the German Con-
sul General in that city, Franz Bopp, the Vice Consul, Baron
Eckhardt, H. von Schack, Maurice Hall, Consul for Turkey, and
a number of men identified with shipping and commercial
interests.
The case was the first in which the United States Government
had asked for indictments against the official representatives of
any of the belligerents. The warrants charged a conspiracy to
violate the Sherman Anti-Trust Law by attempting to damage
plants manufacturing munitions for the Allies, thus interfering
with legitimate commerce, and with setting on foot military
expeditions against a friendly nation in connection with plans to
destroy Canadian railway tunnels.
The vice consul. Von Schack, was also indicted with twenty-six
of the defendants on charges of conspiring to defraud the United
States by sending supplies to German warships in the earlier
stages of the war, the supplies having been sent from New York
to the German Consulate in San Francisco. The charges related
to the outfitting of five vessels. One of the latter, the Sacra"
mento, now interned in a Chilean port, cleared from San Fran-
cisco, and when out to sea, the Government ascertained, was
taken in command by the wireless operator, who was really a
German naval reserve officer. Off the western coast of South
America the Sacramento was supposed to have got into wireless
communication with German cruisers then operating in the
Pacific. There she joined the squadron under a show of com-
pulsion, as though held up and captured. In this guise the war
20 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
vessels seemingly convoyed the Sacramento to an island in the
Pacific, where her cargo of food, coal, and munitions were trans-
ferred to her supposed captors. The Sacramento then proceeded
to a Chilean port where her commanding officer reported that he
had been captured by German warships and deprived of his
cargo. The Chilean authorities doubted the story and ordered
the vessel to be interned.
Far more extensive were unlawful operations in this direction
conducted by officials of the Hamburg- American line, as revealed
at their trial in New York City in November, 1915. The indict-
ments charged fraud against the United States by false clear-
ances and manifests for vessels chartered to provision, from
American ports, German cruisers engaged in commerce destroy-
ing. The prosecution proceeded on the belief that the Hamburg-
American activities were merely part of a general plan devised
by German and Austrian diplomatic and consular officers to use
American ports, directly and indirectly, as war bases for sup-
plies. The testimony in the case involved Captain Boy-Ed, the
German naval attache, who was named as having directed the
distribution of a fund of at least $750,000 for purposes de-
scribed as "riding roughshod over the laws of the United States."
The defense freely admitted chartering ships to supply German
cruisers at sea, and in fact named a list of twelve vessels, so
outfitted, showing the amount spent for coal, provisions, and
charter expenses to have been over $1,400,000 ; but of this out-
lay only $20,000 worth of supplies reached the German vessels.
The connection of Captain Boy-Ed with the case suggested the
defense that the implicated officials consulted with him as the
only representative in the United States of the German navy,
and were really acting on direct orders from the German Gov-
ernment, and not under the direction of the naval attache. Mili-
tary necessity was also a feasible ground for pleading justifica-
tion in concealing the fact that the ships cleared to deliver their
cargoes to German war vessels instead of to the ports named in
their papers. These ports were professed to be their ultimate
destinations if the vessels failed to meet the German cruisers.
Had any other course been pursued, the primary destinations
THE PLOT TO DESTROY SHIPS 21
would have become publicly known and British and other hostile
warships patrolling the seas would have been on their guard.
The defendants were convicted, but the case remained open on
appeal.
About the same time the criminal features of the Teutonic
propaganda engaged the lengthy attention of a Federal Grand
Jury sitting in New York City. A mass of evidence had been ac-
cumulated by Government agents in New York, Washington, and
other cities. Part of this testimony related to the Dumba and
Von Papen letters found in the Archibald dossier. Another part
concerned certain revelations a former Austrian consul at San
Francisco, Dr. Joseph Goricar, made to the Department of Jus-
tice. This informant charged that the German and Austrian
Governments had spent between $30,000,000 and $40,000,000 in
developing an elaborate spy system in the United States with the
aim of destroying munition plants, obtaining plans of American
fortifications, Government secrets, and passports for Germans
desiring to return to Germany. These operations, he said, were
conducted with the knowledge of Count von Bemstorff, the Ger-
man Ambassador. Captains Boy-Ed and Von Papen were also
named as actively associated with the conspiracy, as well as Dr.
von Nuber, the Austrian Consul General in New York, who, he
said, directed the espionage system and kept card indices of spies
in his office.
The investigation involved, therefore, diplomatic agents, who
were exempt from prosecution; a number of consuls and other
men in the employ of the Teutonic governments while presum-
ably connected with trustworthy firms; and notable German-
Americans, some holding public office.
Contributions to the fund for furthering the conspiracy, in
addition to the substantial sums believed to be supplied by the
German and Austrian Governments, were said to have come
freely from many Germans, citizens and otherwise, resident in the
United States. The project, put succinctly, was "to buy up or
blow up the munition plants." The buying up, as previously
shown, having proved to be impracticable, an alternative plan
presented itself to "tie up" the factories by strikes. This was
22 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
Dr. Dumba's miscarried scheme, which aimed at bribing labor
leaders to induce workmen, in return for substantial strike pay,
to quit work in the factories. Allied to this design was the move-
ment to forbid citizens of Germany and Austria-Hungary from
working in plants supplying munitions to their enemies. Such
employment, they were told, was treasonable. The men were of-
fered high wages at other occupations if they would abandon
their munition work. Teutonic charity bazaars held throughout
the country and agencies formed to help Teutons out of employ-
ment were regarded merely as means to influence men to leave
the munition plants and thus hamper the export of war supplies.
Funds were traced to show how money traveled through various
channels from the fountainhead to men working on behalf of
the Teutonic cause. Various firms received sums of money, to be
paid to men ostensibly in the employ of the concerns, but who in
reality were German agents working under cover.
Evidence collected revealed these various facts of the Teutonic
conspiracy. But the unfolding of such details before the Grand
Jury was incidental to the search for the men who originated the
scheme, acted as almoners or treasurers, or supervised, as execu-
tives, the horde of German and Austrian agents intriguing on
the lower slopes under their instructions.
CHAPTER III
VON RINTELEN'S ACTIVITIES — CONGRESSMAN
INVOLVED — GERMANY'S REPUDIATIONS —
DISMISSAL OF CAPTAINS BOY-ED
AND VON PAPEN
TN this quest the mysterious movements and connections of
-*• one German agent broadly streaked the entire investigation.
This person was Von Rintelen, supposed to be Dr. Dumba'a
closest lieutenant ere that envoy's presence on American soil was
dispensed with by President Wilson. Von Rintelen's activities
VON RINTELEN'S ACTIVITIES 23
belonged to the earlier period of the war, before the extensive
ramifications of the criminal phases of the German propaganda
were known. At present he was an enforced absentee from the
scenes of his exploits, being either immured by the British in the
Tower of London, or in a German concentration camp as a spy.
This inglorious interruption to the role he appeared to play while
in the United States as a peripatetic Midas, setting plots in train
by means of an overflowing purse, was due to an attempt to return
to Germany on the liner Noordam in July, 1915. The British
intercepted him at Falmouth, and promptly made him a prisoner
of war after examining his papers.
Whatever was Von Rintelen's real mission in the United States
in the winter of 1914-15, he was credited with being a personal
emissary and friend of the kaiser, bearing letters of credit esti-
mated to vary between $50,000,000 and $100,000,000. The figure
probably was exaggerated in view of the acknowledged inability
of the German interests in the United States to command any-
thing like the lesser sum named to acquire all they wanted — con-
trol of the munition plants. His initial efforts appeared to have
been directed to a wide advertising campaign to sway American
sentiment against the export of arms shipments. His energies,
like those of others, having been fruitless in this field, he was
said to have directed his attention to placing large orders under
cover for munitions with the object of depleting the source of
such supplies for the Allies, and aimed to control some of the
plants by purchasing their stocks. The investigation in these
channels thus contributed to confirm the New York "World's"
charges against German officialdom, based on its expose of the
Albert documents. Mexican troubles, according to persistent
rumor, inspired Von Rintelen to use his ample funds to draw
the United States into conflict with its southern neighbor as a
means of diverting munition supplies from the Allies for Amer'
ican use. He and other German agents were suspected of being
in league with General Huerta with a view to promoting a new
revolution in Mexico.
The New York Grand Jury's investigations of Von Rintelen's
activities became directed to his endeavors to "buy strikes." The
24 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
outcome was the indictment of officials of a German organization
known under the misleading name of the National Labor Peace
Council. The persons accused were Von Rintelen himself, though
a prisoner in England ; Frank Buchanan, a member of Congress ;
H. Robert Fowler, a former representative; Jacob C. Taylor,
president of the organization ; David Lamar, who previously had
gained notoriety for impersonating a congressman in order to
obtain money and known as the "Wolf of Wall Street," and
two others, named Martin and Schulties, active in the Labor
Peace Council and connected with a body called the Antitrust
League. They were charged with having, in an attempt to effect
an embargo (which would be in the interest of Germany) on
the shipment of war supplies, conspired to restrain foreign trade
by instigating strikes, intimidating employees, bribing and
distributing money among officers of labor organizations. Von
Rintelen was said to have supplied funds to Lamar wherewith
the Labor Peace Council was enabled to pursue these objects.
One sum named was $300,000, received by Lamar from Von
Rintelen for the organization of this body; of that sum Lamar
was said to have paid $170,000 to men connected with the
council.
The Labor Peace Council was organized in the summer of
1915, and met first in Washington, when resolutions were passed
embracing proposals for international peace, but were viewed as
really disguising a propaganda on behalf of German interests.
The Government sought to show that the organization was
financed by German agents and that its crusade was part and
parcel of pro-German movements whose ramifications throughout
the country had caused national concern.
Von Rintelen's manifold activities as chronicled acquired a
tinge of romance and not a little of fiction, but the revelations
concerning him were deemed sufficiently serious by Germany to
produce a repudiation of him by the German embassy on direct
instructions from Berlin, i. e. :
"The German Government entirely disavows Franz Rintelen,
and especially wished to say that it issued no instructions of
any kind which could have led him to violate American laws."
VON RINTELEN'S ACTIVITIES 25
It is essential to the record to chronicle that American senti-
ment did not accept German official disclaimers very seriously.
They were too prolific, and were viewed as apologetic expedients
to keep the relations between the two governments as smooth as
possible in the face of conditions which were daily imperiling
those relations. Germany appeared in the position of a Franken-
stein who had created a hydra-headed monster of conspiracy and
intrigue that had stampeded beyond control, and washed her
hands of its depredations. The situation, however, was only
susceptible to this view by an inner interpretation of the official
disclaimers. In letter, but not in spirit, Germany disowned her
own offspring by repudiating the deeds of plotters in terms
which deftly avoided revealing any ground for the suspicion —
belied by events — that those deeds had an official inception. Ger-
many, in denying that the plotters were Government "agents,"
suggested that these men pursued their operations with the
recognition that they alone undertook all the risks, and that if
unmasked it was their patriotic duty not to betray "the cause,"
which might mean their country, the German Government, or
the German officials who directed them. Not all the exposed cul-
prits had been equal to this self-abnegating strain on their
patriotism ; some, like Fay, were at first talkative in their ad-
missions that their pursuits were officially countenanced, an-
other recounted defense of Werner Horn, who attempted to de-
stroy a bridge connecting Canada and the United States, even
went so far as to contend that the offense was military — an act
of war — and therefore not criminal, on the plea that Horn was
acting as a German army officer. In other cases incriminating
evidence made needless the assumption of an attitude by culprits
of screening by silence the complicity of superiors. Yet despite
almost daily revelations linking the names of important German
officials, diplomatic and consular, with exposed plots, a further
repudiation came from Berlin in December, 1915, when the New
York Grand Jury's investigation was at high tide. This further
disavowal read :
"The German Government, naturally, has never knowingly ac-
cepted the support of any person, group of persons, society or
26 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
organization seeking to promote the cause of Germany in the
United States by illegal acts, by counsels of violence, by contra-
vention of law, or by any means whatever that could offend the
American people in the pride of their own authority. ... I
can only say, and do most emphatically declare to Germans
abroad, to German-American citizens of the United States, to
the American people all alike, that whoever is guilty of conduct
tending to associate the German cause with lawlessness of
thought, suggestion or deed against life, property, and order in
the United States is, in fact, an enemy of that very cause and a
source of embarrassment to the German Government, notwith-
standing he or they may believe to the contrary."
The stimulus for this politic disavowal, and one must be
sought, since German statements always had a genesis in antece-
dent events — was not apparently due to continued plot exposures,
which were too frequent, but could reasonably be traced to a
ringing address President Wilson had previously made to
Congress on December 7, 1915. The President, amid the pro-
longed applause of both Houses, meeting in joint session, de-
nounced the unpatriotism of many Americans of foreign descent.
He warned Congress that the gravest threats against the na-
tion's peace and safety came from within, not from without.
Without naming German-Americans, he declared that many
"had poured the poison of disloyalty into the very arteries of our
national life," and called for the prompt exercise of the processes
of law to purge the country "of the corrupt distempers brought
on by these citizens."
"I am urging you," he said in solemn tones, "to do nothing
less than save the honor and self-respect of the nation. Such
creatures of passion, disloyalty, and anarchy must be crushed
out."
Three days before this denunciation, the Administration had
demanded from Germany the recall of Captains Boy-Ed and Von
Papen, respectively the military aid and naval attache of the
German embassy. Unlike the procedure followed in requesting
Dr. Dumba's recall, no reasons were given. None according to
historic usage were necessary, and if reasons were given, they
VON RINTELEN'S ACTIVITIES 27
could not be questioned. It was sufficient that a diplomatic
officer was non persona grata by the fact that his withdrawal was
demanded.
Germany, through her embassy, showed some obduracy in
acting upon a request for these officials' recall without citing the
cause of complaint. There was an anxiety that neither should
be recalled with the imputation resting upon them that they v/ere
concerned, say, in the so-called Huerta-Mexican plot — if one really
existed — or with the conspiracies to destroy munition plants and
munition ships, or, in Captain Boy-Ed*s case, in the Hamburg-
American line's chartered ships for provisioning of German
cruisers, sailing with false manifests and clearance papers.
An informal note from Secretary Lansing to Count von Bern-
storff so far acceded to the request for a bill of particulars,
though not customary, that the German embassy professed to be
satisfied. Secretary Lansing stated that Captains Boy-Ed and
Von Papen had rendered themselves unacceptable by "their ac-
tivities in connection with naval and military affairs." This was
intended to mean that such activities here indicated had brought
the two officials in contact with private individuals in the United
States who had been involved in violation of the law. The inci-
dents and circumstances of this contact were of such a cumula-
tive character that the two attaches could no longer be deemed
as acceptable to the American Government. Here was an un-
doubted implication of complicity by association with wrong-
doers, but not in deed. The unofficial statement of the cause of
complaint satisfied the embassy in that it seemed to relieve the
two officers from the imputation of themselves having violated
American laws. The record stood, however, that the United
States had officially refused to give any reasons for demanding
their recall. Germany officially recalled them on December 10,
1915, and before the year was out they quitted American soil
under safe conducts granted by the British Government.
Captain von Papen, however, was not permitted to escape the
clutches of the British on the ocean passage. While respecting
his person, they seized his papers. These, duly published, made
his complicity in the German plots more pronounced than ever.
I.
28 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
His check counterfoils showed a payment of ?500 to "Mr. de
Caserta, Ottawa." De Caserta was described in British records
as "a dangerous German spy, who takes great risks, has lots of
ability, and wants lots of money." He was supposed to have
been involved in conspiracies in Canada to destroy bridges,
armories, and munition factories. He had offered his services to
the British Government, but they were rejected. Later he was
reported to have been shot or hanged in London as a spy.
Another check payment by Captain von Papen was to Werner
Horn for $700. Horn, as before recorded, was the German who
attempted to blow up a railroad bridge at Vanceboro, Maine.
Other payments shown by the Von Papen check book were to
Paul Koenig, of the Hamburg-American line. Koenig was ar-
rested in New York in December, 1915, on a charge of conspir-
acy with others to set on foot a military expedition from the
United States to destroy the locks of the Welland Canal for the
purpose of cutting off traffic from the Great Lakes to the St.
Lawrence River.
The German qonsul at Seattle was shown to have received $500
l^rom Captain von Papen shortly before an explosion occurred
enere in May, 1915, and $1,500 three months earlier. Another
payment was to a German, who, while under arrest in England
on a charge of being a spy, committed suicide.
CHAPTER IV
GREAT BRITAIN'S DEFENSE OF BLOCKADE —
AMERICAN METHODS IN CIVIL
WAR CITED
ISSUES with Great Britain interposed to engage the Adminis-
tration's attention, in the brief intervals when Germany's be-
havior was not doing so, to the exclusion of all other international
controversies produced by the war. In endeavoring to balance
the scales between the '"'^^tending belligerents, the United States
DEFENSE OF BLOCKADE RULE 29
had to weigh judicially the fact that their offenses differed
greatly in degree. Germany's crimes were the wanton slaughter
of American and other neutral noncombatants, Great Britain's
the wholesale infringements of American and neutral property
rights. Protests menacing a rupture of relations had to be made
in Germany's case; but those directed to Great Britain, though
not less forceful in tone, could not equitably be accompanied by
a hint of the same alternative. Arbitration by an international
court was the final recourse on the British issues. Arbitration
could not be resorted to, in the American view, for adjusting the
issues with Germany.
The Anglo-American trade dispute over freedom of maritime
commerce by neutrals during a war occupied an interlude in the
crisis with Germany. The dispatch of the third Lusitania note
of July 21, 1915, promised a breathing spell in the arduous diplo-
matic labors of the Administration, pending Germany's response.
But a few days later the Administration became immersed in
Great Britain's further defense of her blockade methods, con-
tained in a group of three communications, one dated July 24,
and two July 31, 1915, in answer to the American protests of
March 31, July 14, and July 15, 1915. The main document, dated
July 24, 1915, showed both Governments to be professing and
insisting upon a strict adherence to the same principles of inter-
national law, while sharply disagreeing on the question whether
measures taken by Great Britain conformed to those principles.
The United States had objected to certain interferences with
neutral trade Great Britain contemplated under her various
Orders in Council. The legality of these orders the United States
contested. Great Britain was notified by a caveat, sent July 14,
1915, that American rights assailed by these interferences with
trade would be construed under accepted principles of inter-
national law. Hence prize-court proceedings based on British
municipal legislation not in conformity with such principles'
would not be recognized as valid by the United States.
Great Britain defended her course by stating the premise that
a blockade was an allowable expedient in war — ^which the United
States did not question — and upon that premise reared a struc-
30 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
ture of argument which emphasized the wide gap between British
and American interpretations of international law. A blockade
being allowable, Great Britain held that it was equally allowable
to make it effective. If the only way to do so was to extend the
blockade to enemy commerce passing through neutral ports, then
such extension was warranted. As Germany could conduct her
commerce through such ports, situated in contiguous countries,
almost as effectively as through her own ports, a blockade of Ger-
man ports alone would not be effective. Hence the Allies asserted
the right to widen the blockade to the German commerce of
neutral ports, but sought to distinguish between such commerce
and the legitimate trade of neutrals for the use and benefit of
their own nationals. Moreover, the Allies forebore to apply the
rule, formerly invariable, that ships with cargoes running a
blockade were condemnable.
On the chief point at issue Sir Edward Grey wrote :
"The contention which I understand the United States Govern-
ment now puts forward is that if a belligerent is so circumstanced
that his commerce can pass through adjacent neutral ports as
easily as through ports in his own territory, his opponent has no
right to interfere and must restrict his measure of blockade in
such a manner as to leave such avenues of commerce still open
to his adversary.
"This is a contention which his Majesty's Government feel
unable to accept and which seems to them unsustained either in
point of law or upon principles of international equity. They are
unable to admit that a belligerent violates any fundamental
principle of international law by applying a blockade in such a
way as to cut out the enemy's commerce with foreign countries
through neutral ports if the circumstances render such an appli-
cation of the principles of blockade the only means of making it
effective."
In this connection Sir Edward Grey recalled the position of the
United States in the Civil War, when it was under the necessity
of declaring a blockade of some 3,000 miles of coast line, a mili-
tary operation for which the number of vessels available was at
first very small :
DEFENSE OF BLOCKADE RULE 31
"It was vital to the cause of the United States in that great
struggle that they should be able to cut off the trade of the
Southern States. The Confederate armies were dependent on
supplies from overseas, and those supplies could not be obtained
without exporting the cotton wherewith to pay for them.
"To cut off this trade the United States could only rely upon
a blockade. The difficulties confronting the Federal Government
were in part due to the fact that neighboring neutral territory
afforded convenient centers from which contraband could be
introduced into the territory of their enemies and from which
blockade running could be facilitated.
"In order to meet this new difficulty the old principles relating
to contraband and blockade were developed, and the doctrine of
continuous voyage was applied and enforced, under which goods
destined for the enemy territory were intercepted before they
reached the neutral ports from which they were to be reexported.
The difficulties which imposed upon the United States the neces-
sity of reshaping some of the old rules are somewhat akin to
those with which the Allies are now faced in dealing with the
trade of their enemy."
Though an innovation, the extension of the British blockade
to a surveillance of merchandise passing in and out of a neutral
port contiguous to Germany was not for that reason impermis-
sible. Thus that preceded the British contention, which, more-
over, recognized the essential thing to be observed in changes of
law and usages of war caused by new conditions was that such
changes must "conform to the spirit and principles of the essence
of the rules of war." The phrase was cited from the American
protest by way of buttressing the argument to show that the
United States itself, as evident from the excerpt quoted, had
freely made innovations in the law of blockade within this re-
striction, but regardless of the views or interests of neutrals.
These American innovations in blockade methods, Great Britain
maintained, were of the same general character as those adopted
by the allied powers, and Great Britain, as exemplified in the
Springbok case, had assented to them. As to the American con-
tention that there was a lack of written authority for the British
C— War St. 5
82 ■ THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
innovations or extensions of the law of blockade, the absence of
such pronouncements was deemed unessential. Sir Edward Grey
considered that the function of writers on international law was
to formulate existing principles and rules, not to invent or dictate
alterations adapting them to altered circumstances.
So, to sum up, the modifications of the old rules of blockade
adopted were viewed by Great Britain as in accordance with the
general principles on which an acknowledged right of blockade
was based. They were not only held to be justified by the
exigencies of the case, but could be defended as consistent with
those general principles which had been recognized by both
governments.
The United States declined to accept the view that seizures and
detentions of American ships and cargoes could justifiably be
made by stretching the principles of international law to fit war
conditions Great Britain confronted, and assailed the legality of
the British tribunals which determined whether such seizures
were prizes. Great Britain had been informed :
". . . So far as the interests of American citizens are con-
cerned the Government of the United States will insist upon their
rights under the principles and rules of international law as
hitherto established, governing neutral trade in time of war,
without limitation or impairment by order in council or other
municipal legislation by the British Government, and will not
recognize the validity of prize-court proceedings taken under
restraints imposed by British municipal law in derogation of the
rights of American citizens under international law."
British prize-court proceedings had been fruitful of bitter
grievances to the State Department from the American mer-
chants affected. Sir Edward Grey pointed out that American in-
terests had this remedy in challenging prize-court verdicts:
"It is open to any United States citizen whose claim is before
the prize court to contend that any order in council which may
affect his claim is inconsistent with the principles of international
law, and is, therefore, not binding upon the court.
"If the prize court declines to accept his contentions, and if,
^fter such a decision has been upheld on appeal by the judicial
DEFENSE OF BLOCKADE RULE 33
committee of His Majesty's Privy Council, the Government of the
United States considers that there is serious ground for holding
that the decision is incorrect and infringes the rights of their
citizens, it is open to them to claim that it should be subjected
to review by an international tribunal."
One complaint of the United States, made on July 15, 1915, had
been specifically directed to the action of the British naval
authorities in seizing the American steamer Neches, sailing from
Rotterdam to an American port, with a general cargo. The
ground advanced to sustain this action was that the goods orig-
inated in part at least in Belgium, and hence came within the
Order in Council of March 11, 1915, which stipulated that every
merchant vessel sailing from a port other than a German port,
carrying goods of enemy origin, might be required to discharge
such goods in a British or allied port. The Neches had been
detained at the Downs and then brought to London. Belgian
goods were viewed as being of "enemy origin," because coming
from territory held by Germany. This was the first specific case
of the kind arising under British Orders in Council affecting
American interests, the goods being consigned to United States
citizens.
Great Britain on July 31, 1915, justified her seizure of the
Neches as coming within the application of her extended block-
ade, as previously set forth, which with great pains she had
sought to prove to the United States was permissible, under in-
ternational law. Her defense in the Neches case, however, was
viewed as weakened by her citing Germany's violations of inter-
national law to excuse her extension of old blockade principles to
the peculiar circumstances of the present war. In intimating
that so long as neutrals tolerated the German submarine war-
fare, they ought not to press her to abandon blockade measures
that were -a consequence of that warfare. Great Britain was
regarded as lowering her defense toward the level of the posi-
tion taken by Germany. Sir Edward Grey's plan was thus
phrased :
"His Majesty's Government are not aware, except from the
published correspondence between the United States and Ger-
34 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
many, to what extent reparation has been claimed from Germany
by neutrals for loss of ships, lives, and cargoes, nor how far these
acts have been the subject even of protest by the neutral govern-
ments concerned.
"While these acts of the German Government continue, it
seems neither reasonable nor just that His Majesty's Government
should be pressed to abandon the rights claimed in the British
note and to allow goods from Germany to pass freely through
waters effectively patrolled by British ships of war."
Such appeals the American Government had sharply repudi-
ated in correspondence with Germany on the submarine issue.
Great Britain, however, unlike Germany, did not admit that the
blockade was a reprisal, and therefore without basis of law, on
the contrary, she contended that it was a legally justifiable
measure for meeting Germany's illegal acts.
The British presentation of the case commanded respect,
though not agreement, as an honest endeavor to build a defense
from basic facts and principles by logical methods. One com-
mendatory view, while not upholding the contentions, paid Sir
Edward Grey's handling of the British defense a generous tribute,
albeit at the expense of Germany :
"It makes no claim which offends humane sentiment or affronts
the sense of natural right. It makes no insulting proposal for
the barter or sale of honor, and it resorts to no tricks or evasions
in the way of suggested compromise. It seeks in no way to enlist
this country as an auxiliary to the allied cause under sham pre-
tenses of humane intervention."
The task before the State Department of making a convincing
reply to Sir Edward Grey's skillful contentions was generally
regarded as one that would test Secretary Lansing's legal re-
sources. The problem was picturesquely sketched by the New
York "Times":
"The American eagle has by this time discovered that the shaft
directed against him by Sir Edward Grey was feathered with his
own plumage. To meet our contentions Sir Edward cites our
own seizures and our own court decisions. It remains to be seen
whether out of strands plucked from the mane and tail of the
BLOCKADE DENOUNCED AS ILLEGAL 35
British lion we can fashion a bowstring which will give effec-
tive momentum to a counterbolt launched in the general direction
of Downing Street."
CHAPTER V
BRITISH BLOCKADE DENOUNCED AS ILLEGAL
AND INEFFECTIVE BY THE UNITED
STATES — THE AMERICAN
POSITION
SECRETARY Lansing succeeded in accomplishing the diffi-
cult task indicated at the conclusion of the previous chapter.
The American reply to the British notes was not dispatched until
October 21, 1915, further friction with Germany having inter-
vened over the Arabic, It constituted the long-deferred protest
which ex-Secretary Bryan vainly urged the President to make to
Great Britain simultaneously with the sending of the third
Lnsitania note to Germany. The President declined to consider
the issues on the same footing or as susceptible to equitable
diplomatic survey unless kept apart.
The note embraced a study of eight British communications
made to the American Government in 1915 up to August 13, re-
lating to blockade restrictions on American commerce imposed
by Great Britain. It had been delayed in the hope that the an-
nounced intention of the British Government "to exercise their
belligerent rights with every possible consideration for the inter-
est of neutrals," and their intention of "removing all causes of
avoidable delay in dealing with American cargoes," and of caus-
ing "the least possible amount of inconvenience to persons en-
gaged in legitimate trade," as well as their "assurance to the
"United States Government that they would make it their first
aim to minimize the inconveniences" resulting from the "meas-
ures taken by the allied governments," would in practice not un-
justifiably infringe upon the neutral rights of American citizens
engaged in trade and commerce. The hope had not been realized.
36 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
The detentions of American vessels and cargoes since the
opening of hostilities, presumably under the British Orders in
Council of August 20 and October 29, 1914, and March 11, 1915,
formed one specific complaint. In practice these detentions, thel
United States contended, had not been uniformly based on proofs
obtained at the time of seizure. Many vessels had been detained
while search was made for evidence of the contraband character
of cargoes, or of intention to evade the nonintercourse measures
of Great Britain. The question became one of evidence to sup-
port a belief — in many cases a bare suspicion — of enemy destina-
tion or of enemy origin of the goods involved. The United States
raised the point that this evidence should be obtained by search
at sea, and that the vessel and cargo should not be taken to a
British port for the purpose unless incriminating circumstances
warranted such action. International practice to support this
view was cited. Naval orders of the United States, Great Britain,
Russia, Japan, Spain, Germany, and France from 1888 to the
opening of the present war showed that search in port was not
contemplated by the government of any of these countries.
Great Britain had contended that the American objection to
search at sea was inconsistent with American practice during
the Civil War. Secretary Lansing held that the British view
of the American sea policy of that period was based on a
misconception :
"Irregularities there may have been at the beginning of that
war, but a careful search of the records of this Government as
to the practice of its commanders shows conclusively that there
were no instances when vessels were brought into port for search
prior to instituting prize court proceedings, or that captures
were made upon other grounds than, in the words of the Ameri-
can note of November 7, 1914, evidence found on the ship under
investigation and not upon circumstances ascertained from ex-
ternal sources." Mii^b
Great Britain justified bringing vessels to port for search be-
cause of the size and seaworthiness of modem carriers and the
difficulty of uncovering at sea the real transaction owing to the
intricacy of modern trade operations. The United States sub-
BLOCKADE DENOUNCED AS ILLEGAL 37
mitted that such commercial transactions were essentially no
more complex and disguised than in previous wars, during which
the practice of obtaining evidence in port to determine whether
a vessel should be held for prize-court proceedings was not
adopted. As to the effect of size and seaworthiness of merchant
vessels upon search at sea, a board of naval experts reported :
"The facilities for boarding and inspection of modern ships
are in fact greater than in former times, and no difference, so
far as the necessities of the case are concerned, can be seen be-
tween the search of a ship of a thousand tons and one of twenty
thousand tons, except possibly a difference in time, for the pur-
pose of establishing fully the character of her cargo and the
nature of her service and destination."
The new British practice, which required search at port in-
stead of search at sea, in order that extrinsic evidence might be
sought (i. e., evidence other than that derived from an examina-
tion of the ship at sea) , had this effect :
"Innocent vessels or cargoes are now seized and detained on
mere suspicion while efforts are made to obtain evidence from ex-
traneous sources to justify the detention and the commencement
of prize proceedings. The effect of this new procedure is to
subject traders to risk of loss, delay and expense so great and so
burdensome as practically to destroy much of the export trade
of the United States to neutral countries of Europe."
The American note next assailed the British interpretation of
the greatly increased imports of neutral countries adjoining
Great Britain's enemies. These increases. Sir Edward Grey con-
tended, raised a presumption that certain commodities useful for
military purposes, though destined for those countries, were in-
tended for reexportation to the belligerents, who could not im-
port them directly. Hence the detention of vessels bound for
the ports of those neutral countries was justified. Secretary
Lansing denied that this contention could be accepted as laying
down a just and legal rule of evidence :
"Such a presumption is too remote from the facts and offers
too great opportunity for abuse by the belligerent, who could, if
the rule were adopted, entirely ignore neutral rights on the high
38 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
seas and prey with impunity upon neutral commerce. To such
a rule of legal presumption this Government cannot accede, as it
is opposed to those fundamental principles of justice which are
the foundation of the jurisprudence of the United States and
Great Britain."
In this connection Secretary Lansing seized upon the British
admission, made in the correspondence, that British exports to
those neutral countries had materially increased since the war
began. Thus Great Britain concededly shared in creating a con-
dition relied upon as a sufficient ground to justify the intercep-
tion of American goods destined to neutral European ports. The
American view of this condition was :
"If British exports to those ports should be still further in-
creased, it is obvious that under the rule of evidence contended
for by the British Government, the presumption of enemy
destinations could be applied to a greater number of American
cargoes, and American trade would suffer to the extent that
British trade benefited by the increase. Great Britain cannot
expect the United States to submit to such manifest injustice or
to permit the rights of its citizens to be so seriously impaired.
"When goods are clearly intended to become incorporated in
the mass of merchandise for sale in a neutral country it is an un-
warranted and inquisitorial proceeding to detain shipments for
examination as to whether those goods are ultimately destined
for the enemy's country or use. Whatever may be the con-
jectural conclusions to be drawn from trade statistics, which,
when stated by value, are of uncertain evidence as to quantity,
the United States maintains the right to sell goods into the gen-
eral stock of a neutral country, and denounces as illegal and un-
justifiable any attempt of a belligerent to interfere with that
right on the ground that it suspects that the previous supply of
such goods in the neutral country, which the imports renew or
replace, has been sold to an enemy. That is a matter with which
the neutral vendor has no concern and which can in no way af-
fect his rights of trade."
The British practice had run counter to the assurances Great
Britain made in establishing the blockade, which was to be so
BLOCKADE DENOUNCED AS ILLEGAL 39
extensive as to prohibit all trade with Germany or Austria-
Hungary, even through the ports of neutral countries adjacent
to them. Great Britain admitted that the blockade should not,
and promised that it would not, interfere with the trade of
countries contiguous to her enemies. Nevertheless, after six
months' experience of the "blockade," the United States Gov-
ernment was convinced that Great Britain had been unsuc-
cessful in her efforts to distinguish between enemy and neutral
trade.
The United States challenged the validity of the blockade be-
cause it was ineffective in stopping all trade with Great Britain's
enemies. A blockade, to be binding, must be maintained by force
sufficient to prevent all access to the coast of the enemy, accord-
ing to the Declaration of Paris of 1856, which the American note
quoted as correctly stating the international rule as to blockade
that was universally recognized. The effectiveness of a blockade
was manifestly a question of fact :
"It is common knowledge that the German coasts are open to
trade with the Scandinavian countries and that German naval
vessels cruise both in the North Sea and the Baltic and seize and
bring into German ports neutral vessels bound for Scandinavian
and Danish ports. Furthermore, from the recent placing of
cotton on the British list of contraband of war it appears that
the British Government had themselves been forced to the con-
clusion that the blockade is ineffective to prevent shipments of
cotton from reaching their enemies, or else that they are doubt-
ful as to the legality of the form of blockade which they have
sought to maintain."
Moreover, a blockade must apply impartially to the ships of all
nations. The American note cited the Declaration of London and
the prize rules of Germany, France, and Japan, in support of that
principle. In addition, "so strictly has this principle been
enforced in the past that in the Crimean War the Judicial Com-
mittee of the Privy Council on appeal laid down that if belliger-
ents themselves trade with blockaded ports they cannot be re-
garded as effectively blockaded. (The Franciska, Moore, P. C.
56). This decision has special significance at the present time
40 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
since it is a matter of common knowledge that Great Britain ex-
ports and reexports large quantities of merchandise to Norway,
Sweden, Denmark, and Holland, whose ports, so far as American
commerce is concerned, she regards as blockaded."
Finally, the law of nations forbade the blockade of neutral
ports in time of war. The Declaration of London specifically
stated that "the blockading forces must not bar access to neutral
ports or coasts." This pronouncement the American Govern-
ment considered a correct statement of the universally accepted
law as it existed to-day and prior to the Declaration of London.
Though not regarded as binding upon the signatories because
not ratified by them, the Declaration of London, the American
note pointed out, had been expressly adopted by the British Gov-
ernment, without modification as to blockade, in the Order in
Council of October 9, 1914. More than that. Secretary Lansing
recalled the views of the British Government "founded on the
decisions of the British Courts," as expressed by Sir Edward
Grey in instructing the British delegates to the conference which
formulated the Declaration of London, and which had assembled
in that city on the British Government's invitation in 1907.
These views were :
"A blockade must be confined to the ports and coast of the
enemy, but it may be instituted of one port or of several ports
or of the whole of the seaboard of the enemy. It may be insti-
tuted to prevent the ingress only, or egress only, or both."
The United States Government therefore concluded that,
measured by the three universally conceded tests above set forth,
the British policy could not be regarded as constituting a block-
ade in law, in practice, or in effect. So the British Government
was notified that the American Government declined to recog-
nize such a "blockade" as legal.
Stress had been laid by Great Britain on the ruling of the
Supreme Court of the United States on the SpringboJc case. The
ruling was that goods of contraband character, seized while
going to the neutral port of Nassau, though actually bound foi*
the blockaded ports of the South, were subject to condemnation.
Secretary Lansing recalled that Sir Edward Grey, in his instrue-
BLOCKADE DENOUNCED AS ILLEGAL 41
tion to the British delegates to the London conference before
mentioned, expressed this view of the case, as held in England
prior to the present war :
"It is exceedingly doubtful whether the decision of the Su-
preme Court was in reality meant to cover a case of blockade
running in which no question of contraband arose. Certainly if
such was the intention the decision would pro tanto be in con-
flict with the practice of the British courts. His Majesty's
Government sees no reason for departing from that practice, and
you should endeavor to obtain general recognition of its
correctness."
The American note also pointed out that "the circumstances
surrounding the Springbok case were essentially different from
those of the present day to which the rule laid down in that case
is sought to be applied. When the Springbok case arose the
ports of the confederate states were effectively blockaded by the
naval forces of the United States, though no neutral ports were
closed, and a continuous voyage through a neutral port required
an all sea voyage terminating in an attempt to pass the blockad-
ing squadron."
Secretary Lansing interjected new elements into the contro-
versy in assailing as unlawful the jurisdiction of British prize
courts over neutral vessels seized or detained. Briefly, Great
Britain arbitrarily extended her domestic law, through the pro-
mulgation of Orders in Council, to the high seas, which the
American Government contended were subject solely to interna-
tional law. So these Orders in Council, under which the British
naval authorities acted in making seizures of neutral shipping,
and under which the prize courts pursued their procedure, were
viewed as usurping international law. The United States held
that Great Britain could not extend the territorial jurisdiction of
her domestic law to cover seizures on the high seas. A recourse
to British prize courts by American claimants, governed as those
courts were by the same Orders in Council which determined the
conditions under which seizures and detentions were made, con-
stituted in the American view, the form rather than the sub-
stance of redress :
42 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
"It is manifest, therefore, that, if prize courts are bound by
the laws and regulations under which seizures and detentions
are made, and which claimants allege are in contravention of the
law of nations, those courts are powerless to pass upon the real
ground of complaint or to give redress for wrongs of this na-
ture. Nevertheless, it is seriously suggested that claimants are
free to request the prize court to rule upon a claim of conflict be-
tween an Order in Council and a rule of international law. How
can a tribunal fettered in its jurisdiction and procedure by munic-
ipal enactments declare itself emancipated from their restric-
tions and at liberty to apply the rules of international law with
freedom? The very laws and regulations which bind the court
are now matters of dispute between the Government of the
United States and that of His Britannic Majesty."
The British Government, in pursuit of its favorite device of
seeking in American practice parallel instances to justify her
prize-court methods, had contended that the United States, in
Civil War contraband cases, had also referred foreign claimants
to its prize courts for redress. Great Britain at the time of the
American Civil War, according to an earlier British note, "in
spite of remonstrances from many quarters, placed full reliance
on the American prize courts to grant redress to the parties in-
terested in cases of alleged wrongful capture by American ships
of war and put forward no claim until the opportunity for re-
dress in those courts had been exhausted."
This did not appear to be altogether the case. Secretary Lan-
sing pointed out that Great Britain, during the progress of the
Civil War, had demanded in several instances, through diplo-
matic channels, while cases were pending, damages for seizures
and detentions of British ships alleged to have been made with-
out legal justification. Moreover, "it is understood also that
during the Boer War, when British authorities seized,. the Ger-
man vessels, the Herzog, the General and the Bundesrath, and
released them without prize court proceedings, compensation for
damages suffered was arranged through diplomatic channels."
The point made here was by way of negativing the position
Great Britain now took that, pending the exhaustion of legal
BLOCKADE DENOUNCED AS ILLEGAL 43
remedies through the prize courts with the result of a denial of
justice to American claimants, "it cannot continue to deal
through the diplomatic channels with the individual cases."
The United States summed up its protest against the British
practice of adjudicating on the interference with American ship-
ping and commerce on the high seas under British municipal
law as follows :
"The Government of the United States, has, therefore, viewed
with surprise and concern the attempt of His Majesty's Govern-
ment to confer upon the British prize courts jurisdiction by this
illegal exercise of force in order that these courts may apply to
vessels and cargoes of neutral nationalities, seized on the high
seas, municipal laws and orders which can only rightfully be en-
forceable within the territorial waters of Great Britain, or
against vessels of British nationality when on the high seas.
"In these circumstances the United States Government feels
that it cannot reasonably be expected to advise its citizens to
seek redress before tribunals which are, in its opinion, unauthor-
ized by the unrestricted application of international law to grant
reparation, nor to refrain from presenting their claims directly
to the British Government through diplomatic channels."
The note, as the foregoing series of excerpts show, presented
an array of legal arguments formidable enough to persuade any
nation at war of its wrongdoing in adopting practices that
caused serious money losses to American interests and demoral-
ized American trade with neutral Europe. Great Britain, how-
ever, showed that she was not governed by international law
except in so far as it was susceptible to an elastic interpretation,
and held, by implication, that a policy of expediency imposed by
modem war conditions condoned, if it did not also sanction,
infractions.
Nothing in Great Britain's subsequent actions, nor in the utter-
ances of her statesmen, could be construed as promising any
abatement of the conditions. In fact, there was an outcry in
England that the German blockade should be more stringent by
extending it to all neutral ports. Sir Edward Grey duly con-
vinced the House of Commons that the Government could not
44 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
contemplate such a course, which he viewed as needless, as well
as a wrong to neutrals.
As to the hostility of the neutrals to British blockade methods,
Sir Edward Grey said :
"What I would say to neutrals is this : There is one main ques-
tion to be answered — Do they admit our right to apply the prin-
ciples which were applied by the American Government in the
war between the North and South — ^to apply those principles to
modem conditions, and to do our best to prevent trade with the
enemy through neutral countries ?
"If they say *Yes' — as they are bound in fairness to say —
then I would say to them: *Do let chambers of commerce, or
whatever they may be, do their best to make it easy for us to
distinguish.'
"If, on the other hand, they answer it that we are not entitled
to interrupt trade with the enemy through neutral countries, I
must say definitely that if neutral countries were to take that
line, it is a departure from neutrality."
CHAPTER VI
GREAT BRITAIN UNYIELDING — EFFECT OP
TJIE BLOCKi^DE — THE CHICAGO
MEAT PACKERS' CASE
THE existing restrictions satisfied Great Britain that Ger-
many, without being brought to her knees, was feeling the
pinch of food shortage. To that extent — and it was enough in
England's view — the blockade was effective, the contentions of
the United States notwithstanding. So Great Britain's course
indicated that she would not relax by a hair the barrier she had
reared round the German coast; but she sought to minimize the
obstacles to legitimate neutral trade, so far as blockade condi-
tions permitted, and was disposed to pay ample compensation foir
losses as judicially determined. The outlook was that American
GREAT BRITAIN UNYIELDING 45
scores against her could only be finally settled by arbitral tri-
bunals after the war was over. Satisfaction by arbitration thus
remained the only American hope in face of Great Britain's re-
solve to keep Germany's larder depleted and her export trade at
a standstill, whether neutrals suffered or not. Incidentally, the
United States was reminded that in the Civil War it served no-
tice on foreign governments that any attempts to interfere with
the blockade of the Confederate States would be resented. The
situation then, and the situation now, with the parts of the two
countries reversed, were considered as analogous.
A parliamentary paper showed that the British measures
adopted to intercept the sea-borne commerce of Germany had
succeeded up to September, 1915, in stopping 92 per cent of Ger-
man exports to America. Steps had also been taken to stop ex-
ports on a small scale from Germany and Austria-Hungary by
parcel post. The results of the blockade were thus summarized :
"First, German exports to overseas countries have almost en-
tirely stopped. Exceptions which have been made are cases in
which a refusal to allow the export goods to go through would
hurt the neutral country concerned without inflicting injury
upon Germany.
"Second, all shipments to neutral countries adjacent to Ger-
many have been carefully scrutinized with a view to the detec-
tion of a concealed enemy destination. Wherever there has been
a reasonable ground for suspecting the destination, the goods
have been placed in charge of a prize court. Doubtful consign-
ments have been detained pending satisfactory guarantees.
"Third, under agreement with bodies of representative mer-
chants of several neutral countries adjacent to Germany, strin-
gent guarantees have been exacted from importers. So far as
possible all trade between neutrals and Germany, whether aris-
ing from oversea or in the country itself, is restricted.
"Fourth, by agreements with shipping lines and by vigorous
use of the power to refuse bunker coal in large proportions the
neutral mercantile marine which trades with Scandinavia and
Holland has been induced to agree to conditions designed to pre-
vent the goods of these ships from reaching Germany.
46 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
"Fifth, every effort is being made to introduce a system of
rationing which will insure that the neutrals concerned will im-
port only such quantities of articles as are specified as normally
imported for their own consumption."
The case of the Chicago meat packers, involving food consign-
ments to neutral European countries since the war's outbreak,
came before a British prize court before the American protest
had been lodged. Apparently the issues it raised dictated in
some degree the contentions Secretary Lansing made. The Brit-
ish authorities had seized thirty-three vessels mainly bearing
meat products valued at $15,000,000, twenty-nine of which had
been held without being relegated for disposal to the prize courts.
The remaining four cargoes, held for ten months, and worth
$2,500,000 were confiscated by a British prize court on Septem-
ber 15, 1915. The goods were declared forfeited to the Crown.
One of the factors influencing the decision was the sudden ex-
pansion in shipments of food products to the Scandinavian coun-
tries immediately after the war began. The president of the
prize court. Sir Samuel Evans, asserted that incoming vessels
were carrying more than thirteen times the amount of goods to
Copenhagen — ^the destination of the four ships involved — above
the volume which under normal conditions arrived at that port.
He cited lard, the exportation of which by one American firm
had increased twentyfold to Copenhagen in three weeks after
the war, and canned meat, of which Denmark hitherto had only
taken small quantities, yet the seized vessels carried hundreds of
thousands of tins.
The confiscation formed the subject of a complaint made by
Chicago beef packers to the State Department on October 6,
1915. The British Court condemned the cargoes on the grounds :
(1) that the goods being in excess of the normal consumption of
Denmark, raised a presumption that they were destined for, i. e.,
eventually would find their way into Germany. (2) That, owing
to the highly organized state of Germany, in a military sense,
there was practically no distinction between the civilian and
military population of that country and therefore there was a
presumption that the goods, or a very large proportion of them,
GREAT BRITAIN UNYIELDING 47
would necessarily be used by the military forces of the German
Empire. (3) That the burden of proving that such goods were
not destined for, i. e., would not eventually get into the hands of
the German forces, must be accepted and sustained by the Ameri-
can shippers.
The Chicago beef firms besought the Government to register
an immediate protest against the decision of the prize court and
demand from the British Government adequate damages for
losses arising from the seizure, detention and confiscation of the
shipments of meat products. They complained that the judg-
ment and the grounds on which it was based were contrary to
the established principles of international law, and subversive of
the rights of neutrals. The judgment, they said, was unsup-
ported by fact, and was based on inferences and presumptions.
Direct evidence on behalf of the American firms interested, to
the effect that none of the seized shipments had been sold, con-
signed or destined to the armed forces or to the governments of
any enemy of Great Britain, was uncontradicted and disregarded
and the seizures were upheld in the face of an admission that no
precedent of the English courts existed justifying the condemna-
tion of goods on their way to a neutral port.
An uncompromising defense of the prize court's decision came
to the State Department from the British Government a few
days later. Most of the seizures, it said, were not made under
the Order in Council of March 11, 1915, the validity of which
and of similar orders was disputed by the United States Govern-
ment. The larger part of the cargoes were seized long before
March, 1915. The ground for the seizures was that the cargoes
were conditional contraband destined from the first by the Chi-
cago beef packers, largely for the use of the armies, navies and
Government departments of Germany and Austria, and only sent
to neutral ports with the object of concealing their true destina-
tion.
From cablegrams and letters in the possession of the British
Government and produced in court, the statement charged, "it
was clear and that packers' agents in these neutral countries,
and also several of the consigners, who purported to be genuine
D— War St. 5
48 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
neutral buyers, were merely persons engaged by the packers on
commission, or sent by the packers from their German branches
for the purpose of insuring the immediate transit of these con-
signments to Germany. ... No attempt was made by any
written or other evidence to explain away the damning evidence
of the telegrams and letters disclosed by the Crown. The infer-
ence was clear and irresistible that no such attempt could be
made, and that any written evidence there was would have merely
confirmed the strong suspicion, amounting to a practical
certainty, that the) whole of the operations of shipment to
Copenhagen and other neutral ports were a mere mask to cover
a determined effort to transmit vast quantities of supplies
through to the German and Austrian armies."
A portion of the Western press had denounced the confiscation
as a "British outrage" and as "robbery by prize court" ; but the
more moderate Eastern view was that, while American business
men had an undoubted right to feed the German armies, if they
could, they were in the position of gamblers who had lost if the
British navy succeeded in intercepting the shipments.
Exaggerated values placed on American-owned goods held up
for months at Rotterdam and other neutral ports by British be-
came largely discounted on October 1, 1915, under the scrutiny
of the Foreign Trade Advisers of the State Department. These
goods were German-made for consignment to the United
States, and would only be released if the British Government
were satisfied that they were contracted for by American import-
ers before March 1, 1915, the date on which the British blockade
of Germany began. Early protests against their detention com-
plained that $50,000,000 was involved ; later the value of the de-
tained goods was raised to $150,000,000. But actual claims made
by American importers to the British Embassy, through the
Foreign Trade Advisers, seeking the release of the consign-
ments, showed that the amount involved was not much more
than $11,000,000 and would not exceed $15,000,000 at the most
SEIZURE OF SUSPECTED SHIPS 49
CHAPTER VII
SEIZURE OF SUSPECTED SHIPS — TRADINa
WITH THE ENEMY — THE APPAM — THE
ANGLO-FRENCH LOAN — FORD
PEACE EXPEDITION
THE next issue the United States raised with Great Britain
related to the seizure of three ships of American registry —
the Hocking, Genesee and the Kankakee — in November, 1915, on
the ground that they were really German-owned. France had
also confiscated the Solveig of the same ownership for a like
reason. The four vessels belonged to the fleet of the American
Transatlantic Steamship Company, the formation of which
under unusual circumstances was recorded earlier in this his-
tory. Great Britain and France served notice that this company's
vessels were blacklisted, and became seizable as prizes of war be-
cause of the suspicion that German interests were behind the
company, and that its American officials with their reputed hold-
ings of stock were therefore really prizes for German capital.
The Bureau of Navigation had at first refused registry to these
vessels, but its ruling was reversed, and the vessels were ad-
mitted, the State Department taking the view that it could not
disregard the company's declaration of incorporation in the
United States, and that its officers were American citizens.
Great Britain sought to requisition the vessels for navy use
without prize-court hearings, but on the United States protesting
she agreed to try the cases.
Another dispute arose, in January, 1916, over the operation of
the Trading with the Enemy Act, one of Great Britain's war
measures, the provisions of which were enlarged to forbid Brit-
ish merchants from trading with any person or firm, resident in
a neutral country, which had German ownership or German
trade connections. The United States objected to the pro-
hibition as constituting a further unlawful interference with
American trade. It held that in war time the trade of such a
50 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
person or firm domiciled in a neutral country had a neutral
status, and consequently was not subject to interference; hence
goods in transit of such a trader were not subject to confisca-
tion by a belligerent unless contraband and consigned to an
enemy country.
An example of the working of the act was the conviction of
three members of a British glove firm for trading with Germany
through their New York branch. They had obtained some
$30,000 worth of goods from Saxony between October, 1915, and
January, 1916, the consignments evading the blockade and
reaching New York, whence they were reshipped to England.
One defendant was fined $2,000; the two others received terms
of imprisonment.
While the act would injure American firms affiliated with
German interests, it aimed to press hardest upon traders in
neutral European countries contiguous to Germany who were
trading with the Germans and practically serving as inter-
mediaries to save the Germans from the effect of the Allies*
blockade.
The appearance of a captured British steamer, the Appam, at
Newport News, Va., on February 1, 1916, in charge of a German
naval lieutenant, Hans Berg, and a prize crew, involved the
United States in a new maritime tangle with the belligerents.
One of the most difficult problems which Government officials had
encountered since the war began, presented itself for solution.
The Appam, as elsewhere described, was captured by a German
raider, the Moewe (Sea Gull) , off Madeira, and was crowded with
passengers, crews, and German prisoners taken from a number
of other ships the Moewe had sunk. Lieutenant Berg, for lack of
a safer harbor, since German ports were closed to him, sought
for refuge an American port, and claimed for his prize the
privilege of asylum under the protection of American laws —
until he chose to leave. Count von BernstorfF, the German
Ambassador, immediately notified the State Department that
Germany claimed the Appam as a prize under the Prussian-
American Treaty of 1828, and would contend for possession of
the ship.
SEIZURE OF SUSPECTED SHIPS 51
This treaty was construed as giving German prizes brought to
American ports the right to come and go. The British Govern-
ment contested the German claim by demanding the release of
the Appam under The Hague Convention of 1907. This inter-
national treaty provided that a merchantman prize could only
be taken to a neutral port under certain circumstances of dis-
tress, injury, or lack of food, and if she did not depart within a
stipulated time the vessel could not be interned, but must be
restored to her original owners with all her cargo. Were the
Appam thus forcibly released she would at once have been re-
captured by British cruisers waiting off the Virginia Capes. The
view which prevailed officially was that the case must be gov-
erned by the Prussian treaty, a liberal construction of which ap-
peared to permit the Appam to remain indefinitely at Newport
News. This was what happened, but not through any acquies-
cence of the State Department in the German contention. The
Appam owners, the British and African Steam Navigation Com-
pany, brought suit in the Federal Courts for the possession of
the vessel, on the ground that, having been brought into a neu-
tral port, she lost her character as a German prize, and must be
returned to her owners. Pending a determination of this action,
the Appam was seized by Federal marshals under instructions
from the United States District Court, under whose jurisdiction
the vessel remained.
After twelve months of war Great Britain became seriously
concerned over the changed conditions of her trade with the
United States. Before the war the United States, despite its
vast resources and commerce, bought more than it sold abroad,
and was thus always a debtor nation, that is, permanently owing
money to Europe. In the stress of war Great Britain's exports
to the United States, like those of her Allies, declined and her im-
ports enormously increased. She sold but little of her products
to her American customers and bought heavily of American
foodstuffs, cotton, and munitions. The result was that Great
Britain owed a great deal more to the United States than the
latter owed her. The unparalleled situation enabled the United
States to pay off her old standing ind^tedness to Europe and
52 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
became a creditor nation. American firms were exporting to the
allied powers, whose almoner Great Britain was, commodities of
a value of $100,000,000 a month in excess of the amount they
were buying abroad. Hence what gold was sent from London,
at the rate of $15,000,000 to $40,000,000 monthly, to pay for
these huge purchases was wholly insufficient to meet the accumu-
lating balance of indebtedness against England.
The effect of this reversal of Anglo-American trade balance
was a decline in the exchange value of the pound sterling, which
was normally worth $4,861/2 in American money, to the unprece-
dented level of $4.50. This decline in sterling was reflected in
different degrees in the other European money markets, and the
American press was jubilant over the power of the dollar to buy
more foreign money than ever before. Because Europe bought
much more merchandise than she sold the demand in London for
dollar credit at New York was far greater than the demand in
New York for pound credit at London. Hence the premium on
dollars and the discount on pounds. It was not a premium upon
American gold over European gold, but a premium on the means
of settling debts in dollars without the use of gold. Europe pre-
ferred to pay the premium rather than send sufficient gold,
because, for one reason, shipping gold was costly and more
than hazardous in war time, and, for another, all the bellig-
erents wanted to retain their gold as long as they could afford
to do so.
An adjustment of the exchange situation and a reestablish-
ment of the credit relations between the United States and the
allied powers on a more equitable footing was imperative. The
British and French Governments accordingly sent a commission
to the United States, composed of some of their most distin-
guished financiers — government officials and bankers — ^to ar-
range a loan in the form of a credit with American bankers to
restore exchange values and to meet the cost of war munitions
and other supplies. After lengthy negotiations a loan of $500,-
000,000 was agreed upon, at 5 per cent interest, for a term of
five years, the bonds being purchasable at 98 in denominations
as low as $100. The principal and interest were payable in New
SEIZURE OF SUSPECTED SHIPS 53
York City — in gold dollars. The proceeds of the loan were to be
employed exclusively in the United States to cover the Allies'
trade obligations.
The loan was an attractive one to the American investor, yield-
ing as it did a fraction over 5% per cent. It was the only ex-
ternal loan of Great Britain and France, for the repayment of
which the two countries pledged severally and together their
credit, faith, and resources. No such an investment had before
been offered in the United States.
Strong opposition to the loan came from German-American
interests. Dr. Charles Hexamer, president of the German-
American Alliance, made a country-wide appeal urging Ameri-
can citizens to "thwart the loan*' by protesting to the President
and the Secretary of State. Threats were likewise made by Ger-
man depositors to withdraw their deposits from banks which
participated in the loan. The Government, after being consulted,
had given assurances that it would not oppose the transaction
as a possible violation of neutrality — ^if a straight credit, not as
actual loan, was negotiated. Conformity to this condition made
all opposition fruitless.
Toward the close of 1915 an ambitious peace crusade to Europe
was initiated by Henry Ford, the automobile manufacturer.
Accompanied by 148 pacifists, he sailed on the Scandinavian-
American liner, Oscar II, early in December, 1915, with the
avowed purpose of ending the war before Christmas. The expe-
dition was viewed dubiously by the allied powers, who discerned
pro-German propaganda in the presence of Teutonic sym-
pathizers among the delegates. They also suspected a design to
accelerate a peace movement while the gains of the war were
all on Germany's side, thus placing the onus of continuing hos-
tilities on the Allies if they declined to recognize the Ford peace
party as mediators. The American Government, regardful of
the obligations of neutrality, notified the several European Gov-
ernments concerned that the United States had no connection
with the expedition, and assumed no responsibility for any
activities the persons comprising it might undertake in the pro-
motion of peace.
I.
54 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
CHAPTER VIII
AMERICAN PACIFICISM — PREPAREDNESS —
MUNITION SAFEGUARD
THE Ford peace mission, lightly regarded though it was, never-
theless recorded itself on the annals of the time as symp-
tomatic of a state of mind prevailing among a proportion of the
American people. It might almost be said to be a manifestation
of the pacifist sentiment of the country. This spirit found a
channel for expression in the Ford project, bent on hurling its
protesting voice at the chancellories of Europe, and heedless of
the disadvantage its efforts labored under in not receiving the
countenance of the Administration.
"The mission of America in the world," said President Wilson
in one of his speeches, "is essentially a mission of peace and
good will among men. She has become the home and asylum of
men of all creeds and races. America has been made up out of
the nations of the world, and is the friend of the nations of the
world."
But Europe was deaf alike to official and unofficial overtures
of the United States as a peacemaker. The Ford expedition was
foredoomed to failure, not because it was unofficial — official pro-
posals of mediation would have been as coldly received — but
more because the pacifist movement it represented was a home
growth of American soil. The European belligerents, inured and
case-hardened as they were to a militarist environment, had not
been sufficiently chastened by their self-slaughter.
The American pacifists, with a scattered but wide sentiment
behind them, consecrated to promoting an abiding world peace,
and espousing the internationalism of the Socialists to that end,
and President Wilson, standing aloof from popular manifesta-
tions, a solitary watchman on the tower, had perforce to wait
until the dawning of the great day when Europe had accom-
plished the devastating achievement of bleeding herself before
she could extend beckoning hands to American mediation.
AMERICAN PACIFICISM 55
In the autumn of 1915 the President inaugurated his campaign
for national defense, or "preparedness," bred by the dangers
more or less imminent while the European War lasted. "We
never know what to-morrow might bring forth," he warned. In
a series of speeches throughout the country he impressed these
view s on the people :
The United States had no aggressive purposes, but must be
prepared to defend itself and retain its full liberty and self-
development. It should have the fullest freedom for national
growth. It should be prepared to enforce its right to unmo-
lested action. For this purpose a citizen army of 400,000 was
needed to be raised in three years, and a strengthened navy as
the first and chief line of defense for safeguarding at all costs
the good faith and honor of the nation. The nonpartisan sup-
port of all citizens for effecting a condition of preparedness,
coupled with the revival and renewal of national allegiance, he
said, was also imperative, and Americans of alien sympathies who
were not responsive to such a call on their patriotism should be
called to account.
This, in brief, constituted the President's plea for prepared-
ness. But such a policy did not involve nor contemplate the con-
quest of other lands or peoples, nor the accomplishment of any
purpose by force beyond the defense of American territory, nor
plans for an aggressive war, military training that would inter-
fere unduly with civil pursuits, nor panicky haste in defense
preparations.
The President took a midway stand. He stood between the
pacifists and the extremists, who advocated the militarism of
Europe as the inevitable policy for the United States to adopt to
meet the dangers they fancied.
The country's position, as the President saw it, was stated by
him in a speech delivered in New York City:
"Our thought is now inevitably of new things about which
formerly we gave ourselves little concern. We are thinking now
chiefly of our relations with the rest of the world, not our com-
mercial relations, about those we have thought and planned
always, but about our political relations, our duties as an indi-
56 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
vidual and independent force in the world to ourselves, our
neighbors and the world itself.
"Within a year we have witnessed what we did not believe
possible, a great European conflict involving many of the great-
est nations of the world. The influences of a great war are
everywhere in the air. All Europe is embattled. Force every-
where speaks out with a loud and imperious voice in a Titanic
struggle of governments, and from one end of our own dear
country to the other men are asking one another what our own
force is, how far we are prepared to maintain ourselves against
any interference with our national action or development.
'We have it in mind to be prepared, but not for war, but only
for defense; and with the thought constantly in our minds that
the principles we hold most dear can be achieved by the slow
processes of history only in the kindly and wholesome atmos-
phere of peace, and not by the use of hostile force.
"No thoughtful man feels any panic haste in this matter. The
country is not threatened from any quarter. She stands in
friendly relations with all the world. Her resources are known
and her self-respect and her capacity to care for her own citizens
and her own rights. There is no fear among us. Under the new-
world conditions we have become thoughtful of the things which
all reasonable men consider necessary for security and self-
defense on the part of every nation confronted with the great
enterprise of human liberty and independence. That is all.*'
Readiness for defense was also the keynote of the President's
address to Congress at its opening session in December, 1915;
but despite its earnest plea for a military and naval program,
and a lively public interest, the message was received by Congress
in a spirit approaching apathy.
The President, meantime, pursued his course, advocating his
preparedness program, and in no issue abating his condemnation
of citizens with aggressive alien sympathies.
In one all-important military branch there was small need for
anxiety. The United States was already well armed, though
not well manned. The munitions industry, called into being by
the European War, had grown to proportions that entitled the
AMERICAN PACIFICISM 57
country to be ranked with first-class powers in its provision and
equipment for rapidly producing arms and ammunition and other
war essentials on an extensive scale. Conditions were very dif-
ferent at the outset of the war. One of the American contentions
in defense of permitting war-munition exports — as set forth in
the note to Austria-Hungary — was that if the United States
accepted the principle that neutral nations should not supply war
materials to belligerents, it would itself, should it be involved
in war, be denied the benefit of seeking such supplies from
neutrals to amplify its own meager productions.
But the contention that the country in case of war would have
to rely on outside help could no longer be made on the face of
the sweeping change in conditions existing after eighteen months
of the war. From August, 1914, to January, 1916, inclusive,
American factories had sent to the European belligerents ship-
ment after shipment of sixteen commodities used expressly for
war purposes of the unsurpassed aggregate value of $865,795,668.
Roughly, $200,000,000 represented explosives, cartridges, and
firearms; $150,000,000 automobiles and accessories; and $250,-
000,000 iron and steel and copper manufacturing.
This production revealed that the United States could meet
any war emergency out of its own resources in respect of sup-
plies. Its army might be smaller than Switzerland's and its navy
inadequate, but it would have no cause to go begging for the
guns and shells needful to wage war.
How huge factories were built, equipped, and operated in three
months, how machinery for the manufacture of tinware, type-
writers, and countless other everyday articles was adapted to
shell making ; and how methods for producing steel and reducing
ores were revolutionized — ^these developments form a romantic
chapter in American industrial history without a parallel in that
of any other country.
The United States, in helping the European belligerents who
had free intercourse with it, was really helping itself. It was
building better than it knew. The call for preparedness, pri-
marily arising out of the critical relations with Germany, turned
the country's attention to a contemplation of an agreeable new
58 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
condition — ^that the European War, from which it strove to be
free, had given it an enormous impetus for the creation of a
colossal industry, which in itself was a long step in national pre-
paredness, and that much of this preparedness had been provided
without cost. The capital sunk in the huge plants which supplied
the belligerents represented, at $150,000,000, an outlay amortized
or included in the price at which the munitions were sold. Thus,
when the last foreign contract was fulfilled, the United States
would have at its own service one of the world's greatest munition
industries — and Europe will have paid for it.
PART II— OPERATIONS ON THE SEA
CHAPTER IX
NAVAL ENGAGEMENTS IN MANY WATERS
THE months which brought the second year of war to a close
were marked by increased activity on the part of all the navies
engaged. Several single-ship actions took place, and the Ger-
mans pursued their submarine tactics with steady, if not bril-
liant, results.
It was during this period that they sent the first submersible
merchant ship across the Atlantic and gave further proof of
having developed undersea craft to an amazing state of effi-
ciency. On their part the British found new and improved
methods of stalking submarines until it was a hazardous
business for such craft to approach the British coast. A con-
siderable number were captured; just how many was not re-
vealed.
After a slackening in the submarine campaign against mer-
chant ships, due partly to a division of opinion at home and
largely to the growing protests of neutrals, Germany declared
that after March 1, 1916, every ship belonging to an enemy that
carried a gun would be considered an auxiliary, and torpedoed
without warning. (For an account of the negotiations with
the United States in relation to this edict, se« United States
and the Belligerents, Vol. V, Part X.)
A spirited fight took place in the North Sea on March 24,
1916, when the Greif, sl German auxiliary of 10,000 tons, met
the Alcantara, 15,300 tons, a converted British merchantman.
The Greif was attempting to slip through the blockade under
59 ^
60 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
Norwegian colors when hailed. She parleyed with the British
vessel until the latter came within a few hundred yards of her.
Then, seeing a boat put out, the German unmasked her guns and
opened fire. Broadside after broadside. In twelve minutes the
Greif was on fire and the Alcantara sinking from the explosion
of a torpedo. The Greif might have got away had not
two other British vessels come on the scene, the converted
cruiser Andes ending her days with a few long-range shots.
One hundred and fifteen men and officers out of 300 on the
Greif were saved, and the British lost five officers and sixty-
nine men. Both vessels went to the bottom after as gallant
an action as the war had produced. The Greif was equipped
for a raiding cruise and also was believed to have had on board
a big cargo of mines. When the fire started by exploding shells
reaching her hold she blew up with a terrific detonation and
literally was split in twain. Officers of the Alcantara spoke
warmly of their enemy's good showing. One of them said that
they approached to within two hundred yards of the Greif
before being torpedoed and boarding parties actually had been
ordered to get ready. They were preparing to lash the rigging
of the two vessels together in the time-honored way and settle
accounts with sheath knives when the torpedo struck and the
Alcantara drifted away helpless.
On the stroke of midnight, February 29, 1916, the German
edict went into effect placing armed merchantmen in a classi-
fication with auxiliary cruisers. The opening of March also
was marked by the deliverance of a German ultimatum in
Lisbon, demanding that ships seized by the Portuguese be sur-
rendered within forty-eight hours. Thirty-eight German and
Austrian steamers had been requisitioned, striking another blow
at Teutonic sea power. Most of these belonged to Germany.
Coincident with Portugal's action Italy commandeered thirty-four
German ships lying in Italian ports, and several others in her
territorial waters. All Austrian craft had been seized months
before, but the fiction of peace with Germany still was punc-
tiliously observed by both nations. Despite this action Germany
did not declare war upon her quondam ally.
NAVAL ENGAGEMENTS IN MANY WATERS 61
Italy brought another issue sharply to the fore in the early
days of March. A few of her passenger vessels running to
America and other countries had been armed previous to that
time. It was done quietly, and commanders found many reasons
for the presence of guns on their vessels. Of a sudden all
Italian passenger craft sailed with 3-inch pieces fore and aft.
Berlin announced that on the first day of March, 1916, Ger-
man submarines had sunk two French auxiliaries off Havre,
and a British patrol vessel near the mouth of the Thames.
Paris promptly denied the statement, and London was noncom-
mittal. No other particulars were made public. Russian troops
landed on the Black Sea coast on March 6, 1916, under the gunsi
of a Russian naval division and took Atina, seventy-five miles east
of Trebizond, the objective of the Grand Duke Constantine's
army. Thirty Turkish vessels, mostly sailing ships loaded
with war supplies, were sunk along the shore within a few
days.
Winston Spencer Churchill, former First Lord of the Admir-
alty, on March 7, 1916, delivered a warning in the House of Com-
mons against what he believed to be inadequate naval prepara-
tions. He challenged statements made by Arthur J. Balfour,
his successor, on the navy's readiness. Mr. Balfour had just
presented naval estimates to the House, and among other things
set forth that Britain had increased her navy by 1,000,000 tons
and more than doubled its personnel since hostilities began.
This encouraging assurance impressed the world, but Colonel
Churchill demanded that Sir John Fisher, who had resigned
as First Sea Lord, be recalled to his post.
An announcement from Tokyo, March 8, 1916, served to show
the new friendship between Russia and Japan. Three war-
ships captured by the Japanese in the conflict with Russia were
purchased by the czar and added to Russian naval forces. They
were the Soya, the Tango and the Sagami, formerly the Variag,
Poltava and Peresviet, all small but useful ships. Following
the capture of Atina, the Russians took Rizeh on March 9, 1916,»
a city thirty-five miles east x)f Trebizond, an advance of forty
miles in three days toward that important port. The fleet co-
62 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
operated, and it was announced that the defenses of Trebizond
itself were under fire and fast crumbling away.
On March 16, 1916, the Holland-Lloyd passenger steamer
Tuhantid, a vessel of 15,000 tons, was sunk near the Dutch
coast by a mine or torpedo. She was commonly believed to
have been the victim of a submarine. Her eighty-odd passen-
gers and 300 men reached shore. Several Americans were
aboard. Statements by some of the crew that four persons lost
their lives could not be verified, but several of the Tuhantia's
officers made affidavit that the vessel was torpedoed.
The incident aroused public feeling in Holland to fever pitch,
and there were threats of war. Germany hastened to deny
that a submarine attacked the ship, and made overtures to the
Dutch Government, offering reparation if it could be estab-
lished that a German torpedo sank the steamer. This was
never proved, and nothing came of the matter. But it cost
Germany many friends in Holland and intensified the fear and
hatred entertained toward their neighbor by the majority of
Hollanders. It served to keep Dutch troops, already mobilized,
under arms, and gave Berlin a bad quarter hour.
Fast on the heels of this incident came the sinking of another
Dutch steamer, the Palembang, which was torpedoed and went
down March 18, 1916, near Galloper Lights in a Thames estu-
ary. Three torpedoes struck the vessel and nine of her crew
were injured. This second attack in three days upon Dutch
vessels wrought indignation in Holland to the breaking point
The Hague sent a strong protest to Berlin, which again replied
in a conciliatory tone, hinting that an English submarine had
fired on the Palembang in the hope of embroiling Holland with
Germany. This suggestion was instantly rejected by the Dutch
press and people. Negotiations failed to produce any definite
result, save to prolong the matter until tension had been some-
what relieved. The French destroyer Renaudin fell prey to a
submarine in the Adriatic on the same day. Three officers,
including the commander, and forty-four of her crew, were
drowned. Vienna also announced the loss in the Adriatic of the
hospital ship Elektra on March 18, 1916. She was said to have
NAVAL ENGAGEMENTS IN MANY WATERS 63
been torpedoed, although properly marked. One sailor was
killed and two nuns serving as nurses received wounds.
German submarine activity in the vicinity of the Thames was
emphasized March 22, 1916, when the Galloper Lightship, well
known to all seafaring men, went to the bottom after being
torpedoed. The vessel was stationed off dangerous shoals near
the mouth of the river. The Germans suffered the loss of a
7,000-ton steamship on this day, when the Esparanza was sunk
by a Russian warship in the Black Sea. She had taken refuge
in the Bulgarian port of Varna at the outbreak of the conflict
and attempted to reach Constantinople with a cargo of food-
stuffs, but a Russian patrol vessel ended her career.
Another tragedy of the sea came at a moment when strained
relations between Germany and the United States made almost
anything probable. The Sussex, a Channel steamer plying be-
tween Folkestone and Dieppe, was hit by a torpedo March 24,
1916, when about three hours' sail from the former port, and
some fifty persons lost their lives. A moment after the missile
struck there was an explosion in the engine room that spread
panic among her 386 passengers, many of whom were Belgian
women and children refugees bound for England. One or two
boats overturned, and a number of frightened women jumped
into the water without obtaining life preservers. Others strapped
on the cork jackets and were rescued hours later. Some of
the victims were killed outright by the impact of the torpedo
and the second explosion. Fortunately the vessel remained afloat
and her wireless brought rescue craft from both sides of the
Channel.
The rescuers picked up practically all of those in the water
who had donned life belts and took aboard those in the boats.
Many of the passengers, including several Americans, saw the
torpedo's wake. It was stated that the undersea craft ap-
proached the Sussex under the lee of a captured Belgian vessel,
and when within easy target distance fired the torpedo. Ac-
cording to this version, the Belgian ship then was compelled
to put about and leave the stricken steamer's passengers and
crew to what seemed certain destruction. The presence of
E—War St. &
64 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
this third craft never was definitely estabHshed, although
vouched for by a number of those on the Sussex,
Of thirty American passengers five or six sustained painful
injuries. The victims included several prominent persons, one
of whom was Enrique Granados, the Spanish composer, and
his wife. They had just returned from the United States where
they had witnessed the presentation of his opera "Goyescas."
The Sussex, which flew the French flag, although owned by
a British company, had no guns aboard and was in no wise
an auxiliary craft. She reached Boulogne in tow, and the
American consul there reported that undoubtedly she had been
torpedoed. (For an account of the negotiations between the
United States and Germany in relation to this affair see United
States and the Belligerents, Vol. V, Part X.) Ambassador Ger-
ard, in Berlin, was instructed to ask the German Government for
any particulars of the incident in its possession, so as to aid the
United States in reaching a conclusion. Berlin, after much eva-
sion, admitted that a submarine had sunk a vessel near the
spot where the Sussex was lost, but gave it an entirely different
description.
The British converted liner Minneapolis, used as a trans-
port, was torpedoed in the Mediterranean with a loss of eleven
lives, although this vessel also stayed afloat, according to a
statement issued in London, March 26, 1916. She was a ship
of 15,543 tons and formerly ran in the New York-Liverpool
service. In a brush between German and British forces near
the German coast, March 25, 1916, a British light cruiser, the
Cleopatra, rammed and sunk a German destroyer. The British
destroyer Medusa also was sunk, but her crew escaped to other
vessels. In addition the Germans lost two of their armed fishing
craft.
Fourteen nuns and 101 other persons were killed or drowned
March 30, 1916, when the Russian hospital ship Portugal was
sunk in the Black Sea between Batum and Rizeh on the Ana-
tolian coast by a torpedo. The Portugal had stopped and was
preparing to take aboard wounded men on shore. Several of
those on the vessel saw the periscope of a submarine appear
NAVAL ENGAGEMENTS IN MANY WATERS 65
above the waves, but had no fear of an attack, as the Portugal
was plainly marked with the Red Cross insignia and was flying
a Red Cross flag from her peak.
The submarine circled about the ships twice and then, to the
horror of those who were watching, fired a torpedo. The mis-
sile went astray, but another followed and found its mark. Al-
though the ship was at anchor, with the shore near by, it was
impossible to get all of her crew and wounded to safety.
This attack greatly incensed Russia. She sent protests to all
of the neutral powers, calling attention to the deed perpetrated
against her. The flame of national anger was fanned higher
when Constantinople issued a statement saying that a Turkish
submarine had sunk the Portugal, claiming that she flew the
Russian merchant flag without any of the usual Red Cross mark-
ings upon her hull. It was said that the explosion which shat-
tered the vessel was caused by the presence of ammunition.
On the morning of March 30, 1916, the steamship Matoppo,
a British freighter, put into Lewes, Delaware, with her master
and his crew of fifty men held prisoners by a single individual.
Ernest Schiller, as he called himself, had gone aboard the Ma-
toppo in New York, March 29, 1916, and hid himself away until
the vessel passed Sandy Hook, bound for Vladiovstok. Then
he came out and with the aid of two weapons which the captain
described as horse pistols, proceeded to cow the master and crew.
Schiller announced that the Matoppo was a German prize of
war and that he would shoot the first man who moved a hostile
hand. The crew believed him. They also had an uneasy fear
that certain bombs which Schiller mentioned would be set off
unless they obeyed.
With Schiller in command the Matoppo headed down the coast,
her captor keeping vigil. Off Delaware he ordered the captain
to make port. The latter obeyed, but also signaled to shore that
a pirate was aboard. Port authorities then sent a boat along-
side, and Schiller was arrested. He admitted under examination
that he and three other men had plotted to blow up the Cunard
liner Pannonia, They bought the dynamite and made the
bombs, but his companions' courage failed, and the plan was
66 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
abandoned. Then it was proposed to stow away on some out-
ward bound ship, seize her at sea and make for Germany. With
this purpose in mind Schiller got aboard the Matoppo, but the
other conspirators deserted him. Not to be foiled, he captured
the vessel single-handed. It developed that his name was
Clarence Reginald Hodson, his father having been an English-
man, but he was bom of a German mother, had been raised in
Germany, and was fully in sympathy with the German cause.
After a trial he was sent to prison for life, the only man serving
such a sentence in the United States on a charge of piracy.
CHAPTER X
MINOR ENGAGEMENTS AND LOSSES
THE beginning of April found growing discontent among
neutrals against the British blockade of Germany and the
virtual embargo on many other nations. Sweden especially
demonstrated resentment. The United States made new repre-
sentations about the seizure and search of first-class mail. All
of this did not deter the Allies from pursuing their policy of
attrition toward Germany.
The opening day of the month saw the arrival in New York
harbor of the first armed French steamer to reach that port. The
Vulcain, a freighter, tied up at her dock with a 47-milli-
tneter quick-firing gun mounted at the stem. Inquiries followed,
with the usual result, and the advancing days found other French
vessels arriving, some of the passenger liners carrying three and
four 75-millimeter pieces, the famous 75's.
On April 5, 1916, Paris announced that French and British
warships had sunk a submarine at an unnamed point and cap-
tured the crew. In this connection it should be said that many
reports were current of frequent captures made by the Allies
of enemy submersibles. The British seldom admitted such cap-
tures, seeking to befog Berlin as to the fate of her submarines.
MINOR ENGAGEMENTS AND LOSSES. 67
But there was little doubt that numbers of them had been taken
by both French and British.
An Austrian transport was torpedoed by a French submarine
and lost in the Adriatic, April 8, 1916. Neither the loss of life
nor the name of the vessel was made public by Vienna.
Two days later a Russian destroyer, the Strogi, rammed and
sunk an enemy submersible near the spot where the hospital ship
Portugal was torpedoed.
Reports from Paris, April 18, 1916, stated th^t the French had
captured the submarine that torpedoed the Sussex. It was said
that her crew and commander were prisoners, and that documen-
tary evidence had been obtained on the vessel to prove that she
sank the Sussex, The report could not be verified, but Paris
semiofficially intimated that she had indisputable proof that the
Sussex was a submarine's victim. The two incidents coincided
so well that the capture of the vessel was believed to have been
made.
Trebizond fell April 18, 1916, the Russian fleet cooperating
in a grand assault. This gave Russia possession of a fine port
on the Turkish side of the Black Sea and marked important
progress for her armies in Asia.
Zeebrugge, Belgium, was shelled by the British fleet, April 25,
1916, the city sustaining one of the longest and heaviest bom-
bardments which it had suffered since its capture by the Ger-
mans. As a convenient base for submarines it was a particularly
troublesome thorn to the Allies, and the bombardment was
directed mainly at buildings suspected of being submarine work-
shops, and the harbor defenses. Several vessels were sunk and
much damage wrought, the German batteries at Heyst, Blanken-
berghe, and Knocke coming in for the heavy fire.
Naval vessels on guard engaged the Germans and succeeded in
driving them off, although outnumbered. Two British cruisers
were hit, without serious injury. The attack was part of a con-
certed plan which contemplated a smashing blow at the British
line, while the Irish trouble engaged attention.
One British auxiliary was lost and her crew captured and a
destroyer damaged in a scouting engagement off the Flanders
68 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
coast on April 25, 1916. The identity of the vessel was never
learned. The E'22y a British submarine, went down April 25,
1916, in another fight. The Germans scored again when they
sank an unidentified guard vessel off the Dogger Bank after dusk
April 26, 1916.
Reports from Holland, April 28, 1916, told of the sinking by an
armed British trawler of a submarine near the north coast of
Scotland. The enemy vessel had halted two Dutch steamers
when the trawler appeared. The submersible was said to be of
the newest and largest type and sixty men were believed to have
been lost with her. The British announced the sinking of a sub-
marine on the same day off the east coast, one officer and seven-
teen men being taken prisoners. It was believed that the two
reports concerned the same craft.
London also admitted the loss on April 28, 1916, of the battle-
ship Ritssell, which struck a mine or was torpedoed in the Medi-
terranean. Admiral Freemantle, whose flag she bore, was among
the 600 men saved. The loss of life included one hundred and
twenty-four officers and men.
The Ricssell was a vessel of 14,000 tons, carried four 12-
inch guns, twelve 6-inch pieces, and a strong secondary battery.
She belonged to the predreadnought period, but was a formidable
fighting ship.
The quality of Russia's determination to win victory, despite
serious reverses in the field, was well indicated by an announce-
ment made in Petrograd, May 1, 1916. A railroad from the
capital to Soroka, on the White Sea, begun since the war started,
had just reached completion. It covered a distance of 386 miles
and made accessible a port that hitherto had been practically
useless, where it was proposed to divert commercial shipments.
This left free for war purposes the port of Archangel, sole
window of Russia looking upon the west until Soroka was linked
with Petrograd. German activity had halted all shipping to
Russian Baltic ports. At the moment announcement was made
of this event more than 100 ships were waiting for the ice to
break up, permitting passage to Archangel and Soroka, which
are held in the grip of the north for many months of each year.
MINOR ENGAGEMENTS AND LOSSES 69
A majority of these vessels carried guns, ammunition, harness,
auto trucks and other things sorely needed by the Czar's armies.
Additional supplies were pouring in through Vladivostok for
the long haul across Siberia.
May 1, 1916, witnessed the destruction of a British mine
sweeper, the Nasturtium, in the Mediterranean along with the
armed yacht Aegusa, both said to have been sunk by floating
mines.
The Aegusa formerly was the Erin, the private yacht of Sir
Thomas Lipton, and valued at $375,000 when the Government
took it over. The craft was well known to Americans, as Sir
Thomas, several times challenger for the international cup held
in America, had made more than one trip to our shores on the
vessel.
The French submarine Bernouille was responsible for the sink-
ing of an enemy torpedo boat in the Adriatic, May 4, 1916.
Washington received a note from Germany, May 6, 1916, offer-
ing to modify her submarine orders if the United States would
protest to Great Britain against the stringent blockade laid upon
Germany. This offer met with prompt rejection. President
Wilson standing firm and insisting upon disavowal for the sink-
ing of the Sussex and search of merchantmen before attack.
(See United States and the Belligerents, Vol. V, Part X.)
Laden with munitions, the White Star liner Cymric was tor-
pedoed and sunk May 9, 1916, near the British coast with a loss
of five killed. The vessel remained afloat for several hours, and
the remainder of her 110 officers and men were saved. She had
no passengers aboard.
An Austrian transport, name unknown, went down in the
Adriatic, May 10, 1916, after a French submarine torpedoed her.
She was believed to have had a heavy cargo of munitions, but
few soldiers, and probably was bound for Durazzo, Albania, from
Pola, the naval base.
The M-30, a small British monitor, was struck by shells from a
Turkish battery upon the island of Kesten in the Mediterranean
and sunk on the night of May 13, 1916. Casualities consisted of
two killed and two wounded.
70 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
The sunny weather of May brought a resumption of attacks
by British and Russian submarines in the Baltic. May 18,
1916, London announced that four German steamers, the Kolga,
Biancha, Hera and Trav, had been halted and destroyed in that
sea within a few days. Other similar reports followed and Ger-
man shipping was almost driven from the Baltic, thereby cutting
off an important source of supply with Sweden and Norway,
the only neutrals still trading with Germany to any considerable
extent. For her part, Germany alleged that several merchant
ships torpedoed by the British were sunk without warning and
some of the crews killed. London denied the charge and there
was none to prove or disprove it.
An Italian destroyer performed a daring feat on the night of
May 30, 1916, running into the harbor at Trieste and sinking a
large transport believed to have many soldiers aboard. Scarcely
a soul was saved, current report stated. The raider crept out to
sea again and made good her escape.
CHAPTER XI
THE BATTLE OP JUTLAND BANK —
BEGINNING
A GREAT naval battle was fought in the North Sea off Jutland,
where, in the afternoon and evening hours of May 31, 1916,
the fleets of England and Germany clashed in what might have
been — but was not — ^the most important naval fight in history.
Why it missed this ultimate distinction is not altogether clear.
Nor is it altogether clear to which side victory leaned. To
pronounce a satisfactory judgment on this point we need far more
information than we have at present, not only as to the respec-
tive losses of the contending fleets, but as to the objects for
which the battle was fought and the degree of success attained
in the accomplishment of these objects. The official German
report states that the German fleet left port "on a mission to the
northward." No certain evidence is at hand as to the nature of
THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND BANK 71
this mission ; but whatever it was, it can hardly have been accom-
plished, as the most northerly point reached was less than 180
miles from the point of departure, and the whole fleet, or what
was left of it, was back in port within thirty-six hours of the
time of leaving.
It has been surmised, and there is some reason to believe, that
the German plan was to force a passage for their battle cruisers
through the channel between Scotland and Norway into the open
sea, where, with their high-speed and long-range guns, they
might, at least for a time, have paralyzed transatlantic com-
merce with very serious results for England's industries, and
still more serious results for her supplies of food.
Another and a somewhat more plausible theory is that the
plan contemplated the escape to the open sea, not of the battle
cruisers themselves, but of a number of very fast armed mer-
chant cruisers of the Moewe type, which were to repeat the
Moewe's exploit on a large scale, serving the same purpose that
the submarines served during the period of their greatest
activity. Color is lent to this theory by what is known of the
controversy now going on in Germany between those who advo-
cate a renewal of the submarine warfare against commerce, and
those who are opposed to this. It is evident that if fast cruisers
could be maintained on England's trade routes they might do all
that the submarine could do and more, and this without raising
any question as to their rights under international law.
Whatever the plan was, we must assume that it was thwarted
by the interposition of the British fleet; and from this point of
view the battle takes on the aspect of a British victory. The
German fleet is back behind the fortifications and the mine fields
of the Helgoland Bight, in the waters which have been its
refuge for nearly two years of comparative inactivity. And the
British fleet still holds the command of the sea with a force
which makes its command complete, and, in all human proba-
bility, permanent.
From the narrower point of view of results on the actual field
of battle, it appears from the evidence at present available that,
although the Germans were first to withdraw, they had the
72 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
advantage in that they lost fewer ships than their opponents and
less important ones. This is not admitted by the British, and
it may not be true, but we have the positive assurance of the
German Government that it is so, and no real evidence to the
contrary. It must therefore be accepted for the present, always
with remembrance of the fact that the first reports given out by
the German authorities are admitted to have been understated
"for military reasons." Only time can tell us whether the world
has the whole truth even now. But taking the situation as it
appears from the official statements on both sides the losses are
as follows :
British : German :
Battleships Battleships
None One
Battle Cruisers Battle Cruisers
Three One
Armored Cruisers Armored Cruisers
Three None
Light Cruisers Light Cruisers
None Four
Destroyers Destroyers
Eight Five
It is certain that the British losses as here given are sub-
Btantially correct. It is possible, as has been said, that the Ger-
man losses are much understated. British officers and seamen
claim to have actually seen several large German ships blow up,
and they are probably quite honest in these claims. They may
be right. But it is only necessary to picture to one's self the
conditions by which all observers were surrounded while the
appalling inferno of the battle was at its height to understand
how hopelessly unreliable must be the testimony of participants
as to what they saw and heard. Four or five 15-inch shells strik-
ing simultaneously against the armor of a battleship and ex-
ploding with a great burst of flame and smoke might well suggest
to an eager and excited observer the total destruction of the
ship. And an error here would be all the easier when to the
THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND BANK 73
confusion of battle was added the obscurity of darkness and
of fog.
No doubt the time will come when we shall know, if not the
full truth, at least enough to justify a conclusion as to the com-
parative losses. Until that time comes, we may accept the view
that, measured by the narrow standard of ships and lives lost,
the Germans had the advantage. This may be true, and yet it
may be also true that the real victory was with the British,
since they may have bought with their losses, great as these
were, that for which they could well afford to pay an even
higher price.
According to the statement of Admiral Jellicoe, the British
fleet has for some months past made a practice of sweeping the
North Sea from time to time with practically its whole force of
fighting ships, with a view to discouraging raids by the German
fleet, and in the hope of meeting any force which might, whether
for raiding or for any other purpose, have ventured out beyond
the fortifications and mine fields of the Helgoland Bight.
On May 31, 1916, the fleet was engaged in one of these excur-
sions, apparently with no knowledge that the German fleet was
to be abroad at the same time.
In accordance with what appears to have been the general
practice, the Grand Fleet was divided; the main fighting force
under the command of Admiral Jellicoe himself occupying a
position near the middle of the North Sea, while the two battle-
cruiser divisions under Vice Admiral Beatty, supported by a
division of dreadnoughts of the Queen Elizabeth class under
Rear Admiral Evan-Thomas, were some seventy miles to the
southward (Plate I). Admiral Jellicoe had a division of battle
cruisers and another of armored cruisers in addition to his
dreadnoughts, and both he and Admiral Beatty were well pro-
vided with destroyers and light cruisers.
The day was pleasant, but marked by the characteristic misti-
ness of North Sea weather; and as the afternoon wore on the
mist took on more and more the character of light drifting fog,
making it impossible at times to see clearly more than two or
three miles.
74
THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
Jelli&oe 70 miles
north of Beatty
^'^
5ritish Baitleahip
Division
Evan -Tho.was
0
5
t A
0
Dritish Battle Cruisers J
^^"""^^^ir-^.^
\ V^'''*'5^ Battleship Fleet
Q (Jellicoe)
%
» •
• .,^VCru/^^t
G«rnnan
Battle Cruisers
C n
p-
(Von Hipper)
ft
•
Von Sheer 6o Miles
South of Von Hipper
\ German Bat Hesh.p
1 , ^'«'«'^
I
1 (Von Sheer)
1
1
1
1
1
1
»
1*
H^n R»ef
Distribution of Forces
2'30PM..Mo)^3M9l6
Not drawn to 5cale. all distances distorted.
PLATE I.
THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND BANK 75
At two o'clock in the afternoon Admiral Beatty's detachment
was steaming on a northerly course, being then about ninety miles
west of the coast of Denmark, accompanied by several flotillas of
destroyers and with a screen of light cruisers thrown out to the
north and east.
At about 2.20 p. m. the Galatea, one of the light cruisers en-
gaged in scouting east of Beatty's battle cruisers, reported smoke
on the horizon to the eastward, and started to investigate, the
battle cruisers taking up full speed and following. The Galatea
and her consorts were soon afterward engaged with a German
force of similar type, and at 3.80 p. m. a squadron of five
battle cruisers was made out some twelve miles farther to the
eastward.
Beatty immediately swung off to the southeast in the hope of
getting between the German squadron and its base; but the
German commander, Vice Admiral von Hipper, changed course
correspondingly, and the two squadrons continued on courses
nearly parallel but somewhat converging until, at about 3.45
p. m., fire was opened on both sides, the range at that time
being approximately nine miles. About ten minutes after the
battle was fully joined, the Indefatigable, the rear ship of
the British column, was struck by a broadside from one or more
of the enemy ships, and blew up ; and twenty minutes later the
Queen Mary, latest and most powerful of the British battle
cruisers, met the same fate. The suddenness and completeness
of the disaster to these two splendid ships has not yet been ex-
plained and perhaps never will be. Their elimination threw the
advantage of numbers actually engaged from the British to the
German side, but very shortly afterward the leading ships of
Rear Admiral Thomas's dreadnought division came within range
and opened fire (Plate II), thus throwing the superiority again
to the British side. For the next half hour or thereabouts. Von
Hipper's five battle cruisers were pitted against four battle
cruisers and four dreadnoughts, and Beatty reports that their
fire fell off materially, as would naturally be the case. They
appear, however, to have stood up gallantly under the heavy
punishment to which they must have been subjected.
76 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
Beatty was drawing slowly ahead, though with little prospect
of being able to throw his force across the enemy's van, as he
had hoped to do, his plan being not only to cut the Germans off
from their base, but to "cap" their column and concentrate the
fire of his whole force on Von Hipper's leading ships. Had he
been able to do this he would have secured the tactical advantage
which is the object of all maneuvering in a naval engagement,
and would at the same time have compelled Von Hipper to run
to the northward toward the point from which Jellicoe was
known to be approaching at the highest speed of his dread-
noughts. With this thought in mind, Beatty was holding on to
the southward, taking full advantage of his superiority in both
speed and gunfire, when a column of German dreadnoughts was
sighted in the southeast approaching at full speed to form a
junction with Von Hipper 's squadron (Plate II). Seeing him-
self thus outmatched, Beatty made a quick change of plan.
There was no longer any hope of carrying out the plan of throw-
fng himself across the head of the German column, but if Von
Hipper could not be driven into Jellicoe's arms it was conceivable
that he might be led there, and with him the additional force
that Von Scheer was bringing up to join him. So Beatty turned
to the northward, and, as he had hoped, Von Hipper followed ;
not, however, until he had run far enough on the old course to
effect a junction with Von Scheer, whose battleships fell in
astern of the battle cruisers as these last swung around to the
northward and took up a course parallel to that of Beatty and
Thomas. Thus the running fight was resumed, with the differ-
ence that both forces were now heading at full speed toward the
point from which Beatty knew Jellicoe to be approaching. Von
Hipper*s delay in turning had permitted Beatty to draw ahead,
and the relative positions of the engaged squadrons were now
those shown in Plate III.
It is during this part of the fight that the British accounts
speak of Beatty as engaging the whole German fleet and as
being thus tremendously overmatched. A moment's study of
Plate III will make it clear that this claim is not tenable. With-
out fuller information than we have of positions and distances,
THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND BANK
77
\
4 Dreadnougnl5\ ,
Comin9 within range ^^ r
4»
sunk ^
(h
^^rc.
¥am rrmu M OOO y^tcf^
Qu««n Mary^nQ^
1
I
I
9
Beallv Uarns o\ approach
of Enemy baitlesnips
and turna north.
IT
• •o'4:40 p. M.
(Head of Column)
VonHipp€»r iurna north
diter effect I no junction*
tehee r.
with Von Scl
The Running Fighi to the Southward. 4^52pm
3:4-8 to 4:40 P.M.
PLATE n.
(Hedd ot Column) .*
German batfWshipa
Von Scheer approaching
from thi& qoart--
underX
78 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
it is impossible to say exactly how many of Von Scheer's ships
were able to fire on Beatty's column, but certainly the total
German force within effective range could not have been ma-
terially larger than the British force it was engaging.
As far as can be figured out from Beatty's own report, the
only time when he was actually pitted against a force superior to
his own, within fighting range, was after he had lost the Inde-
fatigable and the Queen Mary, and before the dreadnoughts of
Admiral Thomas's force had reached a point from which they
were able to open an effective fire. He entered the fight with six
battle cruisers opposed to five. He then, for a short time, had
four opposed to five. A little later he had four battle cruisers
and four dreadnoughts opposed to five battle cruisers, and a little
later still, as has just been stated, the forces actually opposed
within firing range became practically equal.
About six o'clock, having gained enough to admit of an at-
tempt to "cap," Beatty turned his head to the eastward, but Von
Hipper refused to accept this disadvantage and turned east him-
self, thus continuing the parallel fight on a large curve tending
more and more to the east (Plate IV) . It was about this time
that the Lutzow, Von Hlpper's flagship and the leader of the
German column, dropped out of the formation, having been so
badly damaged that she could no longer maintain her position in
the formation. Von Hipper, calling a destroyer alongside,
boarded her and proceeded, through a storm of shell, to the
Moltke, on which he resumed his place at the head of the fleet.
Jellicoe, seventy miles to the northward with the main fight-
ing force, received word about three o'clock that the scouting
force was in contact with the enemy, and started at once to effect
a junction with Beatty. He may well have wished at that mo-
ment that his forces were separated somewhat less widely.
Under his immediate command he had three squadrons of the
latest and most powerful fighting ships in the world, twenty-five
in all, including his own flagship, the Iron Duke. His squadrons
were led by three of the youngest and most efficient vice admirals
in the service. Sir Cecil Burney, Sir Thomas Jerram, and Sir
Doveton Sturdee (Plate V) . With him also were Rear Admirals
ullllllllllllllllllinillllllllllllllllllllllllllMIIIIIIIIIIIIIMIIIIIIIMIMIMIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIMIIIIIIIIMIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIMIIIfllllllllllllllllinilllllllllllMlllllllllllllliiiiiiiiiiuiiM^
o 2
ft 5
to *
3 V
§ I
.2 S
H =
WllllllllUtlllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllilllililliiliiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiii, 1,1, ,„|,|„, ,„„,„„, I
lllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllli'
THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND BANK
79
6:00RM..o' '^
Beatty turns eaot acroM »*
Von Hipp«rs coura*. [
6.00 P.
A Battle Cruidens
Evon-^Thomaa.
4DreQdnou9ht<>.
0
I
0
0
I
0
I
I
%
I
0
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0
6 ♦
'-0-4:40 rm:
(•Mid a< Coluiitii )
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s
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I
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Running Fight to Northward
4:40 to 6:00 P.M.
, 4:52 RM.^—':
f Heed of Column)
i
V^n ScWer falls in 4
ost«m o4 Von Hipp<»r ^
PLATE HI.
Baitlesl^ip ft
fleet.
F— War St. 5
80 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
Hood and Arbuthnot, the former commanding three of the earliei
battle cruisers, Invincible, Inflexible, and Indomitable, the latter
commanding four armored cruisers, of which we shall hear more
hereafter.
A majority of the battleships were capable of a speed of 21 to
22 knots, but it is improbable that the force, as a whole, could do
better than 20 knots. Hood, with his "Invincibles,'* was capable
of from 27 to 28 knots, and Jellicoe appears to have sent him on
ahead to reenforce Beatty at the earliest possible moment, while
following himself at a speed which, he says, strained the older
ships of his force to the utmost. The formation of the fleet was
probably somewhat like that shown at A, Plate V, which doubt-
less passed into B before fighting range was reached.
Of the southward sweep of this great armada, the most
tremendous fighting force the world has ever seen on sea or
land, we have no record. They started. They arrived. Of the
hours that intervened no word has been said. Yet it is not
difficult to picture something of the dramatic tenseness of the
race. The admirals, their staffs, the captains of the individual
ships, all were on the bridges, and there remained not only
through the race to reach the battle area, but through all the
fighting after they had closed with the enemy. The carefully
worked-out plans for directing everything from the shelter of
the conning tower were thrown aside without a thought. So
there we see them, grouped in the most exposed positions on
their ships, straining their eyes through the haze for the first
glimpse of friend or foe, and urging those below, at the fires and
the throttle, to squeeze out every fraction of a knot that boilers
and turbines could be made to yield.
Word must have been received by wireless of the loss of the
Indefatigable and the Queen Mary, while the battleships were
still fifty or sixty miles away, for Beatty at this time was run-
ning south faster than Jellicoe could follow. It was perhaps at
this time that Hood was dispatched at full speed to add his three
battle cruisers to the four that remained to Beatty. They ar-
rived upon the scene about 6.15 p. m., shortly after Beatty had
turned eastward, and swung in ahead of Beatty's column, which,
THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND BANK
81
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, J
82 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
as thus reenforced, consisted of seven battle cruisers and four
dreadnoughts (Plate IV). Admiral Beatty writes in terms of
enthusiastic admiration of the way in which Hood brought his
ships into action, and it is easy to understand the thrill with
which he must have welcomed this addition to his force.
But his satisfaction was not of long duration. Hardly had the
Invincible, Hood's flagship, settled down on her new course and
opened fire than she disappeared in a great burst of smoke and
flame. Here, as in the case of the Indefatigable and the Queen
Mary, the appalling suddenness and completeness of the disaster
makes it impossible of explanation. The survivors from all three
of the ships totaled only about one hundred, and none of these
are able to throw any light upon the matter.
By this time Beatty*s whole column had completed the turn
from north to east, and Jellicoe was in sight to the northward
With his twenty-five dreadnoughts, coming on at twenty knots or
more straight for the point where Beatty's column blocked his
approach. Jellicoe writes of this situation :
"Meanwhile, at 5.45 p. m., the report of guns had become
audible to me, and at 5.55 p. m. flashes were visible from ahead
around to the starboard beam, although in the mist no ships
could be distinguished, and the position of the enemy's fleet could
not be determined.
". . . At this period, when the battle fleet was meeting the
battle cruisers and the Fifth Battle Squadron, great care was
necessary to ensure that our own ships were not mistaken for
enemy vessels."
Here is a bald description of a situation which must have been
charged with almost overwhelming anxiety for the commander
in chief. He knew that just ahead of him a tremendous battle
was in progress, but of the disposition of the forces engaged he
had only such knowledge as he could gather from the few frag-
mentary wireless messages that Beatty had found time to flash
to him. He could see but a short distance, and he knew that
through the cloud of mingled fog and smoke into which he was
rushing at top speed, all ships would look much alike. That he
was able to bring his great force into action and into effective
THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND BANK
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84 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
cooperation with Beatty without accident or delay is evidence of
high tactical skill on his part and on that of every officer under
his command; and, what is even more creditable, of supremely
efficient coordination of all parts of the tremendous machine
which responded so harmoniously to his will.
As Jellicoe's leading ships appeared through the fog, Beatty
realized that he must make an opening in his column to let them
through. Accordingly, he called upon his own fast battle
cruisers for their highest speed and drew away to the eastward,
at the same time signaling Admiral Evan-Thomas to reduce
speed and drop back (Plate VI). The maneuver was perfectly
conceived and perfectly timed. As Jellicoe approached he found
Beatty's column opening before him. As he swept on through,
steering south toward the head of the German line, Beatty also
swung south on a course parallel and a little to the eastward,
and, by virtue of his high speed, a little ahead. The result was
that neither force blanketed the other for a moment, and the
head of the German column a little later found itself under the
concentrated fire of practically the whole British fleet. It may
well have "crumpled" as Jellicoe says it did; and whether it is
true or not, as British reports insist, that several of the leading
ships were destroyed at this time, it appears to be true, at least,
that a second battle cruiser dropped out, leaving only three of
this type under Von Hipper's command.
The situation quickly passed from that shown in Plate VI to
that shown in Plate VII. The British had succeeded in estab-
lishing a cap, and their position was so favorable that it looked
as if nothing could save the Germans from destruction. But
night was coming on, the mist was thickening into fog, and the
only point of aim for either fleet was that afforded by the flash of
the enemy's guns. Von Scheer, who, as Von Hipper's senior,
was in command of the German forces as a whole, turned from
east to west, each ship swinging independently, and sent his
whole force of destroyers at top speed against the enemy. It
would be difficult to imagine conditions more favorable for such
an attack. Jellicoe saw the opportunity and acted upon it as
quickly as did Von Scheer, with the result that as the German
THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND BANK
85
I.
86 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
\
(25 Ships to this column) V
^ Jellicoe
/^
f
^^^German Fleet heading west and ^
^ sendinq out destroyers agdinet ^'^ Beattv
th$ encirclina British Forces. «^ ^ ovQWy
y
160 miles to Hellqoland
X'
Jellicoe and Beatt> pass around f lanK of Gernnan Fleet,
capping" it and interposing between the Fleet and its base.
Both sides send owt destroyer attacks, whicV> continue throucjHout the night
PLATE VII.
THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND BANK 87
destroyers swept toward the British fleet they met midway
the British destroyers bent on a similar mission, and a battle
followed in the fog between destroyers, which broke up both
attacks against the main fleets and saved the capital ships on
both sides from what must otherwise have been very serious
danger. Meantime, as the German fleet drew off to the westward,
Jellicoe and Beatty passed completely around the German flank
and reached a position to the southward and between the Ger-
man fleet and its base at Helgoland (Plate VHI). By the time
this was accomplished it was nearly ten o'clock, and the long day
of that high northern latitude was passing into darkness ren-
dered darker by the fog. Contact between the main fleets had
been lost, and firing had ceased. Both sides continued destroyer
attacks through the night, and some of these were delivered with
great dash and forced home with splendid determination. The
British claim to have sunk at least two of the German capital
ships during these attacks. But this the Germans deny.
The Battle of Horn Reef, if that is to be its name, was at an
end. The German fleet, now heading west, evidently soon after-
ward headed south toward the secure waters of the Helgoland
Bight, which it was allowed to reach without interference by the
British main fleet and apparently without discovery. The British
may well have been cautious during the night about venturing
far into the fog, which, as they knew, if it concealed the capital
ships of Von Hipper and Von Scheer, concealed also their de-
stroyers, and possibly a stretch of water strewn with mines laid
out by the retreating enemy. It must not be forgotten, however,
that the British were between the German fleet and its base when
they ceased the offensive for the night, and that only a few
hours, in that high latitude, separate darkness from dawn.
With daylight, which was due by two o'clock or thereabouts,
and with the lifting of the fog, Jellicoe reports that he searched
to the northward and found no enemy. The following day,
June 2, 1916, his fleet was back in port taking account of its
losses, which were undeniably great, though whether or not they
were greater than those of the enemy, only the future can prove.
88 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
10:00 RM.
Darkness and Fog
Germans moving West, pcotectinq themselves
and iittacking British vwilh destroyers ^^'
and Uqht cruisers. ,^'
\ \ ^
\ \ ^ ^
;f
V
^ Beatty ^ \ Q
A '<• Q *
P ^ A ^
^ Jellicoe Q ft V Q
^ \ ^
^British Main Fleet
^100 miles to Hehqoldnd)
British Forces heading off to Southward to avoid atfack during
darkness and to keep between German Fleet and its Base.
Protectinq rear with Destroyers and Light CruiaervS.
PLATE Vffl
SOME SECONDARY FEATURES 89
CHAPTER XII
SOME SECONDARY FEATURES OP THE
BATTLE
ONE of the most inexplicable incidents of the day occurred as
Jellicoe's fleet approached the battle area and shortly before
the leading ship of his column passed through the opening in
Beatty's column as already described. The four armored cruisers,
Duke of Edinburgh, Defence, Warrior, and Black Prince, under
Rear Admiral Arbuthnot, were in company with Jellicoe, but
separated from his main force by several miles. Tliese ships
were lightly armed and very lightly armored, and had absolutely
no excuse for taking part in the main battle. Yet they now
appeared, somewhat in advance of the main fleet and to the west-
ward of it, standing down ahead of Evan-Thomas's division of
battleships, which, as has been explained, had dropped back to
allow Jellicoe to pass ahead of them. As Arbuthnot appeared
from the mist, several German ships opened on him at short
range, and within a very few moments three of his four ships
were destroyed. The Defence and Black Prince were sunk im-
mediately. The Warrior was so badly damaged that she sank
during the night while trying to make port. The Duke of Edin-
burgh escaped.
Another incident belonging to this phase of the battle was
the jamming of the steering gear of the War spite, of Admiral
Evan-Thomas's division of dreadnoughts. Apparently the helm
jammed when in the hard-over position, and the ship for some
time ran around in a circle. Through the whole of this time she
was under heavy fire, and is reported to have been struck more
than one hundred times by heavy shells, in spite of which she
later returned to her position in column and continued the fighti
In the course of her erratic maneuvers, while not under control,
she circled around the Warrior and received so much of the fire
intended for that ship as to justify the belief that her accident
saved the Warrior from immediate destruction and made it pos-
90 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
sible, later, to rescue her crew before she finally sank, as she did
during the night following the battle. It was for a time believed
that the Warspite had deliberately intervened to save the War-
rior, and there was much talk of the "chivalry'* of the Warspite^s
commander in thus risking his own ship to save another — ^this
from those who overlooked the fact that the duty of the Warspite,
as one of the most valuable fighting units of the fleet, was to keep
place in line as long as possible, and to carry out the general
battle plan ; which, of course, is exactly what the Warspite did
to the best of her ability.
It is an interesting fact that of the small number of capital
ships lost or disabled, four were flagships. Two rear admirals,
Hood and Arbuthnot, went down with their ships. Two vice
admirals. Von Hipper and Bumey, shifted their flags in the
thickest of the fight. Von Hipper from the Liltzow to the Moltke,
Bumey from the Marlborough to the Revenge.
A large part of Admiral Jellicoe's official report deals with the
work of the light cruisers and destroyers, which, while neces-
sarily restricted to a secondary role, contributed in many ways
to the operations of the main fighting forces, securing and trans-
mitting information, attacking at critical times, and repelling
attacks from the corresponding craft of the enemy. All of these
tasks took on a special importance as the afternoon advanced,
because of the decreasing visibility due to fog and darkness.
The light cruisers were constantly employed in keeping touch
with the enemy, whose capital ships they approached at times to
within two or three thousand yards. And the destroyers of both
fleets were repeatedly sent at full speed through banks of fog
within which the enemy battleships were known to be concealed.
It is rather remarkable that so few of either type were lost, and
still more remarkable, so far as the destroyers are concerned,
that so few of the large ships were torpedoed.
The Marlborough was struck and badly damaged, but she
made her way safely to port. The Frauenlob, Rostock, and Pom-
mem were sunk. And that is the whole story so far as known
at present. Yet several hundred torpedoes must have been dis-
charged, most of them at ranges within 5,000 yards. It looks a
SOME SECONDARY FEATURES 91
little as if the world would be obliged to modify the view that has
been held of late with reference to the efficiency of the torpedo —
or at least of the torpedo as carried by the destroyer.
The loss of the three large battle cruisers, Indefatigable, Irv-
vincible, and Queen Mary is, and will always remain, the most
dramatic incident of the battle, and the most inexplicable. It is
doubtful if we shall ever know the facts, but that something
more than gunfire was involved is made clear by the fact that in
each case the ship was destroyed by an explosion. Whether this
was due to a shell actually penetrating the magazine, or to the
ignition of exposed charges of powder, or to a torpedo or a mine
exploding outside in the vicinity of the magazine, it is impossible
to do more than conjecture. There is a suggestion of something
known, but kept back, in the following paragraph from a de-
scription of the battle by Mr. Arthur Pollen, which is presumably
based upon information furnished by the British admiralty:
"As to the true explanation of the loss of the three ships that
did blow up, the admiralty, no doubt, will give this to the public
if it is thought wise to do so. But there can be no harm in
saying this. The explanation of the sinking of each of these
ships by a single lucky shot — both they and practically all the
other cruisers were hit repeatedly by shots that did no harm —
is, in the first place, identical. Next, it does not lie in the fact
that the ships were insufficiently armored to keep out big shell.
Next, the fatal explosion was not caused by a mine or by a
torpedo. Lastly, it is in no sense due to any instability or any
other dangerous characteristic of the propellants or explosives
carried on board. I am free to confess that when I first heard
of these ships going down as rapidly as they did, one of two
conclusions seemed to be irresistible — either a shell had pene-
trated the lightly armored sides and burst in the magazine, or
a mine or torpedo had exploded immediately beneath it. But
neither explanation is right."
One of the most striking and surprising features about the
battle is the closeness with which it followed conventional lines,
both in the types of vessels and weapons used and in the manner
of using them. Neither submarines nor Zeppelins played any^
92 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
part, although both were at hand. Some effective scouting was
done by an aeroplane sent up from one of the British cruisers
early in the afternoon, and the British report that they saw and
fired on a Zeppelin early in the morning of June 1, 1916. But
this is all.
There have been stories for many months of a 17-inch gun of
marvelous power carried by German dreadnoughts, but no such
weapon made its appearance on this occasion.
And the tactics employed on both sides were as conventional as
the weapons used. The fight was a running fight in parallel
columns from the moment when Beatty and Von Hipper turned
simultaneously toward the south upon their first contact with
each other, until night and fog separated them at the end.
Beatty's constant effort to secure a "cap" contained no element
of novelty, and Von Hipper's reply, refusing the cap by turning
his head away and swinging slowly on a parallel interior curve,
was the conventional, as it was the proper, reply. Unfortunately,
as we shall presently have occasion to note, the German fleet ulti-
mately allowed itself to be capped, with results which ought to
have been far more disastrous than they actually were. The de-
stroyers availed themselves of the opportunities for attack pre-
sented from time to time by smoke and fog, and their drive was
stopped by opposing destroyers.
So little is known of the German injuries that there is hardly
sufficient ground for comment on the British marksmanship, but
it does not appear to have been what the world had expected.
Exactly the reverse is true of the German marksmanship, espe-
cially at long ranges. It was surprisingly good, and the most
surprising thing about it was the promptness with which it
found the target. The Indefatigable was blown up ten minutes
after she came under fire. Hood, in the Invincible, had barely
gained his place in line ahead of Beatty's column when the ship
was smothered by a perfect avalanche of shells. If it is true
that the Germans had the best of the fight so far as material
damage is concerned, the explanation must be sought in their
unexpectedly excellent marksmanship, with, perhaps, some
sinister factor added, either of weakness in the British ships or
SOME SECONDARY FEATURES 93
of amazing power in the German shells, yet to be made known.
It should be noted that the sinking of the Indefatigable and
the Queen Mary belongs to a phase of battle in which Beatty had
a distinct advantage of force, his six battle cruisers being op-
posed to live.
While the torpedo, as has been said, played no important part
in the action, the destroyers on both sides appear to have been
active and enterprising, and if they accomplished little in a
material way, the threat involved in their presence and their
activity had an important moral effect at several critical stages
of the battle. When Jellicoe decided not to force his offensive
during the night he was no doubt influenced in a large degree by
the menace of the German destroyers.
Destroyers, too, contributed indirectly to the loss of Arbuth-
not's armored cruisers. When Jellicoe's fleet was seen approach-
ing, ''appearing shadowlike from the haze bank to the north-
east,*' the German destroyers were thrown against them, and it
was apparently to meet and check this threat that Rear Admiral
Arbuthnot pushed forward with his armored cruisers into the
area between the two main battle lines. It may be that he could
not see what lay behind the thrust he sought to parry. Both the
British and the German stories of the battle assume that he was
surprised. But whether this is true or not, the fact is that it
was in seeking to shield the battleships from a destroyer attack
that he came under fire of the main German force and lost
three of his ships almost immediately ; for the Warrior, although
she remained afloat for several hours, was doomed from the first.
94 THE STORY OF THE GREAT VMR
CHAPTER XIII
LOSSES AND TACTICS
THE British losses as reported officially, and no doubt truth-
fully, are as follows:
Officers and \
Battle Cruisers : Tonnage Men
Queen Mary 27,500 1,000
Invincible o 17,250 790
Indefatigable 18,750 780
Armored Cruisers:
Defence 14,600 850
Black Prince 13,500 750
Warrior 13,500 750
Destroyers :
Tipperary 1,850 160
Turbulent 980 100
Fortune 950 100
Sparrowhawk 935 100
Ardent 950 100
Nestor 950 100
Nomad 950 100
Shark 950 100
The reported German losses are as follows. The actual losses
may be much greater :
Officers and
Battle Cruiser: Tonnage Men
Liitzow 28,000 1,150
Battleship :
Pommern 13,040 736
LOSSES AND TACTICS 95
Officers and
LIGHT Cruisers: Tonnage Men
Wiesbaden
Frauenlob 2,657 281
Elhing
Rostock 4,820 373
Destroyers :
Five
• • •
Total Tonnage Lost
British 117,150
German 60,720 (acknowledged)
Total Personnel Lost
British 6,105
German 2,414 (acknowledged)
When the losses above given are analyzed they are found to
be much less favorable to the German side than they appear to be
on the surface. To begin with, we may eliminate the three
armored cruisers on the British side as of no military value
whatever. This reduces the effective tonnage lost on the British
side by more than 40,000 tons.
The Queen Mary and the Liitzow offset each other.
If we accept the German claim that the Pommern, which was
lost, was actually the old predreadnought of that name, it is fair
to say that she offsets the Invincible, There is, however, very
good reason for believing that she was a new and very powerful
dreadnought. If this is the case, her loss easily offsets that of
both the Invincible and the Indefatigable, Accepting the Ger-
man statement, however, as we have done at all other points, we
may say that so far as effective capital ships are concerned, the
British lost one more than the Germans. This, after all, is not a
very great difference, and it is to a large extent offset by the
loss of four light cruisers which the German admiralty admit.
In destroyers the advantage is with the Germans.
With regard to the armored cruisers already referred to, it is
interesting to note the fact that these three ships were practically
G— War St. 5
96 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
presented to the Germans, thus paralleling the fate of their
sister ships, the Cressy, Hogue, and Aboukir, which, as will be
remembered, were destroyed by a submarine in September, 1914,
under conditions of inexplicable carelessness. The military loss
represented by all six of these ships was small (disregarding
the loss of personnel), but they all selected a fate which was so
timed, and in its character so spectacular, as to contribute
enormously to the lessening of the prestige with which the
British navy had entered upon the war.
As bearing still further upon the comparative losses of the
battle, account must be taken of ships seriously injured. Of
these, reports from sources apparently unprejudiced insist that
the German fleet has a large number and that the number in-
cludes several of the most powerful ships that took part in the
battle. It is known that the Seydlitz, one of the latest and largest
of the German battle cruisers, was so badly damaged that it will
be many months before she can take the sea again. There are
stories of two other large ships which reached port in such a
condition that it was necessary to dock them at once to keep them
from sinking. Contrasted with this is the fact that the British
ships which reached port were but little injured. This gives an
air of probability to the story that the German fire tactics pro-
vided for concentrating the fire of several of their ships on some
one ship of the enemy's line until she was destroyed. This would
explain the otherwise inexplicable fact that, while the Indefat-
igable and the Queen Mary were being overwhelmed, the ships
ahead and astern of them were hardly struck at all.
It may well be that the total damage done the German ships
by the steady pounding of the whole line vastly exceeds the
total received by the British ships. Something will be known on
this subject when it becomes clear that the Germans are, or are
not, ready to take the sea again. If their losses and their in-
juries were as unimportant as they would have the world believe,
if their victory was as great as they claim that it was, they should
be ready at an early date to challenge the British again, this
time with a fleet practically intact as to ships, and with a per-
sonnel fired with enthusiastic confidence in its own superiority.
LOSSES AND TACTICS 97
If, instead of this, they resume the attitude of evasion which
they have maintained so long, the inference will be plain that
they have not given the world the truth with regard to what the
battle of May 31, 1916, meant to them.
A significant fact in this connection is that, regardless of what
others may say on the subject, the officers and men of the British
navy are convinced that the victory was with them, and are
eager for another chance at the enemy, which they fully believe
they would have destroyed if night and fog had not intervened
to stay their hand.
The net result of the battle as seen by the world, after careful
appraisement of the claims and counterclaims on both sides, is
that England retains the full command of the sea, with every
prospect of retaining it indefinitely, but that the British navy
has, for the moment, lost something of the prestige which it has
enjoyed since the days of Nelson and Jervis. There is nothing
to support the belief that the control of the North Sea or of any
other sea has passed, or by any conceivable combination of cir-
cumstances can pass, into the hands of Germany during the
present war, or as a result of the war.
All accounts of the battle by those who participated in it rep-
resent the weather as capricious. The afternoon came in with
a smooth sea, a light wind, and a clear, though somewhat hazy,
atmosphere. The smoke of the German ships was made out at a
distance which must have been close to twenty miles, and the
range-finding as Beatty and Von Hipper closed must have been
almost perfect, as is proved by the promptness with which the
Germans began making hits on the Queen Mary and the Inde-
fatigable. But this did not continue long. Little wisps of fog
began to gather here and there, drifting about, rising from time
to time and then settling down and gathering in clouds that at
times cut off the view even close at hand.
As the sun dropped toward the horizon it lighted up the
western sky with a glow against which the British ships were
clearly outlined, forming a perfect target, while the dark-colored
German ships to the eastward were projected against a back-
ground of fog as gray as themselves. It is interesting to recall
98 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
the fact that these are exactly the conditions which existed when
the British and German squadrons in the Pacific met off Coronel.
In that case, as in the present one, the British fleet was to the
westward, clearly silhouetted against the twilight sky. And the
fate of the Indefatigable and the Queen Mary was not more
sudden or more tragic than that of the Good Hope and the
Monmouth. It may be that the unfavorable conditions were a
matter of luck in both cases. But it may be also that the Ger-
mans chose the time of day for fighting in each case to accord
with the position which they expected to occupy.
The British complain much of their bad luck, but there are
well-recognized advantages of position with regard to light and
wind and sea, and the Germans seem to have the luck, if luck it
be, to find these advantages habitually on their side.
The British call it luck that both in the battle off Horn Reef
and that off Dogger Bank the Germans escaped destruction
through the coming on of night. But how would this claim look
if it were shown that the Germans timed their movements with
direct regard for this — allowing themselves time for a decided
thrust, to be followed by withdrawal under cover of night before
they could be brought to a final reckoning? A careful study of
the operations of the present war shows, on both sea and land, a
painstaking attention on the German side to every detail, how-
ever small ; and instances are not rare in which they have bene-
fited from this in ways which could hardly have been anticipated.
TACTICS
There has been much discussion of the tactics of the battle.
And critics, not in foreign countries alone, but in England, have
pointed out errors of Beatty and Jellicoe, while many more have
come to their defense and shown conclusively that everything
done was wisely done, and that the escape of the German fleet
and the losses by the British fleet were due not to bad manage-
ment but to bad luck.
The first point selected for criticism by those who venture to
criticize is the initial separation of Beatty's force from Jellicoe's
LOSSES AND TACTICS 99
by from sixty to seventy miles. This certainly proved unfortu-
nate, and if it was deliberately planned it is undoubtedly open to
criticism. A reference, however, to the letter which Mr. Balfour
addressed to the mayors of Yarmouth and Lowestoft on May 8,
1916, suggests an explanation which makes the separation of
the two forces seem a reasonable one. Mr. Balfour states, for
the reassurance of the mayors and their people, that a policy is
to be adopted of keeping a force of fast and powerful ships in
certain ports near the English Channel, where they will be ready
to sally forth at short notice to run down any force which may
venture to cross the North Sea, whether for raiding or for any
other purpose. This foreshadows the assignment of a force of
battle cruisers to the south of England, and it is altogether prob-
able that Beatty, instead of having been detached by Jellicoe for
operations to the southward, had, in fact, gone out directly from
the mouth of the Thames to sweep northward toward a junction
with the main fleet. This view of the matter is confirmed by the
opening sentence of Beatty's official report to Jellicoe :
"I have the honor to report that at 2.37 p. m. on 31st May, 1916,
I was cruising and steering to the northward to join your flag."
Another point which has been criticized is the action of Beatty
in turning south instead of north when he first found himself in
touch with Von Hipper.
It is not clear from the evidence at hand whether he followed
Von Hipper in this move or whether Von Hipper followed him.
If Von Hipper headed south, Beatty could not well refuse to fol-
low him. Beatty was there to fight if there was a chance to fight,
and there is no question that in heading south, whether he was
following Von Hipper's lead or taking the lead himself, he took
the one course which made the existing chance a certainty.
From this point of view he was right. From another point of
view he was wrong, for he was running at full speed directly
away from his own supports and directly toward those of his
opponent. He thought, and Jelhcoe appears to have thought,
that the Germans did not wish to fight. But when Beatty finally
turned north, both Von Hipper and Von Scheer followed readily
enough, although they must have known pretty accurately what
100 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
lay ahead of them. Beatty's error, then, if error it was, seemg
to have been not so much in judging the tactical situation as in
judging the spirit of his opponent.
Very severe criticism has been directed against Beatty for
fighting at comparatively short ranges — 9,000 to 14,000 yards —
when he had a sufficient excess of speed to choose his distance.
This is hardly a fair criticism of the early stages of the battle, as
he was then opposed to ships of the same type as his own, so that
if he was accepting a disadvantage for himself, he was forcing
the same disadvantage upon his opponent. And after all, 14,000
yards is not a short range, though it is certainly much shorter
to-day than it would have been ten years ago.
When, in the later stages of the battle, he was opposed to
dreadnoughts, it would perhaps have been wiser to maintain a
range of from 18,000 to 20,000 yards, but the situation was com-
plicated by the necessity of holding the enemy and leading him
to the northward, and it is not possible to say with any confidence
that he could have done this if he had held off at a distance as
great as prudence might have suggested. Circumstances placed
him in a position where it seemed to him desirable to forget the
distinction between his ships and battleships, and this is exactly
what he did.
Broadly speaking, it must be said that Beatty^s course through-
out the day was, to quote the favorite expression of British
writers on naval matters, "in keeping with the best traditions of
the service." And while it was bold and dashing, it was entirely
free from the rashness which the British public has been a little
inclined to attribute to him since the Dogger Bank engagement.
The only further criticism of the conduct of the battle is that
which insists that the German fleet should not have been allowed
to escape. And here it is difficult to find an explanation which is
at the same time an excuse. Of the situation at 9 p. m. Admiral
Jellicoe writes that he had maneuvered into a very advantageous
position, in which his fleet was interposed betiveen the German
fleet and the German base. He then goes on to say that the
threat of destroyer attack during the rapidly approaching dark-
ness made it necessary to dispose the fleet with a view to its
LOSSES AND TACTICS 101
safety, while providing for a renewal of the action at daylight.
Accordingly, he "maneuvered so as to remain between the Ger-
mans and their base, placing flotillas of destroyers where they
(jould protect the fleet and attack the heavy German ships."
Admiral Beatty reported that he did not consider it desirable
or proper to engage the German battle fleet during the dark
hours, as the strategical position made it appear certain he could
locate them at daylight under most favorable circumstances.
Here, then, is the situation between nine and ten o'clock at
night, when the approach of darkness made it seem desirable to
call a halt for the night — ^a huge fleet, of more than thirty capital
ships, was interposed between the Germans and their base. The
general position of the Germans was known, and destroyers, of
which the British had at least seventy-five available, were so
disposed as to keep in touch with the Germans and attack them
during the night. The German fleet was slower than the British
fleet by several knots, and if the statements by Jellicoe and
Beatty of the damage done are even approximately true, Von
Hipper and Von Scheer must have been embarrassed by the
necessity of caring for a large number of badly crippled ships.
The night is short in that high latitude — not over five hours
at the maximum.
And this is the report of what happened at daylight:
"At daylight on the first of June the battle fleet, being south-
ward of Horn Reef, turned northward in search of the enemy
vessels, and for the purpose of collecting our own cruisers and
torpedo-boat destroyers. The visibility early on the first of
June was three to four miles less than on May 31, and the torpedo-
boat destroyers, being out of visual touch, did not rejoin the fleet
until 9 a. m. The British fleet remained in the proximity of the
battle field and near the line of approach to German ports until
11 a. m., in spite of the disadvantages of long distances from
fleet bases and the danger incurred in waters adjacent to the
enemy's coasts from submarines and torpedo craft.
"The enemy, however, made no sign, and I was reluctantly
compelled to the conclusion that the High Sea Fleet had returned
into port. Subsequent events proved this assumption to have
102 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
been correct. Our position must have been known to the enemy,
as, at 4 a. m., the fleet engaged a Zeppelin about Ave minutes,
during which time she had ample opportunity to note and subse-
quently report the position and course of the British fleet."
Here is the mystery of the Battle of Horn Reef, and here we
may place our finger on the point at which the explanation liea
(if we could only make out what the explanation is) of the rea-
son why this battle cannot take rank, either in its conduct or i»
its results, with the greatest naval battles of history — with Tra*
falgar and the Nile, to speak only of English history. At is an
unfinished battle ; inconclusive, indecisive. And in this respect it
cannot be changed by later news of greater losses than are noW
known. When Jellicoe, with a force materially superior to that
commanded by Von Scheer and with higher speed, had inter-
posed between the latter and his base, it would seem that there
should have been no escape for the German fleet from absolute
destruction. It should have been "played'' during the night, and
either held or driven northward. How it could work around the
flank of the British fleet and be out of sight at dawn is impossible
of comprehension even when we have made due allowance for low
visibility. And its disappearance was complete. The only Ger-
man force that was seen was a lone Zeppelin, which was engaged
for five minutes. The mystery is increased by Jellicoe's state-
ment that at daylight he "turned northward in search of the
enemy's vessels."
His story ends with something in the nature of a reproach for
the Germans because they did not return, although "our position
must have been known to them."
Let us consider what the situation actually was at daylight.
The German fleet, as a whole, had a maximum speed of perhaps
18 knots when fresh from port, and with every ship in perfect
condition. According to the English account it had suffered very
severely, many of its units being badly crippled. It is incon'
ceivable that it was in a condition when Jellicoe lost touch with
it at ten oclock at night to make anything like its maximum
speed without deserting these cripples. Let us suppose, how-
ever, that it could and did make 18 knots in some direction be-
LOSSES AND TACTICS
103
Qrand Fleet a 6 P.M.
Von Hipper ai beginning of BatUe — ►/d
Beatiy b\ b«><^innlng of BatUe->d
/ !
y ^German f l«<»M
^ovinq to 3oulhtiwil
nd Wntvtard in s«fln|
Known poaiVion of German Fleet
at 10 PM. May 31st ^
^-
y4ndW(
. ' pvtrf this aroa
10 PM. May 3 lit. to
daylifjM Jun«« Ut
__ b hours at
is Z' 12 knots
Gcrman-
F»pe1
within ~TZ.
Ihis
NORTH
littlp Fl5h«^
Bank
Hantsholm
&riti«h Fleet to Southward
10 P. M.May 3 1 3t
JUTLAND
BANK
at doy\(<jht -
:_ June I at 7:::
6 houra
•t 18 knots
XiCM's Horn R««f4
<4'*-
--V-* B*atty's
iW,..r=;,
'%%.
vX
Movement of Forces
10 P. M. May Slst to 4 A.M. June 1st.
V
Track of British BattW Fleot
\.
" " " Cruisers
•• Enemy's Ships ,. ,^^, »,,,...,•, .J-,.
NOTE '■ British movements are from JeHtcoe's otficiat Feport
from. 3:30 P.M. May 3l5l. to Dayli<)ht. June 1st,
German movements are irom best information obtain^le.
up to 10 P.M. May 3l3t..and probable movements to
Dd^\i9ht.
Sylt
Probable Mioe
and
Submarine Area
Heligoland
PLATE IX
c:^
104 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
tween 10 p. m. and 4 a. m. It would run in that time 108 miles.
If, therefore, we draw a circle around the point at which it was
known to have been at ten o'clock, with 108 miles as a radius, we
shall have a circle beyond which it cannot have passed at 4 a. m.
(Plate IX).
If we assume a lower limit for its speed, say 12 knots, we may
draw another circle with 72 miles as a radius, and say that in all
probability the fleet has passed beyond this circle, in some direc-
tion, by 4 a. m. We have now narrowed the space within which
the German fleet may be at 4 a. m. of June 1, 1916, to the narrow
area between our two circles.
But we know that the fleet, if it is in reality badly crippled,
will be under the necessity of making its way back to a base at
once, and that the detour which it makes to avoid the British
fleet will accordingly be as slight as possible. It certainly will
not attempt to reach Helgoland by running north or east. It
will doubtless start off toward the west or southwest and swing
around to the south and southeast as soon as Von Scheer feels
confident of having cleared the western flank of the British fleet.
We may then draw two bounding lines from the point which the
Germans are known to have occupied at ten o^clock, and feel
reasonably sure that four o'clock will find them between these
lines. In other words, Jellicoe knew with almost mathematical
certainty that at four o'clock on the morning of June 1, 1916, the
German fleet was within the area A, B, C, D, Plate IX. His own
more powerful fleet was at E and F, still between the Germans
and their base, with an excess of speed of at least three knots,
and probably much more than this. He searched to the north,
and not finding them there, "was reluctantly compelled to the
conclusion that the High Sea Fleet had returned into port." He
accordingly returned to port himself.
THE GERMAN TACTICS
If it is true that the British blundered in allowing the Germans
to escape from a trap from which escape should have been im-
possible, it is equally true that the Germans blundered in allow-
LOSSES AND TACTICS
105
' German
/^ Batt le
roop.M^
/3.3OP.M.
/
/
•
.-''^ British
Battle Cruisers
Beertty
x '
.0*
..•815 PM
1^ \
\ N
\ \
Approximate Track of British Battle Fleet .— \ \^q:Q0P.M
« !• •< II 11 Cruisers — ^-^C^
•• « " Enemy Ships /
9:00Rrt^O
^ermarv'i
Battle
Fleet
Vori Scheer
9:24 PM.
Movements of Jellicoes Forces-3:30 P.M. to 9:30 RM. I1a>3lst.
(as shown in Jellicoe's Official Report) ■
Note: The movements of the German Forces here shown correspond nearly,
but not exactly, with the Information on which plates3ZL and "SII are based.
PLATE X.
106
THE STORY OP THE GREAT WAR
«=> c=> cz> c=>
•C=>c^^
Jeilicoe
^
^£van-ThomA«
\
Beatty Q
^ If VonScheer had refused
his f look, as here indicated,
the cap would have been
avoided, and the parallel f ight
would have been continued with
the whole German fleet- opposed
to Beatty's six battle cruisers.
The British battleships would not
have reached fighting range be-
fore dark, and could not have
interposed between the Germans
QY\cX their base.
I
%
I
\
To Heligoland
160 Miles
What Von Scheer Should Have Done
When British Battleship Fleet was Sighted
NOTE: Compare this with
Plates 301 and 5111.
PLATE XL
LOSSES AND TACTICS 107
ing themselves to be caught in such a trap. In the early part of
the battle the German tactics were all that they should have been.:
In turning south, when Beatty's force was sighted, Von Hipper
was right from every point of view, for he was closing with
Von Scheer while drawing Beatty away from Jellicoe. He was
equally sound a little later when he turned north, for he did not
turn until he had been joined by Von Scheer. He was still sound
when at six o'clock he turned east, refusing to be capped, for
there was as yet no threat of any important increase in the force
to which he was opposed. His mistake — or that of his superior,
Von Scheer — came when the British battleships were sighted to
the northeastward, heading down across his course. He knew, oir
should have known, that he was now opposed by a force over-
whelmingly superior to his own and with considerably higher
speed ; and yet he not only did not attempt to withdraw, but held
his course and allowed himself to be capped, thus deliberately
accepting battle with a greatly superior force and with conditions
the most unfavorable that could have been devised. That he suf-
fered much at this point, as he undoubtedly did, was the result
of his own bad tactics. That he suffered less than he deserved
was the result of the equally bad tactics on the part of his op-
ponent.
As soon as the British battleships were seen approaching the
German fleet should have turned south and proceeded at full
speed (Plate X), not necessarily with intent to refuse battle per-
manently. But with intent to refuse it until conditions could be
made more favorable than they were at this time. There would
have been no difficulty about reproducing on a larger scale the
parallel fight which had marked the earlier phases of the battle ;
and with night coming on and the weather thickening, this would
have reduced the British advantage to a minimum. This plan
would, moreover, have led the British straight toward the mine
and submarine area of the Helgoland Bight; or, if they refused
to be so led, would have made it necessary for them to abandon
the fight.
It is true, of course, that they did abandon the fight in spite
of the great advantage which the German tactics gave them,
108 JHE STORY OP THE GREAT WAR
but it is equally true that the German admiral had no reason
to hope for anything so amazingly fortunate for his reputation
as a tactician.
CHAPTER XIT
DEATH OP LORD KITCHENER — OTHER
EVENTS OP THE SECOND YEAR
THE night of June 7, 1916, a storm raged along the Scottish
shore. There was wind, rain, and high seas. Toward dusk a
British cruiser approached a point on the extreme northerly end
of the coast and took aboard Earl Kitchener, Secretary of State
for War, and his staff. Among those with him were Lieutenant
Colonel Oswald Arthur Fitzgerald, his military secretary ; Brig-
adier General Arthur Ellershaw, one of the war secretary's ad-
visers; Sir Hay Frederick Donaldson, munitions expert, and
Hugh James O'Beime, former counselor at the British embassy
in Petrograd and for some time secretary of the embassy in
.Washington.
The cruiser, which was the Hampshire, of an old class, put
to sea and headed for Archangel, whence Lord Kitchener was to
travel to Petrograd for a war council with the czar and his gen-
erals. About eight o'clock, only an hour after the party em-
barked, a mine or torpedo struck the Hampshire when she was
two miles from land between Merwick Head and Borough Brisay,
west of the Orkney Islands. It is supposed that the cruiser's
magazine blew up. Persons on shore saw a fire break out amid-
ships, and many craft went to her assistance, although a north-
west gale was blowing and the sea was rough.
Four boats got away from the Hampshire ^ all of which were
swamped. According to one report Lord Kitchener and his staff
were lost after leaving the cruiser, but a survivor said that he
was last seen on the bridge with Captain Herbert J. Savill, her
commander. According to this man Kitchener had on a rain-
coat and held a walking stick in his hand. He said that the two
DEATH OF LORD KITCHENER 109
men calmly watched preparations for departure and saw at least
two lifeboats smashed against the ship's side.
Twenty minutes after being torpedoed the Hampshire sank,
with a loss of 300 lives.
On July 9, 1916, two days after the Hampshire went down,
eleven men of the cruiser reached the Orkneys, after forty-eight
hours buffeting by the waves upon a raft. The body of Colonel
Fitzgerald was washed ashore the same day of the sinking, but
the sea did not give up Kitchener or any of the other members
of his staff.
The Italian admiralty made known June 9, 1916, that the
transport Principe Umberto had fallen victim to a submarine in
the Adriatic with a large loss of life. Estimates of the dead ran
from 400 to 500.
King George and Queen Mary attended a memorial service at
St. Paul's in honor of Kitchener on June 13, 1916, when many of
the most prominent officials and citizens of the realm were pres-
ent. They had a large military escort to and from the cathedral
in respect to the dead war minister. Other services were held at
Canterbury and in many cities through the kingdom.
On the night of June 18, 1916, a squadron of Russian sub-
marines, destroyers and torpedo boats surprised a German con-
voy of merchant vessels at a point southeast of Stockholm and
not far from Swedish waters. Owing to the heavy losses of
German shipping in the Baltic practically all Teuton ships in that
sea traveled under escort only, and there was a dozen or more
vessels in the convoy. An engagement took place lasting forty-
five minutes, during which the Russians sank the auxiliary
cruiser Herzmann, capturing her crew and two other craft, one
of which was believed to have been a destroyer. In the confusion
all of the merchant ships reached the Swedish coast and other de-
stroyers and armed trawlers accompanying them made good their
escape. Berlin admitted the loss, adding that the Herzmann's
commander and most of her crew were saved.
During the night of June 16, 1916, the British destroyer Eden
collided with the transport France in the English Channel and
sank. Thirty-one men and officers escaped.
110 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
The German submarine U-35, commanded by Lieutenant von
Arnauld, put into Cartagena, Spain, June 21, 1916, after a 1,500
mile run from Pola with a personal letter to King Alfonso, signed
by Kaiser Wilhelm. The missive bore thanks for the treatment
of German refugees from the Kameruns who had been interned
in Spain, and the submarine also brought hospital supplies for the
fugitives. Its arrival made a strong impression on the Spanish
public and was taken as a new sign of Germany's power. No
such trip ever had been made before for such a purpose. It was
a precedent in the communication of kings.
The British steamship Brussels, carrying freight and a number
of passengers, most of whom were Belgian refugees bound from
Rotterdam to Tillbury, a London suburb, was captured in the
channel by German destroyers and taken to Zeebrugge, Belgium
on the night of June 23, 1916. The incident proved that German
warcraft were again far afield. It was said that the capture had
been made by means of previous information as to the time of
the Brussels sailing and with the aid of a spy. Her course lay
about forty miles north of Zeebrugge, and a suspected passenger
was seen to wave a lantern several times before the destroyers
came up.
Captain Fryatt attempted to ram the nearest vessel and
escape, but the effort failed and he was arrested and charged
with piracy. Germany had announced early in the war that she
would consider any merchant captain who made a hostile move,
even in defense of his vessel, as a f ranc-tireur.
Loss of the Italian auxiliary cruiser Citta di Messina, 3,495
tons, and the French destroyer Fourche was announced by Paris
June 25, 1916. The Messina was carrying troops across the
Strait of Otranto when a submarine torpedoed her. The Fourche,
serving as a convoy, gave pursuit without result, then turned
back to save such survivors as she could. Within a few minutes
she was struck by a second torpedo and sunk. All on board the
two vessels, probably 300 men, were drowned.
The Austrians lost two transports in the harbor of Durazzo,
June 26, 1916, when Italian submarines succeeded in passing the
forts and inflicting a heavy blow. Both ships had troops, arms
Earl Kitchener
iiiiiiiiiiiiii iiiiiiiiii iiiiiiiiti Ill mil iiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiii iiiiiiiii iiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiii iiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiii,=
DEATH OF LORD KITCHENER 111
and ammunition aboard, according to a Rome report. The cas-
ualties were unknown.
Petrograd announced that Russian torpedo craft intercepted
a large convoy of Turkish sailing vessels in the Black Sea on
June 29, 1916, and destroyed fifty-four ships. The attack took
place off the Anatolian coast, and several hundred men were
believed to have been drowned. If the number of ships sunk was
correct it established a record for the war.
The former German warship Goeben, renamed the Sultan
Selim, shelled Tournose, a Russian Black Sea port, on July 3,
1916, and did considerable damage. One steamship in the harbor
went down as a result of shell fire and large oil works near the
city broke into flames. The Breslau, called the Midullu by the
Turks, bombarded Scotchy, a near-by port, about the same time.
Several fires started in the latter city and there were some casu-
alties at both points.
A second Russian hospital ship, the Vperiode, was torpedoed
in the Black Sea, July 9, 1916, with a loss of seven lives. She was
a ship of 850 tons, having accommodations for about 120
wounded. Like the Portugal, sunk by a submarine some weeks
before the Vperiode was plainly marked with the usual Red Cross
emblem. The attack came in daylight and was accepted by the
Russians as having been deliberately made, which once more
aroused the indignation of the Russian people.
Berlin announced July 7, 1916, that the British steamer Les-
tris, outward bound from Liverpool had been captured near the
British East Coast and taken to a German port. This second
capture in the channel within a few days caused considerable
criticism in England.
As dawn was breaking on July 10, 1916, a submarine came
alongside a tug in Hampton Roads and asked for a pilot. The
pilot went aboard and found himself on the subsea freighter
Deutschland, first merchant submarine to be built and the first
to make a voyage. She came from Bremerhaven, a distance of
4,000 miles, in sixteen days. Reports had been current since the
U-35 made her trip to Cartagena that the kaiser would send a
message to President Wilson by an undersea boat. The American
H— War St. 5
112 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
public scouted the idea as being impossible of accomplishment,
but the report persisted, and cities along the Atlantic Coast line
had been on the watch for several days. The Deutschland
eventually turned into Hampton Roads, piloted by a waiting tug,
and tied up at a Baltimore dock.
The submarine, which was the largest ever seen in American
waters, became a seven days' wonder. Captain Paul Koenig and
his twenty-nine men and officers told some interesting stories of
their trip across the ocean. It was said that the Deutschland
could remain submerged for four days. When they got into the
English Channel there was a cordon of warships barring exit
to the Atlantic that made them extremely cautious. So Captain
Koenig let his vessel lay on the bottom of the channel for a day
and a night while the men enjoyed themselves with a phonograph
and rousing German songs. When their enemies thinned out to
some extent the submarine started again on her way and headed
directly for Baltimore, which she reached without special in-
cident.
The Deutschland immediately received the name of supersub-
marine. Some thousand tons of dyes and other valuable products
filled her hold. They were reported to be worth $1,000,000. The
vessel was able to make twelve knots an hour on the surface and
about seven knots when submerged. She traveled most of the way
across on the surface, being under water about one-third of the
time. In addition to her valuable cargo, she brought a special
message from Kaiser Wilhelm to the president.
No other submarine, so far as known, had made a trip of such
distance as the Deutschland up to that time. Longer voyages
have been accredited to several British submarines, but they
were either made with a convoy or broken by stops enroute.
Soon after the beginning of the war, several Australian sub-
marines journeyed from their far-away home ports to the Dar-
danelles, traveling 13,000 miles. They called at various points in
the two Americas. Submarines built in America and assembled
in Canada proceeded from Newfoundland to Liverpool before the
Deutschland crossed the Atlantic, but they had another ship as
convoy.
DEATH OF LORD KITCHENER 113
The Sultan Selim and the Midullu clashed with Russian ships
in the Black Sea, July 11, 1916, sinking four merchant vessels.
They also bombarded harbor works on the Caucasian Coast
near Puab. Both attacking vessels made their escape without
injury.
Vienna reported on the same day the sinking of five British
patrol boats in the Otranto Road, between Italy and Albania, by
the cruiser Novara, Only nine men were saved.
Seaham Harbor, a small coal port near Sunderland, on the
British Channel coast, was shelled by a submarine the night of
July 11, 1916. Thirty rounds of shrapnel started several fires
and caused the death of one woman. Berlin also claimed the
sinking of a British auxiliary cruiser of 7,000 tons and three
patrol vessels on the night of that day. The statement was never
denied in London, and no details were made public as to the fate
of the crews.
The Italian destroyer Impetuoso was torpedoed in the Adri-
atic, July 16, 1916, with a loss of 125 lives.
In retaliation for Turkish attacks upon her hospital ships,
Russia announced July 21, 1916, that she would no longer respect
hospital ships of the Ottomans. It was pointed out that hitherto
all vessels bearing the markings of the Red Crescent Society,
which is the Turkish equivalent of the Red Cross, had been uni-
formly respected. This declaration by Russia implied a depth of
resentment that had swept through all of the allied countries
because of deeds said to have been committed by the Teutons and
their Turkish cohorts. Some few reprisals were taken by France
in the way of air raids in retaliation for the bombardment of open
cities. But this was the first recorded step of Russia in that
direction and foretold a war in which all quarter would dis-
appear.
Two years of fighting had cost both sides heavily upon the sea.
Up to August 1, 1915, according to the best available figures, the
allied navies lost seventy-one warships, with a tonnage of 326,-
855. Great Britain was a sufferer to the extent of forty-two
ships in that first year, aggregating 254,494 tons, represented by
eight battleships, three armored cruisers, four protected cruisers,
114 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
four light cruisers, and twenty-three smaller craft. In the same
period France lost twelve ships of 28,027 tons ; Russia six ships
of 21,775 tons ; Japan seven ships of 4,801, and Italy four ships
of 17,758 tons.
The losses of Germany, Austria and Turkey in 1915 were
placed at eighty-nine ships, with a gross tonnage of 262,791. Of
these Germany lost sixty-nine vessels, aggregating 238,904 tons,
and consisting of one battle cruiser, five armored cruisers, ten
protected cruisers and fifty smaller craft. Austria lost seven
ships of 7,397 tons, and Turkey thirteen ships of 16,490 tons.
Curiously enough the second year's figures show smaller losses
for both sides. The Allies are accredited with forty-one ships
having a tonnage of 202,600, and the Teutonic allies with thirty
three ships, having a tonnage of 125,120. Thirty-four British
ships were sunk, including two battleships, three battle cruisers,
seven protected cruisers, two light cruisers, and seventeen smaller
craft. The other losses were distributed between her partners
in arms.
Germany's loss in 1916 was twenty-six ships — four battle-
ships, one battle cruiser, six protected cruisers, and fifteen
smaller craft, approximating 114,620 tons. The remaining
casualties on the German side were divided between Austria
and Turkey.
These figures do not take into account several vessels claimed
to have been sunk by both sides but are predicated upon known
sea casualties. During the two years Germany sustained a re-
duction of 18.5 of her strength in battleships and battle cruisers
of the dreadnought era, which means ships built since 1904, and
these are the units that really count in modern warfare. Britain
is believed to have lost 6.6 of similar vessels. In light cruisers
her loss was only 5.2 per cent, while Germany was weakened
nearly 45 per cent in that class of vessel. The figures shift for
vessels of an older type, showing a ratio of about two to one
against Great Britain. This is due largely to the Dardanelles
enterprise and because in some instances older craft were as-
signed to many dangerous undertakings where the newer ships
were held in reserve.
DEATH OF LORD KITCHENER 115
In every engagement of any consequence that took place during
the first two years of war, with the single exception of the fight
off Chile, Britain won and Germany lost. But Germany inflicted
greater injury upon her opponent than any other nation in all
the years of Britain's maritime supremacy. The actual material
loss to her enemies was larger than her own. Despite this and
the fact of Germany's strongest efforts Britain still ruled the
waves.
PART III— CAMPAIGN ON THE EASTERN
FRONT
CHAPTER XV
THE EASTERN FRONT AT THE APPROACH
OF SPRING, 1916
IN the preceding volumes we have followed the fates of the
Austrian, German, and Russian armies from the beginning of
the war up to March 1, 1916. Although spring weather does
not set in in any part of the country through which the eastern
front ran until considerable time after that date, events along
the western front, where the Germans were then hammering
away at the gates of Verdun, had shaped themselves in such
a manner that they were bound to influence the plans of the
Russian General Staff. It was, therefore, not much of a surprise
that a Russian offensive should set in previous to the actual
arrival of spring.
As we shall see shortly, the first two weeks or so of March,
1916, saw a renewal of active fighting at many points along
the entire eastern front. But most of this was restricted
during this period to engagements between small bodies
of troops and in most instances amounted to little more than
clashes between patrols. This preliminary period of recon-
noitering was followed by another short period of prepara-
tory work on the part of the Russian armies consisting of artil-
lery attacks on certain selected points and undertaken with a
violence and an apparently unlimited supply of guns and am-
munition such as had not been displayed by the Russian forces
on any previous occasion, and when, after these preliminaries
116
THE EASTERN FRONT 117
the actual offensive was launched, the number of men employed
was proportionally immense.
Before we follow in detail developments along the eastern
front, it will be well for a fuller understanding of these, to
visualize again its location and to determine once more the dis-
tribution of the forces maintaining it on both sides. In it» loca-
tion the eastern front had experienced very little change since
the winter of 1915 had set in and ended active campaigning.
Its northern end now rested on the southwest shore of the Gulf
of Riga at a point about ten miles northwest of the Baltic town
of Pukkum on the Riga-Windau railroad and about thirty
miles northwest of Riga itself. From these it ran in a south-
easterly direction through Schlock, crossed the river Aa where
it touches Lake Babit, passed to the north of the village of
Oley and only about five miles south of Riga, and reached the
Dvina about halfway between Uxkull and Riga. From there
it followed more or less closely the left bank of the Dvina,
passed Friedrichstadt and Jacobstadt to a point just west of
Kalkuhnen, a little town on the bend of the Dvina, opposite
Dvinsk. There it continued, generally speaking, in a southerly
direction, at some points with a slight twist to the east, at
others with a similarly slight turn to the west. It thus passed
just east of Lake Drisviaty, crossed the Disna River at Koziany,
then ran through Postavy and just east of Lake Narotch, crossed
the Viliya River and the Vilna-Minsk railroad at Smorgon, and
reached the Niemen at Lubcha. From thence it passed by the
towns of Korelitchy, Zirin, Luchowtchy and entered the Pripet
Marshes at Lipsk. About ten miles south of the latter town
the line crossed the Oginsky Canal and followed along its west
bank through the town of Teletshany to about the point where
the canal joins the Jasiolda River. From that point the Germans
still maintained their salient that swings about five miles to
the east of the city of Pinsk.
Up to just south of the Pinsk salient, where the line crossed
the Pripet River, it was held, for the Central Powers, almost
exclusively by German troops. Below that point its defense was
almost entirely in the hands of Austro-Hungarian regiments.
118 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
Soon after crossing the Pripet River the line reached the Styr
River and followed its many turns for some thirty miles, now
on its western bank and then again on its eastern shore. This
river was crossed between Czartorysk and Kolki. About thirty
miles south of Kolki, just to the east of the village of 0|yka
the Russians had succeeded in maintaining a small salient, the
apex of which was directed toward their lost fortress of Lutsk
almost twenty miles to the west, while the southern side passed
very close to, that other fortress, Dubno, even though it ran
still some distance to the east of it. Crossing then the Lemberg-
Rovno railroad, the line ran along both banks of the Sokal River
to Ikva and crossed the Galician border near Novo Alexinez.
A short distance south of the border, about twenty miles, it
crossed the Lemberg-Tarnopol railroad, at Jesierne, a little town
about sixty miles east of Lemberg and less than twenty miles
west of Tamopol. Ten miles further south the Strypa River was
crossed and followed within a mile or so along its west bank for
a distance of some twenty miles, passing west of Burkanow
and Buczacz. Just south of the latter town the line overspread
both banks of the Strypa up to its junction with the Dniester,
thence along the banks of this stream for almost twenty miles
to a point about ten miles west of the junction of the Sereth
River with the Dniester. At that point the line took another
slight turn to the east, passing just east of the city of Czemowitz,
and crossing at that point the river Pruth into the Austrian
province of Bukowina. Less than ten miles southeast of Czer-
novitz the border of Rumania was reached near Wama and
thereby the end of the line.
As the crow flies, the length of this line, from the Gulf of
Riga to the Rumanian border was six hundred and twenty
miles. Actually, counting its many turns and twists and sa-
lients, it covered more than seven hundred and fifty miles.
From the Gulf to the Pripet River the eastern front was held
by German troops with one single exception.
From there an Austrian army corps with only a very slight
admixture of German troops completed the front of the Central
Empires down to the Bessarabian border.
THE EASTERN FPwONT
119
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DANZI
A U'S T.R I Ki au N C?>^^
-;X/y;4r/,'iH!\V\ ^<)^ '
sc<q^L.E OF r^iLEs
o 20 50 100
w<iB» FRONTIERS
■■■■■ BATTLE LINE
AUGUST 15. 1916
• ••• LINE A5 IT WAS BEFORE
RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE juNesigie
J^\ BOTOSHANI
EASTERN BATTLE FRONT, AUGUST, 1916
120 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
From the Gulf of Riga down to the Oginski Canal five distinct
German army corps were facing the Russians. The most north-
ern of these covered the Gulf section and the Dvina front down
to a point near Friedrichstadt. The second group was lined up
from that point on down to somewhere just south of Lake Dris-
viaty, the third from Lake Drisviaty to the Viliya River, the
fourth from the Viliya River to the Niemen River, and the fifth
from the Niemen to the Oginski Canal. Generals von Scholz,
von Eichhorn, von Fabeck, and von Woyrsch, were in command
of these difficult units, with Field Marshal von Hindenburg in
supreme command. The sector south of the Oginski Canal and
up to the Pripet River was held by another army group under
the command of Field Marshal Prince Leopold of Bavaria.
The first Austrian army corps, forming the left wing of the
front held by the Austro-Hungarian forces, was commanded by
Archduke Joseph Ferdinand. Later on, as the rapid success of
the Russian offensive made it necessary for German troops to
come to the assistance of their sorely pressed allies. General
von Linsingen was dispatched from the north with reenforce-
ments and assumed supreme command of this group of armies
located in Volhjmia. The command of the Galician front was
in the hands of the Bavarian general, Count von Bothmer,
while the forces fighting in the Bukowina were directed by
General Pflanzer.
On the Russian side of the line General Kuropatkin, well
known from the Russo-Japanese War, was in command of the
northern half of the front. Of course, there were a number of
other generals under him in charge of the various sectors of
this long line. But on account of the comparative inactivity
which was maintained most of the time along this line, their
niames did not figure largely. South of the Pripet Marshes
General Alexeieff was in supreme command. Under him were
General Brussilov and General Kaledin in Volhjmia, General
Sakharoff in Galicia, and the Cossack General Lechitsky in the
Bukowina along the Dniester. Here, too, of course were a num-
ber of other commanders who, however, came into prominence
only occasionally.
THE EASTERN FRONT 121
An intimate view of some of the Russian generals and their
troops is presented in the following description from the pen
of the official English press representative :
'The head of the higher command, General Alexeieff, early
in the Galician campaign clearly proved, as chief of staff to
General Ivanoff , his extraordinary capacity to direct an advance.
As commander on the Warsaw front he made it evident that
he could, with an army short of all material things, hold until
the last moment an enemy equipped with everything, and then
escape the enemy's clutches. At Vilna he showed his technique
by again eluding the enemy.
"General Kaledin, the commander of the army on the Koyel
front, is relatively a new figure in important operations. At
the beginning of the war, as commander of a cavalry division, his
universal competence in all operations committed to his care
brought him rapid promotion, until now he is the head of this
huge army. Meeting him frequently as a guest, I have come
to feel great confidence in this resolute, quiet man, who is sur-
rounded by a sober, serious staff, each officer picked for his
past performance.
"I note an infinite improvement since last year in the army.
In the first place I see no troops without rifles, and there is no
shortage of ammunition apparent. Then there is ,an extraor-
dinary improvement in the organization of the transport. In
spite of the large volume of troops on this front they are moving
with less confusion than the transport of single corps entailed
two years ago. The compact organization of munition columns^
and the absence of wasted time have speeded up communications
fully fifty per cent, enabling three units to be moved as easily
as two last year.
**The transport has been further improved by the addition of
motor vehicles. The staff organization is incomparably better
than at the beginning of the war, and I have not seen a single
staff on this front which is not entirely competent. The system
of transporting the wounded has been well organized, and vast
numbers are being cleared from the front stations without con-
fusion or congestion.
122 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
"In comparison I can recall the early Galician days when
unimagined numbers of wounded, both our own and Austrian,
flooded Lemberg in a few days, and there were countless casu-
alties. In spite of the numbers of wounded here I have not
seen any congestion, and I find all the clearing stations cleared
within a few hours after every fight, the wounded passing to
base hospitals and being evacuated into the interior of Russia
with great promptness.
"Owing to the few good roads and the distance from the rail-
way of much of the fighting, in many places the wounded have
been obliged to make trips of two or three days in peasants' carts
before reaching the railways.
"Finally, the morale of the army has reached an unexampled
pitch. In the hospitals which I inspected with the general many
of the wounded, even those near death, called for news of the
front, asking if the trenches were taken, and saying they were
willing to die if the Germans were only beaten. Such sentiments
typify fhe extent to which this conflict is now rooted in the
hearts of the Russian army and people."
CHAPTER XVI
THE RUSSIAN M AR C H — -0 F FE N S I VE
FROM RIGA TO PINSK
BEGINNING with March 1, 1916, active campaigning was
renewed along the eastern front. CHmatic conditions, of
course, made any extensive movements impossible as yet. But
from here and there reports came of local attacks, of more fre-
quent clashes between patrols, and of renewed artillery activity.
Some of these occurred in the Bukowina, in Bessarabia, and in
Galicia, others in the neighborhood of Baranovitchy, north of
the Pripet Marshes, and, later, toward the middle of March,
1916, fighting took place at the northernmost point of the line,
near Lake Babit.
THE RUSSIAN MARCH 123
It was not until March 17, 1916, however, that it became more
apparent what was the purpose of the many encounters between
Russian and German patrols that had been officially reported
with considerable regularity since the beginning of March. On
March 17, 1916, both the German and Austro-Hungarian official
statements reported increased Russian artillery fire all along the
line. On the following day, March 18, 1916, the Russians started
a series of violent attacks. The first of these was launched in the
sector south of Dvinsk. This is the region covered witk a number
of small marshy lakes that had seen a great deal of the most
desperate fighting in 1915. With great violence Russian infantry
was thrown against the German lines that ran from Lake Dris-
viaty south to the town of Postavy; another attack of equal
strength developed still further south along both banks of Lake
Narotch. But the German lines not only held, but threw back
the attacking forces with heavy losses which, according to the
German official statement of that day were claimed to have num-
bered at Lake Narotch alone more than 9,000 in dead.
In spite of these heavy losses and of the determined German
resistance, the Russians repeated the attack with even increased
force on March 19, 1916. At Lake Drisviaty, in the neighborhood
of Postavy and between Lake Vishnieff and Lake Narotch attack
after attack was launched with the greatest abandon. This time
the Germans not only repulsed all these attacks, but promptly
launched a counterattack near Vidzy, a little country town on the
Vilna-Dvinsk post road, capturing thereby some 300 men. The
German official statement claimed that these prisoners belonged
to seven different Russian regiments, giving thereby an indication
of the comparatively large masses of troops employed on the
Russian side.
Again on March 30, 1916, new attacks were launched in the
same locality. At one point the Germans were forced to with-
draw a narrow salient which protruded to a considerable distance
just south of Lake Narotch. Russian machine guns had been
placed in such positions that they enfiladed the salient in three
directions and made it untenable. The German line here was
withdrawn a few hundred feet toward the heights of Blisuiki.
124 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
During the night of March 20, 1916, especially violent attacks
were again launched against the German lines between Postavy
and Vileity, a small village to the northwest of that town. There
the Russians succeeded in gaining a foothold in the German
trenches. During the afternoon the Russians attempted to extend
this success. With renewed violence they trained their guns on
the German positions. In order to throw back a strong German
counterattack, a curtain of fire was laid before the trenches
stormed earlier in the day. At the same time German artillery
strongly supported the attack of their infantry. On both sides
the gunfire became so violent that single shots could not be dis-
tinguished any longer. Shrapnel exploded without cessation and
rifle fire became so rapid that it sounded hardly less loudly than
the gunfire. Late in the afternoon the Germans succeeded in re-
taking the trenches which they had lost in the morning, capturing
at that time the Russian victors of the morning to the number
of 600.
On the same day, March 21, 1916, the Russians extended the
sphere of their attack. At the same time that they were hammer-
ing away at the German lines south of Dvinsk other attacks were
launched all along the northern front. In the Riga region, near
the village of Plakanen, as well as in the district south of Dahlen
Island, heavy engagements were fought. Farther south, be-
tween Friedrichstadt and Jacobstadt, on the south bank of the
Dvina River the Russians captured a village and wood east of
Augustinhof.
At many other points, along the entire eastern front from Lake
Narotch south attacks developed. In most of these the Russians
assumed the initiative. But here and there — ^near Tverietch, just
south of Vidzy ; along Lake Miadziol, just north of Lake Narotch,
and around Lake Narotch itself — ^the Germans attempted a series
of counterattacks which, however, yielded no tangible results.
All in all, the day's fighting made little change in the respective
positions and the losses in men were about evenly divided.
The violence and energy with which the Russian attacks during
March were executed may readily be seen from reports of special
correspondents, who were behind the German lines at that pe-
THE RUSSIAN MARCH 125
viod. Their collective testimony also tends to confirm the German
claims that very large Russian forces were used and that their
losses were immense.
**From Riga to the Rumanian border/' says one of these eye-
witnesses, "thundered the crashing of guns. . . . About sev-
enty miles northeast of Mitau, a chain of lakes runs through the
wooded, swampy country, narrow, long bodies of water follow
the course of Mjadsjolke River, a natural trench in a region that
is otherwise a very difficult territory by nature. In the south the
chain is closed by Lake Narotch, a large secluded body of water
of some thirty-five square miles, through which now runs the
front. In the north of this chain of lakes, near the village of Pos-
tavy, a thundering of guns commenced on the morning of March
18, 1916, such as the eastern front had hardly ever heard before.
Russian drum fire! From out of the woods, across the ice and
snow water of the swamps, line after line came storming against
the German trenches. ... On the same day, farther south, be-
tween Lakes Narotch and Vishnieff another Russian attack was
launched. . . . The losses of the Russians are immense. More than
5,000 dead and wounded must be lying before our positions only
about ten miles wide. During the night a lull came. But with the
break of dawn the drum fire broke out once more, and again the
waves of infantry rolled up against our positions. . . . During the
night from March 19 to March 20, 1916, the drum fire of the Rus-
sian guns increased to veritable fury. As if the entire supply of
ammunition collected throughout the winter months were to be
used up all at once, shells continuously shrieked and howled
through the darkness: 50,000 hits were counted in one single
sector. . . .**
Another correspondent writes : "The numbers of the Russians
are immense. They have about ^ixty infantry divisions ready.
Their losses are in proportion and were estimated on a front
of about ninety miles to have been near to 80,000 men. For in-
stance, against one German cavalry brigade there were thrown
seven regiments with a very narrow front, but eight lines deep.
Four times they came rushing on against the German barbed-
wire obstacles without being able to break through, but losing
I
126 THE STORY OP THE GREAT WAR
some 3,000 men just the same. ... On March. 24, 1916, 6,000
Russian shells were counted in a small sector on the Dvinsk
front."
In the latter sector and to the north of it, heavy fighting had
developed on March 22 and 23, 1916. Especially around Jacol>
stadt, attack followed attack, both sides taking turns in assuming
the offensive. The Russian attacks were particularly violent
during the evening and night of March 22, 1916, and in some
places resulted in the temporary invasion of the German first-
line trenches. Especially hard was fighting along the Jaco.bstadt-
Mitau railroad. Between Dvinsk and Lake Drisviaty a violent
artillery and rifle duel was kept up almost continuously, resulting
at one point, just below Dvinsk near Shishkovo, in the breaking
up of a German attack. South of the lake, at the village of Mint-
siouny, however, a German attack succeeded and drove the Rus-
sians out of some trenches which they had gained only the day
before. Here, too, both artillery and rifle fire of great violence
carried death into both the Russian and German ranks. At Vidzy,
a few miles farther south, the Russians stormed four times in
quick succession against the German positions. Northwest of
Postavy another Russian attack failed, the Germans capturing
over 900 men and officers at that particular point. On the other
hand, a German attack still farther south and northwest of Lake
Narotch was repulsed and the Russians made slight gains in the
face of a most violent fire. Near the south shore of Lake Narotch
a German attack supported by asphyxiating gas forced back
the Russians on a very narrow front for a very short distance.
From Lake Narotch down to the Pripet Marshes the Russians
maintained a lively cannonade at many points without, however,
making any attacks in force.
During March 23, 1916, a determined Russian attack against
the bridgehead at Jacobstadt broke down under the heavy Ger-
man gunfire. During the night repeated Russian attacks to the
north of the Jacobstadt-Mitau railroad a surprise attack south-
west of Dvinsk and violent attacks along the Dvinsk- Vidzy
sector suffered the same fate, although in some instances the
Russian troops succeeded in coming right up to the German
THE RUSSIAN MARCH 127
barbed-wire obstacles. Between Lake Narotch and Lake Vish-
nieff the Russians captured some woods after driving out German
forces which had constructed strong positions there.
Without cessation the Russian attacks continued day by day.
Fresh troops were l^rought up continuously. The munition sup-
ply, which in the past had been one of the chief causes of Russian
failure and disaster, seemed to have become suddenly inexhaust-
ible. Not only was each attack carefully and extensively prepared
by the most violent kind of artillery fire, but the latter was di-
rected also against those German positions which at that time
were immune from attack on account of the insurmountable
natural difficulties brought about by climatic conditions. For by
this time winter began to break up and ice and snow commenced
to meet, signifying the rapid approach of the spring floods. To a
certain extent these climatic conditions undoubtedly had an im-
portant influence on Russian plans. Almost along the entire
northern part of the front the Germans possessed one great
advantage. Their positions were located on higher and drier
ground than those of the Russians, whose trenches were on low
ground, and would become next to untenable, once thaw and
spring floods would set in in earnest. There is little doubt that
the great energy and superb disregard of human life which the
Russian commanders developed throughout the March offensive
were principally the result of their strong desire to get their
forces on better ground before it was too late or too difficult, and
from a tactical point of view the risks which they took at that
time and the price which they seemed to be willing to pay to
achieve their ends were not any too great.
In spite of the lack of any important success the Russian at-
tacks against the Jacobstadt sector were renewed on March 24,
1916. But the German guns had shot themselves in so well that
it availed nothing. Other attacks, attempted to the southwest
of Dvinsk and at various points north of Vidzy suffered the same
fate. In the neighborhood of Lake Narotch Russian activities on
that day were restricted to artillery fire.
The Germans assumed the offensive on March 25, 1916, on the
Riga-Dvinsk sector. Their guns were trained against Schlock, a
I— War St. 5
128 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
small town on the south shore of the Gulf of Riga, just northwest
of Lake Babit, against the bridgehead at Uxkull, fifteen miles
southeast of Riga on the Dvina, and against a number of other
positions between that point and Jacobstadt. A German attempt
to gain ground north of the small sector of the Mitau-Jacobstadt
railway, that was still in Russian hands, failed in the face of a
devastating Russian cannonade. A German trench was captured
by Russian infantry ably supported by artillery west of Dvinsk,
but neither southwest nor south of this fortress were the Rus-
sians able to register any success. Northwest of Postavy and be-
tween Lake Narotch and Lake Vishnieff heavy fighting still con-
tinued and in some places developed into hand-to-hand fighting
between smaller detachments. From Lake Narotch down to the
Pripet Marshes German and Russian guns again raked the
trenches facing them.
On March 26, 1916, the following day, the Russians attacked
at many points. Northwest of Jacobstadt, near the village of
Augustinhof, a most violent attack brought no results. North-
west of Postavy the Russians stormed two trenches. Southwest
of Lake Narotch repeated heavy attacks were repulsed and some
West Prussian regiments recovered an important observation
point which they had lost a week before. Over 2,100 officers and
men were captured that day by the Germans. Aeroplanes of the
latter also resumed activity and dropped bombs on the stations
at Dvinsk, and Vileika, as well as along the Baranovitchy-Minsk
railroad.
Russian artillery carried death and destruction into the Ger-
man trenches on March 27, 1916, before Oley, south of Riga,
and before the Uxkull bridgehead. In the Jacobstadt sector, as
well as near Postavy, violent engagements, launched now by the
Germans and then again by the Russians, occurred all day long
without yielding any results to either side. Southwest of Lake
Narotch the Russians made a determined attack with two di-
visions against the positions captured by German regiments on
the previous day, but were not able to dislodge the latter. Fight-
ing also developed now in the Pripet Marshes and the territory
immediately adjoining. Weather conditions were rapidly chang-
THE RUSSIAN MARCH 129
ing for the .worse all along" the eastern front. Thaw set in, and
all marsh and lake ground was flooded. Everywhere, not only in
the southern region, but also in the northern, the ice on the rivers
and lakes became covered with water and was getting soft near
the banks. Throughout the northern region the melting of the
thickly lying snow in the roads was making the movements of
troops and artillery extraordinarily difficult.
As a result of these conditions, which were growing more
difficult every day, a decided decrease in activity became imme-
diately noticeable on both sides. For quite a time fighting, of
course, continued at various points. But both the numbers of
men employed as well as the intensity of their effort steadily
increased.
Before Dvinsk and just south of the fortress artillery fire
formed the chief event on March 28, 1916. But south of Lake
Narotch the Russians still kept up their attacks. At one point,
where the Germans had gained a wood a few days ago the
Russian forces attacked seven times in quick succession and
thereby recovered the southern part of the forest. Along the
Oginski Canal fighting was conducted at long range. G^erman
aeroplanes again dropped .bombs, this time on the stations at
Molodetchna on the Minsk- Vilna railroad, as well as at Politzy
and Luniniets.
Both March 30 and 31, 1916, were marked by a noticeable
cessation of attacks on either side. Long-range rifle fire and ar-
tillery cannonades, however, took place at many points from the
Gulf down to the Pripet Marshes. German aeroplanes again at-
tacked a number of stations on railroads leading out of Minsk
to western points.
Of all the violent fighting which took place during the second
half of March, 1916, along the northern half of the eastern front,
the little village of Postavy, perhaps, saw more than any other
point. The special correspondent of a Chicago newspaper wit-
nessed a great deal of this remarkably desperate struggle during
his stay with Field Marshal von Hindenburg's troops. His vivid
description, which follows, will give a good idea of the valor
displayed both by German and Russian troops, as well as of the
130 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
immense losses incurred by the attackers during this series of
battles lasting ten days.
"Despite the artillery, despite the machine guns and despite
the infantry fire, the apparently inexhaustible regiments of
Russians swept on over the dead, over the barbed-wire barriers
before the German line, over the first trenches and routed the
German soldiers, who were half frozen in the mud of their shat-
tered shelters. A terrible hand-to-hand conflict followed. Hand
grenades tore down scores of defenders and assailants* attacks.
The men fought like maniacs with spades, bayonets, knives and
clubbed guns.
"But the Russians won at a fearful price for so slight a gain.
They stopped within a hundred feet of victory. It may have
been lack of discipline, lack of officers or lack of reserves; no
one knows.
"The Russians seemed helpless in the German trenches. In-
stead of sweeping on to the second lines they tried to intrench
themselves in the wrecked German first line. Immediately Ger-
man artillery hurled shells of the heaviest caliber into those lines
and tore them into fragments.
"Then came the reserves and by nightfall the Russians had
again been driven out.
"Four days later, suddenly without warning, a mud-colored
wave began to pour forth from the forest. It was a line of Rus-
sians three ranks deep containing more than 1,000 men. Behind
this was a second wave like the first, and then a third.
"The German artillery tore holes in the ranks, which merel>'
closed up again, marched on, and made no attempt to fire. They
marched as though on parade. 'It was magnificent but criminal !'
said a German officer.
"When a fourth line emerged from the woods the German
artillery dropped a curtain of fire behind it, and then a similar
wall of shells ahead of those in front. They then moVed these
two walls closer together with a hail of shrapnel between them,
while at the same time they cut loose with the machine guns.
"The splendid formation of Russians, trapped between the
walls of fire, scattered heedlessly in vain. Shells gouged deep
THE RUSSIAN MARCH l^l
holes in the dissolving ranks. The air was filled with clamor and
frantic shrieks were sometimes heard above the incessant roar
and cracking of exploding projectiles.
"Defeated men sought to dig themselves into the ground in the
foolish belief that they could find safety there from this deluge
of shells. Others raced madly for the rear and some escaped in
this way as if by a miracle. Still others ran toward the German
lines only to be cut down by the German machine-gun fire.
"In less than twenty minutes the terrible dream was over. The
attack had cost the Russians 4,000 lives, and yet not a Russian
soldier had come within 600 yards of the German line."
Another important feature of the March offensive, especially
in its early phases, was the patrol work, executed on both sides.
This required not only courage of the highest order, but also a
high degree of intelligence on the part of the leader as well as of
the men working under him. The results obtained by patrol
work are, of course, of the greatest importance to the respective
commanding officers, and many times the way in which such a
mission is carried out is the decisive factor in bringing success
or failure to an important movement. At the same time patrol
work is, of course, a matter of chiefly local importance, and no
matter how difficult the problem or how cleverly it is solved it is
only on rare occasions that the result reaches the outside world,
even though a collection of detailed reports which patrol leaders
are able to make would form a story that would put to shadow
the most impossible book of fiction or the most unbeliev^^ble
adventure film.
The following two descriptions of such work, therefore, make
not oiily a highly sensational story, but prove also that war in
modem times relies almost as much on personal valor and ini-
tiative as in times gone by, all claims to the contrary notwith-
standing, and in spite of the wonderful technical progress which
military science of our times shares with all other sciences.
An American special newspaper correspondent with Von Hin-
denburg's army reports the following occurrences and also gives
a vivid pen picture of conditions in the territory immediately
behind the front:
132 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
"In a forest near the town of Lyntupy a patrol of thirteen
Russian spies hid in an abandoned German dugout in the course
of a night march southward to destroy a bridge over the river
Viliya with high explosives.
"Desperate for food, they finally intrusted their safety to a
Polish forester, ordering him to bring food. The forester
promptly gave the Germans information. The Germans sur-
rounded the dugout, throwing in three hand grenades. On enter-
ing the dugout they discovered ten Russians killed by grenades
and three by bullets.
"The Russian lieutenant had shot two comrades not killed by
grenades and then himself, in order to escape execution as spies,
for the patrol was not in uniform.
"Another audacity was performe'd during a Russian attack
on the German trenches. From the darkness came a voice calling
in perfect German, What is the matter with you? Are you
soldiers? Are you Germans? Are you men? Why don't you get
forward and attack the Russians? Are you afraid?*
"Bewildered by these words coming up to them direct from
the nearest wire entanglements, the Germans turned a search-
light in the direction, discovering the speaker to be a Russian
officer who had taken his life in his hands on the chance of
drawing the Germans from the trenches. His audacity cost him
his life, for instantly he fell before a volley of bullets.
"The Germans speak well of the marksmanship of considerable
bodies of the Russian infantry. Personally, I can say they shoot
as well as I have any desire to have men shoot when aiming at
me. Twice on Friday I was sent scurrying off exposed ridges by
the waspish whisper of bullets coming from a Russian position
jutting from the south shore of Lake Miadziol.
"There is not only railroad building, but also much farming
going on around Karolinow. The land for a distance of thirty
miles has been divided into thirteen farm districts by the Ger-
mans and planted to iwtatoes, rye, oats and summer barley. In
many parts the Germans are taking a census, all their methodi-
calness contributing vastly to the troops' comfort and happiness.
Their health is amazing. The records of one division show five
AUSTRO-RUSSIAN OPERATIONS 133
sick men daily, which is not as many as one would find in any
town of 20,000 in any part of the world.
"German caution and inventiveness also keep down the casual-
ties marvelously. Records I saw to-day showed thirty-eight
wounded in one division in the month of March, though the di-
vision was attacked twice during the offensive. The percentage
of heavily wounded for all the German troops in this region in
the last three months averages seven.
"Despite the horrible roads, Field Marshal von Hindenburg
has penetrated to numerous villages on the front in the last few
days to greet and thank the troops. Returning to his head-
quarters Von Hindenburg attended a banquet given by princes,
nobles and generals of the empire to mark the fiftieth year of
the field marshal's army service. Present amid the notables was
a private soldier, in civil life a blacksmith, who was elected with
two officers by their comrades to represent Von Hindenburg's
old regiment at the banquet. The private was chosen because he
had been in all the battles, but never had been wounded and
never sick. He wears the Iron Cross of both classes."
CHAPTER XVII
RESUMPTION OP AUSTRO-RUSSIAN"
OPERATIONS
JUST as was the case along the Russo-German line, consider-
able local fighting took place during the early part of March,
to the south, along the Austro-Russian front. Here, too, much
of it was between scouting parties and advanced outposts who
attempted to feel out each other's strength. Occasionally one
or the other side would launch an attack, with small forces, which,
however, had little influence on general conditions, even though
the fighting always was furious and violent.
On March 4, 1916, a detachment of Russian scouts belonging
to General Ivanoff's army captured and occupied an advanced
134 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
Austrian trench, close to the bridgehead of Michaleze, to the
northeast of the town of Uscieszko on the Dniester River. Aus-
trian forces immediately atteinpted to regain this position,
launching three separate attacks against it. But the Russian
troops held on to their slight gain. Near by, in the neighborhood
of Zamnshin on the Dniester, Russian engineers had constructed
elaborate mining works which were exploded on the same day,
doing considerable damage to the Austrian defense works, and
enabling the Russian forces to occupy some advanced Austrian
trenches.
During the next two weeks considerable fighting of this
nature occurred at many points along the front from the Pripet
Marshes down to the Dniester. At no time, however, were the
forces engaged on either side very numerous, nor did the results
change the front materially. The various engagements coming
so early in the year, quite some time before spring could be ex-
pected, signified, however, that there were more important un-
dertakings in the air. The fact that the Russians were es-
pecially active in these scouting expeditions — for they really
amounted to little more at that time — rather pointed toward
an early resumption of the offensive on their part.
It was, therefore, not at all surprising that, before long, a
considerable increase in Russian artillery activity became notice-
able. About the middle of March, coincident with a similar in-
crease of artillery attacks along the German-Russian front, the
Russian guns in South Poland, Galicia, and the Bukowina be-
gan to thunder again as they had not done since the fall of 1915.
This was especially done along the Dniester River and the Bes-
sarabian front.
During the night of March 17, 1916, the Austrian position
near Uscieszko, which had been attacked before in the early
part of March, again was subjected to extensive attacks
by means of mines and to a considerable amount of shelling.
This was a strongly fortified position, guar<iing a bridgehead
on the Dniester, which had been held by the Austrians ever since
October, 1915. The mining operations W(ire so successfully
planned and executed that the Austrian^ were forced to with-
AUSTRO-RUSSIAN OPERATIONS 135
draw a short distance, when the Russians followed the explosion
of their mines with a determined attack with hand grenades.
In spite of this, however, the Austrians held the major part of
this position until March 19, 1916.
How furious the lighting was on both sides is indicated in
the official Austrian statement announcing on March 20, 1916,
the final withdrawal from this position:
"Yesterday evening, after six months of brave defense, the
destroyed bridge and fortifications to the northwest of Uscieszko
(on the Dniester) were evacuated. Although the Russians
succeeded in the morning in exploding a breach 330 yards in
width, the garrison, which was attacked by an eightfold su-
perior force, despite all losses held out for seven hours in a
most violent gun and infantry fire.
"Only at 5 o'clock in the afternoon the commandant, Colonel
Planckh, determined to evacuate the destroyed fortifications.
Smaller detachments and the wounded reached the south bank
of the Dniester by means of boats. Soon, however, this means
of transport had to be given up, owing to the concentrated fire
of the enemy.
"There remained for our brave troops, composed of the Kaiser
Dragoons and sappers, only one outlet if they were to evade
capture. They had to cut their way through Uscieszko, which
was strongly occupied by the enemy, to our troops ensconced on
the heights north of Zaleszczyki. The march through the enemy
position succeeded. Under cover of night Colonel Planckh led
his heroic men toward our advanced posts northwest of
Zaleszczyki, where he arrived early this morning."
During the next few days the fire from the Russian batteries
increased still more in violence. It did not, however, at any
time or place assume the same strength which it had reached
by that time at many points along the Russo-German front,
north of the Pripet Marshes. Nor, indeed, did the Russians
duplicate in the south their attempt at a determined offensive
which they were making then in the north.
Considering the relative importance of Russian activities
during the month of March, 1916, most of the engagements
136 THE STORT OF THE GREAT WAR
which took place in Galicia and Volhynia must be classed as
unimportant. On March 21, 1916, it is true, abnost the entire
Austrian front was subjected to extensive artillery fire. But
only at a few points was this followed by infantry attacks, and
these were executed with small detachments only. Along the
Strypa River Russian forces attempted to advance at various
points, without gaining any ground.
Throughout the following days many engagements between
individual outposts were again reported. On March 27, 1916,
a Russian attempt to capture Austrian positions near Bojan,
after destroying some of the fortifications by mines, failed. A
similar fate met the attempt made during that night to cross
the Strypa River at its junction with the Dniester. Other parts
of the front, especially near Olyka and along the Bessarabian
border, were again subjected to heavy artillery fire.
Although, generally speaking, the Austrians restricted them-
selves in most instances to a determined resistance against all
Russian attacks, they took the offensive in some places, without,
however, making any more headway than their adversaries.
By the end of March, 1916, aeroplanes became more active on
this part of the front, just as they did further north. On March
28, 1916, both sides report more or less successful bombing
expeditions, which on that day seemed to bring better results
to the Austrians than to the Russians, though these operations,
too, must be considered of minor importance. Increasingly bad
weather now began to hamper further undertakings, just as it
did in the north, and by March 31, 1916, the Russian activities
seemed to have lost most of their energy. Along the entire
southeastern front thaw set in and the snows were melting.
Although the territory along the Austro-Russian front, south
of the Pripet Marshes, is not as difficult as further north, not
being equally swampy, the fact that the line ran to a great
extent along rivers and through a mountainous, or at least hilly
country, resulted in difficulties hardly less serious. Rivers and
creeks which only a few weeks before held little water suddenly
became torrents and caused a great deal of additional suffering
to the troops on both sides by invading their trenches.
AUSTRO-RUSSIAN OPERATIONS 137
The Russian offensive had barely slowed down when the
Austrians themselves promptly assumed offensive operations.
But here, too, it must be borne in mind that, although we used
the word offensive, operations were altogether on a minor scale
and restricted to local engagements. Some of the heaviest fight-
ing of this period occurred near the town of Olyka, on the
Rovno-Brest-Litovsk railroad. Just south of this place repeated
Austrian attacks were launched against a height held by the
Russians, both on April 1 and 2, 1916, but they were promptly
repulsed.
On April 3, 1916, another attack in that neighborhood, this
time northeast of Olyka, near the villages of Bagnslavka and
Bashlyki, also failed to carry the Austrians into the Russian
trenches. On the same day Austrian attacks were reported
northwest of Kremenets on the Ikva, along the Lemberg-
Tarnopol railway and in the vicinity of Bojan. Against all of
these the Russian troops successfully maintained their positions.
Austrian aeroplanes continued their bombing expeditions
against some of the more important places immediately to the
rear of the Russian front, without, however, inflicting any very
important damage.
Again a comparative lull set in. Of course, artillery duels
as well as continuous fighting between scouting parties and out-
posts took place even during that period. But attacks in force
were rare, and then restricted to local points only. The latter
were made chiefly by the Austrians, but did not lead to anything
of importance. The official Russian statements report such
engagements on April 6, 1916, near Lake Sosno, south of Pinsk,
along the upper Strypa in Galicia, and north of Bojan. On
April 7, 1916, an Austrian offensive attack attempted with con-
siderable force on the middle Strypa, east of Podgacie, in
Galicia, did not even reach the first line of the Russian trenches.
On April 9, 1916, the Russians captured some Austrian trenches
in the region of the lower Strypa, and on April 11, 1916, re-
pulsed Austrian attacks north and south of the railway station
of Olyka. Once more comparative quiet set in along the
southern part of the eastern front, broken only by engagements
138 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
between outposts and by a considerable increase in aeroplane
activity.
But on April 13, 1916, the Russians again began to hammer
away against the Austrian lines. A violent artillery attack waa
launched against the Austrian positions on the lower Strypa,
on the Dniester and to the northwest of Czemowitz, and the
Austrians were forced to withdraw some of their advanced posi-
tions to their main position northeast of Jaslovietz. Southeast
of Buczacz an Austrian counterattack failed. A height at the
mouth of the Strypa, called Tomb of Popoff, fell into the hands
of the Russian troops. Both Austrian and Russian aeroplanes
dropped bombs, without however inflicting any serious damage,
even though the Russians officially announced that as many as
fifty bombs fell on Zuczka — about half a mile outside of Czerno-
witz — and on North Czernowitz.
On April 14, 1916, the Russian artillery attacks on the lower
Strypa, along the Dniester and near Czemowitz, were repeated.
Again the Russians launched attacks against the advanced
Austrian trenches at the mouth of the Strypa and southeast of
Buczacz. An advanced Russian position on the road between
that town and Czortkov was occupied by the Austrians.
For the balance of April, 1916, comparative quiet again ruled
along the southeastern front. The muddy condition of the roads
made extensive movements practically impossible. Outposts en-
gagements, artillery duels, aeroplane bombardments, isolated
attacks on advanced trenches and field works, of course, contin-
ued right along. But both success and failure were only of local
importance, so that the official reports in most cases did not even
mention the location of these engagements.
On the last day of April, 1916, however, the army of Arch-
Duke Joseph Ferdinand started a new strong offensive move-
ment north of Mouravitzy on the Ikva in Volhynia. Heavy
and light artillery prepared the way for an attack in consider-
able force against Russian trenches which formed a salient at
that point, west of the villages of Little and Great Boyarka.
The Russians had to give ground, but soon afterward started
a strong counterattack, supported by heavy artillery fire, and
AUSTRO-RUSSIAN OPERATIONS 139
regained the lost ground, capturing some 600 officers and men.
In the southern half of the eastern front, just as in the north-
em half, there was little change in the character of fighting with
the coming of May and the improvement in the weather. Ar-
tillery duels, aeroplane attacks, scouting expeditions, and local
infantry attacks of limited extent and strength were daily oc-
currences.
On May 1, 1916, Austro-Hungarian detachments were forced
to withdraw from their advanced positions to the north of the
village of Mlynow. This place is located on the Ikva River,
some ten miles northwest of the fortress of Dubno. Here the
Russians had made a slight gain on April 28, 1916, and when
they made an attack with superior forces from their newly
fortified positions, they were able to drive back the Austro-
Hungarians still a little bit farther.
Twenty miles farther north, in the vicinity of Olyka, the little
town about halfway between the fortress of Lutsk and Rovno,
on the railway line connecting these two points, the Russian
forces reported slight progress on May 2, 1916. Northwest of
Kremenets, in the Ikva section, Austro-Hungarian engineers
succeeded in exploding mines in front of the Russian txenches.
But the Russians themselves promptly utilized this accomplish-
ment by rushing out of their trenches and making an advanced
trench of their own out of the mine craters dug for them by
their enemies.
Two days later, on May 4, 1916, the Russians were able to
improve still more their new positions southeast of Olyka sta-
tion, and to gain some more ground there. Repeated Austro-
Hungarian counterattacks were repulsed. The same fate was
suffered by determined infantry attacks on the Russian trenches
in the region of the Tarnopol-Pezema railway, in spite of the
fact that these attacks were made in considerable force and were
supported by strong artillery and rifle fire. Later the same day
an engagement between reconnoitering detachments in the same
region, southwest of Tamopol, resulted in the capture of one
Russian officer and 100 men by their Austro-Hungarian op-
ponents.
140 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
Minor engagements jbetween scouting parties and outposts
were the rule of the day on May 5, 1916. These were especially
frequent in the region of Tzartorysk on the Styr, just south
of the Kovel-Kieff railway and south of Olyka station where
Austro-Hungarian troops were forced to evacuate the woods
east of the village of Jeruistche. A slight gain was ma^e on
May 6, 1916, by Russian troops in Galicia, on the lower Strypa
River, north of the village of Jaslovietz.
Extensive mining operations, which, of course, were carried
on at all times at many places, culminated successfully for the
Russians in the region northwest of Kremenets on the Ikva and
south of Zboroff on the Tarnopol-Lemberg railway. In the
latter place Russian troops crept through a mine crater toward
a point where Austro-Hungarian engineering troops were pre-
paring additional mines and dispersed the working parties by
a shower of hand grenades.
Throughout the balance of May operations along the south-
ern part of the eastern front consisted of continued artillery
duels, of frequent aeroplane attacks, and of a series of unim-
portant though bitterly contested minor engagements at many
points, most of which had no relation to each other, and were
either attacks on enemy trenches or attempts at repulsing such
attacks. Equally continuous, of course, also were scouting ex-
peditions and mining operations. None of these operations,
however, yielded any noticeable results for either side, and the
story of one is practically the story of all. The result of the
artillery duels frequently was the destruction of some advanced
trenches, while occasionally a munitions or supply transport was
caught, or an exposed battery silenced. Mining operations
sometimes would also lead to the destruction of isolated trenches,
and thus change slightly the location of the line. But what one
side gained on a given day was often lost again the next day,
and the net result left both Germans and Russians at the end
of May practically where they had been at the beginning. Most
of these minor engagements occurred in regions that had seen
a great deal of lighting before. Again and again there appear
in the official reports such well«]r>own names as Tzartorysk,
THAW AND SPRING FLOODS 141
Kolki, Olyka, Kremenets, Novo Alecinez, Styr River, Ikva
River, Strypa River. Inch by inch abnost this ground, long
ago drenched with the blood of brave men, was fought over and
over again — and a gain of a few hundred feet was considered,
indeed, a gain.
CHAPTER XVIII
THAW AND SPRING FLOODS
WITH the coming of thaw and the resulting spring floods
roads along the eastern front, not any too good under the
most favorable climatic conditions, had become little else than
rivers of mud. Many of them, it is true, had been considerably
improved during the long winter months, especially on the Ger-
man-Austrian side of the line. But in many instances this im-
provement consisted simply of covering them with planks in
order to make it possible to move transports without having
wheels sink into the mud up to the axles. When the creeks and
rivers along the line were now suddenly transformed by the
melting snows into streams and torrents, much of this improve-
ment was carried aWay and many roads not only sank back into
their former impossible state, but, becoming thoroughly soaked
and saturated with water in many places became impassable
even for infantry. Movements of large masses soon were out of
the question. To shift artillery, especially of the heavier kind,
as quickly as an offensive movement required, and to keep both
guns and men sufficiently supplied with munitions, were out of the
question. The natural result, therefore, of these conditions was
the prompt cessation of the Russian offensive which had been
started in March, 1916, just before the breaking up of a severe
winter.
However, this did not mean everywhere a return to the trench
warfare, such as had been carried on all winter, although in many
parts of the front activities on both sides amounted to little more.
At other points, however, offensive movements were kept up»
142 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
even if they were restricted in extent and force. Throughout
the months of April and May, 1916, no important changes took
place anywhere on the eastern front. A great deal of the fight-
ing, almost all, indeed, was the result of clashes between scouting
detachments or else simply a struggle for the possession of the
most advantageous points, involving in most instances only a
trench here or another trench there, and always comparatively
small numbers of soldiers.
Though the story of this series of minor engagements as it can
be constructed from oflfidal reports and other sources offers few
thrills and is lacking entirely in the sensational accomplishments
which mark movements of greater extent and importance, this is
due chiefly to the fact that few details become known about fight-
ing of only local character. In spite of this it must be borne in
mind that all of this fighting was of the most determined kind,
was done under conditions requiring the greatest amount of
endurance and courage, and resulted in innumerable individual
heroic deeds, which, just because they were individual, almost
always remained unknown to the outside world.
On April 1, 1916, a German attack against the bridgehead at
Uxkull was repulsed by Russian artillery. Farther south, in the
Dvinsk sector German positions were subjected to strong artil-
lery bombardment at many points, especially at Mechkele, and
just north of Vidzy. On the following day, April 2, 1916, fighting
again took place in the Uxkull region. Mines were exploded
near Novo Selki, south of Krevo, a town just south of the Viliya
River. The Germans launched an attack north of the Barano-
vitchy railway station. This is the strategically important vil-
lage through which both the Vilna-Rovno and the Minsk-Brest-
Litovsk railways pass and around which a great deal of fighting
had taken place in the past. Even though this attack was ex-
tensively supported by aeroplanes, which bombarded a number
of railway stations on that part of the Minsk-Baranovitchy rail-
way which was in the hands of the Russians, it was repulsed by
che Russians.
April 3, 1916, brought a renewal of the German attacks
against the Uxkull bridgehead. For over an hour and a half
THAW AND SPRING FLOODS 143
artillery of both heavy and light caliber prepared the way for
this attack. But again the Russian lines held and the Germans
had to desist. Before Dvinsk and to the south of the fortress
artillery duels inflicted considerable damage without affecting
the positions on either side. Just north of the Oginski Canal
German troops crossed the Shara River and attacked the Rus-
sian positions west of the Vilna-Rovno railway, without being
able to gain ground. All along the line aircraft were busily
engaged in reconnoitering and in dropping bombs on railway
stations.
The bombardment of the Uxkull region was again taken up
on April 4, 1916, by the German artillery. South of Dvinsk,
before the village of Malogolska, the German troops had to
evacuate their first-line of trenches when the arising floods of
neighboring rivers inundated them. German aeroplanes bom-
barded the town of Luchonitchy on the Vilna-Rovno railway,
just southeast of Baranovitchy.
By April 5, 1916, the German artillery Are before Uxkull had
spread to Riga and Jacobstadt, as well as to many points in the
Dvinsk sector. Floods were still rising everywhere and the ice
on the Dvina began to break up.
Again on April 7, 1916, the German guns thundered against
the Russian front from Riga down to Dvinsk. Lake Narotch,
where so many battles had already been fought, again was the
scene of a Russian attack which resulted in the gain of a few
advanced German positions. The next day the Germans
promptly replied with a determined artillery attack which re-
gained for their side some of the points lost the previous day.
Artillery duels also were staged near Postavy, in the Jacobstadt
sector, and at the northernmost end of the line where the Ger-
man guns bombarded the city of Schlock.
All day on April 9, 1916, the guns of all calibers kept up their
death-dealing work along the entire Dvina front, and in the
Lake district south of Dvinsk. The railway stations at Remer-
shaf and Dvinsk were bombarded by German aeroplanes, while
other units of their aircraft visited the Russian lines along the
Oginski Canal. Both on April 11 and 12, 1916, artillery activity
j_War St. 5
144 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
on the Dvina was maintained. A German infantry attack
against the Uxkull bridgehead, launched on the 11th, failed.
By this time the ice had all .broken up and the floods had
stopped rising. In the Pinsk Marshes considerable activity de-
veloped on both sides by means of boats. A vivid picture of
conditions as they existed at this time in the Pripet Marshes
may be formed from the following description from the pen of
a special correspondent on the staff of the Russian paper
"Russkoye Slovo'':
"The marshes," he writes, "have awakened from their winter
sleep. Even on the paved roads movement is all but impossible ;
to the right and left everything is submerged. The small river
S en has become enormously broad; its shores are lost
in the distance.
*The marshes have awakened, and are taking their revenge
on man for having disturbed the ordinary life of Poliessie. But
however difficult the operation, the war must be continued and
material obstacles must be overcome. Owing to the enormous
area covered by water the inhabitants have taken to boat build-
ing. Sentries and patrols move in boats, reconnoitering parties
travel in boats, fire on the enemy from boats, and escape in
boats from the attentions of the German heavy guns.
"The great marshy basin of the S en and the P
is full of new boats, which are called 'baidaka.* These 'baidaka'
are small, constructed to hold three or four men. The boats
are flat-bottomed and steady. The scouts take the 'baidaka* on
their shoulders, and as soon as they come to deep water launch
their craft and row to the other side. Small oars or paddles
are used, and punting operations are often necessary.
"On the S en these boats move with great secrecy in
the night; in the daytime they are hidden in rushes and reeds.
"It was a foggy day when we decided on making a voyage in
a 'baidaka.' 'The Germans came very suddenly to this place,'
said one of my companions. 'Our soldiers are concealed every-
where.' We decided to row near the forest, so that in case of
necessity we might gain the shelter of the trees. The silence
was broken by occasional rifle reports from the direction of
THAW AND SPRING FLOODS 145
Pinsk, and a big gun roared now and then. Once a shell flew
overhead, hissing as it went. But this was very ordinary music
to us.
"I was more interested in the intense silence of the marsh,
for I knew that all this silence was false. Our secret posts
abounded, and perhaps German scouts were in the vicinity.
The marsh was full of men in hiding, and the waiting for a
chance shot was more terrible than a continuous cannonade.
Our sentinels fired twice close by; we did not know why. The
shots resounded in the forest. We lay down in our boat and
hid our heads. It was difficult for us to advance through the
undergrowth as the spaces between the bushes were generally
very narrow. We could not row, and we had to punt with our
oars.
"We advanced in this fashion half an hour. Then we reached
a lakelike expanse clear of growth. This is the river S en,'
I was further informed. The Overmans are on the other side.'
"I could not see where the 'other side' was. The water spread
to the horizon and ended only in the purple border of the forest.
'We must be quiet here,' one whispered. The boat moved along
the river without a splash, and strange, unaccustomed outlines
grew up as we proceeded. 'What place is that yonder?' I asked
my neighbor. Tinsk,' he replied. I felt excited; we were near
a town that was occupied by the Germans, and I wished that
boat would turn back.
"We got into the rushes and moved through the jungle as
though we were advancing in open water, for the path through
the rushes had been prepared in the autumn. We advanced in
this manner forty minutes until we could distinctly hear the
whistling of steam engines and the bells ringing in the monas-
tery at Pinsk. It was evident that the monks had remained.
The kaiser himself was in Pinsk in November,' said one of my
companions, 'and we knew it. The Germans blew horns all
over the railway line and sang their national, hymn. In Pinsk
there was much animation.'
"A minute or two later the boat stopped and I was told it was
dangerous to go farther. On the right we could see the out-
146 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
lines of houses and of the quay at Pinsk, only about a thousand
paces distant. The town was covered by a thin mist and a faint
fog was rising from the marsh.
" 'Thei-e on your left are their heavy guns.' I could see noth-
ing except some trenches near the quay.
"We took our leave of Pinsk. The twilight had arrived and
it was necessary to retire.*'
Though the ice on the rivers and lakes had well broken up by
the middle of April, thaw, of course, steadily increased, and with
it the volume of water carried by the creeks and rivers. More
and more difficult it became, therefore, to carry out military
operations, and, as a result of these conditions, they were es-
pecially limited at this period.
In spite of this the Russians attempted local advance on April
13, 1916, in the region of Garbunovka, northwest of Dvinsk and
south of Lake Narotch; however, though their losses were quite
heavy, they could not gain any ground. This was also true of
another local attack made against the army of Prince Leopold
of Bavaria near Zirin, on the Servetsch River northeast of
Baranovitchy. Similarly unsuccessful were German attacks
made the same day between Lakes Sventen and Itzen. German
artillery still kept up its work along the entire front, especially
at Lake Miadziol, south of Dvinsk at Lake Narotch, and at Smor-
gon, the little railroad station south of the Viliya River on the
Vilna-Minsk railway.
On the following day, April 14, 1916, the Russians repeated
their efforts in the Servetsch region. After strong artillery
preparation they launched another attack near Zirin, and south-
east of Kovelitchy, but were again repulsed. The same fate
was suffered by an attack attempted northwest of Dvinsk.
South of Garbunovka, however, they registered a slight local
success. After cutting down four lines of barbed-wire obstacles
that had been erected by the Germans, they stormed and occu-
pied two small hills west and south of this village. This gain
was maintained in the face of strongly concentrated artillery
and rifle fire, and repeated German counterattacks, which later
proved very sanguinary to the German troops. German artillery;
THAW AND SPRING FLOODS 147
again directed violent fire against the Russian positions be-
tween Lake Narotch and Lake Miadziol and near Smorgon. A
German attack made northwest of the latter village broke down
under Russian gunfire.
At this point the Germans resumed their offensive at day-
break on April 15, 1916, after strong artillery preparation
accompanied by the use of asphyxiating gas. Concentrated fire
from the Russian artillery, however, prohibited any noticeable
advance. During the following day, April 16, 1916, both sides
restricted themselves more or less to artillery bombardments,
which became especially violent on the Dvina line, around the
Uxkull bridgehead, and in the neighborhood of the Russian
positions south of the village of Garbunovka, as well as between
Lake Narotch and Lake Miadziol.
Two days later, on April 18, 1916, German detachments tem-
porarily regained some of the ground lost about a week before
south of Garbunovka. Again on that day the guns on both
sides roared along the entire northern sector of the eastern
front. On the 19th the bombardment became especially intense
at the bridgehead at Uxkull and south of lake.
The artillery attack against the former was maintained
throughout the following two days. German scouting parties
which crossed the river Shara, north of the Oginski Canal, on
April 22, 1916, were surrounded in the woods adjoining and
practically annihilated. On the same day a German squadron
of ten aeroplanes bombarded the Russian hangars on the island
of Oesel, a small island in the Baltic across the entrance to the
Gulf of Riga.
As if both sides had agreed to observe the Easter holidays,
a lull set in during the next four or five days. Only occasional
unimportant local attacks and artillery duels were reported.
Aeroplanes were the only branch of the two armies which
showed any marked activity. Dvinsk was visited repeatedly by
German machines and extensively bombarded. On April 26,
1916, a German airship dropped bombs on the railway station
at Duna-Muende, at the mouth of the Dvina, and caused con-
siderable damage. Other railway stations and warehouses at
148 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
various points, a« well as a number of Russian flying depots,
were attacked on April 27, 1916.
The end of April, 1916, brought one more important action,
the most important, indeed, which had occurred anywhere on
the eastern front since the Russian offensive of the latter half
of March, 1916. On April 28, 1916, at dawn, German artillery
began a very violent bombardment of the Russian positions
south of Lake Narotch. There, between the village of Stava-
rotche and the extensive private estate of Stakhovtsy, the Ger-
mans had lost a series of important trenches on March 20, 1916,
during the early part of the short Russian offensive. Part of
these positions had been recaptured a few days later on March
26, 1916. Now, after a considerable artillery preparation, a
strong attack was launched with the balance of the lost ground
as an objective. Large bodies of German infantry came on
against the Russian positions in close formation. They recap-
tured not only all of the ground lost previously but carried their
attack successfully into the Russian trenches beyond. The most
fierce hand-to-hand fighting resulted. Losses on both sides were
severe, especially so on the part of the Russians, who attempted
unsuccessfully during the night following to regain the lost
positions by a series of violent counterattacks, executed by large
forces of infantry, who, advancing in close formation over diffi-
cult ground, were terribly exposed to German machine-gun fire
and lost heavily in killed and wounded. The Germans officially
claimed to have captured as a result of this operation the re-
markably large num,ber of fifty-six officers, 5,600 men, five guns,
twenty-eight machine guns and ten trench mortars. During
the same day artillery attacks were directed against Schlock on
the Gulf of Riga and Boersemnende near Riga, as well as against
Smorgon, south of the Lake district. An infantry attack, pre-
ceded by considerable artillery preparation, near the village
of Ginovka, west of Dvinsk, was met by severe fire from the
Russian batteries and the Germans were forced to withdraw
to their trenches. In the early morning hours German airships
bombarded railway stations along the Riga-Petrograd railroad
as far as Venden, about fifty miles northeast of Riga, and along
ARTILLERY DUELS 149
the Dvinsk-Petrograd railway as far as Rzezytsa, about fifty
miles northeast of Dvinsk. At the latter point considerable
damage was done by a dirigible which dropped explosive and
incendiary bombs.
Throughout the last day of April) 1916, artillery duels were
fought again at many points. Once more the railway station
and bridgehead at Uxkull was made the target for a most
violent German artillery attack. Along the Dvinsk sector, too,
guns of all caliber were busy.
CHAPTER XIX
ARTILLERY DUELS
WITH the .beginning of May, the weather became warmer
and the rain and watersoaked roads more accessible. In
spite of this, however, conditions along the eastern front
throughout the entire month of May were very much the same
as during April. Continuously the guns on both sides thundered
against each other, with a fairly well-maintained intensity
which, however, would increase from time to time in some
places. Frequently, almost daily, infantry attacks, usually pre-
ceded by artillery preparation, would be launched at various
points. These, however, were almost all of local character and
executed by comparatively small forces. Even smaller detach-
ments, frequently hardly more than scouting parties, often
would reach the opponent's lines, but only rarely succeed in
capturing trenches, and then usually were soon forced to retire
to their own lines in the face of successive counterattacks. Again
in May the story of events on the eastern front is lacking in sensa-
tional movements, accompanied by equally unsensational success
or failure. But, nevertheless, it is on both sides a story of un-
ceasing activity, of unending labor, of unremitting toil, of
endless suffering, of unlimited heroism, and of unsurpassed
courao;e, the more so, because much of all that was accomplished
150 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
was counted only as part of the regular daily routine, and lacked
both the incentive and the reward of widespread publicity^
which more frequently attaches to military operations of more
extensive character. Not for years to come will it be possible
to write a detailed history of this phase of the Great War as far
as the eastern front is concerned. Not until the regimental
histories of the various Russian, German and Austro-HungariaK
military units will have been completed will it become prac-
ticable to recount all the uncounted deeds of valor accomplished
by heroes whose names and deeds now must remain unknown
to the world at large, even though both perchance have beeiT
for months and months on the lips of equally brave comrades
in arms.
The new month was opened by the Germans with another
intensive artillery bombardment of the Uxkull bridgehead.
Farther to the south, before Dvinsk, and also at many points
in the Lake district to the south of this fortress, the Russian
positions likewise were raked by violent gunfire. An attempted
offensive movement on the extreme northern end of the line
before Raggazem, on the Gulf of Riga, broke down before the
Russian gunfire, even before it was fully developed. German
naval airships successfully bombarded Russian military depots
at Perman, while another squadron of sea planes inflicted con-
siderable damage to the Russian aerodrome at Papenholm. \
Russian squadron was less successful in an attack on the German
naval establishment at Vindau on the east shore of the Baltic
Sea.
May 2, 1916, brought a continuation of artillery activity at
many points. It was especially intensive in the Jacobstadt and
Dvinsk sectors of the Dvina front, as well as in the Ziriu-
Baranovitchy sector in the south and along the Oginski Canal,
still farther to the south. At two other points the Germans^
after extensive artillery preparation, attempted to launch in-
fantry attacks, but were promptly driven back. This occurred
near the village of Antony, ten miles northwest of Postavy^
where two successive attacks failed, and farther north in the
region east of Vidzy.
I
ARTILLERY DUELS 151
The following day again was devoted to artillery duels at
many points. Aeroplanes, also, became more active. German
planes bombarded many places south of Dvinsk, and attacked
the railway establishments at Molodetchna, on the Vilna-Minsk
railway, at Minsk, and at Luniniets, in the Pripet Marshes, east
of Pinsk on the Pinsk-Gomel railway. May 4, 1916, brought
especially intensive artillery fire along the entire Dvina front,
in the Krevo sector south of the Vilna-Minsk railway, and along
the Oginski Canal, particularly in the region of Valistchie.
The Dvina front along its entire length was once more the
subject of a violent artillery attack from German batteries on
May 5, 1916. Uxkull, so many times before the aim of the Ger-
man fire, again received special attention. The Friedrichstadt
sector, too, came in for its share. All along this front aero-
planes not only guided the gunfire, but supported it extensively
by dropping bombs. Between Jacobstadt and Dvinsk a Russian
battery succeeded in reaching a German munition depot and
with one well-placed hit caused havoc among men and muni-
tions. Southeast of Lake Med a surprise attack, carried out
by comparatively small Russian forces, resulted in the capture
of some German trenches. Northwest of Krochin strong Ger-
man forces, after artillery preparation lasting over three hours,
attacked the village of Dubrovka. Some ground was gained,
only to be lost again shortly after as a result of a ferocious
counterattack made by Russian reenforcements which had been
brought up quickly.
May 6, 1916, brought a slightly new variation in fighting.
Russian torpedo boats appeared in the Gulf of Riga, off the west
coast, and bombarded, without success, the two towns of Rojen
and Margrafen. Artillery fire of considerable violence marked
the next day, May 7, 1916. Russian batteries before Dvinsk
caused a fire at 111, the little town just northwest of Dvinsk on
the Dvinsk-Ponevesh railway, and so well was this bombard-
ment maintained that the Germans were unable to extinguish
the conflagration before it had reached some of their munition
depots. In the early morning hours very violent gunfire was
directed south of lUuxt. But an infantry attack, for which this
152 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
bombardment was to act as preparation, failed. Other bombard-
ments were directed against Lake Ilsen and the sector north of
it, and against the region south of the village of Vishnieff on the
Beresina River. Mining operations of considerable extent were
carried out that night near the village of Novo Selki, south of
the town of Krevo. On May 8, 1916, artillery fire again roared
along the Dvina front, especially against the Uxkull bridge-
head. An attack in force was made by German troops against
the village of Peraplianka north of Smorgon on the Viliya
May 9, 1916. After considerable artillery preparation the Ger-
mans rushed up against the Russian barbed-wire obstacles.
There, however, they were stopped by concentrated artillery and
rifle fire and, after heavy losses, had to withdraw. A Russian at-
tack of a similar nature south of Garbunovka was not any more
successful. In the Pripet Marshes, too, artillery operations had
by now become possible again and the Russian positions west
of the village of Pleshichitsa, southeast of Pinsk, were subjected
to a violent bombardment.
Throughout the balance of May not a day passed during
which guns of all calibers did not maintain a violent bombard-
ment at many points along the entire front. Especially fre-
quent and severe was the gunfire which the Germans directed
against the Dvina sector of the Russian positions. But, just
as in the past weeks, the result, though not at all negligible as
far as the damage inflicted on men, material, and fortifications
was concerned, was practically nil in regard to any change in
the location of the front.
Infantry attacks during this period were not lacking, though
they were less frequent than artillery bombardments, and were
at all times only of local character, and in most cases executed
with limited forces. A great deal of this kind of fighting oc-
curred in the region of Olyka where engagements took place
almost every day. One of the few more important events was
a German attack against the Jacobstadt sector of the Dvina
front. For two days. May 10 and 11, 1916, the fighting con-
tinued, becoming especially violent to the north of the railway
station of Selburg on the Mitau-Kreutzburg railway. There
ARTILLERY DUELS 153
very heavy artillery fire succeeding the infantry attacks had
destroyed some small villages for the possession of which the
most furious kind of hand-to-hand fighting ensued. Finally
the Germans captured by storm about 500 yards of the Russian
positions as well as some 300 unwounded soldiers and a few
machine guns and mine throwers.
Engagements of a similar character, though not always yield-
ing such definite results to either side, occurred on May 11,
1916, southwest of Lake Medum, on May 12, 1916, at many
points along the Oginski Canal and also in the Pripet Marshes,
where fighting now had again become a physical possibility.
On the latter day a Russian attempt to recapture the positions
lost previously near Selburg failed.
Thus the fortunes of war swayed from side to side. One day
would bring to the Germans the gain of a trench, the capture
of a few hundred men or guns, or the destruction of an enemy
battery, to .be followed the next day by a proportionate loss.
So closely was the entire line guarded, so strongly and elabor-
ately had the trenches and other fortifications been built up,
that the fighting developed into a multitude of very short but
closely contested engagements. In each one of these the num-
bers engaged were very small, though the grand total of men
fighting on a given day at so many separate points on a front
of some 500 miles was, of course, still immense.
Amongst the places which saw the most fighting during this
period were many which had been mentioned a great many
times before. Again and again there appeared in the official
records such names as: Lake Sventen, Krevno, Lake Miadziol,
Ostroff, Lake Narotch, Smorgon, Dahlen Island, and many
others.
The net result of all the fighting during May, 1916, was that
both sides lost considerable in men and material. Both Rus-
sians and Germans, however, had succeeded in maintaining
their respective lines in practically the same position in which
they had been at the beginning of May.
154 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
CHAPTER XX
THE GREAT RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE
TOURING the first two days of June, 1916, a lull occurred at
■*-^ almost all important points of the eastern front. Only one
or two engagements of extremely minor importance between
scouting parties were reported. In the light of future events
this remarkable condition might well be called ominous, es^
pecially if one connects with it a decided increase in Russian
aeroplane activity, which resulted in two strong attacks on June
1, 1916, against points on the Vilna-Minsk and Samy-Kovel
railways.
On June 2, 1916, a more or less surprising increase in the
strength of the Russian artillery fire was noticed, especially
along the Bessarabian and Volhynian fronts and in the Ikva
sector. So strong did this fire become that the official Austrian
statement covering that day says that at several places the
artillery duels "assumed the character of artillery battles."
More and more the extent and violence of the Russian ar-
tillery attack increased. The next day, June 3, 1916, Russian
artillery displayed the greatest activity all along the southern
half of the eastern front, and covered the Dniester, Strypa, and
Ikva sectors, as well as the gap between the last two rivers,
northwest of Tarnopol, and the entire Volhynian front.
Near Olyka in the region of the three Volhynian fortresses o(
Rovno, Dubno, and Lutsk, the Russian gunfire was especially
intense along a front of about seventeen miles. That this un-
usually strong artillery activity increased the alarm of the
Austro-Hungarian commanders may readily be seen from the
concluding sentence of that day's official Austrian statement,
which read : "Everywhere there are signs of an impending in-
fantry attack."
The storm oegan to break the next day, June 4, 1916. That
it was entirely unexpected, was not likely, for this new Russian
offensive coincided with the Austro-Hungarian offensive against
I
THE GREAT RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE 155
the Italian front which by that time had assumed threatening
developments. Undoubtedly it was one of the objects of the
Russian offensive to force the Austrians to withdraw troops
from the Italian front and at least curtail their offensive efforts
against the Italian armies, if not to stop them entirely. At the
same time the limits within which the Russian offensive was
undertaken indicated that the Russian General Staff had
another much more important object in view, the breaking of
the German-Austrian front at about the point where the Ger-
man right touched the Austrian left. Along a front of over 300
miles the Russian forces attacked. From the Pinth in the
south — at the Rumanian border to the outrunners of the Pripet
Marshes — near Kolki and the bend of the Styr — in the north the
battle raged. At many points along this line the Russians
achieved important successes, with unusual swiftness they were
pushing whatever advantage they were able to gain. But not
only swiftness did they employ. Immense masses of men were
thrown against the strongly fortified Austrian lines and quanti-
ties of munitions of the Russian artillery which transcended
everything that had ever been done along this line on the east-
em front. Not against one or two points chosen for that
particular purpose, but against every important point on the
entire line the Russian attacks were hurled. The most bitter
struggle developed at Okna, northwest of Tamopol, at Koklow,
at Novo Alexinez, along the entire Ikva, at Sanor, around Olyka
and from there north to Dolki. No matter how strong the
natural defenses, no matter how skillful the artificial obstacles,
on and on rolled the thousands and thousands of Russians. So
overwhehning was this onrush that the Austro-Hungarians had
to give way in many places in spite of the most valiant resist-
ance, and so quick did it come that as a result of the first day's
work the Russians could claim to have captured 13,000 prison-
ers, many guns and machine guns.
By June 5, 1916, this number had increased to 480 officers,
25,000 men, twenty-seven guns and fifty machine guns. The
battle on the northeast front continued on the whole front of
218 miles with undiminished stubbornness. North of Okna,
156 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
the Austrians had, after stiff and fluctuating battles, to with-
draw their shattered first positions to the line prepared three
miles to the south. Near Jarlowiec, on the lower Strypa, the
Russians attacked after artillery preparation. They were re-
pulsed at some places by hand fighting. At the same time a
strong Russian attack west of Trembowla (south of Tamopol)
broke down under Austrian fire. West-northwest of Tarnopol
there was bitter fighting. Near Sopanow (southeast of Dubno)
there were numerous attacks by the enemy. Between Mlynow,
on the Ikva, and the regions northwest of Olyka, the Russians
were continually becoming stronger, and the most bitter kind of
fighting developed.
Especially heavy fighting developed in the region before
Lutsk. There the pressure from the Russian army of General
Brussilov had become so strong that the Austrians had found
it necessary by June 6, 1916, to withdraw their forces to the
plain of Lutsk, just to the east of that fortress and of the river
Styr. This represented a gain of at least twenty miles made
in two days. The official Russian statement of that day claimed
that during the same period General Brussilov's armies had cap-
tured 900 officers, more than 40,000 rank and file, seventy-seven
guns, 134 machine guns and forty-nine trench mortars, and, in
addition, searchlights, telephone, field kitchens, a large quantity
of arms and war material, and great reserves of ammunition.
On the other hand, the Austrians were still offering a de-
termined resistance at most points south and north of Lutsk,
and Russian attacks were repulsed with sanguinary losses at
many places, as for instance at Rafalowka, on the lower Styr,
near Berestiany, on the Corzin Brook, near Saponow, on the
npper Strypa, near Jazlovice, on the Dniester, and on the Bessa-
rabian frontier. Northwest of Tarnopol were repulsed two
Attacks. At another point seven attacks were repulsed.
The Russians also suffered heavy losses in the plains of Okna
(north of the Bessarabian frontier) and at Debronoutz, where
there were bitter hand-to-hand engagements.
It was quite clear by this time that the Russian offensive
threatened not only the pushing back of the Austrian line, but
THE GREAT RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE
157
■SCALE QF MILES
lo 20
RAILROAOe*
-BATTLE LIN5
UUNE" 5. 19I6
^^^^ BATTLE LIINE
^^^ AUGUST 15.1916
POSITIOIN OF COMMANDERS
ouine: i9ie>
SHADED PORTION SHOWb
RUSSIAN eAlMS TOAU&.I5".
PRINCE LEOPOLD
ARMV
THE RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE FROM PINSK TO DUBNO
158 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
their very existence. Unless the Austrians either succeeded in
repulsing the Russians decidedly or else found some other way
of reducing immediately the strength of this extensive offensive
movement, it was inevita.ble that many of the important con-
quests which the Central Powers had made in the fall of 1915
would be lost again. In spite of this and in spite of the quite
apparent strength of the Russian forces, it caused considerable
surprise when it was announced officially on June 8, 1916, that
the fortress of Lutsk had been captured by the Russians on
June 7, 1916.
The fortress lies halfway between Rovno and Kovel, on the
important railway line that runs from Brest-Litovsk to the
region southwest of Kiev. It is this railway sector, between
Rovno and Kovel, that has been the objective of the Russian
attacks ever since the Teuton offensive came to a standstill eight
months ago, for its control would give the Russians a free hand
to operate southward against the lines in Galicia.
Lutsk is a minor fortress, the most westerly of the Volhynian
triangle formed by Rovno, Dubno, and Lutsk. The town is the
center of an important grain trade, and the districts of which it
is the center contained before the war a considerable German
colony. It is supposed to have been founded in the seventh
century. In 1791 it was taken by Russia. It is the seat of a
Roman Catholic bishop and at the outbreak of the war had a
population of about 18,000. During the war it suffered a varied
fate. On September 1, 1915, it was captured by the combined
German and Austro-Hungarian forces which had accomplished
a month before the capture of Warsaw and had forced the Rus-
sian legions to a full retreat. Twenty-three days later it was
evacuated by the forces of the Central Powers and recaptured
by the Russians on September 24, 1915. Four days later, Sep-
tember 28, 1915, the Russians were forced to withdraw again,
and on October 1, 1915, it fell once more into the hands of the
Austrians. During the winter the Russians had made a dash
for its recapture, but had not succeeded, and ever since the front
had been along a line about twenty miles to the east. The cap-
ture of the fortress was due primarily to the immensity of the
THE GREAT RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE 159
Russian artillery, which maintained a violent, continuous fire,
(smashing the successive rows of wire entanglements, breastworks,
and trenches. The town was surrounded with nineteen rows of
entanglements. The laconic order to attack was given at dawn
on June 7, 1916. Up to noon the issue hung in the balance, but
at 1 o'clock the Russians made a breach in the enemy's position
near the village of Podgauzy. They repulsed a fierce Austrian
counterattack and captured 3,000 prisoners and many guns.
Almost simultaneously another Russian force advanced on
Lutsk along the Dubno and stormed the trenches of the village
of Krupov, taking several thousand prisoners. General Brus-
silov seemed to have at his disposal an immense infantry force,
which he sent forward in rapid, successive waves after artillery
preparation. Reserves were brought up so quickly that the
enemy was given no time to recover from one assault before
another was delivered.
Fifty-eight officers, 11,000 men and large quantities of guns,
machine guns, and ammunition fell in the hands of the victorious
Russian armies. On the same day on which Lutsk was captured
other forces stormed strong Austrian positions on the lower
Strypa in Galicia between Trybuchovice and Jazlovice and
crossed both the Ikva and the Styr. Along the northern part
of the front, north of the Pripet River, comparative quiet
reigned throughout the early stages of the Russian offensive.
During the evening of June 7, 1916, however, German artillery
violently bombarded the region northeast of Krevo and south of
Smorgon, southeast of Vilna. The bombardment soon extended
farther north, and during the night of June 8, 1916, the Ger-
mans took the offensive there with considerable forces.
In the neighborhood of Molodetchna station (farther east) on
the Vilna-Minsk railway, a German aeroplane dropped four
bombs.
Five German aeroplanes carried out a raid on the small town
of Jogishin, north of Pinsk, dropping about fifty bombs.
The battle in Volhynia and Galicia continued with undimin-
ished force on June 8, 1916. Near Sussk, to the east of Lutsk,
a squadron of Cossacks attacked the enemy behind his fortified
K—WaE^i
160 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
lines, capturing two guns, eight ammunition wagons, and 200
boxes of anmiunition.
Near Boritin, four miles southeast of Lutsk, Russian scouts
captured two 4-inch guns, with four officers and 160 men. A
4-inch gun and thirty-five ammunition wagons were captured,
near Dobriatin on the Ikva below Mlynow, fourteen miles south-
east of Lutsk.
Young troops, just arrived at the front, vied with seasoned
Russian regiments in deeds of valor. Some regiments formed
of Territorial elements by an impetuous attack drove back the
Austrians on the Styr, and pressing close on their heels forced
the bridgehead near Rozhishche, thirteen miles north of Lutsk,
at the same time taking about 2,500 German and Austrian pris-
oners, as well as machine guns and much other booty. Other
regiments forced a crossing over the Strypa and some advanced
detachments even reached the next river, the Zlota Potok, about
five miles to the west.
The number of prisoners captured by the Russians continually
increased. Exclusive of those already reported — ^namely, 958
officers, and more than 51,000 Austrian and German soldiers,
they captured in the course of the fighting on June 8, 1916, 185
officers and 13,714 men, making the totals so far registered in
the present operations 1,143 officers and 64,714 men.
The next day, June 9, 1916, the troops under General Brussilov
continued the offensive and the pursuit of the retreating Aus-
trians. Fighting with the latter's rear guards, they crossed the
river Styr above and below Lutsk.
In Galicia, northwest of Tamopol, in the regions of Gliadki
and Cebrow, heavy fighting developed for the possession of
heights, which changed hands several times. During that day's
fighting the Russians captured again large numbers of Aus-
trians, consisting of ninety-seven officers and 5,500 men and
eleven guns, making a total up to the present of 1,240 officers
and about 71,000 men, ninety-four guns, 167 machine guns,
fifty-three mortars, and a large quantity of other war material.
At dawn of June 10, 1916, Russian troops entered Buczacz
on the west bank of the Strypa and, developing the offensive
THE GREAT RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE 161
along the Dniester, carried the village of Scianka, eight miles
west of the Strypa. In the village of Potok Zloty, four miles
west of the Strypa, they seized a large artillery park and large
quantities of shells.
In the north the Germans again attempted to relieve the
pressure on their allies by attacking in force at many points.
Artillery duels were fought along the Dvina front and on the
Oginski Canal.
Without let up, however, the Russian advance continued. So
furious and swift was the onslaught of the czar's armies that
the Austrians lost thousands upon thousands of prisoners and
vast masses of war material of every kind. For instance, in
one sector alone the Austrians were forced to retreat so rapidly
that the Russians were able to gather in, according to official
reports, twenty-one searchlights, two supply trains, twenty-
nine field kitchens, forty-seven machine guns, 193 tons of
barbed wire, 1,000 concrete girders, 7,000,000 concrete cubes,
160 tons of coal, enormous stores of ammunition, and a great
quantity of arms and other war material. In another sector
they captured 80,000 rounds of rifle ammunition, 300 boxes of
machine-gun ammunition, 200 boxes of hand grenades, 1,000
rifles in good condition, four machine guns, two optical range
finders, and even a brand-new Norton well, a portable con-
trivance for the supply of drinking water.
The prisoners captured during June 10, 1916, comprised one
general, 409 officers, and 35,100 soldiers. The material booty
included thirty guns, thirteen machine guns, and five trench
mortars. The total Russian captures in the course of about a
week thus amount to one general, 1,649 officers, more than 106,-
000 soldiers, 124 guns of all sorts, 180 machine guns, and fifty-
eight trench mortars.
This was now the seventh day of the new Russian offensive,
and on it another valuable prize fell into the hands of General
Brussilov, the town and fortress of Dubno. This brought his
forces within twenty-five miles of the Galician border and put
the czar's forces again in the possession of the Volhynian for-
tress triangle, consisting of Lutsk, Dubno, and Rovna
162 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
Dubno, which had been in the hands of the Austrians since
September 7, 1916, lies on the Rovno-Brody-Lemberg rail-
way, and is about eighty-two miles from the Galician capital,
Lemberg. The town has about 14,000 inhabitants, mostly
Jews, engaged in the grain, tobacco, and brickmaking industry.
It was in existence as early as the eleventh century.
So powerful was the Russian onrush on Dubno that the
attackers swept westward apparently without meeting any re-
sistance, for on the same day on which the fortress fell, some
detachments crossed the Ikva. One part of these forces even
swept as far westward as the region of the village of Demidovka,
on the Mlynow-Berestetchko road, thirteen miles southwest of
the Styr at Mlynow, compelling the enemy garrison of the
Mlynow to surrender. Demidovka is twenty-five miles due west
of Dubno. Thus the Russians have in Volhynia alone pushed
the Austro-Hungarian lines back thirty-two miles.
CHAPTER XXI
THE RUSSIAN RECONQUEST OP THE
BUKOWINA
SIMULTANEOUSLY with the drive in Volhynia, the extreme
left wing of the Russian southern army under General Le-
chitsky forced the Austro-Hungarians to withdraw their whole
line in the northeastern Bukowina, invaded the crownland with
strong forces and advanced to within fourteen miles of the
capital, Czemowitz. On the Strypa the Austrians had to fall
back from their principal position north of Buczacz. In spite of
the most desperate resistance and in the face of a violent flank-
ing fire, and even curtain fire, and the explosions of whole sets
of mines. General Lechitsky's troops captured the Austrian po-
sitions south of Dobronowce, fourteen miles nortri&ast of Czer-
nowitz. In that region alone the Russians claimed to have cap-
tured 18,000 soldiers, one general, 347 officers, and ten guns.
RUSSIAN RECONQUEST OF BUKOWINA 163
Southeast of Zaleszcyki on the Dniester the Russians again
were victorious and forced the withdrawal of the Austrian lines.
Fourteen miles north of Czemowitz the Austrian troops tried to
stem the tide by blowing up the railroad station of Jurkoutz.
At the same time they made their first imporant counterattack
in the Lutsk region. Making a sudden stand, after being driven
over the river Styr, north of Lutsk, they turned on the Russians
with the aid of German detachments rushed to them by General
von Hindenburg, drove the Muscovite troops back over the Styr
and took 1,508 prisoners, including eight officers. At other
points, too, the Austrian resistance stiffened perceptibly, espe-
cially in the region of Torgovitsa, and on the Styr below Lutsk.
Dubno, a modem fortress, built, like Lutsk, mainly in support
of Rovno, to ward off possible aggression, now supplied an
(excellent starting point for a Russian drive into the heart of
Galicia. Proceeding on both sides of the Rovno-Dubno-Brody*
Lemberg railway the Russians should be able to cover the eighty-
two miles which still separates them from the Galician capital
within a comparatively short time, provided that Austrian resis-
tance in this region continues as weak as it has been up to date.
A greater danger than the capture of Lemberg was, however,
presented by the Russian advance into the Bukowina. If these
two Russian drives — to Lemberg and to Czemowitz — would
prove successful the whole southeastern Austro-Hungarian army
would find itself squeezed between two Russian armies, and its
only escape would be into the difficult Carpathian Mountain
passes, where the Russians, this time well equipped and greatly
superior in numbers, could be expected to be more successful
than in their first Carpathian campaign.
Still the Russian advance continued, although on June 11,
1916, there was a slight slowing down on account of extensive
storms that prevailed along the southern part of the front.
In Galicia, in the region of the villages of Gliadki and Vero-
bieyka, north of Tarnopol, the Austrians attacked repeatedly
and furiously, but were repulsed on the morning of the 11th.
Farther south, however, near the town of Bobulintze, on the
Strypa, fifteen miles north of Buczacz, the Austro-Hungarians,
164 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
strongly reenforced by Germans, scored a substantial success.
They launched a furious counterattack, bringing the Russian
assaults to a standstill and even forcing the Muscovite troops
to retreat a short distance. According to the German War Office
more than 1,300 Russian prisoners were taken.
Simultaneously with this partial relief in the south Field
Marshal von Hindenburg began an attack at several points
against the Russian right wing and part of the center. He pene-
trated the czar's lines at two points near Jacob&tadt, halfway
between Riga and Dvinsk, and at Kochany between Lake Narotch
and Dvinsk. At the three other points, in the Riga zone, south
of Lake Drisviaty and on the Lassjolda, his attacks broke down
under the Russian fire.
Lemberg, Galicia's capital, was now threatened from three
sides. Czemowitz, the capital of the Bukowina, was even in a
more precarious position. It had been masked by the extreme
left wing of the Russian armies and, unless some unexpected
turn came to the assistance of the Austrians, its fall was sure
to be only a matter of days, or possibly even of hours. All of
southern Volhynia had been overrun by the Russians who were
then, on the ninth day of their offensive, forty-two miles west
of the point from where it had begun in that province.
Northwest of Rojitche, in northwestern Volhynia, after dis-
lodging the Germans, General Brussilov on June 12, 1916, ap-
proached the river Stokhod. West of Lutsk he occupied Torchin
and continued to press the enemy back.
On the Dniester sector and farther General Lechitsky's troops,
having crossed the river after fighting, captured many fortified
points and also the town of Zaleszcyky, twenty-five miles north-
west of Czernowitz. The village of Jorodenka, ten miles farther,
northwest of Zaleszcyky, also was captured.
On the Pruth sector, between Doyan and Niepokoloutz, the
Russian troops approached the left bank of the river, near the
bridgehead of Czemowitz.
The only point at which the Austrian line held was near Kolki
In northern Volhynia, south of the Styr. There attempts by the
Eussians to cross that river failed and some 2,000 men were
RUSSIAN RECONQUEST OF BUKOWINA 165
captured by the Austro-Hungarians. In the north Field Marshal
?on Hindenburg's efforts to divert the Russian activities in the
south by a general offensive along the Dvina line had not de-
veloped beyond increased artillery bombardments which appar-
ently exerted no influence on the movements of the Russian
armies in Volhynia, Galicia and the Bukowina.
The only hopeful sign for the fate of the threatened Austro-
Hungarian armies was the fact that the daily number of pris-
oners taken by the Russians gradually seemed to decrease, indi-
cating that the Austrians found it possible by now, if not to
withstand the Russian onslaught, at least to save the largest part
of their armies. Even at that the Russian General Staff claimed
to have captured by June 12, 1916, a total of 1,700 officers and
114,000 men. Inasmuch as it was estimated that the total Aus-
trian forces on the southwestern front at the beginning of the
operations were 670,000, of which, according to Russian claims,
the losses cannot be less than 200,000, including an estimated
80,000 killed and wounded, the total losses now constituted 30
per cent of the enemy's effectives.
How the news of the continued Russian successes was received
in the empire's capital and what, at that time, was expected aa
the immediate results of this remarkable drive, secondary only
to the Austro-German drive of the summer and fall of 1915,
are vividly described in the following letter, written from Petro-
grad on June 13, 1916, by a special correspondent of the London
"Times" :
"As the successive bulletins recording our unprecedented vic-
tories on the southwestern fronts come to hand, the pride and
joy of the Russian people are becoming too great for adequate
expression. There is an utter absence of noisy demonstrations.
The whole nation realizes that the victory is the result of the
combined efforts of all classes, which have given the soldiers
abundant munitions, and of an admirable organization.
"The remarkable progress in training the reserves since the
beginning of this year was primarily responsible for the enor-
mous increase in the efficiency of our armies and the heightening
of their morale. The strategy of our southwestern offensive has
166 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
been seconded by a remarkable improvement in the railways and
communications. Last, but not least, it must be noted that the
Russian high command long ago recognized that the essential
condition of the overthrow of the Austro-German league, so far
as this front is concerned, was the completion of the work of
disintegration in the Austrian armies, in which Russia has al-
ready achieved such wonderful results. At the rate at which
they are at present being exterminated it would require many
weeks completely to exhaust the military resources of the Dual
Empire and to turn the flank of the German position in Poland.
"The consensus of military opinion is inclined to the belief that
the Germans will not venture to transfer large reenforcements
to the Galician front, as it would require too much time and give
the Allies a distinct advantage in other theaters. But as the
Germans were obviously bound to do something to save the Aus-
trian army, they are endeavoring to create a diversion north of
the Pripet in various directions. The points selected for these
efforts are almost equidistant on the right flank of the Riga
front, near Jacobstadt, and south of Lake Drisviaty, where the
enemy's maximum activity synchronized with General Lechit-
sky's greatest successes on the southern front. . . .
"On the southwestern front all eyes are now focused on Gen-
eral Lechitsky's rapid advance on Zaleszcyky and Czemowita.
As the official reports show, the Austrians have already blown up
a bridge across the Pruth at Mahala, thus indicating that they en-
tertain scant hope of being able to hold Czemowitz,.and they may
even now be evacuating the city. General Lechitsky's gallant
army, which some months ago stormed the important stronghold
of Uscieszko on the Dniester, has performed prodigies of valor in
its advance during the last few days. The precipitous banks of
the Dniester had been converted into one continuous stronghold
which appeared impregnable and last December defied all our
efforts to overcome the enemy's resistance. In the first few days
of the offensive we took one of the principal positions between
Okna and Dobronowce, southeast of Zaleszcyky. Dobronowce
and the surrounding mountains, which are thickly covered with
forests, were regarded by the enemy as a reliable protection
RUSSIAN RECONQUEST OF BUKOWINA 167
against any advance on Czernowitz. The country beyond offers
no such opportunities for defense.
''General Brussilov's operations on the flanks of the Austro-
German army under Von Linsingen are proceeding with won-
derful rapidity. All the efforts of German reenforcements to
drive in a counterwedge at Kolki, Rozhishshe and Targowica,
at the wings and apex of our Rovno salient, proved ineffectual.
On the other hand, we have scored most important successes west
of Dubno, capturing the highly important point of Demidovka,
marking an advance of twenty miles to the west. Demidovka
places us in command of the important forest region of Dubno,
which, as its name indicates, is famous for its oak trees. These
forests form a natural stronghold, of which the Ikva and the
Styr may be compared to immense moats protecting it on two
sides. The possession of this valuable base will enable General
Brussilov to checkmate any further effort on the part of the
enemy to counter our offensive at Targowica, which is situated
fifteen miles to the north.
"The valiant troops of our Eighth Army, who have altogether
advanced nearly thirty miles into the enemy's position in the
direction of Kovel, will doubtless be in a position powerfully to
assist the thrust of the troops beyond Tarnopol and join hands
with them in the possible event of an advance on Lemberg."
On June 13, 1914, the progress of the Russian armies continued
along the entire 250-mile front from the Pripet River to the
Rumanian border. The capture of twenty officers, 6,000 men,
six cannon, and ten machine guns brought the total, captured by
the Russian troops, up to about 120,000 men, 1,720 officers, 130
cannon and 260 machine guns, besides immense quantities of
material and munitions.
South of Kovel the Austrians, reenforced by German troops,
offered the most determined resistance near the village of Zaturzi
halfway between Lutsk and Vladimir- Volyn«ki. Southwest of
Dubno, in the direction of Brody and Lemberg, Kozin was stormed
by the Russians, who were now only ten miles from the Galician
border. To the north of Buczacz, on the right bank of the
Strypa, a strong counterattack launched by the Austrians could
168 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
not prevent the Russians from occupying the western heights in
the region of Gaivivonka and Bobulintze, where only two days
before the Austrians had been able to drive back their oppo-
nents. But the most furious battle of all raged for the possession
of Czemowitz. A serious blow was struck to the Austro-Hun-
garian defenders when the Russians captured the town of
Sniatyn, on the Pruth, about twenty miles northwest of Czer-
nowitz, on the Czemowitz-Kolomea-Lemberg railway. This seri-
ously threatened the brave garrison which held the capital of
the Bukowina, as it put the Russians in a position where
they could sweep southward and cut off the defenders of Czer-
nowitz, if they should hold out to the last. In fact the entire
Austro-Hungarian army in the Bukowina was now facing this
peril.
The first massed attack against Von Hindenburg's lines since
the offensive in the south began was delivered on June 18, 1916,
when, after a systematic artillery preparation by the heaviest
guns at the Russians' disposal, troops in dense formation
launched a furious assault against the Austro-German positions
north of Baranovitchy. The attack was repeated six times, but
each broke down under the Teuton fire with serious losses to the
attackers, who in their retreat were placed under the fire of
their own artillery.
Baranovitchy is an important railway intersection of great
strategical value and saw some of the fiercest fighting during
the Russian retreat in the fall of 1915. It is the converging
point of the Brest-Litovsk-Moscow and Vilna-Rovno railways.
Sixty-one miles to the west lies Lida, one of the commanding
points of the entire railway systems of western Russia.
Again, on June 14, 1916, the number of prisoners in the hands
of the Russians was increased by 100 officers and 14,000 men,
bringing the grand total up to over 150,000. All along the entire
front the Russians pressed their advance, gaining considerable
ground, without, however, achieving any success of great im-
portance.
Closer and closer the lines were drawn about Czemowitz,
though on June 16, 1916, the city was still reported as held by
RUSSIAN RECONQUEST OF BUKOWINA 169
the Austrians. On that day furious fighting also took place
south of Buczacz, where the Russians in vain attempted to cross
the Dniester in order to join hands with their forces which were
advancing from the north against Czemowitz with Horodenka,
on the south bank of the Dniester as a base. To the west of
Lutsk in the direction toward Kovel, now apparently the main
objective of General Brussilov, the Austro-Hungarians had re-
ceived strong German reenforcements under General von Lin-
singen and successfully denied to the Russians a crossing over
the Stokhod and Styr Rivers.
June 17, 1916, was a banner day in the calendar of the Rus-
sian troops. It brought them once more into possession of the
Bukowinian capital, Czemowitz.
Czemowitz is one of the towns whose people have suffered most
severely from the fluctuating tide of war.
Its cosmopolitan population, the greater part of whom are
Germans, have seen it change hands no less than five times in
twenty-one months. The first sweep of the Russian offensive in
September, 1914, carried beyond it, but they had to capture it
again two months later, when they proceeded to drive the Aus-
trians out of the whole of the Bukowina. By the following Feb-
ruary, however, the Austrians, with German troops to help
them, were again at its gates, and they forced the Russians to
retire beyond the Pruth. For a week the battle raged about the
small town of Sudagora, opposite Czemowitz, the seat of a fa-
mous dynasty of miracle-working rabbis, but the forces of the
Central Powers were in overwhelming numbers, and with the
loss of Kolomea — ^the railway junction forty-five miles to the
west, which the Russians were again rapidly approaching —
the whole region became untenable and the Russians retired to
the frontier.
Czemowitz is a clean and pleasant town of recent date. A
century ago it was an insignificant village of 5,000 people. To-
day it has several fine buildings, the most conspicuous of which is
the Episcopal Palace, with a magnificent reception hall. In one
of the squares stands the monument erected in 1875 to commem-
orate the Austrian occupation of the Bukowina.
170 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
The population consists for the most part of Germans, Rw-
thenes, Rumanians, and Poles. Among these are 21,000 Jews
and there are also a number of Armenians and gypsies. Witk
all these diverse elements, therefore, the town presents a very
varied appearance, and on market days the modern streets are
crowded with peasants, attired in their national dress, who
mingle with people turned out in the latest fashions of Paris
and Vienna.
How violently the Russians assaulted Czemowitz is vividly
described in a letter from a correspondent of a German news-
paper who was at Czernowitz during this attack.
"The attack began on June 11, 1916. Shells fell incessantly,
mostly in the lower quarter of the town and the neighborhood
of the station. They caused a terrible panic. Incendiary shells
started many fires.
"Austrian artillery replied vigorously. The Russians during
the night of June 12, 1916, attempted a surprise attack aga'inst
the northeast corner defenses, launching a tremendous artillery
fire against them and then sending storming columns forward.
These were stopped, however, by the defenders, who prevented
a crossing of the Pruth, inflicting severe losses upon the
Russians.
"The Russian artillery attack on the morning of June 16, 1916,
was terrific. It resembled a thousand volcanoes belching fire.
The whole town shook. Austrian guns replied with equal inten-
sity. The Russians advanced in sixteen waves and were mown
down and defeated. Hundreds were drowned. Russian columns
were continually pushed back from the Pruth beyond Sudagora.*'
Serious, though, this loss was to the Central Powers, they had
one consolation left. JBefore the fall of Czemowitz the Austro-
Hungarian forces were able to withdraw and only about 1,000
men fell into Russian captivity. In one respect then the Rus-
sians had not gained their point. The Austrian army in the
Bukowina was still in the field.
Slowly but steadily the force of Von Hindenburg's offensive
in the north increased. On the dry on which Czernowitz fell at-
tacks were delivered at mar'^'- points along the 150-mile line be-
RUSSIAN RECONQUEST OF BUKOWINA 171
tween Dvinsk in the north and Krevo in the south. Some local
successes were gained by the Germans, but generally speaking
this offensive movement failed in its chief purpose, namely, to
lessen the strength of the Russian attack against the Austrian
lines.
A more substantial gain was made by the combined German
and Austro-Hungarian forces, opposing the Russians west of
Lutsk, in order to stop their advance against Kovel. There the
Germans drove back the center of General Brussilov's front and
captured 3,500 men, 11 officers, some cannon, and 10 machine
guns.
On the day of Czernowitz's fall the official English newspaper
representative with the Russian armies of General Brussilov se-
cured a highly interesting statement from this Russian general
who, by his remarkable success, had so suddenly become one of
the most famous figures of the great war.
"The sweeping successes attained by my armies are not the
product of chance, or of Austrian weakness, but represent the
application of all the lessons which we have learned in two years
of bitter warfare against the Germans. In every movement, great
or small, that we have made this winter, we have been studying
the best methods of handling the new problems which modern
warfare presents.
"At the beginning of the war, and especially last summer, we
lacked the preparations which the Germans have been making
for the past fifty years. Personally I was not discouraged, for
my faith in Russian troops and Russian character is an enduring
one. I was convinced that, given the munitions, we should do
exactly as we have done in the past two weeks.
"The main element of our success was due to the absolute
coordination of all the armies involved and the carefully planned
harmony with which the various branches of the service sup-
ported each other.
"On our entire front the attack began at the same hour and it
was impossible for the enemy to shift his troops from one quarter
to another, as our attacks were being pressed equally at all
points.
172 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
"The most important fighting has been in the sector between
Rovno, and here we have made our greatest advances, which are
striking more seriously at the strategy of the whole enemy front
in the east.
"If we are able to take Kovel there is reason to believe that
the whole eastern front will be obliged to fall back, as Kovel
represents a railway center which has been extraordinarily use-
ful for the intercommunications of the Germans and Austrians.
"That this menace is fully realized by the enemy is obvious
from the fact that the Germans are supporting this sector with
all the available troops that can be rushed up. Some are coming
from the west and some from points on the eastern front to the
north of us.
"In all of this fighting the Russian infantry has proved itself
sujperb, with a morale which is superior even to that of 1914,
when we were sweeping through Galicia for the first time. This
is largely due to the fact that the army now represents the feel-
ing of the whole people of Russia, who are united in their desire
to carry the war to its final and sutcessful conclusion."
To the question how he had been able to make such huge cap-
tures of prisoners the Russian general replied:
'•'The nature of modem trenches, which makes them with their
deep tunnels and maze of communications, so difficult to destroy,
renders them a menace to their own defenders once their posi-
tion is taken in rear or flank, for it is impossible to escape
quickly from these elaborate networks of defenses.
"Besides, we have for the first time had sufficient ammunition
to enable us to use curtain fire for preventing the enemy from
retiring from his positions, save through a scathing zone of
shrapnel fire, which tenders surrender imperative."
IN CONQUERED EAST GALICIA 173
CHAPTER XXII
IN CONQUERED EAST GALICIA
ANOTHER very interesting account of conditions along the
'-southeastern front can be found in a letter from the Petro-
grad correspondent of a London daily newspaper, who spent
considerable time in Tarnopol, a city which had been in the hands
of the Russians ever since the early part of the war:
"We are in Austria here, but no one who was plumped down
into Tarnopol, say from an aeroplane, would ever guess it. Not
only are the streets full of Russian soldiers: all the names on
the shop fronts are in Russian characters. The hotels have
changed their styles and titles. The notices posted up in public
places are Russian. Everywhere Russian (of a kind) is talked.
German, the official language of Austria, is neither heard nor
seen.
"It is true that this part of Galicia has been in the possession
of Russia since the early days of the war. Even so, it is a
surprise to find a population so accommodating.
"The people in this part of Austria are Poles, Ruthenes and
Jews. Polish belongs to the same family of languages as Rus-
sian, and the Poles are Slavs. So are the Ruthenes, whose speech
is almost identical with that of southwestern Russia. They are
very like the 'Little' Russians, so called to distinguish them
from the people of 'Great* Russia on the north. They live in
the same neat, thatched and whitewashed cottages. They have
the same gayly colored national costumes still in wear, and the
same fairy tales, the same merry lilting songs, so different from
the melancholy strains of northern folk music. Almost the same
religion.
"The finest churches in Tarnopol belong to the Poles, who are
Roman Catholics. The Russian soldiers, many of them, seem
to find the Roman mass quite as comforting as their Orthodox
rite. They stand and listen to it humbly, crossing themselves in
eastern fashion, only caring to know that God is being wor-
174 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
shiped in more or less the same fashion as that to which they
are accustomed. But in the Ruthenian churches they find ex-
actly the same ritual as their own. With their blood relations
they are upon family terms. There was an interesting exhibi-
tion in Petrograd last year illustrating the Russian racial traits
in the Ruthenian population. Down here one recognizes these
at once.
"No clearer proof could be found of the gentle, kindly char-
acter of the Russians than the attitude toward them of the
Austrian Slavs generally. At a point close to the firing line,
early this morning, I saw three Austrian prisoners who had
been 'captured' during the night. They had, in point of fact,
given themselves up. They were Serbs from Bosnia, and they
were quite happy to be in Russian hands. I saw them again
later in the day on their way to the rear, sitting by the road-
side smoking cigarettes which their escort had given them. Cap-
tives and guardians were on the best of terms.
"The only official evidences of occupation which I noticed
are notices announcing that restaurants and cafes close at 11,
and that there must be no loud talking or playing of instruments
in hotels after 10 — an edict for which I feel profoundly grateful.
Signs of peaceful penetration are to be found everywhere. The
samovar (urn for making tea) has become an institution in
Galician hotels. The main street is pervaded by small boys sell-
ing Russian newspapers or making a good thing out of cleaning
the high Russian military 'sapogee' (top boots). They get five
cents for a penny paper and ninepence or a shilling for boot-
blacking, but considering the mud of Galicia (I have been up
to my boot tops — ^that is, up to my knees — in it), the charge
is not too heavy, especially if the unusual dearness of living be
taken into account.
"Very gay this main street is of an afternoon, crowded with
officers, who come in from the trenches to enjoy life. A very
pleasant Jot of young fellows they are, and very easily pleased.
One I met invited me to midday tea in his bombproof shelter in
a forward trench. I accepted gratefully and found him a charm-
ingly gay host. He took a childlike pleasure in showing me all
IN CONQUERED EAST GALICIA
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the conveniences he had fitted up, and kept on saying, *Ah, how
comfortable and peaceful it is here,' with the sound of rifle
shots and hand grenade and mine explosions in our ears all the
time.
"From highest to lowest, almost all the Russian officers I have
met are friendly and unassuming. The younger ones are de-
lightful. There is no drink to be had here, and therefore no
foolish, tipsy loudness or quarreling among them.'*
On June 18, 1916, further progress and additional large cap-
tures of Austro-Hungarian and German prisoners were reported
by the Russian armies fighting in Volhynia, Galicia, and the
Bukowina. However, both the amount of ground gained and
the number of prisoners taken were very much slighter than
\iad been the case during the earlier part of the Russian of-
fensive. This was due to the fact that the armies of the Central
Powers had received strong reenforcements and had apparently
succeeded in strengthening their new positions and in stiffening
their resistance. Powerful counterattacks were launched at
many points.
One of these, according to the Russian official statement, was
of special vigor. It was directed against General Brussilov's
armies which were attempting to advance toward Lemberg, in the
region of the village of Rogovitz to the southwest of Lokatchi,
about four miles to the south of the main road from Lutsk to
Vladimir- Volynski. There the Austro-Hungarian forces in large
numbers attacked in massed formation and succeeded in break-
ing through the Russian front, capturing three guns after all
the men and officers in charge of them had been killed. The
Russians, however, brought up strong reenforcements and made
it necessary for the Austro-Hungarians to withdraw, captur-
ing at the same time some hundred prisoners, one cannon, and
two machine guns.
At another point of this sector in the region of Korytynitzky,
southeast of Svinioukhi, a Russian regiment, strongly supported
by machine-gun batteries, inflicted heavy losses on the Austro-
Hungarian troops and captured four officers, a hundred soldiers,
and four machine guns.
IN CONQUEKED EAST GALICIA 177
South of this region, just to the east of BorohofF, a desperate
fight developed for the possession of a dense wood near the vil-
lage of Bojeff, which, after the most furious resistance, had to be
cleared finally by the Austro-Hungarian forces, which, during this
engagement, suffered large losses in killed and wounded, and fur-
thermore lost one thousand prisoners and four machine guns.
At still another point on this part of the front, just south of
Radziviloff, a Russian attack was resisted most vigorously and
heavy losses were inflicted on the attacking regiments. Here, as
well as in other places, the Austro-Hungarian-German forces
employed all possible means to stem the Russian onrush, and
a large part of the losses suffered by General Brussilov's regi-
ments was due to the extensive use of liquid fire.
The troops of General Lechitsky's command, after the occu-
pation of Czernowitz, crossed the river Pruth at many points
and came frequently in close touch with the rear guard of the
retreating Austro-Hungarian army. During the process of these
engagements, about fifty officers and more than fifteen hundred
men, as well as ten guns, were captured. Near Koutchournare,
four hundred more men and some guns of heavy caliber, as well
as large amounts of munitions fell into the hands of the Russian
forces. The latter claimed also at this point the capture of im-
mense amounts of provisions and forage, loaded on almost one
thousand wagons. At various other points west and north of
Czernowitz, large quantities of engineering material had to be
left behind at railroad stations by the retreating Austro-Hun-
garian army and thus easily became the booty of the victorious
Russians.
Farther to the north, along the Styr, to the west of Kolki, in
the region of the Kovel-Rovno Railway, General von Linsingen's
Austro-German army group successfully resisted Russian at-
tacks at some points, launched strong counterattacks at other
points, but had to fall back before superior Russian forces at
still other points.
In the northern sector of the eastern front, along the Dvina,
activity was restricted to extensive artillery duels during this
day.
178 - THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
CHAPTER XXIII
THE GERMAN C 0 U NT E RO PPE N S I VE
BEFORE KOVEL
AN extensive offensive movement was developed on June 19,
-1916, by General von Linsingen. The object of this move-
ment apparently was not only to secure the safety of Kovel, but
also to threaten General Brussilov's army by an enveloping
movement which, if it had succeeded, would not only have pushed
the Russian center back beyond Lutsk and even possibly Dubno,
but would also have exposed the entire Russian forces, fighting in
Galicia and the Bukowina, to the danger of being cut off from
the troops battling in Volhynia. This movement developed in
the triangle formed by the Kovel-Raf alovka railroad in the north,
the Kovel-Rozishtchy railroad in the south, and the Styr River
between these two places. The severest fighting in this sector
occurred along the Styr between Kolki and Sokal.
On the other hand Russians scored a decided success in the
southern comer of the Bukowina where a crossing of the Sereth
River was successfully negotiated. '
Artillery duels again were fought along the Dvina front as
well as along the Dvina- Vilia sector. In the latter region a num-
ber of engagements took place south of Smorgon, near Kary and
Tanoczyn, where German troops captured some hundreds of
Russians as well as four machine guns and four mine throwers.
A Russian aeroplane was compelled to land west of Kolodont,
south of Lake Narotch, while German aeroplanes successfully
bombarded the railroad station at Vileika on the Molodetchna-
Polotsk railway.
With ever increasing fury the battle raged along the Styr
River on the following day, June 20, 1916. Both sides won local
successes at various points, but the outstanding feature of that
day's fighting was the fact that in spite of the most heroic efforts
the Russian troops were unable to advance any farther toward
Kovel. Ten miles west of Kolki the Russians succeeded in cross-
COUNTEROFFENSIVE BEFORE KOVEL 179
of Gruziatin, two miles north of Godomitchy, the small German
garrison of which, consisting of some five hundred officers and
men, fell into Russian captivity. Only a short time later, on the
same day,, heavy German batteries concentrated such a furious
fire on the Russian troops occupying the village that they had to
withdraw and permit the Germans once more to occupy Gru-
ziatin. How furious the fighting in this one small section must
have been that day may readily be seen from the fact that the
German official statement claimed a total of over twenty thou-
sand men to have been lost by the Russians.
Hardly less severe was the fighting which developed along the
Stokhod River. This is a southern tributary of the Pripet River,
joining it about thirty miles west of the mouth of the Styr. It
is cut by both the Kovel-Rovno and the Kovel-Rafalovka rail-
ways, and forms a strong natural line of defense west of Kovel.
In spite of the most desperate efforts on the part of large Russian
forces to cross this river, near the village of Vorontchin north-
east of Kieslin, the German resistance was so tenacious that the
Russians were unable to make any progress. Large numbers of
guns of all calibers had been massed here and inflicted heavy
losses to the czar's regiments. Another furious engagement in
this region occurred during the night near the village of Ray-
niesto on the Stokhod River.
To the north heavy fighting again developed south of Smorgon,
where, with the coming of night, the Germans directed a very
intense bombardment against the Russian lines. Again and
again this was followed up with infantry attacks, which in some
instances resulted in the penetrating of the Russian trenches,
while in others it led to sanguinary hand-to-hand fighting. How-
ever, the Russian batteries likewise hurled their death-dealing
missiles in large numbers and exacted a terrific toll from the
ranks of the attacking Germans. Along the balance of the north-
em half of the front a serious artillery duel again was fought,
which was especially intense in the region of the Uxkull bridge-
head, in the northern sector of the Jacobstadt positions and along
the Oginsky Canal.
German aeroplane squadrons repeated their activity of the
180 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
day before and successfully bombarded the railroad stations at
Vileika, Molodetchna, and Zalyessie.
The well-known English journalist, Mr. Stanley Washburn,
acted at this time as special correspondent of the London *Times"
at Russian headquarters and naturally had exceptional oppor-
tunities for observing conditions at the front. Some of his de-
scriptions of the territory across which the Russians* advance
was carried out, as well as of actual fighting which he observed
at close quarters, therefore, give us a most vivid picture of the
difficulties under which the Russian victories were achieved and
of the tenacity and courage which the Austro-German troops
showed in their resistance.
Of the Volhynian fortress of Lutsk, as it appeared in the
second half of June, 1916, he says :
"This town to-day is a veritable maelstrom of war. From not
many miles away, by night and by day, comes an almost uninter-
rupted roar of heavy gunfire, and all day long the main street
is filled with the rumble and clatter of caissons, guns, and trans-
ports going forward on one side, while on the other side is an
unending line of empty caissons returning, mingled with
wounded coming back in every conceivable form of vehicle, and
in among these at breakneck speed dart motorcycles carrying
dispatches from the front.
"The weather is dry and hot, and the lines of the road are
visible for miles by the clouds of dust from the plodding feet
3f the soldiery and the transport. As the retreat from Warsaw
was a review of the Russian armies in reverse, so is Lutsk to-day
a similar spectacle of the Muscovite armies advancing ; but now
all filled with high hopes and their morale is at the highest
pitch.
"Along the entire front the contending armies are locked in a
fierce, ceaseless struggle. No hour of the day passes when there
is not somewhere an attack or a counterattack going forward
with a bitterness and ferocity unknown since the beginning of
the war. The troops coming from Germany are rendering the
Russian advance difficult, and the general nature of the fighting
is defense by vigorous counterattacks."
COUNTEROFFENSIVE BEFORE KOVEL 181
Of the fighting along the Kovel front he says : "The story of
the fighting on the Kovel front is a narrative of a heroic advance
which at the point of the bayonet steadily forced back through
barrier after barrier the stubborn resistance of the Austrians,
intermingled occasionally with German units, till at one point
the advance measured forty-eight miles.
"After two days spent on the front I can state without any
reservation that I believe that the Russians are engaged in the
fiercest and most courageous fight of their entire war, hanging
on to their hardly won positions and often facing troops con-
centrated on the strategic points of the line outnumbering them
sometimes by three to one.
"I spent Thursday at an advanced position on the Styr, where
the Russian troops earlier forced a crossing of the river, facing
a terrific fire, and turning the enemy out of his positions at the
point of the bayonet. In hurriedly dug positions offering the
most meager kind of shelter, the Russians in one morning
drove back four consecutive Austrian counterattacks. Each left
the field thickly studded with Austrian dead, besides hundreds
of their wounded who had been left.
"From an observation point in the village I studied the ground
of the day's fighting, and though familiar with Russian courage
and tenacity, I found it difficult to realize that human beings had
been able to carry the positions which the Russians carried here.
"I was obliged to curtail my study of the enemy's lines and
of the position on account of the extremely local artillery fire,
the shells endeavoring to locate our observation point, which
was evidently approximately known. At any rate, two shells
bursting over us and one narrowly missing our waiting carriage,
besides three others falling in the mud almost at our feet,
prompted our withdrawal. Fortunately the last three had fallen
in the mud and did not explode.
"Along this front the Russians are holding against heavy odds,
but they are certainly inflicting greater losses than they are
receiving.
"The next day I spent at the Corps and Divisional Head-
quarters west of the Kovel road. The forward un^ts of this corps
182 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
represent the maximum point of our advance, and the Russians*
most vital menace to the enemy, as is obvious from the numbers
of Germans who are attacking here in dense masses, v^ithout
so far seriously impairing the Russian resistance.
"After spending three days on this front motoring hundreds
of versts, and inspecting the positions taken by the Russians,
their achievement becomes increasingly impressive. The first
line taken which I have inspected represents the latest practice in
field works, in many ways comparing with the lines which I saw
on the French front. The front line is protected by five or six
series of barbed wire, with heavy front line trenches, studded
with redoubts, machine-gun positions, and underground shelters
twenty f«eet deep, while the reserve positions extend in many
places from half a mile to a mile in series behind the first
line, studded with communication trenches, shelters, and bomb-
proofs.
"It must not be thought that the Austrians offered only a feeble
resistance, for I inspected one series of trenches where, I was
informed, the Russians in a few versts of front buried 4,000
Austrian dead on the first lines alone. This indicates the nature
and tenacity of the enemy resistance. I am told also that far
fewer Slavs and Poles have been found among the Austrians
than in any other big action. It is believed that most of these
have been sent to the Italian front on account of their tendency
to surrender to the Russians.
"Another interesting point about their advance is the fact
that the Russians practically in no place used guns of the heaviest
caliber, and that the preliminary artillery fire in no place lasted
above thirty hours, and in many places not more than twelve
hours.
"Last summer's experience is not forgotten by the Russians
and there has probably been the most economic use of ammuni-
tion on any of the fronts in this war commensurate with the
results during these advances. Rarely was a hurricane fire di-
rected on any positions preceding an assault, but the artillery
checked each shell and its target, which was rendered possible
by the nearness of our front lines.
PROGRESS OF BUKOWINIAN CONQUEST 183
"In this way avenues were cut through the barbed wire at
frequent intervals along the line through which the attacks were
pressed home and the flanking trenches and the labyrinths were
taken in the rear or on the flanks before the Austrians were able
to effect their escape. The line once broken was moved steadily
forward, taking Lutsk six days after the first attack, and one
division reaching its maximum advance of forty-eight miles just
ten days after the first offensive movement."
CHAPTER XXIV
PROGRESS OF THE BUKOWINIAN
CONQUEST
/^N June 21, 1916, the Russians gained another important
^^ victory by the capture of the city of Radautz, in the southern
Bukowina, eleven miles southwest of the Sereth River, and less
than ten miles west of the Rumanian frontier. This river Sereth
must not be confused with a river of the same name further to
the north in Galicia. The latter is a tributary of the Dniester,
while the Bukowinian Sereth is a tributary of the Danube,
which latter it joins near the city of Galatz, in Rumania, after
flowing in a southeasterly direction through this country for
almost two hundred miles.
The fall of Radautz was an important success for various rea-
sons. In the first place, it brought the Russian advance that
much nearer to the Carpathian Mountains. In the second place,
it gave the invading armies full control of an important railway
running in a northwesterly direction through the Bukowina.
This railway was of special importance, because it is the northern
continuation of one of the principal railroad lines of Rumania
which, during its course in the latter country, runs along the west
bank of the Ser6th River.
In Galicia, General von Bothmer's army successfully resisted
strong Russian attacks along the Hajvoronka-Bobulinze line,
north of Przevloka,
184 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
Without cessation the furious fighting in the Kolki-Sokal sec-
tor on the Styr River continued. There General von Lin-
singen's German reenforcements had strengthened the Austro-
Hungarian resistance to such an extent that it held against all
Russian attempts to break through their line in their advance
toward Kovel.
The same condition existed on the Sokal-Linievka line,
where the Russian forces had been trying for the best part
of a week to force a crossing of the Stokhod River, the only
natural obstacle between them and Kovel. Further south, west
of Lutsk, from the southern sector of the Turiya River down to
the Galician border near the town of Gorochoff, the Teutonic
forces likewise succeeded in resisting the Russian advance. This
increased resistance of the Teutonic forces found expression,
also, in a considerable decrease in the number of prisoners taken
by the Russians.
Along the northern half of the front. Field Marshal von Hin-
denburg renewed his attacks south of Dvinsk. South of Lake
Vishnieff, near Dubatovka, German troops, after intense ar-
tillery preparation, stormed a portion of the Russian trenches,
but could not maintain their new positions against repeated
ferocious counterattacks carried out by Russian reenforcements.
Near Krevo, the Germans forced a crossing over the River
Krevlianka, but were again thrown back to its west bank by
valiant Russian artillery attacks.
The Russian advance in the Bukowina progressed rapidly
on June 22, 1916. Three important railroad towns fell into
their hands, on that day, of the left wing of the Russian army,
Gurahumora in the south, Straza in the center, and Vidnitz in
the northwest. Gurahumora lies fifty miles south of Czerno-
witz, and is situated on the only railway in the southern part
of the crownland. The town is ten miles from the Russian bor-
der. Straza lies a few miles east of the western terminal of
the Radautz-Frasin railway. Its fall indicates a Russian ad-
vance of eighteen miles since the capture of Radautz. Vidnitz
is on the Galician border, a few miles south of Kuty, and twenty-
five miles southwest of Czernowitz.
PROGRESS OF BUKOWINIAN CONQUEST 185
In spite of these successes, however, it became clear by this
time that the Russian' attempt to cut off the Austrian army fight-
ing in the Bukowina had miscarried. Each day yielded a smaller
number of prisoners than the preceding day. The main
pai-t of the Austro-Hungarian forces had safely reached the foot-
hills of the Carpathians, while other parts farther to the north
had succeeded in joining the army of General von Bothmer.
In Galicia and Volhynia the Teutonic forces continued to
resist successfully all Russian attempts to advance, even though
there was not the slightest let-up in the violence of the Russian
attack.
Along many other points of the front, more or less important
engagements took place, especially so along the Oginsky Canal,
where the Russians suffered hea\y losses. Von Hindenburg's
troops in the north also were active again, both in the Lake dis-
trict south of Dvinsk, and along the Dvina sector from Dvinsk
to Riga.
Once more a Russian success was reported in the Bukowina
on June 23, 1916. West of Sniatyn the Russian troops advanced
to the Rybnitza River, occupying the heights along its banks.
Still further west, about twenty miles south of the Pruth River,
the town of Kuty, well up in the Carpathian Mountains, was
captured. Kuty is about forty miles west of Czernowitz, just
across the Galician border and only twenty miles almost due
south from the important railroad center Kolomea, itself about
one-third the distance from Czernowitz to Lemberg on the main
railway between these two cities.
A slight success was also gained on the Rovno-Dubno-Brody-
Lemberg railway. A few miles northeast of Brody, just east of
the Galician-Russian border, near the village of Radziviloff , Rus-
sian troops gained a footing in the Austro-Hungarian trenches
and captured a few hundred prisoners. Later that day, how-
ever, a concentrated artillery bombardment forced them to give
up this advantage and to retire to their own trenches.
In Volhynia the German counterattacks against General Brus-
silov's army extended now along the front of almost eighty
miles, stretching from Kolki on the Styr River to within a few
186 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
miles of the Galician border near Gorochoff. Along part of
this line, General von Linsingen's forces advanced on June 23,
1916, to and beyond the line of Zubilno-Vatyn-Zvinatcze, and
repulsed a series of most fierce counterattacks launched by the
Russians which caused the latter serious losses in killed, wounded,
and prisoners. The country covered by these engagements is
extremely difficult, impeded by woods and swamps, and a great
deal of the fighting, therefore, was at close quarters, especially
so near the town of Tortchyn, about fifteen miles due west of
Lutsk. Other equally severe engagements occurred near Zu-
bilno and southeast of Sviniusky, near the village of Pustonyty.
In the north, the Russians took the offensive in the region of
Illuxt, on the Dvina, and in the region of Vidzy, north of
the Disna River. Although successful in some places, the Ger-
man resistance was strong enough to prevent any material gain.
German aeroplanes attacked and bombarded the railway sta-
tions at Kolozany, southwest of Molodetchna, and of Puniniez.
West of Sniatyn, Russian troops, fighting as they advanced,
occupied the villages of Kilikhoff and Toulokhoff on June 24,
1916.
Late on the preceding evening, June 23, 1916, the town of
Kimpolung was taken after intense fighting. Sixty officers and
2,000 men were made prisoners and seven machine gun3 were
captured. In the railway station whole trains were captured.
With the capture of the towns of Kimpolung, Kuty and Viznic,
the whole Bukowina was now in the hands of the Russians. So
hurried had been the retirement of the Austro-Hungarian forces
that they left behind eighty-eight empty wagons, seventeen
wagons of maize, and about 2,500 tons of anthracite, besides
structural material, great reserves of fodder and other material.
On the Styr, two miles south of Sminy, in the region of Czar^
torysk, the Russians, by a sudden attack, took the redoubt of a
fort whose garrison, after a stubborn resistance, were all put
to the bayonet.
North of the village of Zatouritzky, the German-Austrian
forces assumed the offensive, but were pushed back by a counter-
attack, both sides suffering heavily in the hand-grenade fighting.
PROGRESS OF BUKOWINIAN CONQUEST 187
North of Poustomyty, southeast of Sviusky (southwest of
Lutsk), the Germans attacked Russian Hnes, but were received
by concentrated fire, and penetrated as far as the Russian
trenches in only a few points, where the trenches had been vir-
tually destroyed by the preparatory artillery fire.
German artillery violently bombarded numerous sectors of the
Riga positions. A strong party of Germans attempted to ap-
proach Russian trenches near the western extremity of Lake
Babit, but without result.
On the Dvina, between Jacobstadt and Dvinsk, German ar-
tillery was also violently active. German aeroplanes dropped
twenty bombs on the station at Polochany southwest of Molo-
detchna.
Oi. June 25, 1916, there was again intense artillery fire in many
sectors in the regions of Jacobstadt and Dvinsk.
Along the balance of the front many stubborn engagements
were fought between comparatively small detachments. Thus
for instance, in the region east of Horodyshchj' north of Bara-
novitchy, after a violent bombardment of the Rvissian trenches
near the Scroboff farm on Sunday night, the German troops took
the offensive, but were repulsed. At the same time, on the road
to Slutsk, a German attempt to approach the Russian trenches
on the Shara River was repulsed by heavy fire.
In the region northwest of Lake Vygonovskoye, at noon the
Germans attacked the farm situated five versts southwest of
Lipsk. At first they were repulsed; but nevertheless they re-
newed the attack afterward on a greatly extended front under
cover of heavy and light artillery.
Especially heavy fighting again developed along the Kovel
sector of the Styr front. From Kolki to Sokal the Germans
bombarded the Russian trenches with heavy artillery and
made many local attacks, most of which were successfully
repulsed.
Repeated attacks in mass formation in the region of Linievka
on the Stokhod, resulted also in some successes to the German
troops. West of Sokal they stormed Russian positions over a
length of some 3,000 meters and repulsed all counterattacks.
188 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
On the reaches of the Dniester, south of Buczacz, Don Cos-
sacks, having crossed the river fighting and overthrowing ele-
ments of the Austro-Hungarian advance guards, occupied the
villages of Siekerghine and Petruve, capturing five officers and
350 men. Russian cavalry, after a fight, occupied positions near
Pezoritt, a few miles west of Kimpolung.
Additional large depots of wood and thirty-one abandoned
wagons were captured at Molit and Frumos stations on the
Gurahumora-Rascka railway.
On the other hand the number of prisoners and the amount
of booty taken by General von Linsingen's army alone in Vol-
hynia since June 16, 1916, increased to sixty-one officers, 11,097
men, two cannon and fifty-four guns.
CHAPTER XXV
TEMPORARY LULL IN THE RUSSIAN
OFFENSIVE
SO strong had the combined Austro-Hungarian-German resist-
ance become by this time, that by June 26, 1916, the Russian
advance seemed to have been halted all along the line. The
resistance had stiffened, especially in front of Kovel, where the
Central Powers seemed to have assembled their strongest forces
and were not only successful in keeping the Russians from reach-
ing Kovel but even regained some of the ground lost in Volhynia.
Southwest of Sokal they stormed Russian lines and took sev-
eral hundred prisoners. Russian counterattacks were nowhere
successful. This was especially due to the fact that both on the
Kolki front and on the middle Strypa the Germans bombarded all
Russian positions with heavy guns.
To the north of Kuty and west of Novo Posaive Russian at-
tacks were repulsed likewise with heavy losses.
The fighting in the north, along the Dvina front and south
of Dvinsk in the lake district, had settled down to a series of local
TEMPORARY LULL IN RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE 189
engagements between small detachments and to artillery duels.
German detachments which penetrated Russian positions south
of Kekkau brought back twenty-six prisoners, one machine gun
and one mine thrower. Another detachment which entered Rus-
sian positions brought back north of Miadziol one officer, 188
men, six machine guns and four mine throwers. Numerous
bombs were again dropped on the railway freight station at
Dvinsk. In the Baltic, however, three Russian hydroplanes in
the Irben Strait engaged four German machines, bringing down
one. On the Riga front and near Uxkull bridgehead there was an
artillery duel. Against the Dvinsk positions, too, the Germans
opened a violent artillery lire at different points, and attempted
to take the offensive north of Lake Sventen, but without
success.
In the region north of Lake Miadziol, south of Dvinsk, the
Germans bombarded with heavy and light artillery Russian
trenches between lakes Dolja and Voltchino. They then started
an offensive which was stopped by heavy artillery fire. A second
German offensive also failed, the attacking troops being again
driven back to their own trenches.
In the region of the Slutsk road; southeast of Baranovitchy,
the Germans after a short artillery preparation attempted to
take the offensive, but were repulsed by heavy fire.
The Germans also resumed the offensive in the vicinity of a
farm southwest of Lipsk, northeast of Lake Vygonovskoe, and
succeeded in reaching the east bank of the Shara, but soon after-
ward were dislodged from it and fell back.
The Russian official statement of that day, June 26, 1916, an-
nounced that General Brussilov had captured between June 4th
and 23d, 4,413 officers and doctors, 194,941 men, 219 guns, 644
machine guns and 195 bomb throwers.
Again, during the night of June 26, 1916, southeast of Riga, the
Germans, after bombarding the Russian positions and emitting
clouds of gas, attacked in great force in the direction of Pulkarn.
Reenforcements, having been brought up quickly by the Russians,
they succeeded with the assistance of their artillery, in repulsing
the Germans, who suffered heavy losses.
190 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
On the Dvina and in the Jacobstadt region there was an artil-
lery and rifle duel. German aeroplanes were making frequent
raids on the Russian lines. They dropped sixty-eight bombs
during a nocturnal raid on the town of Dvinsk on June 27, 1916.
The damage both to property and life was considerable.
An attempt on the part of German troops to take the offensive
south of Krevo was repulsed by gunfire. On the rest of the front
as far as the region of the Pripet Marshes there was an exchange
of fire.
On the same day General von Linsingen's forces stormed and
captured the village of Linievka, west of Sokal and about three
miles east of the Svidniki bridgehead on the Stokhod, and the
Russian positions south of it. West of Torchin, near the apex
of the Lutsk salient, a strong Russian attack collapsed under
German artillery and infantry fire.
In Galicia, southwest of Novo Pochaieff , east of Brody, Austro-
Hungarian outposts repulsed five Russian night attacks.
Gradually the Russians were closing in on the important posi-
tion of Kolomea, near the northern Bukowina border. On the east
they were only twelve miles off, on the north they had crossed
the Dniester twenty-four miles away, and in a few days they
reported having driven the Austrians across a river thirteen
miles to the southeast, while at Kuty, twenty miles almost due
south, one attack followed another.
On the following day, June 28, 1916, strong offensive move-
ments again developed both in East Galicia and in Volhynia. In
the former region the Russians were the aggressors ; in the latter,
the Germans.
In East Galicia General Lechitsky, commander of Brussilov's
center, began a mighty onrush against the Austro-Hungarian
lines, between the Dniester and the region around Kuty, in an
effort to push his opponents beyond the important railway city
of Kolomea, strategically the most valuable point of southern
Galicia.
He succeeded in inflicting a crushing defeat upon the Austro-
Hungarians, taking three lines of trenches and 10,506 prisoners.
This success was achieved in the northern part of the area of
TEMPORARY LULL IN RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE 191
attack, between the Dniester and the region around the Pruth.
The fall of Kolomea looked inevitable because of this new
advance.
Persistent fighting took place on the line of the River Tcherto-
vetz, a tributary of the Pruth, and also in the region of the town
of Kuty. Both sides again suffered heavy losses at these points.
East of Kolomea the Russians again attacked in massed for-
mations on a front of twenty-five miles. At numerous points,
at a great sacrifice, Russian reserves were thrown against the
Austrian lines, and succeeded in advancing in hand-to-hand fight-
ing, but during the evening were forced to evacuate a portion of
their front near Kolomea and to the south. On the Dniester line
superior Russian forces were repulsed north of Obertyn. All
Russian attempts to dislodge the Austrians west of Novo Peczaje
failed. At many other points in Galicia and the Bukowina there
were artillery duels.
In Volhynia, especially in the region of Linievka, and at other
points on the Stokhod, the desperate fighting which had been in
progress for quite a few days continued without abatement.
Russian attacks made by some companies between Dubatow-
ska and Smorgon failed in the face of terrific German fire.
Near Guessitschi, southeast of Ljubtscha, a German division
stormed an enemy point of support east of the Niemen, taking
some prisoners and capturing two machine guns and two mine
throwers.
On the Dvina front German artillery bombarded the region
of Sakowitche, Seltze and Bogouschinsk Wood, northwest of
Krevo. Strong forces then proceeded to attack, but were re-
pulsed by Russian machine guns and infantry fire.
On June 29, 1916, the fighting northwest of Kuty continued.
As a result of pressure on the part of the superior forces of the
Russians the Austro-Hungarians were forced to withdraw their
lines west and southwest of Kolomea. The town of Obertyn was
taken after a stubborn fight, as well as villages in the neighbor-
hood, north and south. In the region south of the Dniester, the
Russians were pursuing the Austrians, who were forced to leave
behind a large number of convoys and military material.
M— War St. 5
192 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
Near the village of Solivine, between the rivers Stokhod and
Styr, to the west of Sokal, the Germans attempted to take the
offensive. Their attack was repulsed, but an artillery duel con-
tinued until late in the day.
In the morning German aviators dropped thirty bombs on
Lutsk. Light and heavy German artillery opened a violent fire on
the Russian trenches in the Niemen sector, northeast of Novo
Grodek. Under cover of this fire German forces crossed the
Niemen and occupied the woods east of the village of Guessitschi.
On the Dvina front German artilleiy bombarded Russian
positions southeast of Riga and the bridgehead above Uxkull.
North of Illuxt the Germans attempted to move forward, but
were thrown back by Russian gunfire.
CHAPTER XXVI
ADVANCE AGAINST LEMBERG AND.KOVEL
LATE that day, June 29, 1916, General Lechitsky captured
^ Kolomea, the important railway junction for the possession
of which the battle had been raging furiously for days past.
This was a severe blow to the Central Powers. It meant a seri-
ous danger to the remainder of General Pfianzer's army and like-
wise threatened the safety of General von Bothmer's forces to
the north.
Still the Russian advances continued. On the last day of June
their left wing drove back the retreating Austro-Hungarians
over a front situated south of the Dniester and occupied many
places south of Kolomea.
Northwest of Kolomea, Russian troops, after a violent en-
gagement, drove back their opponents in the direction of the
heights near the village of Brezova, and as the result of a bril-
liant attack, took part of the heights.
The number of prisoners taken by General Lechitsky during
the last days of June, 1916, was 305 officers and 14,574 men.
ADVANCE AGAINST LEMBERG AND KOVEL 193
Four guns and thirty machine guns were captured. The total
number of prisoners taken from June 4 to June 30, 1916, in-
clusive, was claimed to have reached the immense total of 217,000
officers and men.
During June, in the region south of Griciaty, 158 officers and
2,307 men, as well as cannon and nineteen machine guns, fell
into the hands of the Central Powers.
In the region of the Lipa Austrian artillery continued to bom
bard the Russian front with heavy artillery and field artillery.
Desperate attacks made by newly arrived German troops were,
however, repulsed with heavy losses to the attacking forces.
Near Thumacz an attack of cavalry, who charged six deep
along a front of three kilometers, was successfully repulsed by
Austro-Hungarian troops.
German forces drove back Russian troops south of Ugrinow,
west of Tortschin, and near Sokal.
At other points on the Kovel front engagements likewise took
place, though the violence of the combat had somewhat abated.
West of Kolki, southwest of Sokal, and near Viczny, German
forces conquered Russian positions. West and southwest of
Lutsk various local engagements occurred. Here the Russians
on June 30, 1916, lost fifteen officers, 1,365 men; since June 16th,
twenty-six officers, 3,165 men.
The next objective of General Lechitsky's army was Stanislau,
about thirty miles farther northwest than Kolomea, on the Czer-
novitz-Lemberg railway. On July 1, 1916, in the region west of
Kolomea, the army of General Lechitsky, after intense fighting,
took .by storm some strong Austrian positions and captured some
2,000 men.
Further north, German and Austro-Hungarian troops of Gen-
eral von Bothmer's army stormed the hill of Vorobijowka, a
height southwest of Tarnopol, which had been occupied by the
Russians, and took seven officers and 891 men. Seven machine
guns and two mine throwers were captured.
On the Volhynia front the German troops continued to deliver
desperate attacks against some sectors between the Styr and
Stokhod and south of the Stokhod.
WA THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
In the afternoon German artillery produced gusts of fire in
the region of Koptchie, Ghelenovka and Zabary, southwest of
Sokal. An energetic attack then followed, but was repulsed.
Southwest of Kiselin Russian fire stopped an offensive. At the
village of Seniawa and in the same region near the village of
Seublino there was a warm engagement. A series of fresh Ger-
man attacks southwest of Kiselin-Zubilno-Kochey was repulsed.
The German columns were put to flight with heavy losses. The
fugitives were killed in large numbers, but, reenforced by re-
serves, the attacks were promptly renewed, without, however,
meeting with much success.
South of the village of Zaturze, near the village of Koscheff,
Russian forces stopped an Austrian offensive by a counteroffen-
sive. Austrian attempts to cross the River Shara southwest of
Lipsk and south of Baranovitchy were likewise repulsed.
On July 2, 1916, Russian torpedo boats bombarded the Cour-
land coast east of Raggazem without result. They were attacked
effectively by German coastal batteries and by aeroplanes.
At many points along the front of Field Marshal von Hinden-
burg the Russians increased their fire, and repeatedly undertook
advances. These led to fighting within the German lines near
Niki, north of Smorgon. The Russians were ejected with losses.
On the front of Prince Leopold the Russians attacked north-
east and east of Gorodische and on both sides of the Baranovitchy
railway, after artillery preparation lasting four hours.
Farther south fierce battles occurred between the Styr
and the Stokhod and to the south of these rivers. On the
Koptche-Ghelenovka-Zobary front, after gusts of gunfire,
the Germans left their trenches and opened an assault upon
the Russian line. Under cover of a bombardment of ex-
treme violence German troops opened an offensive south
of Linievka, but were checked. In the region of Zubilno
and Zaturze (west of Lutsk) the Austrians took the offen-
sive in massed formation, but were repulsed with heavy losses.
East of the village of Ougrinov, midway between Lutsk and
Gorochoff, fresh German forces held up Russian attacks. At other
points on the front of General von Linsingen strong Russian
ADVANCE AGAINST LEMBERG AND KOVEL 195
counterattacks were delivered west and southwest of Lutsk, but
failed to stop the German advance. Large cavalry attacks broke
down under German fire. The number of prisoners was increased
by the Germans by about 1,800. As the result of a week of costly
onslaughts by the Austro-German army between the Stokhod and
the Styr Rivers in Volhynia, the Russian forces had now been
forced back a distance of five miles along the greatest part of
the front before Kovel.
In the region of Issakoff, on the right bank of the Dniester,
southeast of Nijniff , the Austrians took the offensive in superior
- numbers. The Russians launched a counteroffensive, which re-
sulted in a fierce fight.
On July 3, 1916, the Russian advance west of Kolomea still
continued in this direction. The Austrians were dislodged from
several positions, and as a result of this the Russians occupied the
village of Potok Tchamy. The booty taken by the Russians here
was four cannon and a few hundred prisoners.
Further north in Galicia the army group of General Count
von Bothmer, southeast of Thumacz, in a quick advance, forced
back the Russians on a front more than twelve and a half miles
wide and more than five and a quarter miles deep.
On the Styr-Stokhod front the Russians again threw strong
forces, part of them recently brought up to this front, in masses
against the German lines to stay their advance, but were re-
pulsed.
An attempt of German troops to cross the Styr in the region
of the village of Lipa was repulsed. During the night the Rus-
sians captured on this front eleven officers, nearly 1,000 men and
five machine guns.
Still farther north, local counterattacks at points where the
Russians first succeeded in making some advances, all yielded
finally some successes for the Germans, who captured thirteen
, officers and 1,883 men. Two lines of German works south of
Tzirine, northeast of Baranovitchy, however, were pierced by the
Russians. In this fighting they captured seventy-two officers,
2,700 men, eleven cannon and several machine guns and bomb
throwers.
196 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
On the northerly front there was lively artillery fire, which
became violent at some points. In the region of the village of
Baltaguzy, east of Lake Vichnevskoye the Germans attempted
to leave their trenches, but were prevented by Russian fire. A
Russian air squadron raided the Baranovitchy railway station.
Once more, on July 4, 1916, the coast of Courland was bom-
barded fruitlessly from the sea by Russian ships. The operations
of the Russian forces against the front of Field Marshal von
Hindenburg were continued, especially on both sides of Smorgon.
On the Riga-Dvinsk front the artillery duels were growing more
intense. Northwest of Goduziesk, Russian troops dislodged Ger-
man forces from the outskirts of a wood. German aeroplane
squadrons dropped bombs freely on the railway.
The Russians recommenced attacking the front from Tzirin to
a point southeast of Baranovitchy. Hand-to-hand fights in some
places were very stubborn. The Russians were driven out of
the sections of the German lines into which they had broken and
suffered very heavy losses.
On the lower Styr and on the front between the Styr and
Stokhod, and farther south as far as the region of the lower
Lipa, everywhere there were fought most desperate engage-
ments.
In the region of Vulka-Galouziskai the Russians broke through
wire entanglements fitted with land mines. In a very desperate
fight on the Styr west of Kolki the Russians overthrew the
Germans and took more than 1,000 prisoners, together with
three guns, seventeen machine guns and two searchlights, and
several thousand rifles.
In the region north of Zaturse and near Volia Sadovska the
Russians seized the first line of enemy trenches, and stopped by
artillery fire an enemy attack on Schkline.
In the region of the lower Lipa the Germans made a most
stubborn attack without result. At another point the Germans,
who crossed the Styr above the mouth of the Lipa, near the vil-
lage of Peremel, were attacked and driven back to the river.
On the Galician front, in the direction of the Carpathians,
there was an artillery action. The left wing of the Russians
ADVANCE AGAINST LEMBERG AND KOVEL 197
continued to press the Austrians back. On the road between
Kolomea and Dalatyn the Russians captured the village of Sad-
zadka at the point of the bayonet.
Southeast of Riga and at many points on the front between
Postavy and Vishnieff, further partial attacks by the Russians
were repulsed on July 5, 1916. On the Dvina front and the
Dvinsk position and further south there were also lively artillery
engagements at numerous points. Near Boyare, on the Dvina
above Friedrichstadt, Russian light artillery smashed a German
light battery. Attempts by the Germans to remove the guns
were unsuccessful. The gun team, which endeavored to save one
of the guns, was annihilated. All the guns were eventually
abandoned.
Extremely fierce fighting, especially in the region east of
Worodische and south of Darovo, was everywhere in German
favor. The losses of the Russians were very considerable.
In the direction of Baranovitchy the fighting continues, devel-
oping to Russian advantage. The Germans delivered repeated
counterattacks in order to regain positions captured by the Rus-
sians, but each was easily repulsed.
South of the Pinsk Marshes the Russians had important new
successes. In the region of Gostioukhovka they captured an
entire German battery and took prisoners twenty-two officers and
350 soldiers. Northwest of Baznitchi, on the Styr, north of Kolki,
the Russians captured two cannon, three machine guns, and
2,322 prisoners. North of Stegrouziatine they captured German
trenches and took more than 300 prisoners and one machine
gun. Between the Styr and the Stokhod, west of Sokal and
southward, the Germans launched many counterattacks under
the protection of artillery.
In Galicia, after intense artillery preparations, the Russians
took up an energetic offensive west of the lower Strypa and on
the right bank of the Dniester. The Germans were defeated and
driven back. The Russian troops were now approaching the
Koropice and Souhodolek Rivers, tributaries of the Dniester.
They took here nearly 5,000 prisoners and eleven machine guns.
On the front of the Barysz sector the defense, after the repulse
198 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
of repeated Russian attacks, was partially transferred to the
Koropice sector. Russian assaults frequently broke down before
the German lines on both sides of Chocimirz, southeast of
Tlumach.
Near Sadzadka the Russians with superior forces were suc-
cessful in penetrating the Austrian positions, who then retreated
about live miles to the west, where they formed a new line and
repulsed all attacks.
Southwest and northwest of Kolomea the Austrians main^
tained their positions against all Russian efforts.
Southwest of Buczacz, after heavy fighting at Koropice Brook,
the Austrians recaptured their line.
CHAPTER XXVII
THE GERMAN STAND ON THE STOKHOD
GENERAL VON LINSINGEN saw himself forced to abandon
on July 6, 1916, a corner of the German lines protruding
toward Czartorysk on account of the superior pressure on its
sides near Kostiukovka and west of Kolki, and new lines of de-
fense were selected along the Stokhod. On both sides of Sokal,
Russian attacks broke down with heavy losses. West and south-
west of Lutsk the situation remained unchanged that day.
Against the front of Field Marshal von Hindenburg, the Rus-
sians continued their operations. They attacked with strong
forces south of Lake Narotch, but after fierce fighting were
repulsed. Northeast of Smorgon and at other points they were
easily repulsed.
The fighting in the vicinity of Kolomea was extended. A
strong Russian advance west of the town was checked by a
counterattack. Southeast of Tlumach German and Austro-
Hungarian troops broke up with artillery and infantry fire an
attack over a front of one and a half kilometers by a large force
of Russian cavalry.
THE GERMAN STAND ON THE STOKHOD 199
The number of prisoners the Russians took on July 4 and 5,
1916, during the fighting which still continued on west of the
line of the Styr and below the town of Kolki, totals more than
300 officers and 7,415 men, mostly unwounded. The Russians
also captured six guns, twenty-three machine guns, two search-
lights, several thousand rifles, eleven bomb throwers, and sev-
enty-three ammunition lights.
The Russians repulsed violent German attacks near Gruziatyn.
On the right bank of the Dniester, in the region of Jidatcheff
and Hotzizrz, there also was desperate fighting.
There was a lively artillery duel in many sectors of the front
north of the Pinsk Marshes. East of Baranovitchy, the Austro-
Hungarian forces launched several desperate counterattacks
which were repulsed by the Russians. Several times the Aus-
trians opened gusts of fire with their heavy and light guns
against the region of the village of Labuzy, east of Baranovitchy.
Under cover of this fire, the Austrians delivered two violent
counterattacks. The Russians drove the Austro-Hungarians
back on both occasions, bringing to bear on them the fire of their
artillery, machine guns, and rifles.
During the repulse of repeated attacks made on July 7, 1916,
south of Lake Narotch, the Germans captured two officers and
210 men. They repelled weak advances at other points.
Repeated efforts by strong Russian forces against the front
from Tzirin to the southeast of Gorodische and on both sides
of the Darovo ended in complete failure. The dead lying before
the German positions numbered thousands. In addition to these
the Russians lost a considerable number of prisoners.
Austro-Hungarian troops fighting along the bend of the Styr,
opposed for four weeks past to hostile forces which have in-
creased from threefold to fivefold superiority, found it necessary
to withdraw their advanced lines which were exposed to a
double outflanking movement. Assisted by the cooperation of
German troops west of Kolki and by the Polish Legion near
Kaloda, the movement was executed undisturbed by the Russians*"
In the region of the lower Styr, west of the Czartorysk sector,
the Russians were closely pressing the Austrians. After the battle
200 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
they occupied the Gorodok-Manevichi station on the Okonsk-
Zagorovka-Gruziatyn line. In combats seventy-five officers in
the zone of the railway were taken with 2,000 men, and also
in the Gruziatyn region.
Following the capture of the village of Grady, and after a hot
bayonet encounter, the village of Dolzyca, on the main road be-
tween Kolki and Manevichi, and village of Gruziatyn were taken.
The number of German and Austrian prisoners continued to
increase.
In the region of Optevo a great number of Austrians were
sabered during pursuit of the Russians after a cavalry charge.
More than 600 men, five cannon, six machine guns, and three
machine gun detachments, with complete equipment, were cap-
tured.
East of Monasterzyska (Galicia), the Russians took posses-
sion of the village of Gregorov, carrying off more than 1,000
prisoners. There were artillery duels at many points. Russian
troops continued to press back the Austrians. In southeastern
Galicia, between Delatyn and Sadzovka, a Russian attack in
strong force was defeated by Alpine Territorials.
In the Bukowina, in successful engagements, Austrian troops
brought in 500 prisoners and four machine guns.
On July 8, 1916, the Russians fighting against the army group
of Prince Leopold of Bavaria, repeated several times their strong
attacks. The attacks again broke down, with heavy losses for
the Russians. In the fighting of the last few days the Germans
captured two officers and 631 men.
The Russian offensive on the lower Stokhod continued. South
of the Sarny-Kovel railway the villages of Goulevitchi and Ka-
chova were occupied after fighting. Farther south there were
fires everywhere in the region of the villages of Arsenovitchi,
Janovka, and Douchtch.
In southern Galicia, General Lechitsky occupied Delatjm after
very violent fighting. Delatyn is a railway junction of great
importance. Depots of war material, steel shields, grenades,
cartridges, iron, and wire abandoned by the Austrians have been
captured at many points.
THE GERMAN STAND ON THE STOKHOD 201
On the northern section of the front, apart from fruitless
Russian attacks in the region of Skobowa, east of Gorodische,
nothing of importance occurred on July 9, 1916.
The Russians advancing toward the Stokhod line were re-
pulsed everywhere. Their attacks west and southwest of Lutsk
were unsuccessful. German aeroplane squadrons made a suc-
cessful attack on Russian shelters east of the Stokhod.
Near the villages of Svidniki, Starly Mossor and Novy Mossor,
on the left bank of the Stokhod, lively fighting was in progress.
The Russians took German prisoners at three points. Between
Kiselin and Zubilno the Austrians attempted a surprise attack,
but it was repulsed with heavy loss.
The total number of prisoners taken by General Kaledine,
from July 4 to July 8, 1916, was 341 officers and 9,145 unwounded
soldiers. He also captured ten pieces of artillery, forty-eight
machine guns, sixteen bomb throwers, 7,930 rifles, and depots
of engineering materials. These figures were supposed to be
added to those given previously, which included 300 officers,
12,000 men and forty-five pieces of artillery.
On the Galician front there was a particularly intense artillery
action on both banks of the Dniester.
From the coast to Pinsk no events of special importance oc-
curred during July 10, 1916.
The Russians made futile attacks with very strong forces at
several points against the German line along the Stokhod River,
notably near Czereviscze, Hulevicze, Korysmi and Janmaka, and
on both sides of the Kovel-Rovno railway.
Near Hulevicze the Germans drove back Russian troops be-
yond their position by a strong counterattack, capturing more
than 700 prisoners and three machine guns.
In the Stokhod region the Germans received strong reenforce-
ments and brought up powerful artillery, enabling them to offer
a very stubborn resistance.
On the Briaza-Fondoul-Moldava front, northwest of Kimpo-
lung, in the southern Bukowina, considerable Austro-Hungarian
forces were thrown back by Russian troops after violent en-
gagements at various points.
202 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
German aeroplanes successfully attacked the railway station
at Zamirie on the Minsk-Baranovitchy railway line, dropping as
many as sixty bombs.
An attempt to cross the Dvina made by weak Russian forces
west of Friedrichstadt on July 11, 1916, and attacks south of
Narotch Lake were frustrated.
Russian detachments which attempted to establish themselves
on the left bank of the Stokhod River, near Janowka, were at-
tacked. Not a single man of these detachments got away from
the southern bank. At this point and on the Kovel-Rovno rail-
road the Germans took more than 800 prisoners. The booty
taken on the Stokhod during the two days, apart from a
number of officers and 1,932 men, included twelve machine guns.
The German aerial squadron continued their activity in attacks
east of the Stokhod. A Russian captive balloon was shot down.
Russian artillery dispersed Germans who were attempting U
bring artillery against the Ikakul works. Near the village ol
Grouchivka, north of Hulevicze, the Germans made their ap-
pearance on the right bank of the river, but later were ejected
therefrom.
In the sector of the Tscherkassy farm, south of Krevo, the
Germans, supported by violent artillery fire, took the offensive,
but were repulsed by Russian counterattacks.
On the whole front from Riga to Poliessie, there was inter-
mittent artillery fire, together with rifle fire. German aviators
dropped bombs on the station of Zamirie and the town of Niesvij,
where several houses were set on fire.
German troops, belonging to General von Bothmer's army
group, by an encircling counterattack, carried out near and to
the north of Olessa, northwest of Buczacz, on July 12, 1916,
drove back Russian troops which had pushed forward and took
more than 400 prisoners.
On the Stokhod there were violent artillery duels. German
aeroplanes appeared behind the Russian front and dropped many
bombs, doing considerable damage.
Again, on July 13, 1916, the Russians advanced on the Stokhod,
near Zarecz, but were driven back by troops belonging to Gen-
THE GERMAN STAND ON THE STOKHOD 203
eral von Linsingen's army, and lost a few hundred men and
some machine guns which fell into the hands of the Germans.
Other German detachments successfully repeated their attacks
on the east bank of the Stokhod River.
German aeroplanes bombarded Lutsk and the railway station
at Kivertsk, northeast of Lutsk.
To the north of the Sarny-Kovel railway the Russians gained
a footing in their opponents* positions on the west bank of the
Stokhod. A surprise attack, made by strong German forces late
in the evening, drove them back again to the opposite bank.
In the region of the lower Lipa, German guns opened a violent
fire against the Russian trenches and inflicted heavy losses.
The town of Polonetchki, northeast of Baranovitchy, was at-
tacked by German aeroplanes, which threw many bombs and
caused considerable damage.
West of the Strypa the Austro-German forces launched a
series of furious counterattacks, as a result of which the Rus-
sians claimed to have captured over 3,000 prisoners.
West and northwest of Buczacz the Russians made two at-
tacks on a broad front which were repulsed. During the third
assault, however, they succeeded in penetrating the Austro-Hun-
garian positions northwest of Buczacz, but were completely
ejected during a most bitter night battle.
On July 14, 1916, the Germans under cover of a violent fire,
approached the barbed-wire entanglements of the Russians on
the grounds in the region of the River Servitch, a tributary of
the Niemen. They were repulsed by Russian artillery fire.
The same day the Germans opened a violent artillery fire
against Russian lines eastward of Gorodichtche (Baranovitchy
sector), after they assumed the offensive in the region of the
village of Skrobowa, but were repulsed with heavy losses. A
little later, after a continuation of the bombardment, the Ger-
mans took the offensive in massed formation a little farther
north of Skrobowa, but were again repulsed by Russian fire.
After having taken breath the Germans made a fresh attack
in the region of the same village, but the Russian troops repulsed
the Germans with machine-gun and rifle fire. The Russians then
204 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
made a counterattack which resulted in the capture of more
ground.
Repeated German attempts to advance toward the sector south-
west of the village of Skrobowa were also repulsed by Russian
fire.
On the front of the Russian position southeast of Riga the
Germans took the offensive against the Russian sectors near
Frantz, northeast of Pulkarn, but were repulsed by Russian ar-
tillery and infantry fire and by hand-grenade fighting. Russian
detachments which attempted to cross the Dvina, near Lenne-
waden, northwest of Friedrichstadt, were repulsed. Numerous
bombs were dropped from German aeroplanes on railway sta-
tions on the Smorgon-Molodetchna line.
On the right wing of their Riga positions, the Russians, sup-
ported strongly by artillery on land and sea, made some progress
during July 15, 1916, in the region west of Kemmern. On the
remainder of the north front there were some local engagements
which, however, did not modify the general situation.
Troops belonging to the army of Field Marshal Prince Leopold
of Bavaria recaptured some positions in the region of Skrobowa.
which had been lost the previous day. The Russians in turn at-
tempted to regain this ground by making a number of very
strong counterattacks, but were not successful. In this attempt
they lost a few hundred men and six officers.
Austrian troops dispersed some Russian detachments south-
west of Moldaha. Near Jablonica their patrols captured, by a
number of daring undertakings, a few hundred prisoners.
Near Delatyn, in the Carpathian Mountains, there was in-
creased activity. Russian advance guards entered Delatyn, but
were driven back to the southern outskirts. Another Russian
attack to the southwest of the town broke down under the Aus-
trian fire.
There also was a renewal of the fighting in the region south-
west of Lutsk, west of Torchin. A number of Russian attacks
were repulsed in this neighborhood.
At other points of the Volhynian front, in the region southeast
of Sviniusky, near Lutsk, the Germans again assumed the of-
THE GERMAN STAND ON THE STOKHOD 205
fensive and attacked in massed formations. This resulted in a
series of strong counterattacks, which enabled the Russians to
maintain their positions.
At many points in the region of Ostoff and Goubine, Russian
troops registered local successes by very swiftly executed attacks
which threatened to outflank their opponents, who were, there-
fore, forced to retreat in great haste. As a result of this, the
Russians captured one heavy and one light battery as well as
numerous cannon which had been installed in isolated locations.
Upward of 3,000 prisoners fell into their hands.
In Volhynia, on July 16, 1916, to the east and southeast of
Svinisuky village, Russian troops under General Sakharoff broke
down the resistance of the Germans. In battles in the region
of Pustomyty, more than 1,000 Germans and Austrian prisoners
have been taken, together with three machine guns and much
other military booty.
In the region of the lower Lipa the successful Russian advance
continued. The Germans were making a stubborn resistance.
In battles in this region the Russians took many prisoners and
guns, as well as fourteen machine guns, a few thousand rifles
and other equipment.
The total number of prisoners taken on July 16, 1916, in bat-
tles in Volhynia, was claimed to be 314 officers and 12,637 men.
The Russians also claimed to have captured thirty guns, of which
seventeen were heavy pieces, and a great many machine guns
and much other material.
In the direction of Kirliababa, on the frontier of Transylvania,
Russians have occupied a set of new positions.
In the region of Riga, skirmishes on both sides have been suc-
cessful for the Russians, and parts of German trenches have been
taken, together with prisoners. Increased fire west and south
of Riga and on the Dvina front preceded Russian enterprises.
Near Katarinehof, south of Riga, considerable Russian forces
attacked. Lively fighting developed here.
On the Riga front artillery engagements continued throughout
July 17 and 18, 1916. At Lake Miadziol, Russian infantry and
a lake flotilla made a surprise attack on the Germans in the
206 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
night. Grerman airmen manifested great activity from the region
south of the Dvina to the Pinsk Marshes.
On the Stokhod there was artillery fighting at many places.
Russian troops repulsed by artillery fire an attempt on the
part of the Germans to take the offensive north of the Odzer
Marsh. Owing to the heavy rains the Dniester rose almost two
and one half meters, destroying bridges, buttresses and ferry-
boats, and considerably curtailing military operations.
On the Russian left flank, in the region of the Rivers Black
and White Tscheremosche, southwest of Kuty, Russian infantry
were advancing toward the mountain defiles.
Southwest of Delatyn the German troops drove back across
the Pruth Russian detachments which had crossed to the west-
em bank. The Germans took 300 prisoners.
On July 19, 1916, General Lechitsky's forces, which were
advancing from the Bukowina and southern Galicia toward the
passes of the Carpathians leading to the plains of Hungary,
met with strong opposition in the region of Jablonica, situated
at the northern end of a pass leading through the Carpathians
to the important railroad center of Korosmezo, in Hungary.
Jablonica is about thirty-three miles west of Kuty and fifteen
miles south of Delatyn. It is on the right of the sixty-mile front
occupied by the advancing army of General Lechitsky.
No let-up was noticeable in the battle along the Stokhod, where
the combined forces of the Central Powers seemed to be able to
withstand all Russian attacks. Along the Lipa increased artil-
lery fire was the order of the day. In Galicia the floods in the
Dniester Valley continued to hamper military operations. Many
minor engagements were fought both in the northern and cen-
tral sectors of the front.
. INCREASED STRENGTH OF RUSSIAN DRIVE 207
CHAPTER XXVIII
INCREASED STEENGTH OF THE RUSSIAN
DRIVE
AS the month of July approached its end the Russian assaults
-became more and more violent. Along the entire front the
most bitter and sanguinary fighting took place day after day
and night after night. Artillery bombardments such as never
had been heard before raged at hundreds of places at the
same time. Troops in masses that passed all former experience
were employed by the Russians to break the resistance of the
Teutonic allies.
The latter, however, seemed to have their affairs well in
hand. At many points they lost local engagements. At other
points advanced positions had to be given up, and at still other
points occasional withdrawals of a few miles became inevitable.
But, all in all, the Austro-German lines held considerably well.
During the last two or three days of July, 1916, however, the
German-Austrian forces suffered some serious reverses. On July
21, 1916, General Sakharoff had succeeded in crossing the Lipa
River and in establishing himself firmly on its south bank. This
brought him within striking distance of the important railway
point of Brody on the Dubno-Lemberg railway, very close to
the Russo-Galician border, and only fifty miles northeast of
Lemberg.
In spite of the most determined resistance on the part of the
Austrian troops, the Russian general was able to push his ad-
vantage during the next few days, and on July 27, 1916, Brody
fell into his hands.
Less successful was the continued attack on the Stokhod line
with the object of reaching Kovel. There the German- Austrian
forces repulsed all Russian advances.
In the Bukowina, however, the Russians gradually pushed on.
Slowly but surely they approached once more the Carpathian
Mountain passes.
N— War St. 5
208 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
The same was true in eastern Galicia. After the fall of
Kolomea in the early part of the month, the Russian advance had
progressed steadily, even if slowly, in the direction of Stanislau
and Lemberg. Closer and closer to Stanislau the Russian forces
came, until on July 30, 1916, they were well within striking dis-
tance.
In the north, too. General Kuropatkin displayed greatly in-
creased activity against Von Hindenburg's front, although as a
result he gained only local successes.
Midsummer, 1916, then saw the Russians once more on a
strong offensive along their entire front. How far this move-
ment would ultimately carry them, it was hard to tell. Once
more the way into the Hungarian plains seemed to be open to
the czar's soldiers, and a sufficiently successful campaign in Gali-
cia might easily force back the center of the line to such an
extent that they might then have prospects of regaining some of
the ground lost during their great retreat.
Interesting details of the terrific struggle which had been
going on on the eastern front for many weeks are given in the
following letter from an English special correspondent :
"I reached the headquarters of a certain Siberian corps about
midnight on July 15, 1916, to find the artillery preparation,
which had started at 4 p. m., in full blast. Floundering around
through the mud, we came almost on to the positions, which were
suddenly illuminated with fires started by Austrian shells in two
villages near by, while the jagged flashes of bursting shells ahead
caused us to extinguish the lights of the motor and to turn across
the fields, ultimately arriving at the headquarters of a corps
which I knew well on the Bzura line in Poland.
"Sitting in a tiny room in an unpretentious cottage with the
commander, I followed the preparations which were being made
for the assault. The ticking of the instruments gave news from
the front, the line of which was visible from the windows by
flares and rockets and burning villages. By midnight ten
breaches had been made in the barbed wire, each approximately
twenty paces broad, and the attacks were ordered for three
o'clock in the morning.
INCREASED STRENGTH OF RUSSIAN DRIVE 209
"Rising at 5 a. m. I accompanied the commander of the corps
to his observation point on a ridge. The attacks had already-
swept away the resistance of the enemy's first line.
"Thousands of prisoners were in our hands, and the enemy-
was already retiring rapidly. He therefore halted but a few
minutes, pushing on to the advanced positions. The commander
stopped repeatedly by the roadside tapping the field wires,
and giving further instructions as to the disposition of the
troops.
"As we moved forward we began to meet the flood from the
battle field, first the lightly wounded, and then Austrian prison-
ers helping our heavily wounded, who were in carts.
"Before we were halfway to the positions a cavalry general
splashed with mud met the commander and informed him that
six guns were already in our hands. The next report from the
field telephone increased the number to ten guns, with 2,000
prisoners, including some Germans.
"At quite an early hour the entire country was alive, and every
department of the army beginning to move forward. All the
roads were choked with ammunition parks, batteries, and trans-
ports following up our advancing troops; while the stream of
returning caissons, the wounded, and the prisoners equaled in
volume the tide of -the advancing columns.
"The commander took up his position on a ridge which but a
few hours before had been our advanced line. Thence the
country could be observed for miles. Each road was black with
moving troops, pushing forward on the heels of the enemy, whose
field gun shells were bursting on the ridges just beyond.
"Here I met the commander of the division and his staff.
Plans were immediately made for following up our success. Evi-
dently the size of our group was discernible from some distant
enemy observation point, for within five minutes came the howl
of an approaching projectile and a 6-inch shell burst with a
terrific crash in a neighboring field. Its arrival, which was
followed at regular intervals by others ranging from 4-inch
upward, was apparently unnoticed by the general, whose inter-
est was entirely occupied with pressing his advantage.
210 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
"So swift was our advance that nearly half an hour elapsed
before the newly strung field wires were working properly.
"The fire had become so persistent that our group scattered
and hundreds of prisoners, whose black mass could be seen by the
enemy, were removed beyond the possibility of observation.
Then the corps commander, stretched on straw on the crest of
the ridge, with his maps spread out, dictated directions to the
operator of the field telephone who crouched beside him.
"Before and beneath us lay the abandoned line of Austrian
trenches, separated from ours by a small stream, where since
daylight the heroic engineers were laboring under heavy shell
fire to construct a bridge to enable our cavalry and guns to pass
in pursuit.
"Leaving the general we proceeded. Our troops had forced the
line here at 3 a. m., wading under machine-gun and rifle fire
in water and marsh above their waists, often to their armpits.
The Austrian end of the bridge was a horrible place, as it was
congested with dead, dying and horribly wounded men, who, as
the ambulances were on the other side of the river, could not be
removed. A sweating officer was urging forward the completion
of the bridge, which was then barely wide enough to permit the
waiting cavalry squadrons to pass in single file. On the opposite
bank waited the ambulance to get across after the troops had
passed. A number of German ambulance men were working
furiously over their own and the Austrian wounded, many of
whom, I think, must have been wounded by their own guns in an
attempt to prevent the bridging of the stream. A more bloody
scene I have not witnessed, though within a few hours the entire
place was probably cleared up.
"Passing on I, for the first time, witnessed the actual taking
of prisoners, and watched their long blue files as they passed
out from their own trenches and were formed in groups allotted
to Russian soldiers, who served as guides rather than guards,
and sent to the rear.
"Near here I encountered about fifty captured Germans and
talked with about a dozen of them. Certainly none of them
showed the smallest lack of morale or any depression.
INCREASED STRENGTH OF RUSSIAN DRIVE 211
"By noon sufficient details of the fighting were available to
indicate that this corps alone had taken between three and five
thousand prisoners and twenty guns, of which four are said to
be howitzers. When one is near the front the perspective of
operations is nearly always faulty, and it was, therefore, impos-
sible to estimate the effect of the movement as a whole, but I
understand that all the other corps engaged had great success
and everywhere advanced."
PART IV— THE BALKANS
CHAPTER XXIX
HOLDING FAST IN SALONIKI
THE six months ending with March, 1916, had been not only
an eventful period in the Balkans, but a most unfortunate one
for the Allies. In no theater of the war had they sustained such
a series of smashing disasters in diplomacy as well as on the
field of battle. First of all, early in the fall, the Austrians had
begun their fourth invasion of Serbia, this time heavily reen-
forced by the Germans and in such numbers that it was obvious
before the first attack was begun that Serbia by herself would
not be able to hold back the invaders. And then, hardly had
the real fighting begun, when Bulgaria definitely cast her lot
in with the Teutons and Hungarians and attacked the Serbians
from the rear.
While it was true that King Ferdinand and his governing
clique had made this decision months before, it is nevertheless a
fact that it was probably the blundering diplomacy of the Allies
which was responsible for this action on the part of the Bul-
garians. Under all circumstances King Ferdinand would prob-
ably have favored the Teutons, since by birth and early training
he is an Austrian and, moreover, as he once expressed himself
publicly, he was firmly convinced that the Teutons would ulti-
mately win. But the Bulgarian people are sentimentally inclined
toward the Russians and dislike the Germans. Had not the
diplomatic policy of the Allies played into the hands of the king,
they would naturally have turned toward the Allies.
Above all else the Bulgarians have desired either the freedom
or the annexation of Macedonia, which is almost entirely inhab-
212
I
HOLDING FAST IN SALONIKI 213
ited by Bulgars. The Germans made the definite promise that
Macedonia should be theirs if they allied themselves with them.
The Allies endeavored to promise as much, but the protests of
Greece and Serbia stood in the way. Neither of these two nations
was willing to give up its possessions in this disputed territory,
though later, when she saw that her very existence was at stake,
Serbia did make some concessions, but not until after Bulgaria
had already taken her^decision. Had the Allies disregarded these
greedy bickerings on the part of her minor allies and promised as
much as the Germans had promised, there is no doubt that the
popular sentiment in Bulgaria would have been strong enough
to block Ferdinand's policy.
In Greece, too, there had been the same blundering policy.
Here the situation was much the same as in Bulgaria ; the king,
with his Teutonic affiliations, was in favor of the Germans, while
the sentiment of the people was in favor of the Allies. Moreover,
here the popular sentiment was voiced by and personified in
quite the strongest statesman in Greece, Eleutherios Venizelos.
Had the Allies made known to the Greeks definitely and in a
public manner just what they were to expect by joining the
Entente, the policy of the king would have been frustrated. But
here again the ambitions of Italy in Asia Minor and in the
Greek archipelago caused the same hesitation. The result
was that popular enthusiasm was so dampened that the king
was able to pursue his own policy.
Then came the disastrous invasion of Serbia; the Serbian
armies were overwhelmed and practically annihilated, a few
remnants only being able to escape through Albania. The as-
sistance that was sent in the form of an Anglo-French army
under General Sarrail came just too late. Having swept Mace-
donia clear of the Serbians, the Bulgarians next attacked the
forces under Sarrail and hurled them back into the Greek terri-
tory about Saloniki.
The Italians, too, had attempted to take part in the Balkan
operations, but with their own national interests obviously
placed above the general interests of the whole Entente. They
had landed on the Albanian coast, at Durazzo and Avlona, hoping
214 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
to hold territory which they desire ultimately to annex. Then
followed the invasion of Montenegro and Albania by the Aus-
trians and the Bulgarians, and the Italians were driven out of
Durazzo, retaining only a foothold in Avlona.
By March, 1916, all major military operations had ceased.
Except for the British and French at Saloniki and the Italians
at Avlona, the Teutons and the Bulgarians had cleared the whole
Balkan- peninsula south of the Danube of their enemies and
were in complete possession. The railroad running down
through Serbia and Bulgaria to Constantinople was repaired
where the Serbians had had time to injure it, and communica-
tions were established between Berlin and the capital of the
Ottoman Empire, which had been one of the main objects of
the campaign.
In the beginning, however, the Bulgarians did not venture
to push their lines across the Greek frontier, though this is a
part of Macedonia which is essentially Bulgarian in population.
There are several reasons why the Bulgarians should have re-
strained themselves. The traditional hatred which the Greeks
feel for the Bulgarians, so bitter that an American cannot com-
prehend its depths, would undoubtedly have been so roused by
the presence of Bulgarian soldiers on Greek soil that the king
would not have been able to have opposed successfully Venizelos
and his party, who were strong adherents of the Allies. This
would not have suited German policy, though to the victorious
Bulgarians it would probably not have made much difference.
Another reason was, as has developed since, that the Bulgarian
communications were but feebly organized, and a further ad-
vance would have been extremely precarious. The roads through
Macedonia are few, and the best are not suited to automobile
traffic. The few prisoners that the French and English were
able to take evinced the fact that the Bulgarians were being
badly supplied and that the soldiers were starved to the point
of exhaustion. And finally, from a military point of view, the
Allied troops were now in the most favorable position. Their
lines were drawn in close to their base, Saloniki, with short,
interior communications. The Bulgarians, on the contrary,
HOLDING FAST IN SALONIKI 215
were obliged to spread themselves around the wide semicircle
formed by the Anglo-French lines. To have taken Saloniki
would have been for them an extremely costly undertaking, if,
indeed, it would have at all been possible.
On the other hand, it was equally obvious that the Allies were
not, and would not be, for a long time to come, in a position to
direct an effective offensive against the Bulgarians in Mace-
donia. That they and their German allies realized this was
apparent from the fact that the German forces now began with-
drawing in large numbers.
The Bulgarians, however, did not attempt to assist their Ger-
man allies on any of the other fronts, a fact which throws some
light on the Bulgarian policy. Naturally, it is in the interests
of the Bulgarians that the Teutons should win the war, there-
fore it might have been expected that they would support them
on other fronts, notably in Galicia. That this has never been
done shows conclusively that the alliance with the Germans is
not popular among the Bulgarians. They have, rather re-
luctantly, been willing to fight on their own territory, or what
they considered rightly their own territory, but they have not
placed themselves at the disposal of the Germans on the other
fronts. It is obvious that Ferdinand has not trusted to oppose
his soldiers against the Russians.
Meanwhile the forces under Sarrail were being daily aug-
mented and their position about Saloniki was being strength-
ened. By this time all the Serbians who had fled through Al-
bania, including the aged King Peter, had been transported to
the island of Corfu, where a huge sanitarium was established,
for few were the refugees that did not require some medical
treatment. Cholera did, in fact, break out among them, which
caused a protest on the part of the Greek Government. Just how
many Serbians arrived at Corfu has never been definitely stated,
but recent reports would indicate that they numbered approxi-
mately 100,000. All those fit for further campaigning needed to
be equipped anew and rearmed.
216 THE STORY OP THE GREAT WAR
CHAPTER XXX
MILITARY AND POLITICAL EVENTS
IN GREECE
ON March 27, 1916, a squadron of seven German aeroplanes
attempted to make a raid on Saloniki. Their purpose was
to drop bombs on the British and French warships in the har-
bor, but the fire of the Allied guns frustrated their efforts and
four of the aeroplanes were brought down. But during the
encounter some of these aircraft dropped bombs into the city
and twenty Greek civilians were killed, one of the bombs falling
before the residence of General Moschopoulos, commander of
the Greek forces in Saloniki.
Deep resentment against the Germans flared up throughout
Greece on account of this raid, which found expression in bitter
editorials in the Liberal press against the continued neutrality
of Greece. The question of the declaration of martial law was
raised in an exciting session of the Chamber of Deputies, which
lasted till late at night. The Government discouraged all hos-
tile comment on the action of the Germans, and Premier Skou-
loudis declined to continue a debate involving discussion of
foreign relations "because the highest interests impose silence.''
Notwithstanding the attitude of the government the raid was
characterized in the chamber as "simply assassination'' and as
"German frightfulness." Plans were started to hold mass meet-
ings in Athens and Saloniki, but the police forbade them. At
the funerals of the victims, however, large crowds gathered in
spite of the efforts of the police to disperse them and the cere-
monies were marked by cries of "Down with the barbarians!"
and "Down with the Germans!"
Hardly had this agitation died down when Venizelos, who for
a long time had remained silent, so aloof from politics that, to
quote his own statement, "I do not even read the reports of
the proceedings in the Chamber," resumed active participation
in the nation's affairs by giving out a lengthy interview to the
EVENTS IN GREECE 217
press, as well as with an editorial in his own personal organ.
This latter occupied an entire page and reviewed completely the
position of the Greek monarch since the dissolution of the last
Chamber of Deputies. Referring to the king's alleged char-
acterization of himself as a '^dreamer," M. Venizelos said :
*'By keeping the country in a state of chronic peaceful war
through purposeless mobilization, the present government has
brought Greece to the verge of economic, material and moral
bankruptcy. This policy, unhappily, is not a dream, but down-
right folly." He further laid great stress on the Bulgarian peril,
pointing out that the utmost to be gained by the present policy
would be to leave Greece the same size> while Bulgaria, flushed
with victory, trained for war, enlarged by the addition of Serbia
and Macedonia and allied with the Turks, would not wait long
before falling on her southern neighbor. "Who thinks," he
continued, '*that under these conditions that Greece, unaided,
could drive the Bulgars from Macedonia, once they have seized
it, is a fool. The politicians who do not see this inevitable dan-
ger, are blind, and unfortunate are the kings following such poli-
ticians, and more unfortunate still the lands where sovereigns
fall their victims."
And, indeed, the ex-premier's references to the economic ruin
of the country were strongly supported by the dispatches that
had for some time been coming from the Greek capital. "Greece,"
said a prominent official to a press correspondent, "is much more
likely to be starved into war than Germany is to be starved out
of it."
The deficit in the Greek treasury for the previous year was^
now shown to have amounted to £17,000,000, or $85,000,000.
The budget for 1916 authorized an expenditure of $100,000,000,
which was double the entire state revenues. For the masses the
situation was daily becoming more difficult. The streets of
Athens were said to be alive with the beggars, while the island of
Samos was in a sporadic state of revolt. At Piraeus and Patras
there were disquieting demonstrations of popular discontent
with the increasing cost of living. Many commodities had more
than doubled in price. This situation was largely due to the
218 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
mobilization, as in the case of the fishermen. As most of them
were with the colors, the price of fish, which had hitherto been
one of the main food supplies, had become prohibitive to the
poorer families.
The sentiment of the people was further expressed on April
7, 1916, when the Greeks celebrated the 100th anniversary of
their national independence. On this occasion Venizelos ap-
peared in public for the first time since his retirement from
political life, after he had been obliged to resign by the king.
When he left the cathedral in Athens, where services were held,
thousands of persons followed his motor car, cheering enthusi-
astically. Finally his car could proceed no farther, being densely
packed about by the people, who broke forth into deafening
cheers and shouts of "Long live our national leader!" and
"Long live Venizelos V*
At about this time, on April 14, 1916, a new critical situation
was precipitated between the Allies and the Greek Government.
On that date the British Minister at Athens had asked per-
mission of the Greek Government to transport Serbian troops
from Corfu to Saloniki by way of Patras, Larissa, and Volo,
which involved the use of the Peloponnesian railway. This was
peremptorily refused as involving a breach of Greek neutrality.
Under ordinary conditions transports would have conveyed
the Serbians from Corfu to Saloniki, such a trip requiring less
than three days. But the German submarines had been so
active in these waters of late that the Allies desired to evade
this danger, contending that it was with the connivance of the
Greek Government officials that the Germans were able to main-
tain submarine bases among the islands. Moreover, they also
contended that the cases were different from what it would have
been had the request concerned French or British troops. The
Greeks were allies of the Serbians, bound to them by a formal
treaty, and though they had refused to assist them in a military
sense, as the terms of the treaty demanded, they might at least
help them in their need. Two days later, on April 16, 1916, the
Chamber of Deputies adjourned for the session, which left the
whole matter in the hands of the government. However, this
EVENTS IN GREECE 219
question hung fire for some time, and later dispatches would
indicate that the Allies did not press their point, for eventually
when the arrival of the Serbian troops in Saloniki was an-
nounced, it was stated incidentally that they had come by means
of transports.
But meanwhile Venizelos was continuing his campaign
against the ministry. On April 16, 1916, the Liberals had at-
tempted to hold several public meetings in Athens, which were
vigorously broken up by the police, or, according to some re-
ports, by agents of the government in civilian dress. The follow-
ing day Venizelos gave out an interview to the press in which
he said:
"I beg you to bring the events of yesterday and the earnest
protest of a majority of the Greeks to the knowledge of the
American people, who have struggled for so long to establish
free speech as the fundamental right of a free people. Here
in Greece we are confronted by the question whether we are to
have a democracy presided over by a king or whether at this
hour of our history we must accept the doctrine of the divine
rights of kings. The present government represents in no sense
the majority of the Greek people. We Liberals, in the course of
a year received the vote of the majority. At the last election,
which was nothing more than a burlesque on the free exercise
of the right of suffrage, we were not willing to participate in
a farcical formality. . . . Now it is even sought to deny us the
right of free speech. Our meetings were held within inclosed
buildings. Those who came to them were invited, but the police
threw out our doorkeepers, put in their own and let enter
whomsoever they, the police, wanted to be present at the
\neetings."
It was now evident that Venizelos had determined to fight the
present government to the bitter end.
On May 7, 1916, it was demonstrated that the contention of the
king, that the agitation in favor of Venizelos and the demon-
strations in his favor were largely artificial, was not true, in one
electoral district of Greece at least. Venizelos had been nomi-
nated candidate for deputy to the National Assembly in My-
220 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
telene, and when the election took place, on the above date, he
was elected with practically no opposition and amid a tremendous
enthusiasm. On the following day, May 8, 1916, at a by-election
in Kavalla, Eastern Macedonia, Constantine Jourdanod, a can-
didate of the Venizelos Liberty party, was also elected .Ci deputy
to the National Assembly by an 85 per cent majority vote.
But these were merely demonstrations — meant merely as in-
dications of popular sentiment — for neither Venizelos nor the
Kavalla representative had any intention of taking their seats
in the chamber, which they considered illegally elected.
Meanwhile practically no military activity had been displayed.
On March 17, 1916, a dispatch was issued from Vienna to the
effect that the Austrian army had reached the vicinity of Avlona
and had engaged the Italians in pitched battle outside the town,
into which they were driving them. But apparently there was
little truth in this report, for some weeks later a body of Italian
troops were reported to have crossed the Greek frontier in
Epirus, which caused an exchange of notes between the Greek
and Italian governments, by no means the best of friends, on
account of their conflicting ambitions in Albania. Further en-
counters between both Austrians and Bulgarians and the
Italians in Avlona were reported during the spring, but appar-
ently the Italians were well able to hold their own.
There were, however, indications that the Allies in Saloniki
had been steadily strengthening their positions and augmenting
their numbers, and that, conscious of their growing strength,
they were throwing out their lines. In the first week in May
came a dispatch announcing that thay had occupied Fiorina, a
small town only some fifteen miles south of Monastir, though
still on Greek territory.
That there was really some truth in these announcements;
that the Allies were really showing some indications of expand-
ing their lines and were assuming a threatening attitude, was
indicated by the next move made on the board, this time by the
Bulgarians; a move, however, which was obviously of a defen-
sive nature, thoug'h at the time it seemed to portend a Bulgarian
offensive.
EVENTS IN GREECE 221
On May 26, 1916, the Bulgarians for the first time ventured
across the Greek frontier. And not only did they cross the
frontier, but, instead of attacking the Allies, they forced the
Greek forces occupying a point of strategic value to evacuate it
and occupied it themselves.
Fort Rupel, on the Struma River, and north of Demir Hissar,
is about six miles within Greek territory. It commands a deep
gorge, or defile, which forms a sort of natural passageway
through which troops can be marched easily into Greek territory
from Bulgaria. To either side tower difficult mountains and
rocky hills. On account of these natural features Greece had
fortified this defile after the Balkan Wars so that she might
command it in case of a Bulgarian invasion. On the commanding
prominences the Greeks had also built fortifications.
It was the chief, the most important, of these forts that the
Bulgarians took. A courier was sent forward with notice to the
Greek commander that he had two hours in which to evacuate
the position with his troops. This he did peacefully, and before
evening the Bulgarians were installed, though it was said that
they had given due assurances that their occupation was merely
a temporary measure undertaken as a defensive precaution, and
that as soon as the need should cease the fort would be returned
to Greece.
On the following day came the announcement that the Bui'
garians, in strong force, had deployed from Fort Rupel and had
also occupied Fort Dragotin and Fort Kanivo. At the same
time unusual activity on the part of the Bulgarians was also
reported from Xanthi. Here, on the left bank of the Mesta
River, which for some distance from its mouth forms the Bulgar-
Greek boundary, the Bulgarians were collecting material for
building pontoon bridges.
Naturally this action on the part of the Bulgarians caused
wild excitement throughout Greece. The government organs
stated that the forts had been taken by German forces, but this
was soon proved to be untrue.
In reporting this movement the Bulgarian Government added,
by way of explanation and excuse:
222 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
"Two months ago the Anglo-French troops began the
abandonment of the fortified camp at Saloniki and started a
movement toward our frontier. The principal enemy forces
were stationed in the Vardar Valley and to the eastward through
Dovatupete to the Struma Valley, and to the westward through
the district of Subotsko and Vodena to Fiorina. A part of the
reconstituted Serbian army has also been landed at Saloniki.
Artillery fire has occurred daily during the past month.**
Evidently Bulgaria was anxious to impress on the outside
world the fact that she had invaded Greek territory entirely
for defensive purposes, for only several days later a correspond-
ent of the Associated Press was allowed to send through a report
of an inspection he had made of the Bulgarian camp, something
that had not previously been permitted. From this report it
was evident that the Bulgarian army was not contemplating
a forward movement.
These assurances probably had their effect in calming the
excitement in Greece, a result which Germany was no doubt
wishful of obtaining. Nevertheless the fact that the govern-
ment had quietly permitted the Bulgarians to take the forts was
not by any means calculated to increase its popularity with
the masses and made for the strengthening of the Venizelos
party.
In spite of the formal protests which the Greek Government
made against the occupation of its territory and fortifications
by Bulgarian troops, there was not a little reason for suspecting
that the Skouloudis government was working on some secret
understanding, if not with the Bulgarians, then with the Ger-
mans. At least this was the general impression that was
created in France and England, as reflected in the daily press.
On June 8, 1916, it was reported from Saloniki that the
Allies were about to institute a commercial blockade of Greek
ports, preliminary to presenting certain demands, the exact
nature of which was not given out, but which were expected to
include the demobilization of the Greek army.
The notice of the blockade again aroused the excitement of
the Greek population, but not so much against the Allies as
EVENTS IN GREECE 223
against the Skouloudis government. And this was because what
the Allies were expected to demand was just what the majority
of the Greek masses seemed most to want, the demobilization of
the army ; the return to their vocations of the thousands of work-
ingmen with the colors. The Venizelos party was especially in
favor of such a measure, for its leaders claimed that it was
because the mass of the voters was with the army and was
therefore deprived of their suffrage, that the sentiment of the
Greek people could not be determined.
On June 9, 1916, it was announced from Athens that the king
had signed an order demobilizing twelve glasses of the army,
amounting to 150,000 men. But this order was not, for some
reason, put into execution, nor was there any indication of the
Allies putting an end to the blockade. On the contrary, on the
same day it was announced that the Greek captain of the port
at Saloniki had been removed and a French naval officer had
been put in his place. Entry to the port had also been refused
to Greek ships from Kavala, and an embargo had been placed
on Greek ships in French ports. Obviously the Allies were
demanding something more than the demobilization of the army.
As a matter of fact, they had not yet formally presented their
demands.
From later reports it was shown that the Allies had prepared
their demands formally and that they were to have been pre-
sented on June 13, 1916. But the evening before, on the 12th,
certain events took place in Athens which caused them to delay
the presentation of their note, holding it back for revision.
On the 12th a military fete had been held at the Stadium,
at which members of the British Legation were present, includ-
ing the military attache and Admiral Palmer, the new chief of
the British Naval Mission. When the king and his suite ap-
peared at the Stadium, Greek police officers immediately
grouped themselves around the British representatives, giving
the inference that the royal party needed to be protected from
them. The indignant Englishmen immediately left the Stadium.
After the fete a mob collected in the street and began a demon-
stration against the Allies. The crowd was escorted by fifty or
0— War St. 5
224 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
sixty policemen in uniform. It first marched to the Hotel
Grande Bretagne, where the French Minister resided, and began
shouting insulting remarks. Next the British Legation build-
ing was visited and a similar hostile demonstration was made.
Thence the mob proceeded to the office of the "Nea Hellas," a
Venizelist journal, hurled stones through the windows and as-
saulted the editor and his staff. The editor, in defending him-
self, fired a revolver over the heads of the mob, whereupon he
was arrested and thrown into jail. During the same evening
another demonstration was made in a theater, in which the
performers made most insulting remarks regarding the repre-
sentatives of the Allies. Several meetings were held in other
parts of the city at the same time, at which resolutions were
passed against the Allies, one of these resolutions denouncing
the conduct of the Allies toward neutral countries, "and
especially their conduct toward the President of the United
States."
Finally, on June 23, 1916, the full text of the demands of the
Allies on Greece, signed by the representatives of France, Great
Britain, and Russia and indorsed by Italy, was given out, simul-
taneously with the official announcement that all the conditions
had been accepted by the Greek Government. The text was as
follows :
"As they have already solemnly declared verbally and in
writing, the three Protecting Powers of Greece do not ask her to
emerge from her neutrality. Of this fact they furnish a striking
proof by placing foremost among their demands the complete
demobilization of the Greek army in order to insure to the
Greek people tranquillity and peace. But they have numerous
and legitimate grounds for suspicion against the Greek Govern-
ment, whose attitude toward them has not been in conformity
with repeated engagements, nor even with the principles of loyal
neutrality.
"Thus, the Greek Government has all too often favored the
activities of certain foreigners who have openly striven to lead
astray Greek public opinion, to distort the national feeling of
Greece, and to create in Hellenic territory hostile organizations
EVENTS IN GREECE 225
which are contrary to the neutrality of the country and tend to
compromise the security of the military and naval forces of the
Allies.
"The entrance of Bulgarian forces into Greece and the occu-
pation of Fort Rupel and other strategic points, with the con-
nivance of the Hellenic Government, constitute for the allied
troops a new threat which imposes on the three powers the
obligation of demanding guarantees and immediate measures.
"Furthermore, the Greek Constitution has been disregarded,
the free exercise of universal suffrage has been impeded, the
Chamber of Deputies has been dissolved a second time within
a period of less than a year against the clearly expressed will
of the people, and the electorate has been summoned to the polls
during a period of mobilization, with the result that the present
chamber only represents an insignificant portion of the elec-
toral college, and that the whole country has been subjected to
a system of oppression and of political tyranny, and has been
kept in leading strings without regard for the legitimate repre-
sentations of the powers.
"These powers have not only the right, but also the impera-
tive duty, of protesting against such violations of the liberties,
of which they are the guardians in the eyes of the Greek
people.
"The hostile attitude of the Hellenic Government toward the
powers, who have emancipated Greece from an alien yoke, and
have secured her independence, and the evident collusion of the
present cabinet with the enemies of these powers, constitute
for them still stronger reasons for acting with firmness, in
reliance upon the rights which they derive from treaties, and
which have been vindicated for the preservation of the Greek
people upon every occasion upon which it has been menaced in
I the exercise of its rights or in the enjoyment of its liberties.
"The Protecting Powers accordingly see themselves compelled
to exact immediate application of the following measures:
f "1. Real and complete demobilization of the Greek Army,
hvhich shall revert as speedily as possible to a peace footing.
"2. Immediate substitution for the existing ministry of a
I
¥
226 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
business cabinet devoid of any political prejudice and present-
ing all the necessary guarantees for the application of that
benevolent neutrality which Greece is pledged to observe toward
the Allied Powers and for the honesty of a fresh appeal to the
electors.
"3. Immediate dissolution of the Chamber of Deputies, fol-
lowed by fresh elections within the time limits provided by the
constitution, and as soon as general demobilization will have
restored the electoral body to its normal condition.
"4. Dismissal, in agreement with the Allied Powers, of
ijertain police officials whose attitude, influenced by foreign
guidance, has facilitated the perpetration of notorious assaults
upon peaceable citizens and the insults which have been leveled
at the Allied Legations and their members.
"The Protecting Powers, who continue to be inspired with
the utmost friendliness and benevolence toward Greece, but who
are, at the same time, determined to secure, without discussioa
or delay, the application of these indispensable measures, caa
but leave to the Hellenic Government entire responsibility for
the events which might supervene if their just demands were
not immediately accepted."
The treaties referred to in the note, on which the "three
Protecting Powers" base their right to intervene in the affairs
of Greece to enforce the carrying out of her constitution, date
back to the early period of last century, when the three nations
in question assisted the newly liberated Greeks in establishing
a government and assumed a semiprotectorate.
This note was presented to Premier Skouloudis, but he refused
to accept it on the ground that no Greek Cabinet existed, as it
had been deposited at the Foreign Office while he was on nis
way back from the residence of the king, where he had presented
the resignation of the ministry.
The people were unaware of what had happened until evening,
when newspapers and handbills, distributed broadcast, made
known the text of the demands. King Constantine returned
hastily to Athens. All the troops in the city were ordered under
arms. The Deputies were summoned to the Chamber, where
EVENTS IN GREECE 227
Skouloudis announced that he had resigned, after which the
Chamber immediately adjourned again.
On the following day the king summoned Alexander Zaimis,
a Greek politician, reputed to be in favor of the Allies, to form
a new Cabinet. He immediately organized a new ministry,
comprising himself as Premier and Minister of Foreign Affairs ;
General Callaris, Minister of War and Marine; George Rallis,
Minister of Finance; Phocian Negria, of Communications;
Colonel Harlambis, of the Interior; Anthony Momperatos, of
Justice; Constantine Libourkis, of Instruction, and Colligas, of
National Economy. The first act of the new Cabinet was to
announce a new election of Deputies to the National Chamber,
to take place on August 7, 1916. The new Premier also an-
nounced that the demands of the Allies would be carried out
to the letter. As a token of good faith, the chief of police of
Athens was immediately dismissed and Colonel Zimbrakakis,
who had been police chief during the Venizelos regime, was
installed in his place. The Allies, on their part, at once raised
the blockade and agreed to advance Greece a loan to tide over
her present financial difficulties.
For some days afterward large and enthusiastic pro-
Venizelos demonstrations took place in Athens and other Greek
cities, in which the labor unions and the soldiers were reported
to take a very prominent part. Meanwhile the demobilization
of the Greek army was begun in good faith.
During this period there had been no further aggression, or
advance, on the part of the Bulgarians. And while there had
been a number of German officers present at the demand for
the evacuation of Fort Rupel by the Greeks, as well as a small
force of Gennan engineers, all the reports emanating from
Bulgaria indicated, directly or indirectly, that the German
forces had been almost entirely drawn away from the Balkans,
to meet the gradually increasing pressure that both the Russians
on the eastern front and the English and French on the western
front were bringing to exert on the Teutonic forces. Being
practically left to themselves, for the Turks, too, had their hands
full in their Asiatic provinces, and considering the need of
228 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
forces for garrison duty in conquered territory, especially in
Albania and upper Serbia, as well as the army needed to watch
the movements of the Rumanians, it was doubtful if the Bul-
garians had more than 300,000 men to spare for their lines
opposing those of the Allies at Saloniki.
The Allies, on the other hand, had been daily waxing stronger.
At least 100,000 Serbians had been added to their forces about
Saloniki before the beginning of August. There were, at this
time, about 350,000 French and British soldiers in Saloniki, so
that the total force was not very far short of half a million.
General Mahon, the British commander, had gone to Egypt, to
superintend the removal to Saloniki of the British troops there,
who had been provided as a defending force when the danger
of a German attack in that section seemed imminent. These
forces were estimated at another 200,000. Added to this the
favorable position of the Allies from a strategic point of view,
it was obvious, by the middle of August, that if active hostilities
were to break out on the Saloniki front very shortly, the initia-
tive would most likely come from the Allies.
PART V~AUSTRO-ITALIAN CAMPAIGN
CHAPTER XXXI
RESUMPTION OF OPERATIONS ON THE
ITALIAN FRONT
THROUGHOUT the early part of March, 1916, military oper-
ations on the Italian front were very restricted. At the end
of February the atmospheric conditions, which up till then had
remained exceptionally favorable, changed suddenly, giving
place to a period of bad weather, with meteorological phenomena
particularly remarkable in that theater of the operations, which
among all those of the European war is the most Alpine and the
most difficult. In the mountain zone snow fell very heavily,
causing frequent great avalanches and sometimes the movement
of extensive snow fields. Communications of every kind were
seriously interrupted. Not only shelters and huts, but in many
cases columns of men and supplies on the march were swept
away. The unceasing tempest made it difficult and in some cases
quite impossible to render any aid, but owing to an organized
service for such eventualities, ample and effective assistance
was given in the great majority of cases. This led to the speedy
restoration of communications and supplies. Nevertheless the
distressing but inevitable loss of human lives was comparatively
large.
In the lowland zone heavy and constant rains caused land-
slides in the lines of defense and shelters. The rise of the rivers
and the consequent floods soon made the ground impassable.
Even the main roads were interrupted at several points. In
the whole theater of operations it was a regular battle against
adverse circumstances.
229
230 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
Austrian troops in many places used the heavy snowfall to
their advantage. By means of mines, bombs and artillery fire
they produced avalanches artificially. Thus on March 8, 1916,
some damage was done in this manner to Italian positions in
the Lagaznos zone. On the same day Italian forces succeeded
in pushing their lines forward for a slight distance in the zone
between the lofana peaks (in the Dolomites), as well as in the
valley of the middle Isonzo" and in the Zagara sector. Along the
entire front vigorous artillery fire was maintained.
The artillery combat gradually increased in vehemence
during the next few days, especially on the Isonzo front, indi-
cating a resumption of offensive movements. About the middle
of March, 1916, Italian troops began again to attack the
Austrian positions. On March 15, 1916, a lively artillery duel
and a series of attacks and counterattacks were repulsed from
the Isonzo front.
Italian infantry carried out a number of successive attacks
in the region of Monte Rombon in the Plezzo basin and on the
height commanding the position of Lucinico, southeast of San
Martino del Carso. After an intensive preparation by artillery
fire the Austrians, on March 16, 1916, launched at dawn a coun-
terattack against the positions conquered by the Italians the day
before, but were at first everywhere repulsed, suffering heavy
losses.
The Austrian concentration of artillery fire, in which guns
of all caliber were employed, lasted uninterruptedly throughout
the day, forcing the Italians to evacuate the positions during
the course of the night.
The Fella sector of the Carinthian front and also the Col di
Lana sector in the Tyrol were shelled by Italian artillery. Ital-
ian airmen dropped bombs on Trieste without doing any damage.
Again atmospheric conditions enforced a lull in military oper-
ations during the next few days and brought to a sudden end
what had seemed to be an extensive offensive movement on the
part of the Italian forces on the Isonzo front.
On March 17, 1916, however, violent fighting again developed
on the Isonzo front in the region of the Tolmino bridgehead. It
RESUMPTION OF OPERATIONS 231
began with greatly increased artillery activity along the entire
sector between Tolmino and Flitsch. Later that day the Austro-
Hungarians launched an attack against the Italian forces which
netted them considerable ground on the northern part of the
bridgehead, as well as some 500 prisoners.
The battle in the Tolmino sector continued on March 18 and 19,
1916, and to a slighter degree on March 20, 1916. On the first
of these three days the Austro-Hungarian troops succeeded in
advancing beyond the road between Celo and Ciginj and to the
west of the St. Maria Mountain. Italian counterattacks failed.
South of the Mrzli, too, the Italians lost a position and had to
withdraw toward Gabrije, losing some 300 prisoners. Increased
artillery activity was noticeable on the Carinthian front, par-
ticularly in the Fella sector; in the Dolomites, especially in the
Col di Lana sector; in the Sugana Valley and at some points on
the west Tyrol front. Goritz, too, was again subjected to heavy
Italian gunfire.
On the following day, March 19, 1916, fighting continued at
the Tolmino bridgehead as a result of Italian efforts to conquer
positions firmly in Austro-Hungarian hands. The number of
Italians captured reached 925 and the number of machine guns
taken was increased to seven. Several Italian attacks against
Mrzli and Krn (Monte Nero) broke down. On the Rombon
the Austro-Hungarians captured a position and took 145 Italians
and two machine guns.
Lively fighting continued on the Carinthian front. In the
Tyrol frontier district Italian artillery again held the Col di
Lana section and some points south of the front under heavy
artillery fire.
On the Goritz bridgehead Austro-Hungarians in the morning
set fire to an Italian position before the southern part of Podgora
Height. In the afternoon Austro-Hungarian artillery shelled
heavily the front before the bridgehead. During the night they
ejected Italian forces from a trench before Bevma.
Again on March 20, 1916, Italian counterattacks against the
positions captured by the Austro-Hungarians during the pre-
ceding days failed. Again fighting slowed down for a few days.
232 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
As usual, resumption of military operations was indicated by
increased artillery fire.
In the Rovereto zone on March 23, 1916, an artillery duel was
followed during the night by Austro-Hungarian attacks against
Italian positions at Moriviccio, near Rio Comeraso, and in the
Adige and Terragnole Valleys. These were repulsed. Through-
out the theater of operations bad weather limited, however, ar-
tillery action on the Isonzo, which was active only near Tolmino
and the heights northwest of Goritz.
On March 25, 1916, Italian artillery again bombarded the
Doberdo Plateau (south of Goritz), the Fella Valley and various
points on the Tyrolese front. East of Ploecken Pass (on the
Camia front) Italian positions were penetrated and Italian at-
tacks repulsed near Marter (Sugana Valley).
Severe fighting took place on March 26, 1916, at several points.
At the Goritz bridgehead the Austro-Hungarians captured an
Italian position fronting on the northern portion of Podgora
Heights, taking 525 prisoners. Throughout the entire day and
the following night the Italian troops in vain attempted to regain
the positions which they had lost the day before east of Ploeckcoi
Pass.
In the Doberdo sector on March 27, 1916, the artillery was
again active on both sides. Italian attacks on the north slope
of Monte San Michele and near the village of San Martino were
repulsed. East of Selz a severe engagement developed.
In the Ploecken sector all Italian attacks were beaten back
under heavy losses. Before the portion of the Carinthian front
held by the Eighth Chasseurs Battalion more than 500 dead
Italians were observed. Austro-Hungarian airmen dropped
bombs on railroads in the province of Venice.
Especially severe fighting occurred once more in the region
of the Gonby bridgehead during March 27, 28 and 29, 1916. On
the last of these days the Italians lost some 350 prisoners. With-
out cessation the guns thundered on both sides on these three
days on the Doberdo Plateau, along the Fella and Ploecken sec-
tors, in the Dolomites and to the east of Selz. Scattered Italian
attacks at various points failed. Then, with the end of
RESUMPTION OF OPERATIONS 233
March, the weather again necessitated a stoppage of military
operations.
An interesting description of the territory in which most of
this fighting occurred was rendered by a special correspondent
of the London "Times" who, in part, says :
"There is no prospect on earth quite like the immense irreg-
ular crescent of serrated peak and towering mountain wall that
is thrown around Italy on the north, as it unrolls itself from the
plains of Lombardy and Venetia. How often one has gazed at
it in sheer delight over its bewildering wealth of contrasting
color and fantastic form, its effect of light and shade and
measureless space ! But now, for these many months past, keen
eyes have been bent upon it; eyes, not of the artist or the poet,
but those of the soldier.
"It was such a pair of military eyes that I had beside me a
day or two ago, as I stood upon the topmost roofs of a high
tower, in a certain little town in northern Italy, where much
history has been made of late; and, since the owner of the eyes
was likewise the possessor of a very well-ordered mind and a
gift of lucid exposition, I found myself able to grasp the main
elements of the extraordinarily complex strategic problem with
which the chiefs of the Italian army have had to grapple. As I
looked and listened I felt that the chapter which Italy is con-
tributing to the record of the greatest war of all time is one of
which she will have every reason to be proud when she has at
length brought it to its victorious conclusion.
''There are few such viewpoints as this. In the luminous still-
ness of a perfect morning of the Italian summer I could look
north, and east, and west, upon more than a third of the battle
line, that goes snaking among the mountains from near the
Swiss frontier to the Adriatic. And what a length of line it is!
In England some people seem to think this is a little war that
Italy has on hand, little in comparison with the campaigns in
France and Russia. But it is not small, weighed even in that
exacting balance. The front measures out at over 450 miles,
which is not very far short of the length of ribbon of trench and
earthwork that is drawn across western Europe.
234 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
"Here, as there, every yard is held and guarded. It is true
that there is not a continuous row of sentries ; for on the Austro-
Italian front there are places where the natural barriers are
impassable even for the Alpine troops, who will climb to the
aerie of the eagles. But wherever nature has not barred the way
against both sides alike the trenches and fortified galleries run,
stretching across the saddle between two inaccessible peaks,
ringing around the shoulder of a mountain, dipping it into the val-
ley, and then rising again to the very summit or passing over it.
"There are guns everywhere — machine guns, mountain guns,
field guns, huge guns of position, 6-inch, 10-inch, 12-inch — ^which
have been dragged or carried with all their mountings, their
equipment, their tools and appurtenances, up to their stations,
it may be, 3,000, 4,000, 6,000 feet above the level. And at those
heights are the larders of shell which must always be kept full
so that the carnivorous mouths of the man-eaters may not go
hungry even for the single hour of the single day which, at any
point, an attack may develop.
"Such is the long Italian battle line. When you know what
it is you are not surprised that here and there, and now and
again, it should bend and give a little before an enemy better
supplied with heavy artillery, and much favored by the topo-
graphical conditions ; for he has the higher mountain passes be-
hind him instead of in front, and is coming down the great Al-
pine stairway instead of going up.
"That of course is the salient feature of the campaign. The
Italians are going up, the Austrians coming, or trying to come,
down. On the loftier uplands, range beyond range, in enemy
territory, the Austrians before the war had their forts and forti-
fied posts and their strategic roads ; and almost everywhere along
the front they have observing stations which overlook, at greater
or less distance, the Italian lines. Thus the Italians have had to
make their advance, and build their trenches, and place their
guns, in the face of an enemy who lies generally much above
them, sometimes so much above them that he can watch them
from his nests of earth and rock as though he were soaring in
an aeroplane."
ON THE AUSTRO-ITALIAN FRONT 235
CHAPTER XXXII
THE SPRING OP 1916 ON THE AUSTRO-
ITALIAN FRONT
DURING the early part of the spring of 1916, a large number
of engagements took place at many scattered points along
the entire Austro-Italian front. Neither side apparently had
determined as yet upon any definite plan of operations, or, if
they had, they took special pains to avoid a premature disclosure.
To a certain extent the fighting which occurred was little more
than of a reconnoitering nature. Each side attempted with all
the facilities at its command to improve its positions, even if
only in a small way, and to find out weak spots in the lines of
its adversary. It was only natural that during the process of
this type of warfare, fortune should smile one day on one side
and turn its back promptly the next day.
During the first week of April, 1916, there was little to report
anywhere along the front. On the 6th, however, considerable
artillery activity developed along the Isonzo front, where the
Italians shelled once m.ore the city of Goritz. This activity grad-
ually increased in vehemence. At the end of about two weeks
it decreased slightly for a few days, only to be taken up again
with renewed vigor and to be maintained with hardly a break
during the balance of April, 1916.
Coincident with this artillery duel there developed a series of
violent engagements on the Carso plateau to the east of the lower
Isonzo. The first of these occurred on April 12, 1916, when
Italian advance detachments approached Austrian trenches be-
tween Monte San Michelo and San Martino, wrecking them with
hand grenades and bombs. Another engagement of somewhat
greater importance occurred on April 22, 1916, east of Selz.
Italian infantry, supported by artillery, despite obstinate resist-
ance occupied strong trenches 350 meters long. The Austrians
receiving reenforcements, violently counterattacked twice during
the night, the second time succeeding in retaking part of the lost
236 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
trenches. After a deadly hand-to-hand struggle in which the
Austrians suffered severely, the Italians drove them out, captur-
ing 133, including six officers, two machine guns, 200 rifles, sev-
eral flame throwers, and numerous cases of ammunition and
bombs.
The following day, April 23, 1916, Austrian artillery of all
calibers violently shelled the trenches occupied east of Selz, oblig-
ing the Italians to evacuate a small section north of the Selz
Valley, which was especially exposed to the Austrian fire. An-
other strong attack, supported by a very destructive gunfire
was launched by the Austrians against these trenches on April
25, 1916, and enabled them to reoccupy some of the ground pre-
viously lost.
Two days later the Italians attempted to regain these positions.
At first they succeeded in entering the Austrian trenches on a
larger front than they had held originally, but when they mani-
fested an intention to continue the attack, the Austro-Hungari-
ans, by counterattacks drove them into their former positions
and even ejected them from these in bitter hand-to-hand fighting,
thereby regaining all their former positions.
During the balance of April, and up to May 15, 1916, military
operations on the entire Isonzo front were restricted to artillery
bombardments, which, however, at various times, became ex-
tremely violent, especially so with respect to Goritz and the sur-
rounding positions.
In the next sector, the Doberdo Plateau, much the same condi-
tion was prevalent. From the 1st of April, until the middle of
May, 1916, there was always more or less artillery activity.
Occasionally infantry engagements of varying importance and
extent would occur. On April 7, 1916, the Italians were driven
back from some advanced saps. South of Mrzlivrh, Austro-
Hungarian troops conquered Italian positions, taking forty-
three prisoners and one machine gun.
Again on the 9th, hand-to-hand fighting, preceded by bomb
throwing, was reported on the Mrzlivrh front. Another attack,
launched early in the morning of April 13, 1916, by the Aus-
trians, lasted throughout the day, with varying fortune, but
ON THE AUSTRO-ITALIAN FRONT 237
finally resulted in a success for the Italians. On April 14, 1916,
the Austro-Hungarians captured an Italian position at Mrzlivrh
and repulsed several counterattacks. The Italians suffered heavy-
losses. Artillery vigorously shelled the Italian positions at
Flitsch and Hontebra.
Other violent engagements took place on the Doberdo Plateau
on April 27, May 9, 10, 12, and 13, without, however, having any
influence on the general situation.
In all the other sectors very much the same conditions pre-
vailed. Artillery fire was maintained on both sides almost con-
stantly. Infantry attacks were launched wherever and when-
ever the slightest opportunity offered itself. Scarcely any of
these, however, resulted in any noticeable advantage to either
side, especially in view of the fact that whenever one side would
register a slight gain, the other side immediately would respond
by counterattack and frequently nullify all previous successes.
Comparatively unimportant and restricted, though, as most of
this fighting was, it was so only because it exerted practically no
influence on the general situation. On the other hand, it was
carried on with the greatest display of valor and persistence that
can be imagined and, because of the very nature of the ground
on which it occurred, it forms one of the most spectacular periods
of the war on the Austro-Italian front.
Of these many local operations there were only a few which
developed to such an extent that they need to be mentioned spe-
cifically.
One of these was a series of engagements in the Ledro Valley,
southwest of Riva and west of Lake Garda. There the Italians
on April 11, 1916, by systematic oflTensive actions, pushed their
occupation of the heights north of Rio Tonale, between Concei
Valley and Lake Garda. Eflficaciously supported by their artil-
lery, their infantry carried with the bayonet a strong line of in-
trenchments and redoubts along the southern slopes of Monte
Pari Cimadoro and the crags of Monte Sperone. On the follow-
ing day, however, April 12, 1916, the Austro-Hungarians, by
violent surprise attacks, succeeded in rushing a part of the
trenches taken by the Italians at Monte Sperone. In the even-
238 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
ingy after an intense preparation by artillery, Italian infantry
counterattacked, reoccupying the lost positions, after a deadly
hand-to-hand struggle and extending their occupation to the
slopes of Monte Sperone. This was followed by a still further
extension on April 16, 1916.
Much of the fighting involved positions on mountain peaks
of great height, creating difficulties for both the attacker and
the defender, which at first glance appeared to be almost insur-
mountable. Of this type of warfare in the high mountains, the
special correspondent of the London "Times" gives the following
vivid description :
"The Italian dispositions are very complete, and it is at this
point necessary to say a few words upon Alpini warfare, which
the Italians have brought to such a pitch of perfection. They
are not the only mountaineers in the world, nor the only people
to possess warriors famous on the hillside, but they were the
first people in Europe, except the Swiss, to organize mountain
warfare scientifically, and in their Alpine groups they possess
a force unrivaled for combat in the higher mountains. The
Alpini are individualists who think and act for themselves and
so can fight for themselves. They are the cream of the army.
"Locally recruited, they know every track and cranny of the
^ills, which have no terrors for them at any season, and their
self-contained groups, which are practically the equivalent of di-
visions, contain very tough fighters and have achieved remark-
able results during the war. Their equipment, clothing, artillery,
and transport are all well adapted to mountain warfare, and as
the whole frontier has been accurately surveyed, and well studied
from every point of view, the Italians are at a great advantage
in the hills.
"There is nothing new about these troops, whose turnout and
tactics have been a subject of admiration for many years, but
in this war much has changed, in the Alps as elsewhere, and the
use of the heaviest artillery in the mountains is one of the most
striking of these changes. One finds oneself under the fire of
twelve-inch howitzers from the other side of mountains 10,000
feet high, and it is no extraordinary experience to find Italian
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ON THE AUSTRO-ITALIAN FRONT 239
^ heavy howitzers sheltering behind precipices rising sheer up
several thousand feet, and fighting with Austrian guns ten miles
distant, and beyond one, if not two, high ranges of hills. One
imagines that the Austrians must have many twelve-inch how-
itzers to spare, for there are, to give an example, a couple near
Mauthen, beyond the crest of the Carnic Alps, and other heavy
artillery in the same district hidden in caverns. In these cav-
erns, which are extremely hard to locate, they are secure against
shrapnel and cannot be seen by airmen. I fancy the Austrians
use galleries with several gun positions, which are used in turn.
"This style of fighting compels the Italians to follow suit, or
at least it is supposed to do so, and then, as no road means no
heavy guns, there comes in the Italian engineer, the roadmaker,
and the mason, and in the art of roadmaking the Italian is
supreme.
"They are very wonderful, these mountain roads. They play
with the Alps and make impossibilities possible. Thanks to
them, and to the filovia, or air railway on chains, it is possible
to proceed from point to point with great rapidity, and to keep
garrisons and posts well supplied. The telephones run every-
where, and observing stations on the highest peaks enable Italian
howitzers to make sure of their aim. I am not quite sure
whether the Italians do not trust too much to their telephones
and will not regret the absence of good flag signalers. When
large forces are operating, and many shells bursting, the tele-
phone is often a broken reed. The motor lorries, with about
a one and one-half ton of useful load, get about wherever there
is a road, and the handy little steam tractors, which make light
of dragging the heaviest guns up the steepest gradients, are
valuable adjuncts to the defense. At the turns of bad zigzags,
the Italians have a remarkable drill for men on the dragropes,
and in fact all diflficulties have been overcome.
"I recall some Italian batteries mounted at an elevation of
about 9,000 feet, of which each gun weighed eleven tons, the
carriage five tons, and the platform, which was divided into
sections, thirty tons. These guns, the battery officers declared,
were brought up from the plains by a new mountain road in
P— War St 5
240 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
seven hours, and placed in position on these platforms five hours
later. It is all a question of roads, but the filovia can carry 400
kilos, and any gun under that weight can get up to a peak by
way of the air.
"It is all very marvelous and very perfect, and the Italians are
also adepts at trench building, and make them most artistically.
The only objection I can see to the mountain road is that, when
the enemy gets a hold of the territory which they serve, he has
the benefit of them. This is true of Trentino operations now,
and the enemy has many more roads at his disposal than the old
maps show. Sometimes I wonder whether the Italians do not
immerse themselves a little too much in these means of war
and lose sight a little of the ends, but over nine-tenths of Italy's
frontier the war is Alpine, and it must be allowed that Italian
soldiers have brought the art of mountain fighting to a degree
of perfection which it has never attained before.
"The Italian Alpine group varies in strength and composition.
It usually has the local Alpine battalions reenforced by the
mountaineers of Piedmont, and completed, when necessary, by
line infantry, who usually act in the lower valleys, leaving the
high peaks to the mountaineers. Artillery is added according
to needs — mountain, field, and heavy — while there are engineers
in plenty, and the mule transport is very good.
"The Alpini wear a good hobnailed boot for ordinary service,
but for work on the ice the heel of the boot is taken off, and an
iron clamp with ice nails substituted. For mountaineering feats
they often use scarpe da gatto, or cat shoes, made of string soles
with felt uppers, which are more lasting than the Pyrenean
straw sandals. The Gavetta, or mess tin of the Alpini, is very
practical. It is of the same shape as ours, but a little deeper,
and has a reserve of spirit at the base and a spirit lamp, enabling
the Alpini to make coffee or heat their wine. They use racquets
or skis on the snow, and carry either the alpenstock or the ice ax,
"I did not realize before coming here that trench warfare, and
the close proximity of hostile trenches, had become as usual in
the mountains as in the plains. The defenses are, of course, not
continuous over such a long, and in parts, impassable line, but
ON THE AUSTRO-ITALIAN FRONT
241
242 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
tend to concentrate at the passes and other points of tactical
importance. But here the adversaries draw together, and one
often finds lines only separated by twenty yards.
"The Alpini are usually as much deprived of the power of
maneuvering as their comrades in the plains, and all that is left
for them is to act by surprise. They have a system of attacking
by infiltration forward, not so very dissimilar from Boer meth-
ods, and they have a number of devices and surprises which
repay study.
"Their enemy is worthy of them, for the chamois hunters, the
foresters, the cragsmen of the Austrian Alps are no mean antag-
onists, as all of us know who have shot and climbed with them.
Very fine men, they shoot quick and straight, and when an
oflScer of Alpini tells us not to dally to admire the scenery, be-
cause we are within view of an Austrian post within easy range,
we recall old days and make no diflficulty about complying.
"The Germans trained their Alpine corps here before it went
to Serbia, and the Italians made many prisoners from it — Ba-
varians, Westphalians, and East Prussians. So at least I am
told by officers of Alpini who fought with it, and it is certainly
proved beyond all doubt that German artillery has been, and
is now, cooperating with the Austrians on the Italian front.
"The Alpini hold their positions winter and summer on the
highest peaks and have made a great name for themselves. They
have lost heavily, and the avalanches have also taken a serious
toll of them. One parts with them with regret, for they are
indeed very fine fellows, and the war they wage is very hard.
"One point more. Pasubio is not one of the highest peaks in
Italian hands, but snow fell there in the end of May and will
fall again at the end of August. The time allowed for big things
in the Alps by big armies is strictly limited. Also we must re-
member that there are winter defenses to be made in the snow,
and summer defenses to be made in the earth and rock. The
Austrians were clever in attacking the other day, just as the
enow defenses had crumbled and the summer defenses had not
been completed. The barbed-wire chevaux-de-frise are often
covered by snow in a night and have to be renewed. When the
ON THE AUSTRO-ITALIAN FRONT 243
snow thaws, all this jumble of obstacles reappears tangled to-
gether.
"Other ghastly sights also reappear, like the 600 Austrian
corpses on Monte Nero — almost awe-inspiring of heights.
They had fallen in the snow which had covered them. In the
summer they reappeared one morning in strange attitudes,
frozen hard and lifelike, and gave the Italian garrison their first
fright."
On April 11, 1916, in the Monte Adamello zone, while a heavy
storm was raging, Italian detachments attacked the Austrian
positions on the rocky crags of the Lobbia Alta and the Doss
di Genova, jutting out from the glaciers at an altitude of 3,300
meters, (10,918 feet). On the evening of April 12, 1916, they
completely carried the positions, fortifying themselves in them
and taking thirty-one prisoners, including one officer and one
machine gun.
The next day, April 13, 1916, saw some severe fighting in the
Sugana Valley in the Dolomites, where Italian troops carried
with the bayonet, a position at Santosvaldo, west of the Sargan-
agna torrent, taking seventy-four prisoners, including five
officers.
Three days later, April 17, 1916, Italian Alpine troops in the
Monte Adamello zone, occupied and strengthened the Monte Val
di Fumo Pass, at an altitude of 3,402 meters (11,161 feet) .
During the night of April 18, 1916, one of the most spectacular
and important exploits of this period was executed. In the upper
Cordevole zone Italian troops, after successful mining opera-
tions, attacked Austrian positions on the Col di Lana and occu-
pied the western ridge of Monte Ancora. The Austrian detach-
ment occupying the trenches was mostly killed. The Italians
took as prisoners 164 Kaiserjagers, including nine officers.
This successful operation of the Italians was of exceptional
importance. The Col di Lana is a mountain 4,815 feet high,
which forms a natural barrier in the valley of Livinallengo and
protects the road of the Dolomites from Falzarego to the Pordoi
Pass and dominates the road to Caprile. The Italians had al-
ready occupied Col di Lana, but could not drive the Austrians
244 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
from its western peak, where an entire battalion of Alpine
troops, Kaiser jagers, was strongly intrenched and protected
by semipermanent fortifications with field and machine guns.
It was impossible for the Italians to attack the enemy's posi-
tions, within range of the Austrian artillery on Mount Siet
which is nearly on the same level, so the entire western margin of
Col di Lana was carefully and patiently mined, an undertaking
which probably took months of hard work, and several tons of
high explosives were distributed in such a way as to destroy the
whole side of the mountain above which the enemy was in-
trenched.
The explosion that followed was terrific. The earth shook as
if rocked by an earthquake, and the havoc wrought was so great
that out of the 1,000 Austrians who held the position, only 164
survived.
Of course, the Austrians launched many counterattacks
against this new strong position of the Italians. But the latter
had fortified it so well that all attempts of their opponents to dis-
lodge them failed.
Considerable further fighting also occurred during the second
half of April, 1916, and the first half of May, 1916, in the Ada-
mello zone, adjoining the Camonica Valley, especially in the re-
gion of the Tonale Pass. The same was true of the Tofana sector
on the upper Boite. But though spectacular, the results were of
comparatively small importance.
CHAPTER XXXIII
THE AUSTRIAN MAY DRIVE IN THE
TRENTINO
ABOUT May 15, 1916, the Italians were at the gates of Ro-
^^^vereto, less than twelve miles south of Trent and seriously
threatening that city. East of Rovereto the Italian lines ran
along the crest of Doss di Somme to the Monte Maggio beyond
Val Terragnolo and then northward to Soglio d*Aspio. The Aus-
AUSTRIAN DRIVE IN THE TRENTINO 245
trian forts of Folgaria and Lavarone compelled the Italians to
follow the frontier as far as Val Sugana, where they occupied
good strategical positions on Austrian territory and held Ron-
segno, on the railroad between Borgo and Trent. Further north
the Italians held dominating positions in front of the Austrian
forts at Fabonti and Monte Cola.
During the preceding months the Austrian forces along the
Italian front had gradually been increased, until they now num-
bered about thirty-eight divisions. Of these, it was estimated
that sixteen divisions, or over 300,000 men had been massed by
May 15, 1916, between the Adige and Brenta Rivers. Artillery,
too, in comparatively great quantity and of as heavy caliber as
the country permitted, had been assembled.
Suddenly on May 15, 1916, the Austrians along the Trentino
front followed up an intense bombardment which had lasted
throughout May 14, 1916, with an attack by large masses of in-
fantry against the Italian positions between the Adige and the
upper Astico. Although the Italians valiantly resisted the first
onrush they had finally to give way, losing some 2,500 men and
sixty-five officers. Austrian troops have occupied Italian posi-
tions on Armentara Ridge, south of the Sugana Valley, on the
Folgarone Plateau, north of Cagnolo Valley and south of Ro-
vereto. On the Oberdo Plateau they entered trenches east of
Monfalcone, capturing five officers and 150 soldiers belonging to
five different Italian cavalry regiments.
The following vivid picture of the vehemence of the Austrian
attack is given in the ^*Comere della Sera" :
"The Austrians have opened a breach in the wall of defense
which we have won by heavy sacrifices beyond our frontier. They
have beaten with a hurricane of fire upon our Alpine line at
its most delicate point, striving with desperate fury to penetrate
into Italian territory. This is the hardest moment of our war ;
it is also one of the most bitter and violent assaults of the whole
European war.
'The battle rages furiously. The Austrian attack is being
made with colossal forces in the narrow zone between the Adige
and the Val Sugana. The enemy had assembled fourteen divisions
246 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
of his best troops. An Austrian officer who was taken prisoner
said :
" *You are not far from the truth in reckoning that there
are three hundred thousand men against you. These comprise
the armies of Dankl, Koevess, and the Boroevic, and these ar-
mies are served by unHmited artillery. More than two thou-
sand pieces are raining on a twenty-five-mile front projectiles
of all calibers.* "
"On Sunday morning, May 14, 1916, three shadows approached
the Italian trenches. As they advanced they were recognized
as Austrian Slav deserters. They said :
" *The attack has been ordered for to-morrow. The bombard-
ment will last from dawn to 6 p. m., when the infantry will
attack.'
"The information was exact. A bombardment of incredible
violence began. Aeroplanes regulated the fire of a 15-inch naval
gun, which sent five projectiles on the town of Asiago. After
the bombardment had ceased the first infantry attack came.
The troops attacked en masse, and at the same time attacks were
made from the Adige to the Val Sugana. Four onslaughts were
made on Zugna Torta. Our machine guns cut down the blue
masses of men ; the wire entanglements were heaped with dead.
The bombardment had destroyed all the first-line trenches. The
infantry then hurled itself against the advance posts of the
Val Terragnolo. The Alpini, deafened by twelve hours of bom-
bardment, defended every foot of the ground, fighting always in
snow. Three terrible bayonet counterattacks lacerated the Aus-
trian lines, but the assailants were innumerable, and no help
could come, as the entire front was in action. The Alpini who
remained, so few in number, threw themselves on the enemy
again, permitting the retirement of the main body to the line
running from Malga Milegna to Soglio d'Aspio. Even here
there was one avalanche of fire. The enemy artillery had been
pouring explosives on these positions for ten hours. The enemy
infantry here attacking were annihilated and the enemy dead
filled the valleys, but fresh troops swarmed up from all parts.
"Night fell on the first day's slaughter."
AUSTRIAN DRIVE IN THE TRENTINO 247
The following day, May 16, 1916, the Austrians attacked again
the Italian positions on the northern slopes of the Zugna Torta
in the Lagarina Valley in five assaults. In the zone between the
Val Terragnolo and the upper Astico a violent concentrated fire
from the Austrian artillery of all calibers forced the Italians to
abandon their advanced positions. In the Asiago sector per-
sistent attacks were repulsed. In the Sugana Valley the Aus-
trians vigorously attacked between the Val Maggio bridgehead
and Monte Collo. The prisoners taken by the Austrians were
increased to forty-one officers and 6,200 men, and the booty to
seventeen machine guns and thirteen guns. Along the whole
remaining front there was artillery fire. Sporadic infantry at-
tacks were made in the San Pellegrino Valley, the upper But, at
Monte Nero, Mrzli, the Tohnino zone, the northern slopes of
Monte San Michele, the region east of Selz, and Monfalcone.
Austrian aeroplanes shelled Castel Tesino, Capedaletto, Mon-
tebelluna, and the stations at Camia and Gemona. Italian aero-
planes shelled Dellach and Kotsschach in the Gail Valley.
The shelling of Zugna Torta was renewed on May 17, 1916,
when five attacks against the Italian positions were repulsed
with heavy losses.
Meanwhile artillery fire continued against the Italian posi-
tions between Val Terragnolo and the upper Astico. After
three days of intense and uninterrupted artillery fire the Italians
abandoned their positions on Zugna Torta on May 18, 1916, but
repulsed two attacks against their positions further south. The
Italians also abandoned their line of resistance between Monte
Soglio d'Aspio and retired upon other prepared positions.
Zugna Torta, the ridge running down upon Rovereto, between
Val Lagarina and Vallarsa, was a dangerously exposed salient.
The western slopes were commanded by the fire of the Austrian
artillery positions at Biaena, north of More, on the western side
of Val Lagarina, and the rest of the position lay open to Ghello
and Fenocchio, east of Rovereto. The Italians had never been
able to push forward their lines on either side of this salient.
Biaena blocked the way on the west, and the advance east of
Vallarsa was held up by the formidable group of fortifications
248 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
on the Folgaria Plateau. When the Austrians attacked Zugna
Torta, under cover of a converging artillery fire, the position
quickly became untenable.
On the same day the Austrians, for the first time since the
beginning of hostilities between Italy and Austria, crossed the
Italian frontier in the Lago di Garda region and established them-
selves on the Costabella, a ridge of the Monte Baldo, between
the lake and the Lagarina Valley. At this point, where the Aus-
trian offensive met with the greatest success, the Italians were
driven back four miles from the positions on Austrian soil which
they occupied at the opening of the attack and which they had
held early in the war.
The Austrian advance was well maintained on the following
day. May 19, 1916, when the Italians were driven from their
positions on the Col Santo, almost directly to the west of Monte
Maggio captured the day before, between the Val di Terragnolo
and the Vallarsa.
By that time the number of Italians taken prisoners by the
Austrians since May 15, 1916, had increased to 257 officers and
13,000 men and the booty to 109 guns, including twelve how-
itzers, and sixty-eight machine guns.
An Austrian dispatch forwarded at that time from Trent tells
of the violent fighting which was in progress in the zone of Monte
Adamello and the Tonale Pass and gives a description of the
capture by the Austrians of an unarmed mountain in this
region.
The preparatory bombardment was begun at three o'clock in
the afternoon, the Italian guns making only a desultory reply.
The bombardment was continued until after sunset, when the
Austrian infantry began to move forward from the direction
of Fort Strino, on the Noce River, northeast of the Tonale Pass,
guided by searchlights and star shells.
The seasoned Austrian troops encountered an extremely heavy
machine-gun and rifle fire as they climbed the slope, using their
bayonets to give them support on the slippery ground, but con-
tinued the advance, and near the summit engaged the Italian
defenders in a hand-to-hand combat, and after an hour of
AUSTRIAN DRIVE IN THE TRENTINO 249
bayonet fighting drove the Italians from their positions. Both
sides engaging in the encounter lost heavily, according to the
dispatch.
According to Rome dispatches the Austrian troops were under
the command of the Austrian heir-apparent, Archduke Charles
Francis Joseph, as well as Field Marshal Count von Hoetben-
dorff, chief of the Austrian General Staff. General Cadoma, the
Italian commander in chief, was also said to have established
his headquarters on the Trentino front to take personal command
of the defense.
The special correspondent of the London "Times" describes
the fighting in the Trentino at this period as follows :
"It is the fifth day of the Austrian offensive. *We have an
action in progress,' says the colonel. The night is clear and
mild. A moon, full red, is rising on the horizon. Headquarters
are located in an ancient Austrian feudal castle, which crowns
a hilltop. At our feet the valley spreads out, and the mountain-
chains to the right and left seem to meet at an angle in the
west. Here a blackened mountain mass dominates the valley.
It is the Panarotta, the stronghold of the enemy.
" The eye of the Austrians,' a young officer exclaims, as from
the crest a beam of light breaks forth, flaring with great intensity
on the Italian positions lower down. Immediately an Italian
light endeavors to shine directly in the path of the Austrian light
and blind its rays. Another Austrian light darts forth from
across the valley. Promptly an Italian searchlight gives battle.
Thus for more than an hour the opposing searchlights endeavor
to intercept one another. To-night the Austrians are on the of-
fensive. Their lights sweep the hillcrests, pursued by Italian
rays.
"The moon is now high in the heavens, the snow-clad peaks, the
shadowy ravines, the villages within Italian lines, as well as
those beyond the invisible ring of steel, are bathed in a silvery
light. We are standing less than four miles from the advanced
enemy positions. The stage is set, the battle is about to begin.
Information brought in during the day tells of fresh units of the
enemy, massed in second line. Deserters, surrendering to Italian
250 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
patrols, report that an important action is impending. The
general commanding bids us good night.
"We make our way on foot through quiet country lanes.
Through the trees, the glimmer of the searchlights* flashes comes
and goes like giant fireflies. The clear notes of a nightingale
ring out in the stillness of the :iight. Nestling in the valley lies
a large town, which only a fortnight ago was filied with civilians,
'redeemed Italians,' who had enjoyed eight months of prosperity
and liberty under Italian rule. Now these have been evacuated
and scattered in the four comers of Italy, and the deserted houses
and empty streets add to the unreality of the scene. The whirr-
ing of the field-telephone wires which hang low, hastily looped
over the branches of olive and mulberry trees, alone indicates
any activity of man. There are no troops in sight, save a patrol
which stops us and examines our papers. It seems difficult to
realize that a great battle is impending. No scene could be
more peaceful. In the marshes, frogs are croaking in loud
unison. The scent of new-mown hay is wafted across the
valley.
"The minutes hang heavily. A half hour passes. An hour
seems interminable. This afternoon, beyond the mountains, in
the next valley, not more than nine miles away as the crow flies,
a bloody action was fought. Not a sound of the cannonade
reached us; what had happend there we did not know, for
the Austrians are attacking from a single base, and their battle
line is not more than fifteen miles long, pivoting on a central
position, whereas the Italian forces in this same sector are com-
pelled, by the configuration of the mountains and the inter-
secting valleys, to fight separate actions which can only be co-
ordinated with utmost difficulty.
"Shortly before one o'clock in the morning the Austrian bat-
teries open fire. From the west, the north, the east, the hail
of shell and shrapnel tears open the crest of the hill, the Monte
Collo, against which the attack is directed. So intense an ar-
tillery fire has not hitherto been witnessed on the Italian front;
380's, SOS's, 240's, 149's, 105's rain upon the short line of Italian
intrenchments.
AUSTRIAN DRIVE IN THE TRENTINO 251,
"For more than three hours the bombardment continues. The
Italian guns apparently refrain from answering. But every bat-
tery is in readiness, every Italian gun is trained on the spot
where the enemy must pass. Every man is at his post, waiting,
waiting. It is just before dawn. The air of this Alpine Valley is
cold and raw. A bleak wind blows through the trees. The
cannonade slackens. From our position we cannot see the enemy
advancing, but the black, broad strip of newly-upturned soil or?
the crest of the Monte Collo shows the effect of the bombard-
ment. Split wide open like a yarning crater, the hilltop has
been plowed up in every direction. Barbed wire, parapets, and
trench lines have disappeared, buried under the tangled earth
clumps.
"A minute, perhaps five or ten! 'They are coming,' is whis-
pered in the observation post. A thunder of Italian artillery
greets the attacking forces. On they come. Instinctively one
can discern a shadowy mass moving forward. Huddled together,
they crouch low. Shells are falling and then cease, and the 'click,'
'click,' of the machine gun's enfilading fire is heard. The enemy
reaches the Italian advance trenches. The first streaks of light,
gray and cold, show new attacking forces coming up over the
hill. They penetrate deep into the plowed soil. They seem
to hold the hill. Stumbling through the cratered terrain the Aus-
trians advance toward the Italian positions. Then from out
of the tawny earth an Italian battalion springs up. One can
almost imagine that one hears their hoarse battle cry, 'Avanti,
Savoia! Avanti!' as they fall upon their enemies.
"We learn later that the losses have been heavy. The Italian
possessions have been badly damaged and have been temporarily
evacuated. Both sides have taken prisoners, and what was the
battle ground is now a neutral zone. Some hours later I again
look across to the Monte Collo. The hill crest is deserted. Below
the summit fresh Italian troops are occupying new and stronger
positions, while an endless stream of pack-mules is winding
slowly up the mountainside."
On May 20, 1916, the battles in southern Tyrol, on the Lava-
rone Plateau, increased in violence as the result of Italian at-
252 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
tacks. The Austrians reached the summit of the Armentara
Ridge and on the Lavarone Plateau penetrated the first hostile
position.
The troops of Archduke Charles Francis Joseph also added to
their successes. They captured the Cima dei Laghi and the
Cima di Nesole. The Italians also were driven from the Borgola
Pass toward the south and lost three more twenty-eight centi-
meter howitzers and 3,000 men, 84 officers, 25 guns and 8
machine guns.
Austrian aeroplanes dropped bombs on Vicenza.
Although the Italian line still held in the main, it could not
deny Austrian advances at certain important points. Slowly
the Austro-Hungarians pushed on everywhere toward the Italian
frontier. On May 21, 1916, an attack of the Graz Corps on
Lavarone Plateau was attended with complete success. The Ital-
ians were driven from their entire position. Other Austrian
troops captured Fima, Mandriolo and the height immediately
west of the frontier from the summit as far as the Astico
Valley.
The troops of Archduke Charles Francis Joseph reached the
Monte Tormino Ma jo line.
Between the Astico and Brenta, in the Sugana Valley, the
Austrian attacks likewise continued, supported by powerful ar-
tillery, against advanced lines in the west valleys of Terra As-
tico, Doss Maggio and Campelle.
Since the beginning of the offensive 23,883 Italians, among
whom are 482 officers, had now been captured and the number
of cannon taken had been increased to 172.
Between Lake Garda and the Adige large Austrian forces
were massed on May 22, 1916, in the Riva zone. There was also
considerable aerial activity on that day on Monte Baldo (the
mountain ridge to the east of the lake). From the Adige to
the Astico there were only reconnoiterings. Between the As-
tico and the Brenta Rivers in the Sugana Valley, the Italians
were again forced to fall back gradually on their main lines
after repulsing heavy attacks throughout the day. The retreat,
however, was orderly and spontaneous.
AUSTRIAN DRIVE IN THE TRENTINO 253
Besides accomplishing their advance in the Val Sugana, the
Austrians continued the reduction of the forts protecting Ar-
siero, well across the Italian frontier on the way toward Vicenza.
Arsiero is the terminus of a railway leading down into the Vi-
cenza plain and the city of Vicenza. Through the capture of the
Spitz Tonezza and Monte Melignone the Austrians now held
the entire line across the frontier as far as Fomi on the Astico.
They also pushed their advance toward the ridge north of the
Val dei Laghi, and toward Monte Tormino and Monte Cremone,
all three outlying defenses of Arsiero. Meanwhile the right
wing of the Austrian army, after storming Col Santo, had
moved toward Monte Pasubio, and the left wing had stormed
the Sasso Alto, commanding the Armentara Ridge, enabling
the Austrians to advance into the Sugana Valley and to take
Roncegno.
In order to appreciate the difficulties connected with all of
this fighting, it must be remembered that the fighting is going on
in the mountains, on ground varying in altitude as much as
5,000 feet per mile. The mountains were still partly covered
with snow and the transportation of supplies, therefore, was
exceedingly difficult.
As the month of May drew to its end, the Austrian advance
spread steadily. By May 23, 1916, the Austrians had occupied
north of the Sugana Valley the ridge from Salubio to Borgo.
On the frontier ridge south of the valley the Italians were driven
from Pompeii Mountain. Further south the Italians success-
fully defended the heights east of the Val d*Assa and the fortified
district Asiago and Arsiero. The armored work of Campolono,
however, fell into Austro-Hungarian hands. The Austro-Hun-
garian troops approached more closely the Val d'Assa and Posina
Valley.
Orderly as the Italian retreat was, it was nevertheless a
hasty one. For the official Italian report for May 23, 1916, ad-
mits that artillery "that could not be removed" was destroyed.
Both the violence and unexpectedness of the Austrian attacks
are testified to by articles published at this time in Italian news-
papers. A writer in the "Giomale d'ltalia" of Rome says that
254 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
"the Austrian offensive came as a^ surprise to the Italian com-
mand and the taking of Monte Maggio and other important po-»
sitions was possible, because the Italians were not looking for
so heavy an attack."
A correspondent of the ''Corriere della Sera" of Milan, writing
of the extensive preparations made by the Austrians for the
present offensive, says "that the Austrians massed 2,000
guns, mostly of large caliber, on the twenty-four-mile front
attacked."
Though it was now scarcely more than a week since the be-
ginning of the Austrian offensive, 24,400 Italians had been made
prisoners, among them 524 officers, and 251 cannon ; 101 machine
guns had been taken.
The Italians, of course, appreciated fully the deeper meaning
of this Austrian offensive. They understood that the Austrian
objective was not simply to reduce the Italian pressure on Trent
or to drive the Italians out of southern Tyrol, but to advance
themselves into Italy. At the same time, Italy also knew that,
though such an advance was not an impossibility, its successful
accomplishment for any great distance or duration would be
seriously handicapped by the fact that the preponderance of
numbers was unquestionably on the Italian and not the Aus-
trian side. This confidence found expression in an order of the
day issued at this junction by King Victor Emmanuel in which
he says :
"Soldiers of land and sea: Responding with enthusiasm
to the appeal of the country a year ago, you hastened to fight,
in conjunction with our brave allies, our hereditary enemy and
assure the realization of our national claims.
"After having surmounted difficulties of every nature, you
have fought in a hundred combats and won, for you have the
ideal of Italy in your heart. But the country again asks of you
new efforts and more sacrifices.
"I do not doubt that you will know how to give new proofs of
bravery and force of mind. The country, proud and grateful,
sustains you in your arduous task by its fervent affections, its
calm demeanor and its admirable confidence.
AUSTRIAN DRIVE IN THE TRENTINO 255
"I sincerely hope that fortune will accompany us in future
battles, as you accompany my constant thoughts."
Still further Austrian successes were reported on May 24,
1916. In the Sugana Valley they occupied the Salubio Ridge
and drove the Italians from Kempel Mountain.
In the Lagarina Valley, after an intense night bombardment/
Austrian forces attacked twice toward Serravalle and Col di
Buole, but were vigorously repulsed. Next morning the attack
on Col di Buole was renewed with fresh troops, but again re-
pulsed with heavy loss. Italian troops followed up this repulse
and reoccupied the height of Darmeson, southeast of Col di Buole.
Between the Val d'Assa and Posina the Austrians, after hav-
ing kept Italian positions at Pasubio under violent bombardment,
launched a night attack with strong columns of infantry, which
were mowed down by Italian fire and thrown back in disorder.
Between Posina and the Astico the Austrians unmasked their
heavy artillery along the Monte Maggio-Toraro line, but Italian
guns replied effectively.
On May 25, 1916, the Austro-Hungarians occupied the Cima
Cista, crossed the Maso rivulet and entered Strigno in the Val
Sugana, four miles northeast of Borgo and a little less than
that distance southeast of Salubio, with the Maso stream be-
tween. They also captured the Corno di Campo Verde to the
east of Grigno, on the Italian border and occupied Chiesa on
the Vallarsa Plateau, southwest of Pasubio.
CHAPTER XXXIV
THE RISE AND FAILURE OF THE
AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN DRIVE
"DY May 26, 1916, the center of the Austro-Hungarian army
■*-^ was sweeping down toward Arsiero, while another strong
force further west was within ten miles of the Italian city of
Schio. Both of these points are terminals of the railroad sys-
tem of which Vicenza is the center. That day some of the ar-
Q— War St 5
256 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
mored works of Arsiero and some strongly fortified positions
southwest of Bacarola were captured and Monte Mochicce was
occupied. Another Austrian success was the capture of the en-
tire mountain range from Como di Campo Verde to Montemeata
(in the Val d*Assa). The Italians suffered sanguinary losses
and also lost more than 2,500 prisoners, four guns, four machine
guns, 300 bicycles and much other material.
In the Monte Nero zone on the night of May 26, 1916, the
Austro-Hungarians attacked Italian trenches near Vrsic and suc-
ceeded in gaining a temporary foothold. When reenforcements
arrived, after a violent counterattack, the Italians drove out the
enemy, taking some prisoners and machine guns.
The natural difficulties in the way of the Austro-Hungarian
invaders were so manifold and severe that it appeared at times
as if the offensive had come to a standstill. However, this was
not the case. Slowly but surely it progressed and as it pro-
gressed it even spread out. Thus on May 27, 1916, the Austrians
not only captured a fortification at Coronolo, west of Arsiero,
and also a barricade in the Assa Valley, southwest of Monte
Interrotto, but also carried their offensive further toward the
west until it included the northern end of Lake Garda.
Again on May 28, 1916, the Italians had to give way. The
Austrians crossed the Assa Valley near Roana, four and a half
miles southwest of Asiago. They also repulsed Italian attacks
near Canove, between Asiago and Schio, and occupied the south-
em slopes and captured the fortifications on the Monte Ingrotto
heights, north of Asiago, after having taken Monte Cebio, Monte
Sieglarella and the Como di Campo Bianco. In the upper Posina
Valley the Italians were driven out of their positions west and
south of Webalen.
With renewed vigor the Austrians attacked on May 29, 1916.
As a result the armored work of Punta Gorda fell into their
hands, and west of Arsiero they forced the crossing of the Posina
Brook and occupied the heights on the southern bank in the face
of determined Italian resistance.
The next day. May 30, 1916, Austrian troops, northeast of
Asiago, drove the Italians from GsMJn and stormed positions on
THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN DRIVE 257
the heights northward. Monte Baldo and Monte Fiara fell into
their hands. West of Asiago the Austrian line south of the Assa
Valley was advanced to the conquered Italian position of Punta
Gorda. The troops which had crossed the day before the Posina
took Monte Priafora.
This brought the Austrians so near to Asiago that the Italians
deemed it wise to evacuate this town, holding, however, the
hills to the east. In spite of the gradual advance of the Austrian
center, the Italian wings held and severely punished the at-
tacking Austrians. This was made possible by the admirable
Italian motor transports which enabled the Italian command
to bring up great reenforcements and stop the gap made in the
first line. The most serious loss which they suffered was that of
the big guns the Italians were obliged to abandon on the Monte
Maggio-Spitz Tonezza line.
The Austrian offensive was now in its second week. So far it
had yielded in prisoners 30,388 Italians, including 694 officers
and 299 cannon.
Reviewing the Austro-Hungarian offensive up to this point,
the military critic of the Berlin "Tageblatt" says :
"The Austro-Hungarian advance is in progress on a front of
thirty-one miles .between the Adige and the Brenta. This is
about the same distance as the front between Gorlice and Tar-
now, in Galicia, over which the offensive against the Russians
was conducted thirteen months ago.
"The general direction of the advance is toward the Italian
line running through Asiago, Arsiero, and Schio, which up to
the present time had been protected by advanced positions. This
line represents the third and last fortified defensive position,
the strategic object of which is to prevent an invasion of the
Venetian plain.
"The Austro-Hungarian troops already have disposed of the
loftiest heights, which presents a situation favorable to them.
When the heavy artillery has been brought into place there will
be visible evidence of this.
"The total Italian casualties thus far are not less than 80,000
inen. The loss of more than 200 cannon is exceedingly serious
258 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
for the Italians, since they cannot be replaced during the
war."
In spite of the fact that on May 30, 1916, the Austrians had
forced their way across the Posina torrent between Posina and
Arsiero and succeeded in partly enveloping the latter, a force
which attempted to take Sant' Ubaldo, immediately southeast of
Arsiero, on May 31, 1916, was driven back by the Italians be-
yond the Posina, thus relieving the strongest pressure on the
town. A little further west another Austrian force attacked the
Italian positions on Monte Spin, southeast of Posina. The Italian
lines held on the mountain slopes and the Austrian advance here
was checked. West of Posina an Austrian assault on Monte
Fomi Alti was repulsed. On the Sette Comuni Plateau, where
the Austrians were advancing against Asiago, they began opera-
tions against the Italian positions on Monte Cengio and Campo
Niulo.
On June 1, 1916, however, the Austro-Hungarians in the Ar-
siero region captured Monte Barro and gained a firm footing on
the south bank of the Posina torrent. Repeated night attacks
along the Posina front against the northern slopes of Monte
Forni Alti and in the direction of Quaro, southwest of Arsiero,
were repulsed.
All day long an intense uninterrupted bombardment by Aus-
trian batteries of all calbers was maintained against the Italian
lines in the Col di Xomo-Rochette sector (southwest of Posina).
On the left wing the Austrians, leaving massed heavy forces
between Posina and Fusine (in the Posina Valley, east of
T^osina), made numerous efforts to advance toward Monte
Spin.
On the right wing strong Austro-Hungarian columns in the
afternoon launched a violent attack against Segheschiri. These
were completely repulsed after a fierce engagement.
In the uplands of the Sette Comuni there was an intense
and obstinate struggle along the positions south of the Assa
Valley as far as Asiago. Italian troops holding the Monte Cengio
Plateau determinedly withstood powerful infantry attacks sup-
ported by a most violent bombardment.
THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN DRIVE 259
On the front pajrallel with the Asiago-Guglio-Valle road near
Campo Mullo the Italians gained ground by a violent counter-
offensive in spite of the strong Austrian resistance.
Intense artillery and infantry fighting along the Trentino
front continued unabated on June 2, 1916, and according to the
official Italian statement the Austrian offensive in some places
was checked. The Austrian infantry on Zugna Torta was scat-
tered by the fierce Italian infantry fire.
Around Asiero and on the Asiago Plateau in Italy, the Italians
repulsed Austrian infantry. The Belmonte position northeast of
Monte Cengio, where the struggle was fiercest and which was
repeatedly taken and lost, was finally definitely occupied by
the Italians.
Several Italian towns, including Vicenza and Verona, were at-
tacked by Austrian aeroplanes, while Italian air squadrons in
a raid on objects of military importance in the lower Astico Val-
ley, dropped 100 bombs on various enemy camps and munition
depots.
The next day, June 3, 1916, the Austrian attack once more
found fresh impetus. In spite of desperate Italian resistance on
the ridge south of the Posina Valley and before Monte Cengio,
on the Asiago front, south of Monte Cengio, considerable ground
was won and the town of Cesuna was captured. Italian counter-
attacks were repulsed.
During this one day 5,600 prisoners, including seventy-eight
officers, were taken and three cannon, eleven machine guns and
126 horses were captured.
In the region west of the Astico Valley fighting activity was
generally less pronounced on June 4, 1916, than it had been
during the preceding days. South of Posina Austrian troops
took a strong point of support and repulsed several Italian coun-
terattacks.
East of the Astico Valley, Austrian groups situated on the
heights east of Arsiero stormed Monte Panoccio (east of Monte
Barco) and thereby gained command of the Canaglio Valley.
Considerable fighting occurred on June 5, 1916, without, how-
ever, resulting in any important changes. Austro-Hungarian
260 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
attacks, preceded by intensive artillery fire, were launched all
along the Trentino front, but were met everywhere with deter-
mined Italian resistance. Italian aeroplanes attacked the rail-
way stations of San Bona di Piava, Livenca and Lati Sana, while
Austrian airmen bombed the stations of Verona, Ala and Vi-
cenza.
Since June 1, 1916, 9,700 Italians, including 184 officers, had
been captured, as well as thirteen machine guns and five cannons.
On June 6, 1916, activities were restricted to artillery duels,
although the Austrians southwest of Asiago continued the at-
tack near Cesuna and captured Monte del Busiballo, southwest
of Cesuna.
More and more it became evident now that the force of the
Austrian offensive had been spent. The pressure on the Italian
center in the Trentino front gradually diminished as a result
of the determined Italian resistance, which had made impossible
an equal progress of the Austrian wings. Possibly, too, the
great Russian offensive on the southeastern front made itself
felt even now. At any rate, there was a decided slowing down
of infantry attacks. At one point, however, on the Sette Com-
uni Plateau, the battle raged along the whole front. On the
evening of June 6, 1916, after an intense artillery preparation,
the Austro-Hungarians made repeated attacks against Italian
positions south and southwest of Asiago. The action, raging
fiercely throughout the night of June 6-7, ended in the morning
of June 7th with the defeat of the Austrian columns. During the
afternoon the Austrians renewed their violent efforts against the
center and right wing of the Italian positions. Preceded by
the usual intense bombardment, dense infantry masses repeat-
edly launched assaults against positions south of Asiago, east
of the Campo Mulo Valley, but were always repulsed with heavy
losses.
Concerning the Austro-Hungarian troops who had carried this
offensive into Italy, the special correspondent of the London
''Times*' says:
'Trench warfare, for the time being, has been abandoned
here. Trench lines no longer count.
THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN DRIVE 261
"Great troop masses are maneuvering in the open, through
the valleys and gorges, swarming over the summits of these
mountains. The Austrians dare advance only as far as the long
arm of their guns will reach, and are bending all their energy
to bring up these guns. It is a gigantic task, and the skill of the
enemy commander in holding together and coordinating his at-
tacks, now that his troops have entered these defiles, must be
acknowledged.
"It is sledge-hammer tactics, so dear to the Prussians, that the
Austrian commanders have adopted, and from the general as-
pect of their plans, it would appear that these were prepared
and matured in Berlin rather than in Vienna.
"How long can it last? How long before the Austrian effort
will have spent itself?" are the questions that are being asked
here as the second week of this great battle is drawing to a close.
For, unlike Verdun, it is not a fortress that is being assaulted,
but a great drive, carried on by siege methods. Not converging
on a single center, but radiating, like sticks of a fan, from a cen-
tral base.
"So much has been written regarding the exhaustion of the
resources of the Dual Monarchy, not only of materials, but of
men. In how far is this true?
"To deal first with the question of ordnance. The Austrians,
it is estimated by competent experts, have well over 2,000 pieces
of artillery in action along this battle line. These include a great
number of heavy-caliber guns. Naval guns, with an extreme
length of range, are being used with great skill throughout the
engagement. Kept in reserve, and silent, though posted close up
to the firing line, they have had a disconcerting eifect, in that
their fire has reached far behind the Italian lines at intervals
between the attacks, firing shots at random which did little ac-
tual damage, but gave the impression of continued advance. With
the front of this battle line extending now to a length of twenty-
two miles, the artillery of the enemy works out at nearly 100
pieces to the mile, or one gun every twenty yards.
'The shells fired by this artillery are of excellent workman-
ship. I have on my table as I write a fragment of a 10-inch shell
262 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
which I picked up here. It is rent in deep fissures, which would
prove, according to competent authority, that the explosive ma-
terials used are good. *The Austrians fired away all their bad
shells during preliminary actions,' was the comment of a young
staff officer who is in the habit of recording the efficiency of
enemy shells. But it is quantity as well as quality which the
enemy is relying upon.
" 'Twenty thousand shells were fired against my position the
first two days of the engagement,* an Alpini major, commanding
a small knoll, remarked to me. Using this as a basis, it would
not be far from the truth to assert that over 1,000,000 shells
have been fired by the enemy in the present battle, and there is
as yet no slackening of effort.
"And the troops? This morning a group of some 250 Aus-
trians, taken during the action last night, are in this village.
They are divided in squads of twenty-five, each in charge of an
Austrian noncommissioned officer. The men had had six hours'
rest before I saw them. These prisoners are Rumanians from
Transylvania. They are young, well~set-up troops. They are nat-
urally glad to be prisoners, though their captors tell me that they
fought valiantly. The equipment of these men is new, and I
was struck by the excellent quality of their boots; high, new
leather, thick mountain boots. In fact, all their leather accouter-
ments are new, and of good leather. Their uniforms are in many
cases of heavy cotton twill, very tough, and resisting the hard
mountain fighting better than the usual cloth uniform. Nearly
every man has an overcoat, which is of stout new cloth. Only
five or six of the men are without caps. None have helmets of
any kind, but all wear the soft cap with ear flaps tied back.
According to answers given to the interpreter, they are of the
class of 1915, and have seen fighting in Galicia.
"Asked about their food, they replied that they did not get
enough to eat, but their looks belied their statements. Whatever
may be the truth in regard to the meatless and fatless days in
the Hapsburg Empire, the armies in the field are not suffering
in this respect, and, though the civilians at home are now put on
strict rations, their soldiers' rations, in this sector at least, have
THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN DRIVE
263
264 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
not been cut down. I was shown small tins of meat, taken from
the knapsack of a prisoner, and several carried 3-ounce tins of
a good quality of butter. In another sector I saw Bosnian pris-
oners wearing a gray fez, and looking much like Turkish troops.
They also impressed me as very fit men ; in fact, all the prisoners
taken recently would seem to be of strong fiber, and far better
equipped than Austrian troops which I have seen elsewhere.
"It is evident that the Austrian commanders have assembled
the picked troops of the Dual Monarchy for the storming of
these Trentino heights. Everything would point to the fact that
they are making a supreme and final effort to win the war. Pris-
oners confirm this by stating that the war cannot go on much
longer.
"Are the last good reserves being used up in this battle? Yes-
terday morning an Italian patrol coming in from the night's
tour of inspection of their positions bring in a prisoner. He is
a burly, thick-lipped peasant boy of twenty, dressed in a Russian
uniform. On his loose-fitting blouselike tunic, torn in many
places, is pinned a black and yellow ribbon, and hanging from a
thin remaining strand shines the silver medal of St. George. An
Italian subaltern takes charge of the prisoner.
" *A Russian refugee,' the officer remarks, in answer to my
look of surprise at the sight of a Russian prisoner being brought
in by an Italian patrol on the Trentino front. The Russian smiles
good-naturedly, as he feels secure, now that he is among friends.
In due time he will be repatriated, or perhaps join the Russian
corps in France. We leave him busy over a big bowl of macaroni.
" 'There are close to 20,000 Russian prisoners of war employed
by the Austrians along our front, repairing roads, making
trenches, and engaged on other 'noncombatant military duties,'
the officer informed me. 'A few manage to escape into our lines
nearly every day, but many more Russian dead lie in the silent
crevasses of our high mountains who have lost their lives while
attempting to escape.
" 'You see, they need the men,' he concluded, as we watched
an endless stream of fresh Italian troops winding their way up
from the valley."
THE ITALIAN COUNTEROFFENSIVE 265
CHAPTER XXXV
THE ITALIAN COUNTEROFFENSIVE
IN THETRENTINO
HARDLY had the Austro-Hungarian offensive shown signs
of weakening when the Italians themselves began to attack
the invaders. The first indication of this change was gleaned
from the wording of the official statements, covering military-
operations on the Italian front for June 9, 1916. No longer is
there any mention of Austro-Hungarian advances, but on the
contrary this term appears now in the reports concerning the
military operations of the Italian troops, who are also reported
as "making attacks." Of course, this turn in affairs developed
slowly in the beginning.
Thus, although on June 9, 1916, the Italian troops attacked at
many points along the entire front between the Adige and Brenta
Rivers, most of these attacks were repulsed by the Austro-Hun-
garians, who were still able to claim the capture of some 1,600
prisoners. At the same time Italian forces began to push back
the invaders at some points and were able to advance in the
upper Arsa Valley in the Monte Novegno region, between the
Posina and Val d'Astico, as well as on the western slopes of
Monte Cengio. Artillery duels were maintained along the entire
balance of the front to the sea. Austrian aeroplanes dropped
bombs on various localities in the Venetian plain, while an
Italian squadron shelled Austro-Hungarian positions in the Arsa
Valley and the Val d'Astico.
Much the same was the result of the fighting on June 10 and
11, 1916. On the former day the Austro-Hungarians concen-
trated their efforts still more and restricted themselves to an at-
tack against a small portion of the Italian front southeast of
Asiago. After an intense bombardment strong forces numbering
about one division repeatedly attacked the Monte Lemerle posi-
tions. They were repulsed with very heavy losses by counter-
attacks.
266 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
From the Adige to the Brenta the Italian offensive action was
increasing. Infantry, effectively supported by artillery, made
fresh progress along the Vallarsa height, south of the Posina, in
the Astico Valley, at the Frenzela Valley bridgehead, on the
Asiago Plateau, and to the left of the Maso torrent.
During the following day Austro-Hungarian artillery intensely
bombarded the Italian positions near Conizugna in the Lagarina
Valley. In the Arsa Valley, in the Pasubio sector, on the Posina,
and on the Astico line Italian infantry advance continued de-
spite violent artillery fire and a snowstorm.
Two Austrian counterattacks toward Fomi Alti and Campig-
liazione were repulsed with very heavy losses. In the plateau of
the Sette Comuni, southwest of Asiago, Italian advanced de-
tachments, after passing the Canaglia Valley, progressed toward
the southeastern slopes of Monte Cengio, Monte Barco, and Monte
Busibello. In the Sugana Valley detachments progressed toward
the Masso torrent, repulsing two Austrian counterattacks near
Sucrelle. Along the remainder of the front there were artillery
duels and bomb-throwing activity by small detachments. Aus-
trian aeroplanes dropped bombs on Vicenza, hitting the military
hospital, and also attacked Thiene, Venice, and Mestre, causing
slight damage.
Still further ground was gained by the Italian forces on June
12, 1916, in spite of the most obstinate resistance.
In the Lagarina Valley, by a strong attack after artillery
preparation, the Italians carried the strongly fortified line from
Parmesan, east of the Cima Mezzana, to Rio Romini. The Aus-
tro-Hungarians immediately launched violent counterattacks,
but were always repulsed.
Along the Posina-Astico front there was an intense bom-
bardment by both sides. Austrian infantry, which succeeded in
penetrating Molisini, was driven out by gunfire, pursued and
dispersed.
In the Sugana Valley on the night of June 12, 1916, and
the fallowing morning, Austrian detachments attempting to
advance east of the Maso torrent were repulsed with very heavy
losses.
THE ITALIAN COUNTEROFFENSIVE 267
Once more the Austro-Hungarians attempted to wrest the
initiative from their opponents, without, however, succeeding to
any extent. On the Posina front on the evening of June 12, 1916,
after violent artillery preparation, they attacked Monte Fomi
Alti, the Campiglia (both southwest of Posina) , Monte Ciove and
Monte Brazonne (both south of Arsiero), but were everywhere
repulsed with heavy losses.
During the day they bombarded with numerous batteries of
all calibers the Italian positions along the whole front from the
Adige to the Brenta, especially in the Monte Novegno zone. The
Italian troops firmly withstood the violent fire and repelled in-
fantry detachments which attempted to advance.
Austro-Hungarian hydroaeroplanes attacked the station and
military establishments at San Giorgio di Nogaro, as well as the
inner harbor at Grado.
More and more it became evident that the Austro-Hungarian
drive in the Trentino region had definitely been stopped or aban-
doned. From time to time, it is true, the Austrians returned to
the offensive. But this was always of local importance only and
restricted in strength and extent. The Italians, on the other
hand, not only maintained their new offensive movement, but
even extended gradually its sphere.
Two attempted attacks by the Austro-Hungarian forces in the
region of Monte Novegno, made in the direction of Monte Ciove
and Monte Brazonne, were repulsed. But on Monte Lemerle,
against which the Austrians had launched without success a
very violent attack only a few days before, they now surprised
a hostile detachment near the summit and captured the mountain
completely, taking 500 prisoners.
Italian activity was renewed again on the Isonzo front. After
intense artillery preparation a Naples brigade, supported by
dismounted cavalry detachments, in a surprise attack, pene^
trated Austrian lines east of Monfalcone. The trenches re-
mained in Italian possession after a severe struggle, duringf
which 10 officers, 488 men, and 7 machine guns were captured.
Italian squadrons of aeroplanes bombarded the railway station
at Mattarello, in the Lagarina Valley, and encampments at the
268 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
junction of the Nos and Campomulo Valleys on the Asiago
Plateau, while Austrian aeroplanes dropped bombs on Padova,
Giorgio di Nogaro, and Porto Rosega.
The Italian advance was steadily maintained from now on,
not without, however, finding everywhere the stiffest kind of
resistance, which at times made it even possible for the Austro-
Hungarians to gain slight local successes. These, however, were
not extensive or frequent enough to change the general picture
of military operations on the Austro-Italian front. The Aus-
trians, though still on Italian territory in a number of localities,
were on the defensive with the Italians, though making only very
slow and painful progress, unquestionably on the offensive.
On June 16, 1916, the Italians advanced northeast of Asiago,
between the Frenzela Valley and Marcesina. Notwithstanding
the difficult and intricate nature of the terrain and the stubborn
resistance of the Austrians, intrenched and supported by numer-
ous batteries, the Italian troops made progress at the head of
the Frenzela Valley, on the heights of Monte Fior and Monte
Castel Gomberto and west of Marcesina. The best results were
attained on the right wing, where Alpine troops carried the
positions of Malga Fossetta and Monte Magari, inflicting heavy
losses on the Austrians and taking 203 prisoners, a battery of
6 guns, 4 machine guns, and much material.
During the next few days the most fierce fighting occurred on
the plateau of Sette Comuni. All Austrian attempts to resume
the offensive and continue their advance failed. The Italian ad-
vance was scarcely more successful; fighting had to be done
in the most difficult territory; strong Austrian resistance devel-
oped everywhere. Thunderstorms frequently added to the diffi-
culties already existent. Yet slowly the Italian forces pushed
back the invader.
On June 18, 1916, Alpine troops carried with the bayonet
Cima di Sidoro, north of the Frenzela Valley. Fighting devel-
oped in the Boite sector, where the Italians had made some slight
gains during the previous days, which the Austrians tried to dis-
pute. Heavy Italian artillery bombarded the railway station at
Toblach and the Landro road in the Rienz Valley. Artillery
THE ITALIAN COUNTEROFFENSIVE 269
and aeroplane activity was extremely lively during this period;
Not a day passed without artillery duels at many scattered points
along the entire front from the Swiss border down to the Adri-
atic. Aeroplane squadrons of considerable force paid continu-
ously visits to the opposing lines, dropping bombs on lines of
communication and railway stations.
Alpine troops captured a strong position for the Italians on
June 20, 1916, at the head of the Posina Valley, southwest of
Monte Purche. On the 22d the Italians pushed their advance
beyond Romini in the Arsa Valley, east of the Mezzana Peak, and
on the Lora Spur, west of Monte Pasubio.
On the same day the Austrians counterattacked with extreme
violence at Malga Fossetta and Castel Gomberto, but were re-
pulsed with heavy losses. On the 21st a further Austrian at-
tack at Cucco di Mandrielle resulted in a rout. On the 22d the
Italians, while holding all the Austrian first-line approaches
under heavy fire to prevent the bringing up of reserves, attacked
on the entire front, but still encountered a strong resistance.
During the night of the 24th the remaining peak of Malga Fos-
setta, held by the Austrians, Fontana Mosciar, and the extremely
important Mandrielle were taken by storm, while the Alpini
on the right made themselves masters of the Cima Zucadini by
the 22d.
Henceforth retreat was inevitable, and during the night of
the 25th the Italians on Monte Fior, seeing that the Austrian
resistance had greatly diminished, pushed their offensive vigor-
ously. Shortly after the advance was begun along the whole
right. Monte Cengio, which had received an infernal bombard-
ment for three days and nights, fell at last, and the advance
proceeded apace.
On June 26, 1916, Italian troops in the Arsa Valley carried
strong trenches at Mattassone and Naghebeni, completing the
occupation of Monte Lemerle. Along the Posina front, after
driving out the last Austrian detachments from the southern
slopes of the mountain, the Italians crossed the torrent and
occupied Posina and Arsiero, advancing toward the northern
slopes of the valley.
270 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
On the Sette Comuni Plateau Italian infantry, preceded by
cavalry patrols, reached a line running through Punta Corbin,
Fresche, Concafondi, Cesuna, southwest of Asiago, and passing
northeast of the Nosi Valley, and occupied Monte Fiara, Monte
Lavarle, Spitzkaserle and Cimasaette.
On the right wing Alpine troops, after a fierce combat, carried
Grolla Caldiera Peak and Campanella Peak.
The inside workings of the Italian armies engaged in this
offensive movement are interestingly pictured in the following
account from the pen of the special correspondent of the London
"Times," who, of course, had special opportunities for observa-
tion:
"Thanks to the courtesy of the Italian Government and higher
command, I have been allowed to go everywhere, to see a great
deal on the chief sectors of a 400-mile Alpine border, and to
study the administrative services on the lines of communication.
"I have visited the wild hills of the upper Isonzo, have in-
spected the strange Carso region on the left bank of the river,
and have continued my investigations on the Isonzo front as
far as Aquileia and the sea. I have threaded beautiful and rug-
ged Carnia nearly as far west as Monte Croce, have ascended the
valley of the But to Mount Timau, where the Austrians, as else-
where, are in close touch, and, passing on to wonderful Cadore,
have visited the haunts of the Alpini above the sources of
the Tagliamento and Piave.
"Coming then to the Trentino sector, I have traversed the
Sugana Valley as far as was practicable, accompanied the army
in its reconquest of Asiago Plateau, and concluded an instructive
•^our by ascending the mountains which dominate Val Lagarina
to the point of contact between the contending armies.
"The rest of the front, from the Lago di Garda to the Stelvio
and the frontier of Switzerland, is not at present the scene of
important operations, so I contented myself by ascertaining at
second hand how matters stand between the Valtellina and the
Chiese.
"I have had the honor of a private audience with his Majesty
the King of Italy, and have seen and talked to nearly all the lead-
THE ITALIAN COUNTEROFFENSIVE 271
ing soldiers. Nothing could exceed the kindness with which I
have been received, and my grateful thanks are due especially
to Colonels Count Barbarich and Claricetti, who were placed at
my disposal by General Cadorna and accompanied me during my
tour.
"It is necessary for those who wish to have a clear under-
standing of Italy's share in the war to look back and realize the
situation of our Italian friends when, at the most critical moment
for the cause, they threw the weight of their sword into the
scales.
"Italy, like England, had lost the habit of considering policy
in military terms. Home politics ruled all decisions. The army
had been much neglected, and the campaign in Libya had left
the war material at a very low ebb. United Italy had not yet
fought a great modern campaign, and neither the army nor the
navy possessed in the same measure as other powers those great
traditions which are the outcome of many recent hard-fought
wars. Italy was without our coal and our great metallurgic
industries. She did not possess the accumulation of resources
which we were able to turn to warlike uses ; nor could she find
in her over-sea possessions, as we did, the strength and vitality
of self-governing younger people of her own race. The old
Sardinian army had given in the past fine proofs of valor, but it
was not known how the southern Italians would fight, and it
was at first uncertain whether the whole country would throw
itself heart and soul into the war.
"These impediments to rapid decisions and the extreme diffi-
culty of breaking with an old alliance explain the apparent
hesitation of Italy to enter the war.
"On the other hand, there were compensations. The heart of
Italy was always with the Allies, and the hatred of Austria was
very deep. There was every hope that the long-prevailing sys-
tem of amalgamating the various races of Italy in the common
army would at last bear fruit, and that this amalgamation, com-
bined with the moral and material progress of Italy in recent
years, and the pride of the country in its past history, would
enable Italy to play an honorable and notable part in the war
R_War St. 5
272
THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
GORIZIA
THE ITALIAN COUNTEROFFENSIVE 273
by land and sea, and to wrest from her hereditary enemy those
portions of unredeemed Italy which still remained in Austrian
hands.
"These hopes have either been fulfilled or are in course of ful-
fillment. United Italy is unitedly in the war, and, except among
a few political busybodies, who intrigue after the manner of their
kind, there are not two opinions about the war. There are many
cases of mothers compelling their sons to volunteer and other
cases of fathers insisting upon being taken because their sons are
at the front. The prefect of Friuli told me that nearly all the
24,000 men in his province who were absent abroad when the
war broke out returned home to fight before they were recalled.
The south and the island areas warm for war as the north, and
the regiments of Naples and of Sicily have done very well indeed
in the field. Some people think that Piedmont is not quite so
enthusiastic as other parts of Italy, because she flags her streets
rather less, but I do not think that there is any real difference
of feeling. In all the capitals of the Allies the political climate
has been a trifle unhealthy, and of Rome it has been said that
the old families of the Blacks have not taken a leading part in the
campaign. My inquiries make me doubt the accuracy of this
statement, and I think on the whole it will be found that, despite
the old and persistent divergence of opinion on certain topics, all
ranks and all classes are heartily for the war, and that an
enemy who counts on assistance from within Italy will be griev-
ously disappointed.
"Italy is fortunate in having at her head, at this critical hour
of her destinies, a king who is a soldier born and bred.
"It is a common saying here that the King of Italy is homesick
when he is absent from the army, and it is certain that his
majesty spends every hour that he can spare from state affairs
vdth his troops. He wears on his breast the medal ribbon, only
given to those who have been at the front for a year, and, though
he deprecates any allusion to the fact, it is true that he is con-
stantly in the firing line, has had many narrow escapes, and is
personally known to the whole army, who love to see him in their
tnidst.
274 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
"I have not found any officer of his army who has a better, a
more intimate, or a more accurate knowledge of his troops than
the king. His attention to the wants of the army is abso-
lutely untiring, and I fancy that his cool judgment and large
experience must often be of great service to his ministers and his
generals.
"I do not know whether the field headquarters of the King of
Italy or of King Albert of Belgium is the most unpretentious, but
certainly both monarchs live in circumstances of extreme sim-
plicity. My recollection is that when I last had the honor of
visiting King Albert's headquarters, the bell in what I must
call the parlor did not ring, and the queen of the Belgians had
to get up and fetch the tea herself.
'When I had the honor of being received by the King of Italy
I found his majesty in a little villa which only held four people,
and the king was working in a room of which the only furniture
which I can recall consisted of a camp bed close to the ground
and of exiguous breadth, a small table,- and two chairs of un-
compromising hardness. The only ornament in the room was
the base of the last Austrian shell which had burst just above
the king's head and has been mounted as a souvenir by the queen.
"When a prince of the House of Savoy lives in the traditions
of his family, and shares all the hardships of his troops, it needs
must that his people follow him. And so they do.
"The hardy Alpini from the frontiers, the stout soldiers of
Piedmont, the well-to-do peasantry of Venetia, the Sardinians,
who are ever to the front when there is fighting to be enjoyed,
the Tuscans, Calabrians, and those Sicilians once so famous
amongst the legionaries, are all here or at the depots training
for war. Mobilization must have affected two and a half million
Italians at least. There have been fairly heavy losses, and
fighting of one kind or another is going on in every sector that
I have visited, and every day, despite the great hardships of
fighting on the Alpine frontier, the moral of the army remains
good, the men are in splendid health, and Italy as a whole
remains gay and confident, less affected on the whole by the
war than any other member of the grand alliance.
THE ITALIAN COUNTEROFFENSIVE 275
"There are certainly more able-bodied men of military age out
of uniform in Italy than there are in France, or than there are
now with us. Except volunteers, no men under twenty are at
the front. There are large reserves still available upon which
to draw. The army has been more than doubled since the war
began.
"The Italian regular officers, and the officers of reserve, are
quite excellent. The spirit of good comradeship which prevails
in the army is most admirable, and the corps of officers reminds
me of a large family which is proverbially a happy one. Those
foreign observers who have seen much of the Italian officers
under fire tell me that they have always led their men with
superb valor and determination, while, though Italy has not
such a professional body of N. C. O.'s as Germany, I believe
that most of these men are capable of leading when their officers
fall.
"But there are not enough of good professional officers and
N. C. 0.*s to admit for the moment of a considerable further
expansion of the army. Existing formations can be, and are
being, well maintained, and this is what matters most for the
moment.
"The peasant in certain parts of Italy rarely eats meat. In
the army he gets 300 to 350 grams a day, according to the
season, not to speak of a kilogram of good bread and plenty
of vegetables, besides wine and tobacco. He is having the time
of his life, and if, as cynics say, peace will break up many happy
homes in England, peace in Italy will certainly make some
peasants less joyful than before."
276 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
CHAPTER XXXVI
CONTINUATION OF THE ITALIAN
COUNTEROFFENSIVE
BETWEEN the Adige and the Brenta the retreating Austro-
Hungarian forces had now reached strongly fortified and
commanding positions which considerably increased their power
of resistance. The Italians, however, continued, even if at re-
duced speed, to make progress. On June 27, 1916, they shelled
Austrian positions on Monte Trappola and Monte Testo and
took trenches near Malga Zugna. Between the Posina and the
Astico they took Austrian positions on Monte Gamonda, north
of Fusine, and Monte Caviojo. Cavalry detachments reached
Pedescala (in the Astico Valley, about three miles north of
Arsiero) .
On the Asiago Plateau other Italian forces occupied the south-
ern side of the Assa Valley and reached the slopes of Monte
Rasta, Monte Interrotto and Monte Mosciagh, which were held
strongly by the Austrian rear guards. Further north, after
carrying Monte Colombara, Italian troops began to approach
Calamara Valley.
•On June 28, 1916, the Vallarsa Alpine troops stormed the fort
of Mattassone, and detachments of infantry carried the ridge
of Monte Trappola. On the Pasubio sector Italian troops took
some trenches near Malga Comagnon. Along the Posina line
their advance was delayed by the fire of heavy batteries from
the Borcola.
In the Astico Valley they occupied Pedescala. On the Sette
Comuni Plateau the Austrians strengthened the northern side
of the Assa Valley Heights on the left bank of the Galmarara
to the Agnella Pass. The Italians established themselves on the
southern side of the Assa Valley and gained possession of
trenches near Zebio and Zingarella.
The following day, June 29, 1916, the Itahan line in the region
between the Val Lagarina and the Val Sugana was pushed for-
I
CONTINUATION OF COUNTEROFFENSIVE 277
ward still further until it reached the main Austrian line of
resistance. The Italians occupied the Valmorbia line, in the
Valkrsa, the southern slopes of Monte Spil, and began an of-
fensive to the northwest of Pasubio, in the Cosmagnon region.
Farther east on the line of the Posina Valley, the Italians
took Monte Maggio, the town of Griso, northwest of Monte
Maggio; positions in the Zara Valley and Monte Scatolari and
Sogliblanchi. Monte Civaron and the Zellonkofel, in the Su-
gana Valley, fell into the hands of the Italians.
The Italians continued their advance along the Posina front
on June 30, 1916, despite the violent fire of numerous Austro-
Hungarian batteries dominating Borcola Pass, and also Monte
Maggio and Monte Toraro. Italian infantry occupied Zarolli
in the Vallarsa, north of Mattassone. On the left wing, over-
coming stubborn resistance, Italian troops scaled the crest of
Monte Cosmagnon, whose northerly ridges they shelled to drive
out the enemy hidden among the rocks. On the Sette Comuni
Plateau they kept in close contact with Austrian positions. Con-
flicts in the densely wooded and rocky ground were carried on
chiefly by hand grenades.
Between the Adige and the Brenta the Italians continued
their offensive vigorously on July 1, 1916. In the Vallarsa in-
fantry began an attack on the lines strongly held by the Aus-
trians between Zugna Torta and Foppiano.
Italian artillery shelled Fort Pozzacchio. On Monte Pasubio
the Austrians were offering stubborn resistance from their for-
tified positions between Monte Spil and Monte Cosmagnon.
Along the Posina-Astico line Italian forces completed the
conquest of Monte Maggio and occupied the southern side of
Monte Seluggio. On the Asiago Plateau there were skirmishes
on the northern side of the Assa Valley.
On July 2, 1916, in the region of the Adige Valley, the Aus-
trians directed a heavy bombardment against the Italian posi-
tions from Serravalle, north of Coni Zugna to Monte Pasubio.
Some shells fell on Ala. Italian artillery replied effectively. The
infantry fighting on the northern slopes of Pasubio was con-
tinued with great violence. In the Posina Valley Italian troops
278 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
occupied the spur to the northwest of Monte Pruche, Molino, in
the Zara Valley (northwest of Laghi), and Scatolari, in the Rio
Freddo Valley. The operations against Como del Coston, Monte
Seluggio, and Monte Cimono (northwest and north of Arsiero),
the main points of Austrian resistance, were continued.
On the Asiago Plateau Italian detachments were pushed for-
ward beyond the northern edge of Assa Valley. On the re-
mainder of this sector there was a lull in the fighting, preparatory
to further attacks on the difficult ground. In the Brenta Valley
small encounters took place on the slopes of Monte Civaron north
of Caldiera.
Monte Calgari, in the Posina Valley, was occupied by the
Italians on July 3, 1916, while other detachments completed the
occupation of the northern edge of the Assa Valley on the Asiago
Plateau.
Between the Adige and the Brenta the Austrians on July 4,
1916, contested with great determination the Italian advance and
attempted to counterattack at various points.
After several attempts, Alpine troops reached the summit of
Monte Como, northwest of the Pasubio.
In the upper Astico Basin they captured the crest of Monte
Seluggio and advanced toward Rio Freddo.
Between the Lagarina and Sugana Valleys the Italian of-
fensive was continued on July 5, 1916. In the Adige Valley
and in the upper Astico Basin pressure compelled the Austrians
to withdraw, uncovering new batteries on comimanding posi-
tions previously prepared by them.
On the Asiago Plateau Italian artillery bombarded the Aus-
trian lines actively. In the Campelle Valley the Austrians evac-
uated the positions they still held on the Prima Lunetta, aban-
doning arms, ammunitions and supplies.
The following day brought some new successes to the Italians
on the Sette Comuni Plateau. With the support of their ar-
tillery they renewed their attack on the strongly fortified line
of the Austrians from Monte Interrotto to Monte Campigoletto
and captured two important points of the Austrian defenses,
near Casera, Zebio and Malga Pozza, taking 359 prisoners, in-
CONTINUATION OF COUNTEROFFENSIVE 279
eluding 5 officers and 3 machine guns. Between the Adige
and the Astico, north of the Posino and along the Rio Freddo
and Astico Valleys there was intense artillery activity, es-
pecially in the region of Monte Maggio and Monte Camone.
The same condition continued throughout July 7, 1916.
On July 8, 1916, Italian infantry advanced on the upper Astico
in the Molino Basin and toward Fomi. Dense mist prevented
all activity of artillery on the Sette Comuni Plateau. In the
northern sector the Italians stormed some trenches north of
Monte Chiesa, and occupied Agnella Pass.
A great deal of the fighting, both during the Austro-Hungarian
offensive in the Trentino and the Italian counteroffensive, took
place in territory abounding with lofty mountain peaks. Though
it was now midsummer, these were, of course, covered with
eternal snow and ice. Austrians and Italians alike faced dif-
ficulties and hardships, the solution and endurance of which
would have seemed utterly impossible a few years ago until
the Great War swept away many long-established military and
engineering maxims. An intimate picture of this new mode
of warfare was given by a special correspondent of the London
"Daily Mail*' who, in part, says :
"The villages in the lower ground behind the front have been
aroused from their accustomed appearance of sleepy comfort.
In their streets are swarms of soldiers on their way to the
front or back from it for a holiday. Thousands are camping
out in the neighborhood of the villages or billeted on the inhabit-
ants. Constant streams of motor vehicles rumble through the
villages on their way up the steep road, bearing ammunition,
food and supplies of all sorts, to the batteries, trenches and
dugouts on the peaks.
The road over which these vehicles travel was before the war
a mere hill path — ^now the military engineers have transformed
it into a modern road, graded, metaled and carried by cunningly
devised spirals and turns three-quarters of the way up the moun-
tains.
"It is a notable piece of miHtary engineering, but it is not
merely that. It will serve as an artery of commerce when it
280 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
is no longer needed for the passage of guns and army service
wagons. There is nothing temporary or makeshift about it.
Rocks have been blasted to leave a passage for it and solid
bridges of stone and steel thrown across rivers.
"Because the Austrians started with the weather gauge in
their favor, being on the upper side of the great ridges, it was
necessary for the Italians to get their guns as high as they could.
The means by which they accomplished this task was de-
scribed to me. They would seem incredible if one had not ocular
demonstration of the actual presence of the cannon among these
inaccessible crags.
"There are some of them on the ice ledges of the Ortler nearly
10,000 feet above sea level, in places which it is by way of an
achievement for the amateur climber to reach with guides and
ropes and porters, and nothing to take care of but his own skin.
But here the Alpini and Frontier Guides had to bring up the
heavy pieces, hauling them over the snow slopes and swinging
them in midair across chasms and up knife-edged precipices,
by ropes passed over timbers wedged somehow into the rocks.
I was shown a photograph of a party of these pioneers working
in these snowy solitudes last winter. They might have been a
group of Scott's or Shackleton's men toiling in the Antarctic
wilderness.
"By means of a suspension railway made of wire rope with
sliding baskets stretched across chasms of great depth, oil, meat,
bread and wine are sent up, for the soldier must not only be
fed, but must be fed with particular food to keep the blood cir-
culating in his body in the cold air and chilling breezes of the
snow-clad peaks. Kerosene stoves in great numbers have been
sent aloft to make the life of the mountaineer soldiers more com-
fortable."
On July 9, 1916, there was bitter fighting between the Brenta
and the Adige. Strong Alpine forces repeatedly attacked the
Austrian lines southeast of Cima Dieci, but were repulsed with
heavy losses. Shells set fire to Pedescala and other places in
the upper Astico Valley. An attempt by the Austrians to make
attacks on Monte Seluggio was checked promptly.
CONTINUATION OF COUNTEROFFENSIVE 281
In the Adige Valley another intense artillery duel was staged
on July 10, 1916. On the Pasubio front the Italians captured
positions north of Monte Corno, but the Austrians succeeded in
obtaining partial repossession of them by a violent counterat-
tack. On the Asiago Plateau Alpine detachments successfully
renewed the attack on the Austrian positions in the Monte Chiesa
region.
The next day, July 11, 1916, the Italians again made some
progress in the Adige Valley, north of Serravalle and in the
region of Malga Zugna, and reoccupied partially some of the posi-
tions lost on the northern slopes of Monte Pasubio on the pre-
vious day. Heavy artillery duels took place in the Asiago Basin
and on the Sette Comuni Plateau.
The Austrians promptly responded on July 12, 1916, by at-
tacking in the Adige Valley, after artillery preparation on an
immense scale, the new Italian positions north of Malga Zugna.
They were driven back in disorder, with heavy loss, by the
prompt and effective concentration of the Italian gunfire.
Fighting in the Adige Valley and on the Sette Comuni Pla-
teau continued without cessation during the next few days
without yielding any very definite results. In that period there
also developed extremely severe fighting at the head of the Posina
Valley. During the night of July 13, 1916, the Italians succeeded
in carrying very strong Austrian positions south of Corno del
Coston and east of the Borcola Pass, notwithstanding the strong
resistance of the Austrians and the difficulty presented by the
roughness of the ground. During the night the Austrians
launched several violent but unsuccessful counterattacks in which
they lost heavily.
In spite of violent thunderstorms, seriously interfering with
artillery activity, fighting continued in this sector on July 14
and 15, 1916. Italian troops made some progress on the south-
ern slopes of Sogli Bianchi, south of Borcola and the Corno di
Coston and in the Boin Valley, where they occupied Vanzi on
the northern slopes of Monte Hellugio.
Austrian reenforcements arrived at this time, and as a result
a series of heavy attacks was delivered in the upper Posina
282 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
area in an attempt to stop the Italian advance between Monte
Santo and Monte Toraro. Italian counterattacks, however, were
launched promptly and enabled the Italian forces to maintain
and extend their lines. Throughout the balance of July, 1916,
the Italian troops succeeded in continuing their advance, al-
though the Austro-Hungarian resistance showed no noticeable
abatement and frequently was strong enough to permit not only
very effective defensive work, but rather considerable counter-
attacks. However, all in all, the Italians had decidedly the better
of it. Step by step they pushed their way back into the ter-
ritory from which the Austro-Hungarian offensive of a few
weeks ago had driven them.
On July 18, 1916, the Italians gained some new positions
on the rocky slopes of the Como del Coston in the upper
Posina Valley. Four days later, July 22, 1916, they captured
some trenches on Monte Zebio on the Sette Comuni Plateau.
The next day, July 23, 1916, between Cismon and Aviso they
completed the occupation of the upper Trevignolo and St. Pel-
legrino Valleys, taking the summit of Monte Stradone and new
positions on the slopes of Cima di Bocche.
On the Posina-Astico line at daybreak of July 24, 1916, after
a fierce attack by night, they captured Monte Cimone, for the
possession of which violent fighting had been in progress for
days.
Further north, Alpine troops renewed their efforts against the
steep rock barrier rising to more than 2,000 yards between the
peaks of Monte Chiesa and Monte Campigoletto. Under heavy
fire from the Austrian machine guns they crossed three Hnes of
wire and succeeded in establishing themselves just below the
crest.
Again and again the Austrians launched attacks against the
Italian positions on these various mountains without, however,
accomplishing more than retarding the further advance of Gen-
eral Cadorna's forces*-:
The second anniversary of the outbreak of the Great War,
August 1, 1916, found the Italians on the Trentino front still
strongly on the offensive and well on their way toward regaining
OPERATIONS ON AUSTRO-ITALIAN FRONT 283
all of the ground which they had lost in June and July, 1916,
before the Austro-Hungarian offensive had been brought to a
standstill, while the Austrians were yielding only under the force
of the greatest pressure which their opponents could bring to
bear on them.
CHAPTER XXXVII
MINOR OPERATIONS ON THE AUSTRO-ITALIAN
FRONT IN TRENTINp OFFENSIVE
JUST as soon as the Austro-Hungarian forces began to con-
centrate their activities in the latter part of May, 1916, on
their drive in the Trentino, military operations in the other sec-
tors of the Austro-Italian front lost in importance and strength.
During the greatest part of both the Austro-Hungarian drive
and the Italian counteroffensive in the Trentino — May to July,
1916 — operations along the rest of the Austro-Italian front — on
the northwestern frontier, of Tyrol, along the Boite River in the
northeastern Dolomites, in the Camic and Julian Alps, and on
the Isonzo front — were practically restricted to artillery duels.
Only occasional, and then but very local infantry engagements
took place, none of which had any particular influence on general
conditions in these various sectors. However, as the Italian
counteroffensive in the Trentino progressed, there developed
from time to time minor operations along the other parts of the
front. Quite a number of these were initiated by the Austro-
Hungarians, undoubtedly in the hopes that they might thereby
reduce the Italian pressure on their newly gained successes in
the Trentino. Others found their origin on the Italian side, which
at all times attempted to avail itself of every opportunity to ex-
tend and strengthen its positions anywhere along the front. And
as the Austrian resistance against the Italian counteroffensive
stiffened and showed no signs of abatement. General Cadoma,
in undertaking operations in other sectors of the front than the
Trentino, was undoubtedly influenced by motives similar to those
guiding his opponents. He, too, hoped to impress his adversary
284 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
sufficiently by minor operations in sectors unconnected with the
Trentino, to reduce their strength there.
Considerable light is thrown upon the organization of the Ital-
ian army, which made it possible to carry on successfully these
operations, in the following article from the pen of the special
correspondent of the London "Times'* :
"I have been allowed to visit the offices of the general staff at
army headquarters and those of the administrative services at
another point within the war zone. This is not a favorable mo-
ment for describing how the army machinery works; but there
is no harm done in saying that all these services appear to run
smoothly, have good men at their head, and produce good re-
sults.
"I was particularly struck by the maps turned out. They do
great credit to the Military Geographical Institute at Florence,
and to the officers at headquarters who revise the maps as new
information pours in. All the frontiers have been well surveyed
and mapped on scales of 1:25,000, 1:50,000, 1:100,000, and 1:-
200,000. These maps are very clear and good. I like best the 1 :-
100,000, which is issued to all officers, and on which operation
orders are based. The photographs are also very fine, and the
panoramas excellent, while the airmen's photographs, and the
plans compiled from them, are quite in the front rank.
"The service of information at headquarters also appears to
me to be good. There are more constant changes in all the Ital-
ian staffs than we should consider desirable, and officers pass
very rapidly from one employment to another, but in spite of
this practice the information is well kept up, and the knowledge
of the enemy's dispositions is up to standard, considering the
extraordinary difficulty of following the really quite chaotic
organization of the Austro-Hungarian forces.
"I am not sure that I like very much the liaison system in
Italy. The comparatively young officers intrusted with it report
direct to army headquarters, and on their reports the communi-
ques are usually based. These officers remind us of the missi
dominici of the great Moltke, but on the whole I confess that the
system does not appeal to me very much.
OPERATIONS ON AUSTRO-ITALIAN FRONT 285
"All the rearward services of the army are united under the
control of the intendant general, who is a big personage in Italy.
He deals with movements, quarterings, railways, supply, muni*
tions in transit, and, in fact, everything except drafts and avia-
tion, both of which services come under the general staff. There
is a representative of the intendant general in each army and
army corps. An order of movement is repeated to the intendant
general by telephone and he arranges for transport, food, and
munitions.
"The means of transport include the railways, motor lorries,
carts, pack mules, and porters. The railways have done well.
They had 5,000 locomotives and 160,000 carriages available when
war broke out, and on the two lines running through Venetia,
they managed during the period of concentration to clear 120
trains a day. Between last May 17 and June 22, 1916, for the
purposes of General Cadorna*s operations in the Trentino, the
railways carried 18,000 officers, 522,000 men, about 70,000 ani-
mals, and 16,000 vehicles, with nearly 900 guns. These figures
have been given by the Italian press, so there is no harm done by
alluding to them. The railway material is much better than I
expected it to be, but coal is very dear.
"The motor lorries work well. There are three types in use—
the heavy commercial cars, the middleweight lorries, which
carry over a couple of tons, and the lightweights, taking about
one and a half tons. These lorries form an army service. Each
army park has a group of lorries for each army corps forming
part of the army, and each group has two sections for each di-
vision. The motor cars of the commanders and staffs are good.
I traveled several thousand miles in them, and having covered
300 miles one day and 350 another, am prepared to give a good
mark to Italian motor-car manufacturers, and also to Italian
roads and Italian chauffeurs.
"I may also point out that the army has hitherto administered
the Austrian districts which have been occupied on various parts
of the front, and has had to deal with agriculture, roads, births,
deaths, marriages, police, and a great many other civil matters.
As I had once seen a French corps of cavalry farming nearly
286 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
5,000 acres of land I was prepared to see the Italian army capable
of following suit; but I fancy that if Signor Bissolati is to take
over all these civil duties General Porro will be far from dis-
pleased.
"There is the little matter of the 4,000 ladies who remain at
Cortina d'Ampezzo while their men are away fighting in the
Austrian ranks, and there are such questions as those of the
Aquileia treasures, which have fortunately been preserved in-
tact. I must confess that it is a novelty and a pleasure to enter
an enemy's territory and sit down in a room marked Militdr
Wachtzimmer, with all the enemy's emblems on the walls, but
on the whole I liked best the advice evitare di fumare esplosioni
painted by some Italian wag on an Austrian guardhouse, and
possibly intended as a hint to Austro-German diplomacy in the
future.
^'The Italians regard Austria as we regard Germany, and Ger-
many as we regard Austria. Austria is the enemy, but at the
same time, while every, crime is attributed to Austria on slight
suspicion, I find no unworthy depreciation of Austrian soldiers.
I am told that while Austrian discipline is very severe, and the
officer's revolver is ever quick to maintain it, the Austrian pri-
vate soldier has a sense of deep loyalty toward his emperor, and
that this is a personal devotion which will not easily be trans-
ferred to a successor. In meeting the Kaiserjager so often the
Italians perhaps see Austria's best, but the fact remains that the
Italian has a good word for the Austrian as a soldier, and that
I did not see many signs of such willful and shameless vandalism
by the Austrians as has disgraced the name of Germany in Bel-
gium and in France. Even towns which are or have been between
the contending armies have not, I think, been willfully destroyed,
but they have naturally suffered when one army or the other has
used the town as a pivot of defense.
"The officers who have to keep the tally of the Austrian
forces and to locate all the divisions have my deepest sympathy.
Long ago the Austrian army corps ceased to contain the old di-
visions of peace times, but one now finds army corps with as
many as four divisions, while the division may be composed of
OPERATIONS ON AUSTRO-ITALIAN FRONT 287
anything from two to eight battalions. A certain number of the
divisions reckoned to be against the Italians on the whole front
are composed of dubious elements, and there are some sixty Aus-
trian battalions of rifle clubmen.
"The Austrians shift regiments about in such apparently hap-
hazard fashion that it is hard to keep track of them. They may
take half a dozen battalions from different regiments and call it
a mountain group. In a week or two they will break it up and
distribute the battalions elsewhere. They usually follow up their
infantry with so-called march battalions, but whether these bat^
talions are 100 or 1,000 strong seems quite uncertain. Some
surprise occurs elsewhere, and away go some of the march bat-
talions. They may lose prisoners, say, on the Russian front, and
the Russians naturally believe that the regiment and the division
to which the regiment belongs are all on the Russian front,
whereas only one weak battalion of drafts may be there and all
the rest may still be against the Italians. The Austrians also
take a number of regiments from a division and send them
elsewhere, leaving a mere skeleton of the divisional command
behind.
"For these reasons one must regard with a good deal of scep-
ticism any estimate which professes to give an accurate distribu-
tion list of the Austrian army. Also it is difficult to believe that
any real esprit de corps can remain when such practices are
common, and we are reduced to the belief that the only real
soldier of the army is the personal devotion to the emperor of
which I have already written.
"I could not find time to study the Italian air service, but
foreign officers with the army speak well of it. The Austrian
airmen deserve praise. They watched us daily and bombed with
pleasing regularity.
"My view of the war on the Italian front is that Italy is in it
with her whole heart, and has both the will and the means to
exercise increasing pressure on Austria, whom she is subjecting
to a serious strain along 400 miles of difficult country. I think
that few people in England appreciate the special and serious
difficulties which confront both combatants along the Alpine
S— War St. 5
288 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
borderland, and especially Italy, because she has to attack. The
Italian army is strong in numbers, ably commanded, well pro-
vided, and animated by an excellent spirit. As this army be-
comes more inured to war, and traditions of victory on hard-
fought fields become established, the military value of the army
is enhanced.
"As I think over the Italian exploits during the war, I re-
member that the men of Alps, of Piedmont and Lombardy, of
Venetia, and Tuscany, of Rome, Naples, Sardinia, and Sicily
have one and all contributed something to the record, and have
had the honor of distinguished mention in General Cadoma's
bulletins, which are austere in character and make no conces-
sions to personal or collective ambitions. I find much to admire
in the cool and confident bearing of the people, in the endurance
of great fatigues by the troops, and in the silent patience of the
wounded on the battle field. I fancy that the army is better in the
attack than in the defense, and I should trust most with an Ital-
ian army to an attack pressed through to the end without
halting.''
The first indications of renewed activity, outside of artillery
duels, anywhere except in the Trentino, appeared during the last
days of June. On June 28, 1916, the Italians suddenly, after
a comparative quiet of several months, began what appeared to
be a strong offensive movement on the Isonzo front. They vio-
lently bombarded portions of the front on the Doberdo Pla-
teau (south of Goritz). In the evening heavy batteries were
brought to bear against Monte San Michele and the region of
San Martino. After the fire had been increased to great intensity
over the whole plateau, Italian infantry advanced to attack. At
Monte San Michele, near San Martino and east of Vermigliano,
violent fighting developed. At the Goritz bridgehead the Italians
attacked the southern portion of the Podgora position (on the
right bank of the Isonzo), and penetrated the first line trenches
of the Austrians, but were driven out.
The Italian offensive was continued the next day, June 29,
1916, and resulted in the capture of Hills 70 and 104 in the
Monfalcone district. The Austrians undertook a counteroffen-
OPERATIONS ON AUSTRO-ITALIAN FRONT 289
sive at Monte San Michele and Monte San Marino, on the Do-
berdo Plateau, attacking the Italian lines under cover of gas.
Fighting continued in the Monfalcone sector of the Isonzo front
for about a week, during which time the Austrians vainly en-
deavored to regain the positions which they had lost in the first
onrush of the Italian offensive. After that it again deteriorated
into artillery activity which was fairly constantly maintained
throughout the balance of July, 1916, without producing any
noteworthy changes in the general situation.
Coincident with this short Italian offensive in the Monfalcone
sector of the Isonzo front, there also developed considerable
fighting to the east on the Carso Plateau, north of Trieste, which,
however, was equally barren of definite results.
Minor engagements between comparatively small infantry de-
tachments occurred in the adjoining sector — ^that of the Julian
Alps — on July 1, 1916, especially in the valleys of the Fella, Gail
and Seebach. These were occasionally repeated, especially so on
July 19, 1916, but throughout most of the time only artillery
duels took place.
In the Camic Alps hardly anything of importance occurred
throughout the late spring and the entire summer of 1916, ex-
cepting fairly continuous artillery bombardments, varying in
strength and extent.
Considerable activity, however, was the rule rather than the
exception in the sector between the Camic Alps and the Dolo-
mites. There, one point especially, saw considerable fighting.
Monte Tofana, just beyond the frontier on the Austrian side,
had been held by the Italians for a considerable period, and
with it a small section of the surrounding country, less than five
miles in depth. The Italians at various times attempted, with
more or less success, to extend and strengthen their holdings,
while the Austrians, with equal determination, tried to wrest
from them what they had already gained, and to arrest their
further progress.
In this region Alpine detachments of the Italian army on the
night of July 8, 1916, gained possession of a great part of the
valley between Tofana Peaks Nos. 7 and 2, and of a strong
290 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
position on Tofana Prima commanding the valley. The Austrian
garrison was surrounded and compelled to surrender. The
Italians took 190 prisoners, including eight officers, and also
three machine guns, a large number of rifles and ammunition.
A few days later, on July 11, 1916, the Italians exploded a
mine, destroying the Austro-Hungarian defenses east of Col
dei Bois peak. This position commanded the road of the
Dolomites and the explosion blew it up entirely, and gave pos-
session of it to the Italians. The entire Austrian force which
occupied the summit was buried in the wreckage. On the
following night the Austrians attempted to regain this position
which the Italians had fortified strongly in the meantime, but
the attack broke down completely.
Three days later, July 14, 1916, Italian Alpine detachments
surprised and drove the Austrians from their trenches near
Castelletto and at the entrance of the Travenanzes Valley. They
took some prisoners, including two officers, as well as two
guns, two machine guns, one trench mortar and a large quan-
tity of arms and ammunition. An Austrian counterattack
against this position was launched on July 15, 1916, but was
repulsed.
Finally on July 30, 1916, the Italians registered one more
success in this region. Some of their Alpine troops carried
Porcella Wood and began an advance in the Travenanzes
Valley.
Throughout this period considerable artillery activity was
maintained on both sides. As a result Cortina d'Ampezzo, on
the Italian side, suffered a great deal from Austrian shells, while
Toblach, on the Austrian, was the equally unfortunate recipient
of Italian gunfire.
On the western frontier, between Italy and Austria, along
Val Camonica, only artillery bombardments were the order of
the day. These were particularly severe at various times
in the region of the Tonale Pass, but without important
results.
Aeroplanes, of course, were employed extenjsively, both by the
Austro-Hungarians and the Italians, although the nature of the
OPERATIONS ON AUSTRO-ITALIAN FRONT 291
country did not lend itself as much to this form of modem
warfare as in the other theaters of war. Some of these enter-
prises have already been mentioned. The Austrians, in this
respect, were at a decided advantage, because their airships
had many objects for attacks in the various cities of the North
Italian plain. Among these Bergamo, Brescia, and Padua were
the most frequent sufferers, while Italian aeroplanes frequently
bombarded Austrian lines of communication and depots.
PART VI— RUSSO-TURKISH CAMPAIGN
CHAPTER XXXVIII
RUSSIAN SUCCESSES AFTER ERZERUM
WITH the same surprising vigor with which the Russian
armies in the Caucasus had pushed their advance toward
Erzerum, they took up the pursuit of the retreating Turkish
army, after this important Armenian stronghold had capitulated
on February 16, 1916. With Erzerum as a center the Russian
advance spread out rapidly in all directions toward the west in
the general direction of Erzingan and Sivas ; in the south toward
Mush, Bitlis and the region around Lake Van, and in the north
with the important Black Sea port of Trebizond as the objective.
This meant a front of almost 300 miles without a single railroad
and only a limited number of roads that really deserved that
appellation. Almost all of this country is very mountainous.
To push an advance in such country at the most favorable season
of the year involves the solution of the most complicated military
problems. The country itself offers comparatively few oppor-
tunities for keeping even a moderate-sized army sufficiently
supplied with food and water for men and beasts. But consid-
ering that the Russian advance was undertaken during the
winter, when extremely low temperatures prevail, and when
vast quantities of snow add to all the other natural difficulties
in the way of an advancing army, the Russian successes were
little short of marvelous.
As early as February 23, 1916, the right wing of the Russian
army had reached and occupied the town of Ispir on the river
Chorok, about fifty miles northwest of Erzerum, and halfway
292
RUSSIAN SUCCESSES AFTER ERZERUM 293
between that city and Rizeh, a town on the south shore of the
Black Sea, less than fifty miles east of Trebizond. At the same
time Russian destroyers were bombarding the Black Sea coast
towns. Under their protective fire fresh troops were landed
a few days later at Atina on the Black Sea, about sixty miles
east of Trebizond, which promptly occupied that town. From
there they rapidly advanced southward toward Rizeh, forcing
the Turks to evacuate their positions and capturing some prison-
ers as well as a few guns, together with rifles and ammunition.
The center, in the meantime, had advanced on the Erzerum-
Trebizond road, and by February 25, 1916, occupied the town
of Ashkala, about thirty miles from Erzerum. From all sides
the Russian armies were closing in on Trebizond, and their
rapid success threw the Turkish forces into consternation, for
the loss of Trebizond would mean a serious threat to their
further safety, having been up to then the principal point
through which supplies and ammunition reached them steadily
and rapidly by way of the Black Sea. No wonder then that the
London "Times" correspondent in Petrograd was able to report
on March 5, 1916, that all accounts agreed that the population
of the Trebizond region were panic-stricken and fleeing even
then in the direction of Kara-Hissar and Sivas, flight along the
Black Sea route being out of question on account of the presence
of Russian warships.
In the south the left wing of the Russian army was equally
successful. On March 1, 1916, it occupied Mamawk, less than
ten miles north of Bitlis, a success foreshadowing the fall of that
important Armenian city. And, indeed, on the next day, March
2, 1916, Bitlis was occupied by the Russians. This was indeed
another severe blow to the Turkish armies. Bitlis, 110 miles
south of Erzerum, in Armenian Tamos, is one of the most im-
portant trade centers, and commands a number of important
roads. It is only about fifty miles north of the upper Tigris,
and even though it is more than 350 miles from Bagdad, its
Occupation by Russian forces seriously menaced the road to
Bagdad, Bagdad itself, and even the rear of the Turkish army,
fighting against the Anglo-Indian army in Mesopotamia.
294 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
Hardly had the Turks recovered from this blow when their
left wing in the north suffered another serious reverse through
the loss of the Black Sea port of Rizeh. This event took place
on March 8, 1916, and the capture was accomplished by the
fresh Russian troops that had been landed a few days before
at Atina, from which Rizeh is only twenty-two miles distant.
Along the Black Sea coast the Russians were now within thirty-
eight miles of Trebizond. On and on the Russians pressed, and
by March 17, 1916, their advance guard was reported within
twenty miles of Trebizond. However, by this time Turkish
resistance along the entire Armenian front stiffened perceptibly.
This undoubtedly was due to reenforcements which must have
reached the Turkish line by that time. For on March 30, 1916,
the official Russian statement announced that seventy officers
and 400 men who had been captured along the Caucasus littoral
front belonged to a Turkish regiment which had previously
fought at Gallipoli. At the same time it was also announced
that fighting had occurred northwest of Mush. The Turkish
forces involved in this fighting must have been recent reenforce-
ments, because Mush is sixty-five miles northwest of Bitlis, the
occupation of which took place about four w^eeks previously, at
which time the region between Erzerum and Bitlis undoubtedly
had been cleared of Turkish soldiers. Their reappearance, now
so close to the road between Bitlis and Erzerum, presented a
serious menace both to the center and to the left wing of Grand
Duke Nicholas's forces, for if the Turkish troops were in large
enough force, the Russians were in danger of having their center
and left wing separated. This condition, of course, meant that
until this danger was removed, the closest cooperation between
the various parts of the Russian army became essential, and
therefore resulted in a general slowing down of the Russian
advance for the time being.
In the meantime the Russian center continued its advance
against Erzingan. This is an Armenian town of considerable
military importance, being the headquarters of the Fourth
Turkish Army Corps. On March 16, 1916, an engagement took
place about sixty miles west of Erzerum, resulting in the occu-
RUSSIAN SUCCESSES AFTER ERZERUM 295
I ation by the Russians of the town of Mama Khatun, located on
the western Euphrates and on the Erzerum-Erzingan-Sivas
road. According" to the official Russian statement the Turks
lost five cannon, some machine guns and supplies and forty-four
officers and 770 men by capture. Here, too, however, the Turks
began to offer a more determined resistance, and although the
official Russian statement of the next day, March 17, 1916,
reported a continuation of the Russian advance towards Erzin-
gan, it also mentioned Turkish attempts at making a stand and
spoke even of attempted counterattacks.
This stiffening of Turkish resistance necessitated apparently
a change in the Russian plans. No longer do we hear now of
quick, straight, advances from point to point. But the various
objectives toward which the Russians were directing their
attacks — Trebizond, Erzingan, the Tigris — are attacked either
successfully or consecutively from all possible directions and
points of vantage. Not until now, for instance, do we hear of
further advances toward Erzingan from the north. It will be
recalled that as long ago as February 23, 1916, the Russians
occupied the town of Ispir, some fifty miles northwest of
Erzerum on the river Chorok.
The headwaters of this river are located less than twenty-
five miles northeast of Erzingan, and up its valley a new Russian
offensive against Erzingan was started as soon as the new
strength of the Turkish defensive along the direct route from
Erzerum made itself felt.
On April 1, 1916, and again on April 12, 1916, the Turks
reported that they had repulsed attacks of Russian scouting
parties advancing along the upper Chorok, and even claimed
an advance for their own troops. But on the next day, April
3, 1916, the Russians apparently were able to turn the tables
on their opponents, claiming to have crossed the upper basin of
the Chorok and to have seized strongly fortified Turkish posi-
tions located at a height of 10,000 feet above sea level, capturing
thereby a company of Turks. Again on the following day,
April 4, 1916, the Russians succeeded in dislodging Turkish
forces from powerful mountain positions.
296 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
Concurrent with these engagements, fighting took place both
in the south and north. On April 2, 1916, a Turkish camp was
stormed by Russian battalions near Mush to the northwest of
Bitlis. Still farther south, about twenty-five miles southeast of
Bitlis, the small town of Khizan had fallen into the hands of the
Russians, who drove its defenders toward the south. The Rus-
«ian advance to the southwest of Mush and Bitlis continued
slowly but definitely throughout the next few days, with the
town of Diarbekr on the right bank of the upper Tigris as its
objective.
Beginning with the end of March, 1916, the Turks also
launched a series of strong counterattacks along the coastal
front. The first of these was undertaken during the night of
March 26, 1916, but apparently was unsuccessful. It was an
answer to a strong attack on the part of the Russians during
the preceding day which resulted in the dislodgment of Turkish
troops holding strong positions in the region of the Baltatchi
Darassi River and in the occupation by the Russians of the
town of Off on the Black Sea, thirty miles to the east of Trebi-
zond. This success was due chiefly to the superiority of the
Russian naval forces, which made it possible to precede their
infantry attack with heavy preparatory artillery fire. By March
27, 1916, the Russians had advanced to the Oghene Dere River,
another of the numerous small rivers flowing into the Black Sea
between Rizeh and Trebizond. There they had occupied the
heights of the left (west) bank. During the night the Turks
made a series of strong counterattacks, all of which, however,
were repulsed with considerable losses to the attackers. Another
Turkish counterattack in the neighborhood of Trebizond was
launched on April 4, 1916. Although strongly supported by
gunfire from the cruiser Breslau, it was repulsed by the com-
bined efforts of the Russian land forces and destroyers lying
before Trebizond. During the next few days the Turks offered
the most determined resistance to the Russian advance against
Trebizond, especially along the river Kara Dere. This resist-
ance was not broken until April 15, 1916, when the Turks were
driven out of their fortified positions on tha le^t bank of that
RUSSIAN SUCCESSES AFTER ERZERUM 297
river by the combined action of the Russian land and naval
forces. The Russian army was now, after almost a fortnight's
desperate fighting, within sixteen miles of its goal, Trebizond.
On April 16, 1916, it again advanced, occupying Surmench on
the Black Sea, and reaching later that day, after a successful
pursuit of the retreating Turkish army, the village of Asseue
Kalessi, only twelve miles east of Trebizond.
With this defeat the fall of Trebizond apparently was sealed.
Although reports came from various sources that the Turkish
General Staff was making the most desperate efforts to save the
city by dispatching new reenforcements from central Anatolia,
the Russian advance could not be stopped seriously any longer.
Every day brought reports of new Russian successes along the
entire Armenian front. On April 17, 1916, they occupied Drona,
only six and a half miles east of Trebizond. Then finally, on April
18, 1916, came the announcement that Trebizond itself had been
taken.
Trebizond is less important as a fortified place than as a port
and harbor and as a source of supply for the Turkish army. It
is in no sense a fortress like Erzerum, though the defenses of the
town, recently constructed, are not to be despised. As a vital
artery of communications, however, its value is apparent from
the fact, first, that it is the Turks' chief port in this region, and
secondly, that railway facilities, which are so inadequate
throughout Asia Minor, are nonexistent along the northern
coast. Hence the Turks will have to rely for the transport of
troops and supplies upon railways which at the nearest point are
more than 300 miles from the front at Trebizond.
Trebizond is an ancient seaport of great commercial impor-
tance, due chiefly to the fact that it controls the point where the
principal trade route from Persia and central Asia to Europe,
over Armenia and by way of Bayezid and Erzerum, descends to
the sea. It has been the dream of Russia for centuries to put her
hands forever upon this important "window on the Black Sea."
Trebizond's population is about 40,000, of whom 22,000 are
Moslems and 18,000 Christians. The city first figured in history
during the Fourth Crusade, when Alexius Comneaus, with an
298 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
army of Iberian mercenaries, entered it and established himself
as sovereign. In, 1461 Trebizond was taken by Mohammed II,
after it had for two centuries been the capital of an empire,
having defied all attacks, principally by virtue of its isolated
position, between a barrier of rugged mountains of from 7,000
to 8,000 feet and the sea.
As far as capturing important ports of the Turkish left wing
was concerned, the victory of Trebizond was an empty one. For
the Turks evacuated the town apparently a day or two before the
Russians occupied it. The latter, therefore, had only the capture
of "some 6-inch guns" to report. This quick evacuation, at any
rate, was fortunate for the town and its inhabitants, for it saved
them from a bombardment and the town did not suffer at all as
a result of the military operations.
The campaign resulting in the fall of Trebizond did really not
begin until after the fall of Erzerum on February 16, 1916. Up
to that time the Russian Caucasian army had apparently been
satisfied to maintain strong defensive positions along the Turk-
ish border. But since the occupation of Erzerum a definite plan
of a well-developed offensive was followed looking toward the
acquisition of Turkish territory which had long been coveted by
Russia.
With the fall of Trebizond Russia became the possessor,
at least temporarily, of a strip of territory approximately 125
miles wide along a front of almost 250 miles length, or of an
area of 31,250 square miles. In the north this valuable acquisi-
tion was bounded by that part of the south shore of the Black
oea that stretches from Batum in Russian Transcaucasia to
Trebizond. In the south it practically reached the Turko-Persian
frontier, while in the west it almost reached the rough line
formed by the upper Euphrates and the upper Tigris. It thus
comprised the larger part of Armenia. As soon as the Russians
had found out that the Turks had a start of almost two days,
they began an energetic pursuit. The very first day of it, April
19, 1916, brought them into contact with Turkish rear guards
and resulted in the capture of a considerable number of them.
The retreat of the Turks took a southwesterly direction toward
RUSSIAN SUCCESSES AFTER ERZERUM 299
Baiburt along the Trebizond-Erzerum road and toward Erzin-
gan, to which a road branches off the Trebizond-Erzerum road.
Baiburt was held by the Turks with a force strong enough to
make it impossible for the Russians to cut off the Trebizond
garrison. Along the coast the Russians found only compara-
tively weak resistance, so that they were able to land fresh forces
west of Trebizond and occupy the town of Peatana, about ten
miles to the west on the Black Sea.
A desperate struggle, however, developed for the possession ^
of the Trebizond-Erzerum road. The Russians had been astride
this road for some time as far as Madan Khan and Kop, both
about fifty miles northwest of Erzerum and just this side of
Baiburt. There the Turks put up a determined resistance and
succeeded in holding up the Russian advance. Although they
were not equally successful farther north, the Russians man-
aged to advance along this road to the south of Trebizond only
as far as Jeyizlik — about sixteen miles south of Trebizond —
where they were forced into the mountains toward the Kara
Dere River. This left still the larger part of the entire road in
possession of the Turks, and especially that part from which an-
other road branched off to Erzingan.
In the Mush and Bitlis region the Russians had made satis-
factory progress in the meantime. On April 19, 1916, progress
was reported to the south of Bitlis toward Sert, although the
Turks fought hard to hold up this advance toward Diarbekr.
This advance was the direct result of the defeat which the Rus-
sians had inflicted on a Turkish division at Bitlis as early as
April 15, 1916. By April 23, 1916, the Turks had again gathered
some strength and were able to report that they had repulsed
Russian attacks south of Bitlis, west of Mush, east of Baiburt,
and south of Trebizond. From then on, however, the Russians
again advanced to the south of Bitlis as well as in the direction
of Erzingan. By the beginning of May, 1916, the Russian official
statements do not speak any longer of the "region south of
Bitlis," but mention instead "the front toward Diarbekr." This
important town is about 100 miles southwest of Bitlis, and ap-
parently had become, after the fall of Trebizond, together with
300 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
Erzingan, one of the immediate objectives of the Russian cam-
paign.
Diarbekr is a town of 35,000 inhabitants, whose importance
arises from its being the meeting point of the roads from the
Mediterranean via Aleppo and Damascus from the Black Sea
via Amasia-IGiarput, and Erzerum and from the Persian Gulf
via Bagdad. Ras-el-Ain, the present railhead of the Bagdad
railway, is seventy miles south.
The stiffening of the Turkish defensive was being maintained
as April, 1916, waned and May approached. The Russian cam-
paign in the Caucasus had resolved itself now into three distinc-
tive parts : In the north its chief objective, Trebizond, had been
reached and gained. There further progress, of course, would
be attempted along the shore of the Black Sea, and in a way it
was easier to achieve progress here than at any other part of the
Caucasian front. For first of all the nature of the ground along
the coast of the Black Sea was much less difficult, and then, too,
the Russian naval forces could supply valuable assistance. That
progress was not made faster here hy the Russians was due en-
tirely to the fact that the advance along the two other sectors
was more difficult and the Turkish resistance more desperate.
And, of course, if the front of any one sector was pushed con-
siderably ahead of the front of the other two, grave danger im-
mediately arose that the most advanced sector would be cut off
from the rest of the Russian armies by flank movements. For
in a country such as Turkish Armenia, without railroads and
with only a few roads, it was of course impossible to establish a
continuous front line, such as was to be formed on the European
battle fields both in the east and west. This explains why by May
1, 1916, the Russian front had been pushed less than twenty-
five miles west of Trebizond, even though almost two weeks had
elapsed since the fall of Trebizond.
In the center sector the immediate objective of the Russians
was Erzingan. Beyond that they undoubtedly hoped to advance
to Swas, an important Turkish base. Toward this objective two
distinct lines of offensive had developed by now — one along the
valley of the river Oborok and the other along the Erzerum-
RUSSIAN SUCCESSES AFTER ERZERUM 301
Erzingan road and the valley of the western Euphrates. The
latter was somewhat more successful than the former, chiefly be-
cause it did not offer so many natural means of defense. But to
both of these offensives the Turks now offered a most determined
resistance, and the Russians, though making progress continu-
ously, did so only very slowly.
In the southern sector conditions were very similar. Here,
too, two separate offensives had developed, although they were
more closely correlated than in the center. One was directed in
a southwestern direction from Mush, and the other in the same
direction from Bitlis. Both had as their objective Diarbekr, an
important trading center on the Tigris and a future station on
tlie unfinished part of the Bagdad railroad. Here, too, Russian
progress was fairly continuous but very slow.
Some interesting details regarding the tremendous difficulties
which nature put in the way of any advancing army, and which
were utilized by the Turks to their fullest possibility, may be
gleaned from the following extracts from letters written by
Russian officers serving at the Caucasian front :
"We have traveled sixty miles in two days, and never have we
been out of sight of the place from whence we started. South
and north we have scouted until we have come into touch with
the cavalry of the Corps of the vedettes which the Cos-
sacks of the Don furnished for the Brigade. Sometimes
it is wholly impossible to ride. The slopes of these hills are cov-
ered with huge bowlders, behind any of which half a company of
the enemy might be lurking. That has been our experience, and
poor K was shot dead while leading his squadron across
a quite innocent-looking plateau from which we thought the
enemy had been driven.
"As it turned out, a long line of bowlders, which he thought
were too small to hide anything but a sniper, in reality marked
a rough trench line which a Kurdish regiment was holding in
strength, K was shot down, as also was his lieutenant,
and half the squadron were left on the ground. Fortunately, at
the foot of the road leading down to the plateau, the sergeant
who led the men out of action found one of our Caucasian regi-
802 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
ments who are used to dealing with the fezzes, and they came
up at the double, and after two hours' fighting were reenforced
by another two companies and carried the trench.
"Farther back we found the enemy in a stronger plateau. Al-
most within sight of the enemy we made tea and rested beforo
attempting to push forward to the fight.
"An officer of the staff who does not understand the Caucasian
way reproved the colonel for delaying, but he took a very philo-
sophical view, and pointed out that it was extremely doubtful
whether he even now had men enough to carry the enormous
position, and that he certainly could not do so with exhausted
troops. So we had the extraordinary spectacle of our men lying
down flat, blowing their fires and drinking their tea and laugh-
ing and joking as though they were at a picnic, but when they
had finished and had formed up they made short work of the
fellows in the trench. But think of what would have happened
if we had left this plateau unsearched!"
"On the Baiburt road," writes another Russian officer, "there
was one small pass which had been roughly reconnoitered, and
through this we were moving some of the heavy guns, not imag-
ining that there were any Turks within ten miles, when a heavy
fire was opened from a fir wood a thousand feet above us. The
limbers of the guns were a long way in the rear, and there was
no way of shelling this enemy from his aerie. There was nothing
to do .but for the battalion which was acting as escort to the guns
to move up the slope under a terrific machine-gun and rifle fire
and investigate the strength of the attack. The guns were left
on the road, and mules and horses were taken to whatever cover
could be found, and an urgent message was sent back to the ef-
fect that the convoy was held up, but the majority of the infantry
had already passed the danger point. Two mountain batteries
were commandeered, however, and these came into action, firing
incendiary shells into the wood, which was soon blazing at sev-
eral points.
"The battle which then began between the Turks who had been
ejected from the wood and the gun escort lasted for the greater
part of the afternoon. It was not until sunset that two of our
RUSSIAN SUCCESSES AFTER ERZERUM 303
batteries, which had been brought back from the front for the
purpose, opened fire upon the Turks' position, and the ambushers
were compelled to capitulate. The progress on the left was even
more difficult than that which we experienced in the northern
sector. •The roads were indescribable. Where they mounted and
crossed the intervening ridges they were almost impassable,
whilst in the valleys the gun carriages sank up to their axles in
liquid mud."
From still another source we hear :
''In the Van sector a Russian brigade was held up by a forest
fire, started by the Turks, which made all progress impossible.
For days a brigade had to sit idle until the fire had burned itself
out, and even when they moved forward it was necessary to
cover all the munition wagons with wet blankets, and the ashes
through which the stolid Russians marched were so hot as to
bu/n away the soles of their boots.
"A curious discovery which was made in this extraordinary
march was the remains of a Turkish company which had evi-
dently been caught in the fire they had started and had been
unable to escape."
On May 1, 1916, Russian Cossacks were able to drive back
Turkish troops, making a stand somewhere west of Erzerum and
east of Erzingan. Other detachments of the same service of the
Russian army were equally successful on May 2, 1916, in driving
back toward Diarbekr resisting Turkish forces west of Mush and
Bitlis, and a similar achievement was officially reported on May
3, 1916. On the same date Russian regiments made a successful
night attack in the upper Chorok basin which netted some im-
portant Turkish positions, which were immediately strongly
fortified. May 4, 1916, brought a counterattack on the part of
Turkish forces in the Chorok sector at the town of Baiburt,
which, however, was repulsed. On the same day the Russians
stormed Turkish trenches along the Erzerum-Erzingan road,
during which engagement most savage bayonet fighting devel-
oped, ending in success for the Russian armies. Turkish attacks
west of Bitlis were likewise repulsed. On May 5, 1916, the Turks
attempted to regain the t'^enches in the Erzingan sector lost the
T— War St. 5
304 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
day before, but although their attack was supported by artillery,
it was not successful.
The Russian official statement of May 7, 1916, gives some data
concerning the booty which the Russians captured at Trebizond.
It consisted of eight mounted coast defense guns, fourteen 6-inch
guns, one field gun, more than 100 rifles, fifty-three ammunition
wagons, supply trains and other war material. This, taken in
connection with the fact that practically the entire Turkish
garrison escaped, confirms the view expressed previously that
the capture of Trebizond was of great importance to the Rus-
sians, not so much on account of what they themselves gained
thereby, but on account of what the Turks lost by being deprived
of their principal harbor on the Black Sea, comparatively close
to the Caucasian theater of war.
The Turkish artillery attack of May 5, 1916, in the Erzingan
sector was duplicated on May 7, 1916, but this time the Russians
used their guns, and apparently with telling effect. For so dev-
astating was the Russian fire directed toward the newly estab-
lished Turkish trenches that the Turks had to evacuate their en-
tire first line and retire to their second line of defensive works.
Throughout the entire day on May 8, 1916, the Turks doggedly
attacked the Russian positions. Losses on both sides were heavy,
especially so on the Turkish side, which hurled attack after at-
tack against the Russian positions, not desisting until nightfall.
Though no positive gain was made thereby, the Russians at least
were prevented from further advances. The same day. May 8,
1916, yielded another success for the Russians in the southern
sector, south of Mush. There, between that town and Bitlis,
stretches one of the numerous mountain ranges, with which this
region abounds. On it the Turks held naturally strong positions
which had been still more strengthened by means of artificial
defense works. A concentrated Russian attack, prepared and
supported by artillery fire, drove the Turks not only from these
positions, but out of the mountain range.
On May 9, 1916, engagements took place along the entire front.
In the center fighting occurred near Mount Koph, in the Chorok
basin southeast of Baiburt, and the Turks made some 300 pris-
RUSSIAN SUCCESSES AFTER ERZERUM 305
oners. Farther south a Turkish attack near Mama Khatun was
stopped by Russian fire. In the south another Turkish attack
in the neighborhood of Kirvaz, about twenty-five miles northwest
of Mush, forced back a Russian detachment after capturing some
fifty men. All this time the Russians were industriously build-
ing fortifications along the Black Sea coast both east and west
of Trebizond. During the night of May 9, 1916, the Turks made
a successful surprise attack against a Russian camp near
Baschkjoej, about thirty-five miles southeast of Mama Khatun.
There a Russian detachment consisting of about 500 men, of
which one-half was cavalry and one-half infantry, found them-
selves suddenly surrounded by the bayonets of a superior Turk-
ish force. All, except a small number who managed to escape,
were cut to pieces.
As the Russians succeeded in pushing their advance westward,
even if only very slowly, they became again somewhat more ac-
tive in the north along the Black Sea. On May 10, 1916, they
were reported advancing both south and southwest of Platana,
a small seaport about twelve miles west of Trebizond. Through-
out May 11, 1916, engagements of lesser importance took place
at various parts of the entire front. During that night the Turks
launched another strong night attack in the Erzingan sector,
without, however, being able to register any marked success. The
same was true of an attack made May 12, 1916, near Mama
Khatun. In the south, between Mush and Bitlis, an engagement
which was begun on May 10, 1916, concluded with the loss of
one Turkish gun, 2,000 rifles and considerable stores of ammu-
nition. In the Chorok sector the Turks succeeded on May 13,
1916, in driving the Russian troops out of their positions on
Mount Koph and in forcing them back in an easterly direction
for a distance of from four to five miles. There, however, the
Russians succeeded in making a stand, though their attempt to
regain their positions failed. May 14, 1916, was comparatively
uneventful. Some Russian reconnoitering parties clashed with
Turkish advance guards near Mama Khatun, and a small force
of Kurds was repulsed west of Bitlis. On May 16, 1916, the Rus-
sians announced officially that they had occupied Mama Khatun,
306 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
a small town on the western Euphrates, about fifty miles west
of Erzerum and approximately the same distance from Erzingan.
Throughout the balance of May, 1916, fighting along the Cau-
casian front was restricted ahnost entirely to clashes between
outposts, which in some instances brought slight local successes
to the Russian arms, and at other times yielded equally unimpor-
tant gains for the Turkish sides. To a certain extent this slowing
down undoubtedly was due to the determined resistance on the
part of the Turks. It is also quite likely that part of the Rus-
sian forces in the north had been diverted earlier in the month
to the south in order to assist in the drive against Bagdad and
Moone, which was pushed with increased vigor just previous to
and right after the capitulation of the Anglo-Indian forces at
Kut-el-Amara in Mesopotamia.
PART VII— CAMPAIGN IN MESOPOTAMIA
AND PERSIA
CHAPTER XXXIX
RENEWED ATTEMPT TO RELIEVE
KUT-EL-AMARA
AS far as the Turko-English struggle in the Tigris Valley is
concerned, the preceding volume carried us to the beginning
of March, 1916. On March 8, 1916, an official English com-
munique was published which raised high hopes among the Allied
nations that the day of delivery for General Townshend's force
was rapidly approaching. That day was the ninety-first day of
the memorable siege of Kut-el-Amara. On it the English relief
force under General Aylmer had reached the second Turkish line
at Es-Sinn, only eight miles from Kut-el-Amara. After an all
night march the English forces, approaching in three columns
against the Dujailar Redoubt, attacked immediately after day-
break. Both flanks of the Turkish line were subjected to heavy
artillery fire. But, although this resulted quickly in a wild stam-
pede of horses, camels and other transport animals and also
inflicted heavy losses in the ranks of the Turkish reenf orcements,
which immediately came up in close order across the open ground
in back of the Turkish position, the English troops could not
make any decisive impression on the strongly fortified position.
Throughout the entire day, March 8, 1916, the attacks were kept
up, but the superior Turkish forces and the strong fortifications
that had been thrown up would not yield. Lack of water — all
of which had to be brought up from the main camp — made it
impossible for the English troops to maintain these attacks be-
S07
308 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
yond the end of that day. In spite of the fact that they could
see the flash of the guns of their besieged compatriots who were
attacking the rear of the Turkish hne from Kut, they were forced
to give up their attempt to raise the siege. During the night
of March 8, 1916, they returned to the main camp, which was
located about twenty-three miles from Kut-el-Amara.
The unusual conditions and the immense difficulties which con-
fronted the English relief force may be more easily understood
from the following very graphic description of this undertaking
rendered by the official representative of the British press with
the Tigris Corps :
''The assembly was at the Pools of Siloam, a spot where we
used to water our horses, two miles southwest of Thorny Nullah.
We left camp at seven, just as it was getting dark. We had gone
a mile when we saw the lamps of the assembly posts — thousands
of men were to meet here from different points, horse, foot, and
guns. They would proceed in three columns to a point south of
west, where they would bifurcate and take a new direction. Col-
umns A and B making for the depression south of the Dujailar
Redoubt, Column C for a point facing the Turkish lines between
the Dujailar and Sinn Aftar Redoubts. There was never such
a night march. Somebody quoted Tel-el-Kebir as a precedent,
but the difficulties here were doubled. The assembly and guid-
ance of so large a force over ground untrodden by us previously,
and featureless save for a nullah and some scattered sand hills,
demanded something like genius in discipline and organization.
"I was with the sapper who guided the column. Our odd
little party reported themselves to the staff officer under the
red lamp of Column A. 'Who are you T he asked, and it tickled
my vanity to think that we, the scouts, were for a moment the
most vital organ of the whole machine. If anything miscarried
with us, it would mean confusion, perhaps disaster. For in
making a flank march round the enemy's position we were dis-
regarding, with justifiable confidence, the first axiom of war.
"We were an odd group. There was the sapper guide. He
had his steps to count and his compass to look to when his
eye was not on a bearing of the stars. And there was the guard
RENEWED ATTEMPT AT KUT-EL-AMARA 309
of the guide to protect him from the — suggestions of doubts
as to the correctness of his line. Everything must depend on
one head, and any interruption might throw him off his course.
As we were starting I heard a digression under the lamp.
" 'I make it half past five from Sirius.*
" *I make it two fingers left of that.*
" 'Oh, you are going by the corps map.'
" *Two hundred and six degrees true.'
" *I was going by magnetic bearing.'
"Ominous warning of what might happen if too many guides
directed the march.
"Then there was the man with the bicycle. We had no cyclom-
eter, but two men checked the revolution of the wheel. And
there were other counters of steps, of whom I was one, for count-
ing and comparison. From these an aggregate distance was
struck. But it was not until we were well on the march that
I noticed the man with the pace stick, who staggered and reeled
like an inebriated crab in his efforts to extricate his biped from
the unevennesses of the ground before he was trampled down
by the column. I watched him with a curious fascination, and
as I grew sleepier and sleepier that part of my consciousness
which was not counting steps, recognized him as a cripple who
had come out to Mesopotamia in this special role 'to do his bit.'
His humped back, protruding under his mackintosh as he labored
forward, bent into a hoop, must have suggested the idea which
was accepted as fact until I pulled myself together at the next
halt and heard the mechanical and unimaginative half of me
repeat Tour thousand, seven hundred, and twenty-one.' The
man raised himself into erectness with a groan, and a crippled
greengrocer whom I had known in my youth, to me the basic
type of hunchback — became an upstanding British private.
"Walking thus in the dark with the wind in one's face at a
kind of funeral goose step it is very easy to fall asleep. The
odds were that we should blunder into some Turkish picket or
patrol. Looking back it was hard to realize that the inky masses
behind, like a column of following smoke, was an army on the
march. The stillness was so profound one heard nothing save
310 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
the howl of the jackal, the cry of fighting geese, and the un-
greased wheel of an ammunition limber, or the click of a picket-
ing peg against a stirrup.
"The instinct to smoke was almost irresistible. A dozen times
one's hands felt for one*s pipe, but not a match was struck in all
that army of thousands of men. Sometimes one feels that one is
moving in a circle. One could swear to lights on the horizon,
gesticulating figures on a bank.
"Suddenly we came upon Turkish trenches. They were
empty, an abandoned outpost. The column halted, made a cir-
cuit. I felt that we were involved in an inextricable coil, a knot
that could not be unraveled till dawn. We were passing each
other, going different ways, and nobody knew who was who.
But we swung into direct line without a hitch. It was a miracle
of discipline and leadership.
"At the next long halt, the point of bifurcation, the counter of
steps was relieved. An hour after the sapper spoke. The
strain was ended. We had struck the sand hills of tlie Dujailar
depression. Then we saw the flash of Townshend's guns at
Kut, a comforting assurance of the directness of our line. That
the surprise of the Turk was complete was shown by the fires
in the Arab encampments, between which we passed silently in
the false dawn. A mile or two to our north and west the camp-
fires of the Turks were already glowing.
"Flank guards were sent out. They passed among the Arab
tents without a shot being fired. Soon the growing light dis-
closed our formidable numbers. Ahead of us there was a camp
in the nullah itself. An old man just in the act of gathering
fuel walked straight into us. He threw himself on his knees
at my feet and lifted his hands with a biblical gesture of suppli-
cation crying out, *Ar-rab, Ar-rab,' an effective, though probably
unmerited, shibboleth. As he knelt his women at the other end of
the camp were driving off the village flock. Here I remem-
bered that I was alone with the guide of a column in an event
which ought to have been as historic as the relief of Khartum."
After this unsuccessful attempt at relief comparative quiet
reigned for about a week, interrupted only by occasional encoun-
RENEWED ATTEMPT AT KUT-EL-AMARA 311
ters between small detachments. On March 11, 1916, English
outposts had advanced again about seven miles toward Kut-el-
Amara to the neighborhood of Abn Roman, among the sand
hills on the right bank of the Tigris. There they surprised at
dawn a small Turkish force and made some fifty prisoners, in-
cluding two officers. Throughout the next two or three days
intermittent gunfire and sniping were the only signs of the con-
tinuation of the struggle. On March 15, 1916, two Turkish
guns were put out of action and during that night the Turks
evacuated the sand hills on the right bank of the river, which
were promptly occupied by English troops in the early morning
hours of March 16, 1916.
During the balance of March, 1916, conditions remained prac-
tically unchanged. The siege of General Townshend's force was
continued by the Turks along the same lines to which they had
adhered from its beginning — a process of starving their oppon-
ents gradually into surrender. No attempt was made by them to
force the issue, except that on March 23, 1916, the English gen-
eral reported that his camp at Kut-el-Amara had been subjected
to intermittent bombardment by Turkish airships and guns
during March 21, 22, and 23, 1916. No serious damage, how-
ever, was inflicted.
As spring advanced the difficulties of the English forces at-
tempting the relief of General Townshend increased, for with
the coming of spring, there also came about the middle of
March — the season of floods. Up in the Armenian highlands,
whence the Tigris springs, vast quantities of snow then begin to
melt. Throughout March, April, and May, 1916, a greatly in-
creased volume of water finds the regular shallow bed of the
Tigris woefully insufficient for its needs. The entire lack of
jetties and artificial embankments results in the submersion of
vast stretches of land adjacent to the river. Military opera-
tions along its banks then become quite impossible, although in
many places this impossibility exists throughout the entire year,
because the land on both sides of the river for miles and miles
has been permitted to deteriorate into bottomless swamps,
through which even the ingenuity of highly trained engineering
812 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
troops finds it impossible to construct a roadway within the
available space of time.
These natural difficulties were still more increased by the fact
that the equipment of the relief force was not all that might
have been expected. This is well illustrated by the following
letter from a South African officer, published in ttie "Cape
Times :"
"The river Tigris plays the deuce with the surrounding coun-
try when it gets above itself, from melting snows coming down
from the Caucasus, when it frequently tires of its own course
and tries another. The river is the only drinking water, and you
can imagine the state of it when Orientals have anything to
do with it. A sign of its fruity state is the fact that sharks
abound right up to Kuma.
"We have all kinds of craft up here, improvised for use higher
up. His Majesty's ship Clio, a sloop, was marked down in
1914 to be destroyed as obsolete, but she, with her sister ships,
Odin and Espiegle, have done great work in the battles to date.
Now that we have got as far as Amara and Nassariyeh, the
vessels that give the greatest assistance are steam launches with
guns on them, flat-bottomed Irrawaddy paddle steamers. For
troops we have 'nakelas' a local sailing vessel, and have 'hel-
iums,' a long, narrow, small cone-shaped thing, holding from
fifteen to twenty men ; barges for animals, etc. Rafts have been
used higher up to mount guns on. Here we have also motor
boats.
"The difficulties as we advance are increased to a certain ex-
tent, though country and climate are improving. Our lines of
communication will lengthen out, and we shall have to look out
for Arab tribes raiding. Our aerial service is increasing; we
have now a Royal Navy flight section, which has hydroplanes
as well."
In spite of these handicaps, however. General Lake, in com-
mand of the English relief force, reported on April 5, 1916, that
a successful advance was in progress and that the Tigris Corps
at five o'clock in the morning of that day had made an attack
against the Turkish position at Umm-el-Hannah, and had car-
RENEWED ATTEMPT AT KUT-EL-AMARA 313
ried the Turkish intrenchments. Umm-el-Hannah is at a much
greater distance from Kut-el-Amara than Es-Sinn which was
reached on March 8, 1916, but from where the relief force had
to withdraw again that same night to a position only a short
distance beyond Umm-el-Hannah. However, it is located on
the left bank of the Tigris, the same as Kut-el-Amara, and the
success of taking this position, small as it was, promised there-
fore, once more an early relief of General Townshend.
This successful attack against Umm-el-Hannah on April 5,
1916, was carried out by the Thirteenth Division, which had
previously fought at the Dardanelles. It now stood under the
command of Lieutenant General Sir G. Gorringe who had suc-
ceeded to General Aylmer. The most careful preparations had
been made for it. For many weeks British engineering troops
had pushed forward a complicated series of sap works, covering
some sixteen miles and allowing the British forces to approach
to within 100 yards of the Turkish intrenchments. With the
break of dawn on April 5, 1916, bombing parties were sent for-
ward. Whose cheers soon announced the fact that they had in-
vaded the first line of Turkish trenches. Already on the pre-
vious day the way had been cleared for them by their artillery,
which by means of incessant fire had destroyed the elaborate
wire entanglements which the Turks had constructed in front
of their trenches.
The storming of the first line of trenches was followed quickly
by an equally successful attack on the second line. By 6 a. m.,
one hour after the beginning of the attack, the third line had
been carried with the assistance of concentrated machine-gun
and artillery fire. Within another hour the same troops had
stormed and occupied the fourth and fifth lines of the Turks.
The latter thereupon were forced to fall back upon their next
line of defensive works at Felahieh and Sanna-i-Yat, about
four and six miles respectively farther up the river. Reen-
forcements were quickly brought up from the Turkish main
position at Es-Sinn, some farther ten miles up, and with fever-
ish haste the intrenchments were made stronger. General Gor-
ringe's aeroplane scouts promptly observed and reported these
814 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
operations, and inasmuch as the ground between these new
positions and the positions which had just been gained by
the British troops is absolutely flat and offers no means of
cover whatsoever, the British advance was stopped for the time
being.
In the meantime the Third British Division under General
Keary had advanced along the right bank of the river and had
carried Turkish trenches immediately in front of the Felahieh
position. In the afternoon of April 5, 1916, the Turks tried to
regain these trenches by means of a strong counterattack with
infantry, cavalry and artillery, but were unable to dislodge the
British forces.
With nightfall General Gorringe again returned to the attack
along the left bank and stormed the Felahieh position. Here,
too, the Turks had constructed a series of successive deep
trenches, some of which were taken by the British battalions
only at the point of the bayonet. This attack as well as all
the previous attacks were, by the nature of the ground over
which they had to be fought, frontal attacks. For all the Turk-
ish positions rested on one side of the river and on the other
on the Suwatcha swamps, excluding, therefore, any flank attack
on the part of the British forces.
Again General Gorringe halted his advance, influenced un-
doubtedly by the open ground and increasing difficulties caused
by stormy weather and floods. April 6, 7, and 8, 1916, were
devoted by the British forces to the closest possible reconnois-
sance of the Sanna-i-Yat position and to the necessary prepara-
tory measures for its attack, while the Turks energetically
strengthened this position by means of new intrenchments and
additional reenforcements from their position at Es-Sinn.
With the break of dawn on April 19, 1916, General Gorringe
again attacked the Turkish lines at Sanna-i-Yat. The attack
was preceded by heavy artillery fire lasting more than an hour.
In the beginning the British troops entered some of the Turkish
trenches, but were driven back at the point of the bayonet.
After this stood success. Again the floods came to the assistance
of the Turkish troops. Increasing, as they were, day by day,
RENEWED ATTEMPT AT KUT-EL-AMARA 315
they covered more and more of the ground adjoining the river
bed and thereby narrowed the front, on which an attack could
be delivered, so much so that most of its force was bound to be
lost. According to Turkish reports the British lost over 3,000
hi dead. Although the British commanding general stated that
his losses were much below this number, they must have been
very heavy, from the very nature of the ground and climatic
conditions, and much heavier, indeed, than those of the Turks
which officially were stated to have been only seventy-nine killed,
168 wounded and nine missing.
After this unsuccessful attempt to advance further a lull en-
sued for a few days. On April 12, 1916, however, the Third
Division again began to attack on the right bank of the Tigris
and pushed back the Turks over a distance varying from one
and one-half to three miles. At the same time a heavy gale in-
undated some of the advanced Turkish trenches on the left
bank at Sanna-i-Yat with the waters from the Suwatcha
marshes. This necessitated a hurried withdrawal to new posi-
tions, which British guns made very costly for the Turks. A
heavy gale made further operations impossible for either side on
April 13 and 14, 1916. On the following day, April 15, 1916,
the Third Division again advanced a short distance on the right
bank, occupying some of the advanced Turkish trenches. Fur-
ther trenches were captured on April 16 and 17, 1916, at which
time the Turks lost between 200 and 300 in killed, 180 by cap-
ture as well as two field and five machine guns, whereas the Eng-
lish losses were stated to have been much smaller. This was
due to the fact that for once the English forces had been able
to place their guns so that their infantry was enabled to ad-
vance under their protection up to the very trenches of the
Turks, which, at the same time, were raked by the gunfire and
fell comparatively easily into the hands of the attackers. The
latter immediately pressed their advantage and succeeded in
advancing some hundred yards beyond the position previously
held by the Turks near Beit Eissa. Here, as well as during the
fighting of the few preceding days, the British troops were fre-
quently forced to advance wading in water up to their waist,
816 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
after having spent the night before in camps which had no more
solid foundation than mud. They were now within four miles
of the Turkish position at Es-Sinn, which in turn was less than
ten miles from Kut-el-Amara. However, this position had been
made extremely strong by the Turks and extended much fur-
ther to the north and south of the Tigris than any of the posi-
tions captured so far by the British relief force.
In spite of this the Turks recognized the necessity of defend-
ing the intermediate territory to the best of their abiUty. After
the British success at Beit Eissa in the early morning of April
17, 1916, they again brought up strong reenforcements from
Es-Sinn, and at once launched two strong counterattacks, both of
which, however, were repulsed by the British.
During the night of April 17 and 18, 1916, the Turks again
made a series of counterattacks in force on the right bank of the
Tigris, and this time they succeeded in pushing back the British
lines between 500 and 800 yards. According to English reports,
about 10,000 men were involved on the Turkish side among
whom there were claimed to be some Germans. The same
source estimates Turkish losses in dead alone to have been more
than 3,000, and considerably in excess of the total British losses.
On the other hand the official Turkish report places the latter as
above 4,000, and also claims the capture of fourteen machine
guns. Storms set in again on April 18 and 19, 1916, and pre-
vented further operations.
Beginning with April 20, 1916, the rehef force prepared for
another attack of the Sanna-i-Yat position on the left bank of
the Tigris, by a systematic bombardment of it, lasting most of
that night, the following night, April 21, 1916, and the early
morning of April 22, 1916. On that day another attack was
launched. Again the flooded condition of the country fatally
handicapped the British troops. To begin with, there was only
enough dry ground available for one brigade to attack, and
that on a very much contracted front against superior forces.
To judge from the official British report, the leading formations
of this brigade gallantly overcame the severe obstacles in their
way in the form of logs and trencher full of water. But, al-
RENEWED ATTEMPT AT KUT-EL-AMARA 317
though they succeeded in penetrating the Turkish first and sec-
ond lines, and in some instances even in reaching the third
lines, their valor brought no lasting success, because it was im-
possible for reenforcements to come up quickly enough in the
face of the determined Turkish resistance strongly supported
by machine-gun fire. According to the Turkish reports, the Brit-
ish lost very heavily without being able to show any gain at
the end of the day. The same condition obtained on the right
bank of the Tigris. In spite of this failure the bombardment
of the Sanna-i-Yat position was kept up by the British artillery
throughout April 23, 1916. On the next day, April 24, 1916,
the British troops again registered a small success by being
able to extend their line at Beit Eissa, on the right Tigris bank —
in the direction of the Umm-el-Brahm swamps. On the left
bank, however, the line facing the Sanna-i-Yat position re-
mained in its original location.
All this time General Townshend was able to communicate
freely by means of wireless with the relief forces. As the weeks
rolled by it became evident that his position was becoming rap-
idly untenable on account of the unavoidable decrease of all sup-
plies. Having had his lines of communication cut off ever since
December 3, 1915, it was now almost five months since he had
been forced to support the lives of some 10,000 men from the
meager supplies which they had with them at the time of their
hurried retreat from Ctesiphon to Kut-el-Amara, which were
only slightly increased by whatever stores had been found at
the latter place. So complete was the circle which the Turks
had thrown around Kut that not a pound of food had come
through to the besieged garrison. It was well known that the
latter had been forced for weeks to exist on horse flesh. Beyond
that, however, few details concerning the life of the Anglo-
Indian force during the siege were known at that time except
that they had not been subjected to any attack on the part of
the Turks.
During the night of April 24, 1916, one more desperate effort
was made to bring relief to General Townshend's force. A ship,
carrying supplies, was sent up the Tigris. Although this under-
318 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
taking was carried out most courageously in the face of the
Turkish guns commanding the entire stretch of the Tigris be-
tween Sanna-i-Yat and the Turkish Hnes below Kut-el-Amara, it
miscarried, for the boat went aground near Magasis, about four
miles below Kut-el-Amara. Another desperate effort to get at
least some supplies to Kut by means of aeroplanes also failed.
The British forces had only some comparatively antiquated
machines, which quickly became the prey of the more modem
equipment of the Turks.
CHAPTER XL
THE SURRENDER OF KUT-EL-AMARA
BY the end of April it had become only a question of days,
almost of hours, when it would be necessary for General
Townshend to surrender. It was, therefore, no surprise when
in the morning of April 29, 1916, a wireless report was received
from him reading as follows :
"Have destroyed my guns, and most of my munitions are be-
ing destroyed ; and officers have gone to Khalil, who is at Madug,
to say am ready to surrender. I must have some food here,
and cannot hold on any more. IGialil has been told to-day, and
a deputation of officers has gone on a launch to bring some food
from Julnar."
A few hours afterward another message, the last one to
come through, reached the relief forces, announcing the actual
surrender :
"I have hoisted the white flag over Kut fort and towns, and
the guards will be taken over by a Turkish regiment, which is
approaching. I shall shortly destroy wireless. The troops at 2
p. m. to camp near Shamran."
It was on the hundred and forty-third day of the siege that
General Townshend was forced by the final exhaustion of his
supplies to hoist the white flag of surrender. According to th(
official British statements this involved a force of "2970 Brit*
SURRENDER OF KUT-EL-AMARA 319
ish troops of all ranks and services and some 6,000 Indian
troops and their followers/'
About one o'clock in the afternoon of April 29, 1916, a pre-
arranged signal from the wireless indicated that the wireless
had been destroyed. It was then that the British emissaries
were received by the Turkish commander in chief, Khalil Bey
Pasha, in order to arrange the terms of surrender. According
to these it was to be unconditional. But the Turks, who ex-
pressed the greatest admiration for the bravery of the British,
readily agreed to a number of arrangements in order to reduce
as much as possible the suffering on the part of the captured
British forces who by then were near to starvation. As the
Turks themselves were not in a position to supply their cap-
tives with sufficiently large quantities of food, it was arranged
that such supplies should be sent up the Tigris from the base
of the relief force. It was also arranged that wounded pris-
ners should be exchanged and during the early part of May,
1916, a total of almost 1,200 sick and wounded reached head-
quarters of the Tigris Corps as quickly as the available ships
could transport them.
The civil population of Kut-el-Amara had not been driven
out by General Townshend as had been surmised. This was un-
doubtedly due to the fact that a few civilians who, driven by
hunger, had attempted to escape, had been shot promptly by the
Turks. Rather than jeopardize the lives of some 6,000 unfor-
tunate Arabs, the English commander permitted them to remain
and the same rations that went to the British troops were dis-
tributed to the Arabs. This, of course, hastened the surrender,
an eventuality on which the Turks undoubtedly had counted
when they adopted such stringent measures against their own
subjects who were caught in their attempt to flee from Kut.
Although Khalil Pasha refused to give any pledge in regard to
the treatment of these civilians, he stated to the British emis-
saries that he contemplated no reprisals or persecutions in re-
gard to the civilian population and that their future treatment
at the hands of the Turkish troops would depend entirely on
their future behavior.
U— War St. 5
320 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
With the least possible delay the Turks moved their prisoners
from Kut-el-Amara to Bagdad and from there to Constantinople,
from which place it was reported on June 11, 1916, that General
Townshend had arrived and, after having been received with
military honors, had been permitted to visit the United States
ambassador who looked after British interests in Turkey during
the war. An official Turkish statement announced ttiat to-
gether with General Townshend four other generals had been
captured as well as 551 other officers, of whom about one-half
were Europeans and another half Indians. The same announce-
ment also claimed that the British had destroyed most of their
guns and other arms, but that in spite of this the Turks cap-
tured about forty cannon, twenty machine guns, almost 5,000
rifles, large amounts of ammunition, two ships, four automobiles,
and three aeroplanes.
It was only after the capitulation of General Townshend that
details became available concerning the suffering to which the
besieged army was subjected and the heroism with which all
this was borne by officers and men, whites and Hindus alike.
An especially clear picture of conditions existing in Kut-el-Amara
during the siege may be gained from a letter sent to Bombay
by a member of the Indian force and later published in various
newspapers. It says in part:
"Wounded and diseased British and native troops are arriving
from Kut-el-Amara, having been exchanged for an equal number
of Turkish prisoners. They bring accounts of Townshend's
gallant defense of Mesopotamia's great strategic point. Some
are mere youngsters while others were soldiers before the war.
"All are frightfully emaciated and are veritable skeletons as
the result of their starvation and sufferings. The absolute ex-
haustion of food necessitated the capitulation, and if General
Townshend had not surrendered nearly the whole force would
have died of starvation within a week.
"The Turkish General Khalil Pasha provided a river steamer
for the unexchanged badly wounded, the others marching over-
land. Because of the wasted condition of the prisoners the
marches were limited to five miles a day.
SURRENDER OF KUT-EL-AMARA 821
"When the capitulation was signed only six mules were left
alive to feed a garrison and civilian population of nearly 20,000
persons.
"In the early stages of the siege, the Arab traders sold stocks
of jam, biscuits, and canned fish at exorbitant prices. The stores
were soon exhausted and all were forced to depend upon the
army commissariat. Later a dead officer's kit was sold at
auction. Eighty dollars was paid for a box of twenty-five cigars
and twenty dollars for fifty American cigarettes.
"In February the ration was a pound of barley-meal bread
and a pound and a quarter of mule or horse flesh. In March the
ration was reduced to half a pound of bread and a pound of
flesh. In April it was four ounces of bread and twelve ounces
of flesh, which was the allowance operative at the time of the
surrender. The food problem was made more difficult by the
Indian troops, who because of their religion refused to eat flesh,
fearing they would break the rules of their caste by doing so.
"When ordinary supplies were diminished a sacrifice was de-
manded of the British troops in order to feed the Indians, whose
allowance of grain was increased while that of the British was
decreased. Disease spread among the horses and hundreds
were shot and buried. The diminished grain and horse feed
supply necessitated the shooting of nearly 2,000 animals. The
fattest horses and mules were retained as food for forty days.
"Kut-el-Amara was searched as with a fine tooth comb and
considerable stores of grain were discovered beneath houses.
These were commandeered, the inhabitants previously self-sup-
porting receiving the same ration as the soldiers and Sepoys.
It was difficult to use the grain because of inability to grind it
into flour, but millstones were finally dropped into the camp by
aeroplanes.
"In the first week in February scurvy appeared, and aero-
planes dropped seeds, which General Townshend ordered planted
on all the available ground, and the gardens bore sufficient fruit
to supply a few patients in the hospital.
"Mule and horse meat and sometimes a variety of donkey
meat were boiled in the muddy Tigris water without salt or
822
THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
SURRENDER OF KUT-EL-AMARA 323
seasoning. The majority became used to horseflesh and their
main complaint was that the horse gravy was like clear oil.
"Stray cats furnished many a delicate 'wild rabbit' supper.
A species of grass was cooked as a vegetable and it gave a relish
to the horseflesh. Tea being exhausted, the soldiers boiled bits
of ginger root in water. Latterly aeroplanes dropped some sup-
plies. These consisted chiefly of com, flour, cocoa, sugar, tea,
and cigarettes.
"During the last week of the siege many Arabs made attempts
to escape by swimming the river and going to the British lines,
twenty miles below. Of nearly 100, only three or four succeeded
in getting away. One penetrated the Turkish lines by floating
in an inflated mule skin."
Another intimate description was furnished by the official
British press representative with the Tigris Corps and is based
on the personal narratives of some of the British officers who,
after having been in the Kut hospital for varying periods of the
siege on account of sickness or wounds, were exchanged for
wounded Turkish officers taken by the relief force. According
to this the real privations of the garrison began in the middle of
February and were especially felt in the hospital.
"When the milk gave out the hospital diet was confined to
corn, flour, or rice water for the sick, and ordinary rations for
the wounded. On April 21, 1916, the 4 oz. grain rations gave
out. From the 22d to the 25th the garrison subsisted on the
two days' reserve rations issued in January ; and from the 25th
to the 29th on supplies dropped by aeroplanes.
"The troops were so exhausted when Kut capitulated that the
regiments who were holding the front line had remained there
a fortnight without being relieved. They were too weak to carry
back their kit. During the last days of the siege the daily death
rate averaged eight British and twenty-one Indians.
"All the artillery, cavalry, and transport animals had been
consumed before the garrison fell. When the artillery horses
had gone the drivers of the field batteries formed a new unit
styled 'Kut Foot.' One of the last mules to be slaughtered had
been on three Indian frontier campaigns, and wore the ribbons
324 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
round its neck. The supply and transport butcher had sent it
back twice, refusing to kill it, but in the end it had to go with the
machine-gun mules. Mule flesh was generally preferred to
horse, and mule fat supplied good dripping; also an improvised
substitute for lamp oil.
"The tobacco famine was a great privation, but the garrison
did not find the enforced abstention cured their craving, as every
kind of substitute was there. An Arab brand, a species similar
to that smoked in Indian hookahs, was exhausted early in April.
After that lime leaves were smoked, or ginger, or baked tea dregs.
In January English tobacco fetched forty-eight rupees a half
pound (equal to eight shillings an ounce) .
"Just before General Townshend*s force entered Kut a large
consignment of warm clothing had arrived, the gift of the British
Red Cross Society. This was most opportune and probably saved
many lives. Tht garrison had only the summer kit they stood
up in.
"Different units saw very little of each other during the siege.
At the beginning indirect machine-gun and rifle fire, in addition
to shells, swept the whole area day and night. The troops only
left the dugouts for important defense work. During the late
phase when the fire slackened officers and men had little strength
for unnecessary walking. Thus there was very little to break
the monotony of the siege in the way of games, exercise, or
amusements, but on the right bank two battalions in the licorice
factory, the 110th Mahratas and the 120th Infantry, were better
off, and there was dead ground here — 'a pitch of about fifty by
twenty yards* — ^where they could play hockey and cricket with
pick handles and a rag balL They also fished, and did so with
success, supplementing the rations at the same time. Two com-
panies of Norfolks joined them in turn, crossing by ferry at
night, and they appreciated the relief."
A personal acquaintance of the heroic defense of Kut-el-Amara
drew in a letter to the London "Weekly Times" the following
attractive picture of this strong personality:
"A descendant of the famous Lord Townshend who fought with
Wolfe at Quebec, and himself heir to the marquisate, General
SURRENDER OF KUT-EL-AMARA 325
Townshend set himself from boyhood to maintain the fighting
traditions of his family. His military fighting has been one long
record of active service in every part of the world. Engaged
first in the Nile expedition of 1884-85, Townshend next took
part in the fighting on the northwest frontier of India in 1891-92,
when he leaped into fame as commander of the escort of the
British agent during the siege of Chitral. He fought in the
Sudan expedition of 1898, and served on the staff in the South
African War. In the peaceful decade which followed Townshend
acted for a time as military attache in Paris, was on the staff
in India, and finally commanded the troops at Bloemfontein,
Orange River Colony.
"The outbreak of the Great War found him in command of a
division in India, longing to be at the front in France, but des-
tined, as events turned out, to win greater fame in Mesopotamia.
All accounts agree as to the masterly strategy with which he
defeated Nur-ed-Din Pasha at Kut-el-Amara, and subsequently
fought the battle of Ctesiphon. Those two battles and his heroic
endurance of the long siege of Kut have given his name a per-
manent place in the annals of the British army.
"TowTishend has always attributed his success as a soldier to
his constant study of the campaigns of Napoleon, a practice
which he has long followed for a regular period of every day
wherever he has happened to be serving. He has mastered the
Napoleonic battle fields at first hand, and is an ardent collector of
Napoleonic literature and relics. Everyone who knows him is
familiar with the sight of the paraphernalia of his studies in
peace time — ^the textbooks and maps, spread on the ground or
on an enormous table, to which he devotes his morning hours.
During the present campaign his letters have been full of com-
parisons with the difficulties which confronted Napoleon.
"But Townshend possesses other qualities besides his zeal for
his profession, and one of them at least must have stood him in
good stead during these anxious months. He is indomitably
serene and cheerful, a lover of amusement himself and well able
to amuse others. In London and Paris he is nearly as well
known in the world of playwtights and actors as in the world
326 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
of soldiers. He can sing a good song and tell a good story.
Like Baden-Powell, the hero of another famous siege, he
is certain to have kept his gallant troops alert and interested
during the long period of waiting for the relief which never came.
Up to the last his messages to the outside world have been full of
cheery optimism and soldierly fortitude. No general was ever
less to blame for a disastrous enterprise or better entitled to the
rewards of success."
CHAPTER XLI
SPRING AND SUMMER TRENCH WAR ON
THE TIGRIS
A FTER the surrender of Kut-el-Amara a lull of a few weeks
-^^ occurred. The Turkish forces seemed to be satisfied for the
time being with their victory over their English opponents for
which they had striven so long. The English forces below Kut-
el-Amara likewise seemed to have ceased their activities as soon
as the fall of Kut had become an establi^ed fact.
Almost for three weeks this inactivity was maintained.
On May 19, 1916, however, both sides resumed military opera-
tions. The Turks on that day vacated an advanced position on
the south bank of the Tigris at Beit Eissa, which formed the
southern prolongation of the Sanna-i-Yat position. On the north
bank the latter was still held strongly by the Sultan's forces.
Immediately following this move the English troops, who
under General Sir Gorringe had attempted the relief of Kut-el-
Amara, attacked. Advancing about three miles south of the
Tigris and south of the Umm-el-Brahm marshes, they threw
themselves against the southern end of the Turkish position at
Es-Sinn. The latter is about seven miles west of the former and
about the same distance east of Kut-el-Amara. It began on the
north bank of the Tigris, a few miles north of the Suwatcha
marshes, continued between these and the Tigris and for almost
five miles in a southeasterly direction. On its southern end the
TRENCH WAR ON THE TIGRIS 327
Turks had erected a strong redoubt, known under the name
Dujailar Redoubt, from which a strong line of six lesser redoubts
run in a southwesterly direction to the Shatt-al-hai. This body
of water is the ancient bed of the Tigris. In the first half of the
year it is a navigable stream, carrying the waters of the Tigris
across the desert to the Euphrates near Nasiriyeh, a town which
British forces have held since the spring of 1915. It was against
the key of this very strong line of defense, the Dujailar Redoubt,
which General Gorringe's battalions attacked. At various other
times before English troops had attempted to carry this point,
but had never succeeded. This time, however, they did meet with
success. In spite of strong resistance they stormed and carried
the position.
On the same day, May 19, 1916, it was officially announced
that a force of Russian cavalry had joined General Gorringe's
troops. This cavalry detachment, of course, was part of the
Russian forces operating in the region of Kermanshah in Persia.
Inasmuch as these troops were then all of 200 miles from Kut-
el-Amara and had to pass through a rough and mountainous
country, entirely lacking in roads and inhabited by hostile and
extremely ferocious Kurdish hillmen, the successful dash of this
cavalry detachment was little short of marvelous. The difficul-
ties which had to be faced and the valor which was exhibited is
interestingly described by the official British press representa-
tive with the Mesopotamian forces :
"The Cossacks' ride across country was a fine and daring
achievement, an extreme test of our Allies' hardness, mobility,
and resource. Their route took them across a mountainous ter-
ritory which has been a familiar landmark in the plains where
we have been fighting for the last few months.
"The country traversed was rough and precipitous and the
track often difficult for mules. They crossed passes over 8,000
feet high. Enemy forces were likely to be encountered at any
moment, as these hills are infested with warlike tribes, whose
attitude at the best might be described as decidedly doubtful.
"Their guide was untrustworthy. He roused their suspicions
by constant attempts to mislead them, and eventually he had to
828 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
point the way with a rope round his neck. Nevertheless, they
met with no actual opposition during the whole journey other
than a few stray shots at long range.
"They traveled light. For transport they had less than one
pack animal for ten men. These carried ammunition, cooking
pots, and a tent for officers. Otherwise, beyond a few simple
necessaries, they had no other kit than what they stood up in,
and they lived on the country, purchasing barley, flour, rice, and
sheep from the villagers. Fodder and fuel were always obtain-
able.
"For ambulance they had only one assistant surgeon, provided
with medical wallets, but none of these Cossacks fell sick. They
are a hard lot.
"Their last march was one of thirty miles, during which five
of their horses died of thirst or exhaustion on the parched desert,
and they reached camp after nightfall. Yet, after a dinner
which was given in their honor, they were singing and dancing
all night and did not turn in till one in the morning.
"The ride of the Cossacks establishing direct contact between
the Russian force in Persia and the British force on the Tigris,
of course, has inipressed the tribesmen on both sides of the
frontier."
On the next day the Turks withdrew all their forces who, on
the south bank of the Tigris, had held the Es-Sinn position. Only
at a bridge across the Shatt-al-Hai, about five miles below its
junction with the Tigris, they left some rear guards. On the
north bank of the Tigris they continued to hold, not only the Es-
Sinn position, but also the Sanna-i-Yat position, some eight miles
farther down the river. This meant that General Gorringe not
only had carried an important position, but also that he had ad-
vanced the British lines on the south bank of the Tigris by about
ten miles, for on May 20, 1916, the British positions were estab-
lished along a line running from the village of Magasis, on the
south bank of the Tigris, about five miles east of Kut-el-Amara,
to a point on the Shatt-al-Hai, about equally distant from Kut.
The withdrawal of the Turkish forces on the south bank of the
Tigris naturally left their positions on the north bank very much
I
TRENCH WAR ON THE TIGRIS 329
exposed to British attacks. It was, therefore, not at all surpris-
ing that English artillery subjected the Turks on the north bank
to heavy bombardments during the following days, nor that
this fire was extremely effective. However, in spite of this fact,
the Turks continued to maintain their positions on the north
bank of the Tigris.
Throughout the balance of May, June, and July, 1916, nothing
of importance occurred in Mesopotamia. The temperature in
that part of Asia during the early summer rises to such an
extent that military operations become practically impossible.
It is true that from time to time unimportant skirmishes between
outposts and occasional artillery duels of very limited extent
took place. But they had no influence on the general situation
or on the location of the respective positions.
During the early part of the month the British trenches on
the north bank of the Tigris were pushed forward a short dis-
tance, until they were within 200 yards of the Turkish position,
Sanna-i-Yat, where they remained for the balance of midsum-
mer. To the south of Magasis, on the south bank of the river,
British troops occupied an advanced position about three and
one-half miles south of the main position. Then they stopped
there too. About the same time, June 10, 1916, Turkish guns
sunk three barges on the Tigris, the only actual success which
the Sultan's forces won since the fall of Kut-el-Amara.
Along the Euphrates, where British troops had held certain
positions ever since 1915, there was also an almost entire lack
of activity, except that occasional small and entirely local puni-
tive expeditions became necessary in order to hold in hand the
Arab tribes of the neighborhood.
Climatic conditions continued extremely trying, and enforced
further desistance from military activity until, toward the end of
July, relief in the form of the shjamal (northwest wind) would
come and once more make it possible to resume operations.
330 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
CHAPTER XLII
RUSSIAN ADVANCE TOWARD BAGDAD
COINCIDENT with the Russian advance in Armenia and the
English attempt at capturing the city of Bagdad by ad-
vancing up the Tigris, the Russian General Staff also directed
a strong attack against this ancient Arabian city from the
northeast through Persia.
Before the Mesopotamian plain, in which Bagdad is situated,
could be reached from Persia the mountains along the Persian-
Turkish frontier had to be crossed, an undertaking full of diffi-
culties.
Just as in Armenia, here completed railroads were lacking
entirely. Such roads as were available were for the most part
in the poorest possible condition. The mountains themselves
could be crossed only at a few points through passes located
at great height, where the caravans that had traveled for cen-
turies and centuries between Persia and Mesopotamia had
blasted a trail. At only one point to the north of Bagdad
was there a break in the chain of mountains that separated Per-
sia from Mesopotamia. That was about one hundred miles
northeast of Bagdad in the direction of the Persian city of
Kermanshah. There one Russian army was advancing un-
doubtedly with the twofold object of reaching and capturing
Bagdad and of submitting the Turkish army operating in that
sector to an attack from this source as well as from the British
army advancing along the Tigris. A Russian success at this
point would have meant practically either the capture of all the
Turkish forces or their ultimate destruction. For the only ave-
nue of escape that would have been left to them would have been
across the desert into Syria. And although there were a num-
ber of caravan routes available for this purpose, it would have
been reasonably sure that most of the Turkish forces attempting
such a retreat would have been lost. For a modem army of the
size operating around Bagdad could not have been safely brought
RUSSIAN ADVANCE TOWARD BAGDAD 331
across the desert with all the supplies and ammunition indispen-
sable for its continued existence.
In order to prevent the escape of these Turkish forces in a
northerly direction along the Tigris and the line of the projected
but uncompleted part of the Bagdad railroad, the Russians had
launched another attack from the north. This second army ad-
vanced to the south of the region around Lake Urumiah, a large
body of water less than fifty miles east of the Turko-Persian
border. This attack was directed against another important
Arabian city, Mosul. This town, too, was located on the Tigris,
and on the line of the Bagdad railroad, about 200 miles north-
west of Bagdad.
Still another Russian attack was developed by a third army,
advancing about halfway between the other two army groups
and striking at Mesopotamia from Persia slightly north of the
most easterly point of the Turkish frontier.
Broadly speaking the Russian attack through Persia covered a
front of about 200 miles. It must not be understood, however,
that this was a continuous "front" of the same nature as the front
in the western and eastern theaters of war in Europe. The unde-
veloped condition of the country made the establishment of a con-
tinuous front not only impossible, but unnecessary. Each of the
three Russian groups were working practically independent of
each other, except that their operations were planned and exe-
cuted in such a way that their respective objectives were to be
reached simultaneously. Even that much cooperation was made
extremely difficult, because of the lack of any means of communi-
cation in a horizontal direction. No roads worthy of that name,
parallel to the Turko-Persian frontier, existed. Telegraph or tele-
phone lines, of course, were entirely lacking, except such as were
established by the advancing armies. How great the difficulties
were which confronted both the attacking and the defending
armies in this primitive country can, therefore, readily be under-
stood. They were still more increased by the climatic conditions
which prevail during the winter and early spring. If fighting in
the comparatively highly developed regions of the Austro-Italian
mountains was fraught with problems that at times seemed al-
332 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
most impossible of solution, what then must it have been in the
more or less uncivilized and almost absolutely undeveloped dis-
tricts of Persian "Alps !" The difficulties that were overcome, the
suffering which was the share of both Russians and Turks make
a story the full details of which will not be told — if ever told
at all — for a long time to come. No daily communique, no vivid
description from the pen of famous war correspondents ac-
quaints us of the details of the heroic struggle that for months
and months progressed in these distant regions of the "near
East." Not even "letters from the front" guide us to any ex-
tent. For where conditions are such that even the transport of
supplies and ammunition becomes a problem that requires con-
stantly ingenuity of the highest degree, the transmission of mail
becomes a matter which can receive consideration only very oc-
casionally. Whatever will be known for a long time to come
about this campaign is restricted to infrequent official state-
ments made by the Russian and Turkish General Staffs, an-
nouncing the taking of an important town on the crossing of a
mountain pass, up to then practically unknown to the greatest
part of the civilized world.
It was such a statement from the Russian General Staff, that
had announced the fall of Kermanshah on February 27, 1916,
This was an important victory for the southernmost Russian
army. For this ancient Persian town lies on the main caravan
route from Mesopotamia to Teheran, passing over the high
Zaros range, as well as on other roads, leading to Tabriz in the
north and to Kut-el-Amara and Basra in the south. It brought
this Russian army within less than 200 miles of Bagdad. To-
ward this goal the advance now was pushed steadily, and on
March 1, 1916, Petrograd announced that the pursuit of the
enemy to the west of Kermanshah continued and had yielded the
capture of two more guns. The next important success gained by
the Russians was announced on March 12, 1916, when the town of
Kerind was occupied. This town, too, is located on the road to
Bagdad and its occupation represented a Russian advance of
about fifty miles in less than two weeks, no mean accomplish-
ment in the face of a fairly determined resistance.
RUSSIAN ADVANCE TOWARD BAGDAD
333
THE RUSSIANS IN PERSIA
334 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
On March 22, 1916, it was officially announced that a Russian
column, advancing from Teheran, to the south, had reached and
occupied Ispaha, the ancient Persian capital in central Persia,
This, of course, had no direct bearing on the Russian advance
against Mosul and Bagdad, except that it increased Russian in-
fluence in Persia and by that much strengthened the position
and security of any Russian troops operating anywhere else
in that country.
Fighting between the northernmost Russian army and detach-
ments of Turks and Kurds was reported on March 24, 1916,
in the region south of Lake Urumiah. Throughout the balance
of March, 1916, and during April, 1916, similar engagements
took place continuously in this sector. On the Turkish side both
regular infantry and detachments of Kurds opposed the Russian
advance in the direction of Mosul and the Tigris. Russian suc-
cesses were announced officially on April 10 and 12, 1916, and
again on May 3, 1916.
In the meantime the advance toward Bagdad also progressed.
On May 1, 1916, the Russians captured some Turkish guns and a
number of ammunition wagons to the west of Kerind. On May
6, 1916, a Turkish fortified position in the same locality was
taken by storm and a considerable quantity of supplies were
captured.
Up to this time the Russian reports were more or less in-
definite, announcing simply from time to time progress of the ad-
vance in the direction of Bagdad. From Kerind, captured early
in March, 1916, two roads lead into Mesopotamia, one by way
of Mendeli, and another more circuitous, but more frequented
and, therefore, in better condition, by way of Khanikin. Not
until May 10, 1916, did it become apparent that the Russians had
chosen the latter. On that day they announced the occupation of
the town of Kasr-i-Shirin, about twenty miles from the Turkish
border, between Kerind and Khanikin. Not only were the Rus-
sian forces now within 110 miles of Bagdad — an advance of
forty-five miles since the capture of Kerind — ^but they were also
getting gradually out of the mountains into the Mesopotamian
plain. At Kasr-i-Shirin, they took important Turkish munition
OFFENSIVE IN ARMENIA AND PERSIA 335
reserves, comprising several hundred thousand cartridges, many
shells and hand grenades, telegraph material, and a camel supply
convoy laden with biscuits, rice, and sugar.
Five days later, on May 15, 1916, another important Russian
success was announced, this time further north. The Russian
forces that had been fighting for a long time ever since the early
part of 1915 to the south of Lake Urumiah, and whose progress
in the direction of Mosul was reported at long intervals, were
now reported to have reached the Turkish town of Rowandiz.
This represented an advance of over 100 miles from the town
of Urumiah and carried the Russian troops some twenty-five
miles across the frontier into the Turkish province of Mosul.
Rowandiz is about 100 miles east of Mosul, and in order to reach
it it was necessary for the Russian forces to cross the formidable
range of mountains that runs along the Turko-Persian border
and reaches practically its entire length, a height of 8,000 to
10,000 feet.
CHAPTER XLIII
TURKISH OFFENSIVE AND RUSSIAN COUNTER-
OFFENSIVE IN ARMENIA AND PERSIA
ON the last day of May, 1916, the Turks scored their first sub-
stantial success against the Russians since the fall of Erzerum.
Having received reenforcements, the Turkish center assumed the
offensive between the Armenian Taurus and Baiburt and forced
the Russians to evacuate Mama Khatun. This was followed by
a withdrawal of the Russian lines in that region for a distance
of about ten miles.
For the next few days the Turks were able to maintain their
new offensive in full strength. The center of the Russian right
wing was forced back continuously until it had reached a line
almost twenty-five miles east of its former positions.
In the south, too, the Turkish forces scored some successes
against the Russian troops, who had been pushing toward the
. V— WarSt.&
336 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
Tigris Valley from the mountains along the Persian border. On
June 8, 1916, Turkish detachments even succeeded in crossing
the border and occupied Kasr-i-Shirin, just across the frontier in
Persia. By June 10, 1916, these troops had advanced sixteen
miles farther east and fought slight engagements with Russian
cavalry near the villages of Serpul and Zehab.
In the north the Turkish advance continued likewise. An
important engagement between Turkish troops and a strong Rus-
sian cavalry force occurred on June 12, 1916, east of the village
of Amachien and terminated in favor of the Turks.
Fighting continued throughout the balance of June, 1916, all
along the Turko-Russian front from Trebizond down to the Per-
sian border northeast of Bagdad. At some points the Russians
assumed the offensive, but were unable to make any impression
on the Turks, who continued to push back the invader and, by
quickly fortifying their newly gained positions, succeeded in
maintaining them against all counterattacks.
By June 30, 1916, Kermanshah in Persia, about 100 miles
across the border, was seriously threatened. On that day Rus-
sian forces, which retreated east of Serai, could not maintain
their positions near Kerind, owing to vigorous pursuit. Russian
rear guards west of Kerind were driven off. Turkish troops pass-
ing through Kerind pursued the Russians in the direction of
Kermanshah.
On July 5, 1916, Kermanshah was occupied by the Turkish
troops after a battle west of the town which lasted all day and
night. The first attempt of the Russians to prevent the capture
of the city was made at Mahidesst, west of Kermanshah. Here the
Russians had hastily constructed fortifications, but the Turks, by
a swift encircling move, made their position untenable and forced
them to retreat farther east. A strong Russian rear guard de-
fended the village for one day and then followed the main body
to a series of previously prepared positions just west of the city.
Here a terrific battle lasting all day and all night was waged, and
resulted in the retreat of the Russians to Kermanshah. Three
detachments of Turks, almost at the heels of the Muscovites,
drove them out before they could make another stand.
OFFENSIVE IN ARMENIA AND PERSIA 337
On July 9, 1916, Turkish reconnoitering forces came in contact
with the Russians who were ejected from Kermanshah at a point
fifteen miles east of the city, while they were on their way to
join their main forces. After a fight of seven hours the Rus-
sians were compelled to flee to Sineh.
By this time, however, the Russians had recovered their breath
in the Caucasus. On July 12, 1916, they recaptured by assault
the town of Mama Khatun. The next day, after a violent night
battle, they occupied a series of heights southeast of Mama
Khatun. The Turks attempted to take the offensive, but were
thrown back. Pressing closely upon them, the Russians took the
villages of Djetjeti and Almali.
The Russian offensive quickly assumed great strength. By
July 14, 1916, the Russians were only ten miles from Baiburt,
had again taken up their drive for Erzingan and had wrested
from the Turks some strongly fortified positions southwest of
Mush.
Baiburt fell to the Russians on July 15, 1916. From then on
the Russian advance continued steadily, although the Turks main-
tained a stiff resistance.
On July 18, 1916, the Russians occupied the town of Kugi,
an important junction of roads from Erzerum, Lhaputi and
Khzindjtna. On July 20, 1916, the Grand Duke's troops captured
the town of Gumuskhaneh, forty-five miles southwest of Trebi-
zond.
The next day, July 21, 1916, these forces had advanced to and
occupied Ardas, about thirteen miles northwest of Gumus-
khaneh. The West Euphrates was crossed the following day.
On July 23, 1916, Russian troops on the Erzingan route, in the
Ziaret Tapasi district, repulsed two Turkish counterattacks and
occupied the heights of Naglika.
East of the Erzingan route they captured a Turkish line on
the Durum Darasi River. After having repulsed several Turkish
attacks Russian cavalry has reached the line of Boz-Tapa-
Mertekli.
Closer and closer the Russians approached to the goal for
which they had striven for many months, Erzingan. On July 25,
838
THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
OFFENSIVE IN ARMENIA AND PERSIA 339
1916, this strongly fortified Turkish city in Central Armenia,
fell into the hands of the Russian Caucasus army under Grand
Duke Nicholas.
Erzingan, situated at an altitude of 3,900 feet, about one mile
from the right bank of the Euphrates, manufactures silk and
cotton and lies in a highly productive plain, which automatically
comes into possession of the Russians. Wheat, fruit, wines, and
cotton are grown in large quantities, and there are also iron
and hot sulphur springs. With its barracks and military fac-
tories, the city formed an important army base.
Erzingan has frequently figured in ancient history. It was
here that the Sultan of Rum was defeated by the Mongols in
1243, and in the fourth century St. Gregory, "the Illuminator,"
lived in the city. Erzingan was added to the Osman Empire in
1473 by Mohammed II, after it had been held by Mongols, Tar-
tars, and Turkomans.
With the capture of Erzingan the Russians not only removed
the strongest obstacle on the road to Sivas, Angora, and Con-
stantinople, but also virtually completed their occupation of
Turkish Armenia.
Throughout the Russian advance, considerable fighting had
occurred in the region of Mush, which, however, resulted in no
important changes. The main object of the Russian attacks there
was to hold as large a Turkish force as possible from any possi-
ble attempt to relieve the pressure on Erzingan.
In the south, near the Persian border at Roanduz, and in
Persia, near Kermanshah, there were no important developments
after the fall of Kermanshah. Considerable fighting, however,
went on in both of these sectors without changing in any way the
general situation.
PART VIII— OPERATIONS ON THE
WESTERN FRONT
CHAPTER XLIV
RENEWAL OF THE BATTLE OF VERDUN
IN another part of this work we have followed the intense
struggle that marked the German assault that began on
February 21, 1916, and continued without cessation for four
days and nights. Despite the tremendous force employed by the
Germans and the destruction wrought by their guns, the French
by incessant counterattacks had held back their opponents and,
by depriving them of the advantage of surprise, had undoubtedly
saved Verdun for the Allies. Though losing heavily in men and
material, they held the Bras-Douaumont front until they could
be relieved by fresh forces. The German advance was stayed
on the night of the 24th.
In the morning of February 25, 1916, the Germans succeeded
in penetrating Louvemont, now reduced to ruins by fire and shell.
Douaumont village to the right seemed in imminent danger of
being captured by the Germans, who were closing in on the place.
But the French infantry attacking toward the north, and the
vigorous action of the Zouaves east of Haudromont Farm, cleared
the surroundings of the enemy. At the close of the day they
occupied the village and a ridge to the east. Though they were
in such position as to half encircle the fort, yet a body of Branden-
burgers succeeded by surprise in forcing their way into its walls,
from which subsequent French attacks failed to dislodge them.
East and west of Douaumont the Germans made incessant
efforts to break through the new French front, but only suc-
340
RENEWAL OF THE BATTLE OF VERDUN 341
ceeded in gaining a foothold in Hardaumont work. Douaumont
village was attacked with fresh forces and abundant material on
the morning of the 27th. The struggle here was marked by
hand-to-hand fighting and bayonet charges in which the Germans
were clearly at a disadvantage. They won a French redoubt on
the west side of Douaumont Fort, but after an intense struggle
were forced out and retreated, leaving heaps of dead on the
ground.
Douaumont became again the center of German attack, and
though driven off with terrible losses, they brought up fresh
troops and renewed the fray. Advances were pushed with reck-
less bravery, but in vain, for their forces were shattered before
they could reach the French positions. Their losses in men must
have been enormous, and for two days no further attacks were
made. The French knew that they had not accepted defeat and
were only reorganizing their forces for a fresh onslaught. On
March 2, 1916, the Germans renewed the bombardment, smoth-
ering the village under an avalanche of shells. Believing that
this time the way was clear to advance, they rushed for-
ward in almost solid ranks. French machine-gun and rifle
fire cut great gaps in the advancing waves, but this time the
brave defenders could not hold them back, and Douaumont was
penetrated.
The Germans occupied the place, but they were not permitted
to leave it, for the French infantry were posted only a hundred
yards away and every exit was under their fire.
On the day following, the 3d, the French, after bombarding
the ruins of Douaumont and working havoc in the ranks of the
enemy, rushed two battalions during the night against the Ger-
man barricades, and after a stubborn fight occupied the place.
But their victory was short lived. Before dawn the Germans,
attacking with large reenforcements, after four or five hours of
intense and murderous struggle, again occupied the village. The
French, somewhat shattered in numbers but by no means dis-
couraged, fell back some two hundred yards to the rear, where
they proceeded to reestablish their line and there await their
opportunity to strike again.
842 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
Some idea of the great courage and devotion displayed by the
French troops during the intense struggle around Douaumont
village may be gained from the statement made by an infantry
officer which appeared in the Army Bulletin, and from which
some quotations may be made.
The Germans on March 2, 1916, at 3.15 a. m. had attacked the
village simultaneously from the north by a ravine and on the
flank, where they debouched from the fort, and certain covered
positions which the French had not had time to reconnoiter.
'The Germans we saw first were "those who came from the
fort. They were wearing French helmets, and for a moment
our men seemed uncertain as to their identity. Major C
called out: 'Don't fire! They are French.' The words were
hardly out of his mouth before he fell with a bullet in his neck.
This German trick made us furious, and the adjutant cried : 'Fire
for all you're worth ! They are Germans !' But the enemy con^
tinued his encircling movement with a view to taking the village
"The battalion which was charged with its defense had lost
very heavily in the bombardment, and most of its machine guns
were out of action, but they were resolved to make any sacrifice
to fulfill their trust. When their left was very seriously threat-
ened, the Tenth Company made a glorious charge straight into
the thick of the oncoming German masses. The hand-to-hand
struggle was of the fiercest description, and French bayonets
wrought deadly havoc among the German ranks. This company
went on fighting until it was at length completely submerged in
the flood, and the last we saw of it was a handful of desperate
heroes seeking death in the heart of the struggle."
An attempt at this time was made by the Germans to debouch
from Douaumont village on the southwestern side, with the
evident purpose of forcing their way to the top of the crest in
the direction of Thiaumont Farm.
'The commander of the Third Company," to continue the
French officer's narrative, "immediately made his dispositions
to arrest their progress. A machine gun was cleverly placed and
got to work. In a short time the hundred or so of Germans that
had got through were so vigorously peppered that only about
RENEWAL OF STRUGGLE AT VERDUN
343
O lO 20 30 4K> 50 75
HEAVY BLACK LINE &HOW6
BATTLE FRONT AU6U&T I 5. 19 16
WESTERN BATTLE FRONT, AUGUST, 1916
344 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
twenty of them got back. This gun was in action until nightfall,
dealing with successive German parties that attempted to ad-
vance from the western and southwestern sides of the village.**
After describing how the French built barricades during the
night and adjusted their front in such a way as to present a
solid wall facing the east, the narrator continues :
"Our counterattack took place at nightfall on March 3, and
was undertaken by two battalions (the Four Hundred and Tenth
and the Four Hundred and Fourteenth) of consecutive regiments.
After an intense rifle fire we heard the cry of 'Forward with the
bayonet!* and night rang with the shouts of the men. Our first
line was carried beyond the village.
"The Germans returned to the attack about 8 o'clock, but were
stopped dead by our rifle and machine-gun fire. Two hours later
another attack was attempted, but was likewise dashed to pieces
before our unshaken resistance. The Germans came on in very
close formation, and on the following morning we counted quite
eight hundred dead before the trench.
"At daybreak on March 4 the Germans launched a fresh
counterattack against Douaumont after an intense bombardment
accompanied by the use of aerial torpedoes. No detailed descrip-
tion is possible of the terrible fighting from house to house, or
the countless deeds of heroism performed by our men in this
bloody struggle, which lasted for two hours. The gaps in our
ranks increased from moment to moment. Finally we were
ordered to retire to a position about 200 meters south of the
exit from Douaumont. The enemy tried in vain to dislodge us
and exploit the success he had so dearly won.**
On March 4, 1916, an Order of the Day issued by the crown
prince was read to the troops in rest billets in which they were
urged to make a supreme effort to conquer Verdun, "the heart
of France.** For four days following the German command was
busy organizing for an onslaught on a gigantic scale, which they
hoped would so crush the French army as to eliminate it as a
serious factor in the war.
In order to clear the way for this great attack the German
General Staff decided that it would be necessary first to capture
RENEWAL OF THE BATTLE OF VERDUN 345
the French positions of Mort Homme and Cumieres on the left
bank of the Meuse.
At this time the French line to the west of the Meuse ran by
the village of Forges, the hills above Bethincourt and Malan-
court, crossed Malancourt Wood and passed in front of Avo-
court. The Germans held positions on the heights of Samogneux
and Champneuville, and their operations were threatened by
the French artillery in the line west of the river.
On March 6, 1916, the Germans began to bombard the French
positions from the Meuse to Bethincourt. They pursued their
usual methods, smashing a selected sector, demolishing advance
works, and keeping a curtain fire over roads and trenches. The
village of Forges during the first half of the day of attack was
literally covered with shells. Crossing the Forges Brook, which
ran through a ravine, and where they were protected from
French artillery fire, the Germans advanced along the northern
slopes of the Cote de TOie. Following the railway line through
Regneville, at all times under heavy fire from French guns,
they attacked Hill 265 on the 7th. An entire division was
employed by the Germans in this assault, and the French, over-
whelmed by weight of men and metal, were forced out of the
position.
In the morning of March 7, 1916, the Germans began a furious
bombardment of Corbeaux Wood. At first the French enjoyed
every advantage, for though the Germans had penetrated the
position, the French by a dashing attack occupied almost the
whole of the wood. A mass attack made by the Germans against
Bethincourt having failed, they counterattacked at Corbeaux
Wood, during which their force was almost annihilated. By
evening of March 8, 1916, the French had recovered all the wood
but a small corner.
The Germans were persistent in their attempts to gain the
wood, despite many failures and heavy losses. On the 10th, after
being reenforced, they threw three regiments against the wood.
The French defense was broken when they lost their colonel and
battalion commanders during the opening bombardment. The
brave defenders, badly hit, were forced to yield ground and
846
THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
t Jy JOB
RENEWAL OF THE BATTLE OF VERDUN 347
retire, but they held the enemy in the wood, thus preventing
him from advancing on Mort Homme, the next objective.
This is a double hill, having a summit of 265 meters at the
northwest and the main summit of 295 meters at the southeast.
The road from Bethincourt to Cumieres scales Hill 265 and
divides it in two. When it reaches Hill 295 it encircles it and
bends toward the northeast.
After a lull that lasted for four days the Germans at half past
10 in the morning began a terrific bombardment to capture
Bethincourt, the Mort Homme, and Cumieres. In this they em-
ployed a great number of heavy guns, and all the points of
attack and the region around was flooded with shells of every
variety. They were said to have fallen at' the rate of one
hundred and twenty a minute.
In the afternoon about 3 o'clock the German infantry attacked.
They succeeded in capturing the first French line, where many
soldiers had fallen half asphyxiated by the gas shells, or were
buried under the debris. Hill 265 was occupied, but the highest
summit, owing to the valor of its defenders, remained in French
hands. During the night the French succeeded in stemming the
German advance by executing a brilliant counterattack which
carried them to the slope between Hill 295 and Bethincourt,
where they came in touch with the enemy.
The French at once proceeded by daring efforts to improve
their positions, and were so successful that when during the
16th and 18th the Germans after prolonged bombardments
resumed their attack on Hill 295 they were repulsed with
appalling losses.
Having failed to capture Mort Homme from the front, the
Germans now attempted to outflank it. They enlarged the
attacking front in the sector of Malancourt and tried to take
Hill 304. In order to do this it was necessary for them to
take the southeastern point of the Avocourt Wood which was
held by the French. On March 20, 1916, the crown prince threw
a fresh division against these woods, the Eleventh Bavarian,
belonging to a selected corps that had seen service in the Galician
and Polish campaigns with Mackensen's army. This division
348 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
launched a number of violent attacks, making use of flame
throwers. They succeeded in capturing Avocourt Wood, but in
the advance on Hill 304 they were caught between two converg-
ing fires and suffered the most appalling losses. According to the
figures given by a neutral military critic, Colonel Feyler, between
March 20 and 22, 1916, the three regiments of this division
lost between 50 and 60 per cent of their number.
This decisive result had the effect of stopping for the time at
least any further attacks by the Germans in this sector. A period
of calm ensued, which they employed in bringing up fresh troops
and in reconstituting their units. Their costly sacrifices in men
and material had brought them little gain. They had advanced
their line to Bethincourt and Cumieres, but the objective they
had been so eager to capture, Mort Homme, was in French pos-
session, and so strongly held that it could only be captured at
an exceedingly heavy price.
CHAPTER XLV
THE STRUGGLE FOR VAUX FORT AND VIL-
LAGE— BATTLE OF MORT HOMME
ON the right bank of the Meuse the Germans on March 8, 1916,
resumed their offensive against the French lines to the east
of Douaumont Fort. The advance was rapidly carried out, and
they succeeded in penetrating Vaux village. A little later by a
dashing bayonet charge the French drove them out of the greater
part of the place except one comer, where they held on deter-
minedly despite the furious attacks that were launched against
them all day long. Vaux Fort had not been included in this
action, or indeed touched, yet a German communique of March
9, 1916, announced that "the Posen Reserve Regiments com-
manded by the infantry general Von Gearetzki-Kornitz had
taken the armored fortress of Vaux by assault, as well as many
other fortifications near by."
BATTLE OF MORT HOMME 349
At the very hour, 2 p. m., that this telegram appeared an
officer of the French General Staff entered the fort and dis-
covered that it had not been attacked at all, and that the garri-
son were on duty and quite undisturbed by the bombardment
storming about the walls.
During the following days the Germans attempted to make
good the false report of their capture of the fort by launching
a series of close attacks. The slopes leading to the fort were
piled with German dead. According to what German prisoners
said, these attacks were among the costliest they had engaged
in during the entire campaign. It was necessary for them to
bring up fresh troops to reconstitute their shattered units.
At daybreak on March 11, 1916, the Germans renewed their
attack on Vaux village with desperate energy. The French had
had time to fortify the place in the most ingenious manner. The
defense was so admirably organized that it merits detailed de-
scription, if only to illustrate that the French are not inferior to
the Germans in ''thoroughness*' in military matters.
The French trenches ran from the end of the main street of
the village to the church. Barricades had been constructed at
the foot of Hardaumont Hill at intervals of about a hundred
yards. Around the ruined walls of the houses barbed wire
was strongly wound and the street was mined in a number
of places. The houses on the two flanks were heavily fortified
with sandbags, while numerous machine guns with steel shields
were set up in positions where they could command all the
approaches. Batteries of mountain guns firing shrapnel were
also cunningly hidden in places where they could work the
greatest destruction.
The French had so skillfully planned the defenses that the
Germans twice fought their way up and back the length of the
main street without discovering the chief centers of resistance.
For nine hours the German bombardment of Vaux Fort and
village was prolonged. Enormous aerial torpedoes were hurled
into the ruined houses, but in the chaos of dust and flame and
smoke the French held fast, and not a position of any importance
within the village or its surroundings was abandoned.
850 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
The first regiments to attack were drawn from the Fifteenth
and Eighteenth German Army Corps. At daybreak, when the
German hosts debouched from the plain of the Woevre, there
was a heavy white mist which enabled them to reach the French
trenches. Owing to the enemy's superiority in numbers, and
fearing that they might be surrounded, the French retired from
their first positions. The Germans pushed their way as far as
the church, losing heavily, and could go no farther. They found
some shelter behind the ruined walls of the church and neigh-
boring houses. Each time that they attempted to leave the pro-
tective walls the French guns smashed their ranks and slew
hundreds.
When the mist vanished and the air cleared, the French bat-
teries of 75's and 155*s opened a heavy fire on and behind the
foremost German regiments, which not only cut gaps in their
formations, but shut them off from any help. The German com-
manders were in a desperate state of mind, for they could not
send either men or ammunition to the relief of the troops under
fire. The Germans did not start any new attacks after that for
a day and a half, although their artillery continued active.
Vaux Fort the Germans claimed to have captured, when after
four days of the bloodiest fighting they had not succeeded in
reaching even the entanglements around the position.
The struggle in the village was of the most desperate char-
acter, but while it lasted there was no more terrible fighting
during the Verdun battle than that which raged back and forth
on the outskirts of the fort. French officers from their com-
manding positions on the neighboring heights afterward testified
that they had never seen the German command so recklessly and
wantonly sacrifice their men. Column after column was sent
forward to certain death. Giant shells hurled by the French
burst in the midst of the exposed German battalions, and the
dead were piled in heaps over acres of ground.
While this slaughter was going on the German artillery was
trying to destroy the French batteries on the plateau, but being
cunningly concealed few were silenced. The French freely
acknowledged the great bravery displayed by the Germans, who,
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BATTLE OF MORT HOMME 351
after gaining the foot of the slope, fought splendidly for an
hour to get up to the fort. Then reserve Bavarian troops were
brought forward and endeavored to climb the slopes by clinging
to rocks and bushes. Many lost their foothold, or were struck
down under the rain of shells. At last even the German com-
mand sickened of the slaughter and ordered a retreat.
It was an especially bitter fact to the Germans that they had
incurred such great losses without gaining any advantage. The
French positions before the fort and in Vaux village remained
intact, and the enemy had failed utterly in their attempts to
pierce the Vaux-Douaumont line.
After some days' pause for reorganization, on March 16, 1916,
the Germans made five attacks on the village and fortress of
Vaux. After a bombardment by thousands of shells they must
have believed that their opponents would be crushed, if not
utterly annihilated. But the French soldiers clung stubbornly
to the shell-ravaged ground, and though sadly reduced in num-
bers, held their positions and flung back five times the German
horde.
Two days later, on the 18th, the Germans resumed their
offensive, and no less than six attacks were made, in which flame
projectors were freely used and every effort made to smash the
stubborn defense. But the French wall of iron held firm, and in
every instance the Germans were beaten back with colossal
losses. Again they were compelled to pause and reorganize their
lines. The calm that succeeded the storm was no less welcome
to the French defenders in this sector, for they too had been hit
hard, and it was questionable if they could have held their posi-
tions against another strong attack.
Attacks on the sector north of Verdun having failed, the
G^ermans began on March 20, 1916, and continued during suc-
ceeding days to turn the French by their (German) right in the
.Vlalancourt sector. The woods of Montfau^on and Malancourt,
where the Germans were strongly established, crown a great
island of sand and clay. The southeastern portion of Malan-
court Wood forms a sort of promontory known as Avocourt
Wood, and was the objective of the next German attack. The
W— War St 5
352
THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
BATTLE OF MORT HOMME 359
main purpose in this operation was to extend their offensive
front.
On March 20, 1916, after intense bombardment in which their
heaviest guns were employed, the Germans sent a new division
that had been hurried up from another front against the French
positions between Avocourt and Malancourt. The attackers were
thrown back in disorder at every point but a comer of Malan-
court Wood. During the night, though strongly opposed by the
French, who contested every foot of ground, and despite heavy
losses, the Germans penetrated and occupied Avocourt "Wood,
from which they could not be dislodged. The French were,
however, in a position to prevent them from leaving the wood,
and every attempt made by the Germans to debouch met with
failure.
On March 22, 1916, the Germans having bombarded through-
out the day, made a number of attacks between Avocourt Wood
and Malancourt village. The French defeated every effort they
made to leave the wood, but they obtained a foothold on Hau-
court Hill, where the French occupied the redoubt.
For five days the Germans were engaged in filling up their
broken units with fresh troops and in preparing plans of attack.
On March 28, 1916, strong bodies of German infantry were
thrown against the French front at Haucourt and Malancourt.
In numbers they far outmatched the French defenders, but they
gained no advantage and were thrown back in disorder. Em-
boldened by this success, the French on the 29th counterattacked
to recover Avocourt Wood, and occupied the southeast corner,
which included an important stronghold, the Avocourt Redoubt.
The Germans attacked and bombarded throughout the day.
Their attempts to regain the captured position in the wood failed,
but they secured a foothold on the northern edge of the village
of Malancourt.
This place was held by a single French battalion. It formed a
salient in the French line, and the Germans appeared to be
desperately eager to capture it. In the night of March 80, 1916,
they launched mass attacks from three sides of the village. The
fighting was of the most violent character and raged all night
354 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
long. There were hand-to-hand struggles from house to hous^
the losses were heavy on both sides. Finally the French were
forced to evacuate, the place now a mass of ruins. They occupied,
however, positions that commanded the exits to the place.
Early in the evening of the following day, the 31st, the Ger-
mans launched two violent attacks on French positions north-
east of Hill 295 in the Mort Homme sector. Tear shells and
every variety of projectile were rained upon the French de-
fenses. The attacks were delivered with dash and vigor, and
in one instance they succeeded in penetrating a position. But
the German success was only temporary. The French rallied,
and fell upon the intruders in a counterattack that drove them
from the field.
During the evening and all night long the Germans violently
bombarded the territory between the wood south of Haudre-
mont and Vaux village. Twice they attacked in force. The
French defeated one assault, but the second carried the Ger-
mans into Vaux, where they occupied the western portion of
the place.
On April 2, 1916, the fighting was prolonged throughout the
day. The Germans employed more than a division in the four
simultaneous attacks they made on French positions between
Douaumont Fort and Vaux village. Southeast of the fort they
succeeded for a time in occupying a portion of Caillette Wood,
but were subsequently ejected.
On the same day the Germans on the northern bank of Forges
Brook, to the west of Verdun, made a spirited attack on the
French lines on the southern bank, but it was not a success, and
they lost heavily. They also failed on the following day in an
attack on Haucourt.
During the night between March 5 and 6, 1916, the Germans
attacked two of the salients of the Avocourt-Bethincourt front
with a large body of troops. On the French right they failed
entirely, and suffered heavy losses. In the center, after many
costly failures, they gained a foothold in Haucourt Wood. On
the other hand, the French delivered a strong counterattack from
the Avocourt Redoubt and succeeded in reoccupying a large
BATTLE OF MORT HOMME 355
portion of the so-called "Square Wood*' and in capturing half a
hundred prisoners.
During the night of March, 6, 1916, new German attacks were
launched along the Bethincourt-Chattancourt road. Part of the
French first line was occupied, but was later lost.
On the 7th the Germans attacked on a front of over a mile.
The assailants lacked neither dash nor daring, and were strong
in numbers, but they were shattered against the wall of French
defense and driven back with slaughter to their own line. At-
tempts on the French positions south and east of Haucourt dur-
ing the night of the 7th failed, except in the south, where the
Germans occupied two small works.
As a result of the fighting between March 30 and April 8, 1916,
the Germans had possession of the French advanced line on
Forges Brook and were in a position to strike at the most formi-
dable line of French defense, the Avocourt-Hill 304-Mort Homme-
Cumieres front.
The French General Staff during this gigantic struggle was
constantly guided by the following rule : Make the Germans pay
dearly for each of their advances. When it was believed that in
order to defend a certain point too many sacrifices would have to
be made, they evacuated that point. As soon as the Germans
took hold of the point, however, they were the target of a terrific
fire from all of the French guns, which were put to work at once.
This was what General Petain, commanding the Verdun army,
called "the crushing fire."
On April 9, 1916, a general attack was made by the Germans
on the front between Haucourt and Cumieres, and simultaneously
assaults were delivered north and west of Avocourt and in Ma-
lancourt Wood and the wood near Haudromont Farm. The
struggle for the possession of Mort Homme developed into one
of the most notable and important battles of Verdun. The
attacking front of the Germans ran from west of Avocourt to
beyond the Meuse as high as the wood in the Haudromont Farm.
This general attack, one of the most violent that the Germans
had made at Verdun, failed completely. On the left of the
French, a little strip of land along the southern edge of the Avo-
356
THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
BATTLE OF MORT HOMME 357
court Wood was won, but in a dashing counterattack the French
recaptured it. In the center the Germans were repulsed every-
where, except south of Bethincourt, where they succeeded in
penetrating an advanced work. On the right bank, at the side of
Pepper Hill, the Germans only gained a foothold in one trench
east of Vacherauville. The main summit of Mort Homme, Hill
295, as well as Hill 304, the principal positions, remained firmly
in the hands of the French.
A captain of the French General Staff, and who was an eye-
witness, has described in a French publication some striking
phases of the fight :
"It is Sunday, and the sun shines brilliantly above — a real
spring Sunday. The artillery duel was long and formidable.
Mort Homme was smoking like a volcano with innumerable
craters. The attack took place about noon. At the same time,
from this same place, lines of sharpshooters could be seen be-
tween the Corbeaux Wood and Cumieres and the gradient at the
east of Mort Homme. They must have come from the Raffecourt
or from the Forges Mill, through the covered roads in the valley-
like depressions in the ground. It was the first wave immedi-
ately followed by heavy columns. Our artillery fire from the
edge of Corbeaux Wood isolated them. ... At times a rocket
appeared in the air ; the call to the cannons, then the marking of
the road. The regular ticktack of the machine guns and the
cracking of the shells were distinctly heard even among the
terrific noises of the bombardment.
"The German barrage fire in the rear of our front lines is so
frightful that one must not dream of going through it. Where
will our reenforcements pass? The inquietude increases when
at 3.15 p. m. sharp numerous columns in disorder regain on
the run the wood of Cumieres. What a wonderful sight is the
flight of the enemy! The sun shines fully on these small
moving groups. But our shells also explode among them, and
the groups separate, stop disjointed. They disappear; they
are lying down. They get up — ^not all of them — but do not
know where to go, like pheasants flying haphazard before the
fusillade.
358 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
"With a tenacity that must be acknowledged the enemy comes
back to the charge, but the new attacks are less ordinate, less
complete, and quite weak. Even from a distance one feels that
they cannot succeed as well as the first. This lasts until sunset."
To honor the French troops for their brilliant defense General
Petain issued the following Order of the Day :
"April 9, 1916, has been a glorious day for our armies. The
furious assaults of the crown prince's soldiers have been broken
everywhere ; infantry, artillerymen, sappers, and aviators of the
Second Army have rivaled each other in heroism. Honor to all !
"The Germans will attack again without a doubt; let each
work and watch, so that we may obtain the same success.
"Courage ! We will win !*'
Far from showing the effects of their defeat, the Germans on
April 10, 1916, attacked Caillette Wood, but were repulsed.
Further attempts made in the course of the night to eject the
French from the trenches to the south of Douaumont also failed.
These futile assaults by no means weakened the Germans* de-
termination, and on March 11, 1916, they attacked in force the
front between Douaumont and Vaux. At some points they
succeeded in penetrating the French trenches, but were driven
out by vigorous counterattacks.
On March 12, 1916, the French learned that the enemy was
making elaborate preparations to the west of the Meuse for a
great assault. Before the Germans could make ready for the
attack the French artillery showered their trenches and con-
centration points with shells, and the assaulting columns that
were in the act of assembling were scattered in disorder. The
French fire was so intense that the Germans who occupied the
first line of trenches were unable to leave them.
Artillery duels continued for several days, marked on the 15th
by a spirited attack made by the French on the German trenches
at Douaumont, during which they took several hundred pris-
oners and wrested from the enemy some positions.
The German bombardment now reached the highest pitch oi
intensity, and the sector between Bras on the Meuse and
Douaumont was swept by a storm of fire. Poivre (or Pepper)
BATTLE OF MORT HOMME 359
Hill, Haudremont, and Chaufour Wood especially, were sub-
jected to such destruction that old landmarks were wiped
out as by magic, and the very face of nature was changed
and distorted.
Having, as they believed, made the way clear for advance, the
Germans launched an attack in great force. It was estimated
that the attacking mass numbered 35,000 men. Believing that
their guns had so crushed the French forces that they would be
unable to present any serious defense, the German hordes swept
on to attack on a front of about three miles. Their reception was
hardly what had been anticipated. Great ragged gaps were torn
in their formations as the French brought rifles, machine guns,
and heavy artillery into play. Their dead lay in heaps on the
ground, and along the whole front they were only able on the
right to penetrate a French trench south of Chaufour Wood.
The greater part of this was subsequently won back by their
opponents in a counterattack. On the 19th a German infantry
assault launched against Eparges failed.
There was a lull in the fighting during most of the day of
April 28, 1916, but in the twilight the Germans attacked at points
between Douaumont and Vaux and west of Thiaumont, but were
forced back by the French artillery.
During the following day the Germans incessantly bombarded
French positions and made a futile attack. On the 30th the
French forces north of Mort Homme were on the offensive,
and carried a German trench. East of Mort Homme on the
Cumieres front on the same day they captured from the Germans
1,000 meters of trenches along a depth varying from 300 to
600 meters.
The Germans reattacked almost immediately with two of their
most famous corps, the Eighteenth and the Third Branden-
burgers, which had suffered so severely at Douaumont that they
had been relegated to the rear. It was estimated by the neutral
military critic, Colonel Feyler, that the first of these corps had
lost 17,000 men and the second 22,000. After the fight in which
they had been so hard hit the two corps had spent seven weeks
resting and were now drawn again into the battle. Both were
S60 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
in action in the evening of April 30, 1916, the Third north of
Mort Homme and the Eighteenth at Cumieres.
According to the evidence given by German prisoners, the
Third Corps again received heavy punishment. Of one regiment,
the Sixty-fourth, only a remnant survived, and one battalion lost
nearly a hundred men during the first attack.
The Eighteenth Corps of Brandenburgers succeeded in pene-
trating one point in the French lines, but a French regiment
rushed the trench with fixed bayonets and destroyed or captured
all the Germans in occupation.
Some futile attempts were made by the Germans to retrieve
their failure, but the French firmly maintained their positions.
In the evening of May 1, 1916, the French again assumed the
offensive and successfully stormed a 500-yard sector south of
Douaumont. On the front northwest of Mort Homme, between
Hills 295 and 265, the French made a brilliant attack in the
evening of May 3, 1916, which was entirely successful, the Grer-
mans being pushed back beyond the line they had won early in
March, 1916.
The position of the French front on May 5, 1916, was as
follows : It was bounded by a line that ran through Pepper Hill,
Hardaumont Wood, the ravine to the southwest of the village of
Douaumont, Douaumont plateau to the south, and a few hun-
dred yards from the fort, the northern edge of Caillette Wood,
the ravine and village of Vaux, and the slopes of the fortress
of Vaux.
On May 5, 1916, this line vras on the whole intact. Only in
one place had the Germans gained a small advance; they had
captured Vaux village, which consisted of a single street, but
the French occupied the slopes near by that commanded the place.
There was no change on the French line on the left bank,
where the character of the ground was favorable for defense.
For two months the French line had remained fixed on Hill 304
and on Mort Homme. Only the covering line, which extended
from the wood of Avocourt to the Meuse along the slopes of
Haucourt, the bed of Forges Brook, and the crests north of
Cumieres, had been broken by the terrific attacks of the enemy.
BATTLES OF HILL 304 AND DOUAUMONT 361
The crown prince's army, which had been badly punished and
suffered heavy losses in this area in March, renewed the attempt
to capture Mort Homme and Hill 304 in May, 1916. It was
evident from the elaborate preparations made to possess these
points that the Germans considered them of first importance
and that their conquest would hasten the defeat of the French
army.
CHAPTER XLVI
BATTLES OP HILL 304 AND DOUAUMONT
— THE STRUGGLE AT FLEURY
IT will be recalled that on April 9, 1916, the crown prince had
launched a general attack on the whole front between Avo-
court and the Meuse, the capture of Hill 304 being one of his
chief objectives. The onslaught, carried out on a huge scale,
was a failure, and another attempt made on the 28th also col-
lapsed. Since then the Germans had been held in their trenches,
unable to engage in any action owing to the vigilance of the
French artillery gunners.
On May 3, 1916, the Germans began a violent bombardment
as a prelude to another attempt to capture Hill 340. On the
following day, about 2 p. m., their assaulting waves were hurled
against the French positions on the counterslope north of the
hill. The bombardment had been so destructive that large num-
bers of French soldiers were buried in the trenches. The active
defenders that remained were not strong enough in numbers to
repel the masses of Germans thrown against them, and the
slopes were occupied by the enemy. During the night there was
a French counterattack; it was directed by a brilliant officer of
the General Staff, Lieutenant Colonel Odent, Who had at his own
request been assigned the duty of defending this dangerous posi-
tion. Rallying the men of his regiment, he threw them against
the foe. The French succeeded in reaching the edges of the
plateau facing northeast. This advance was not gained without
362 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
considerable losses, and during the charge Lieutenant Colonel
Odent was killed.
On May 5, 1916, the Germans after an intense bombardment,
in which gas shells were lavishly used, tried to turn Hill 304,
and also attacked the Camart Wood and Hill 287. On the
northern slope of Hill 304 the French trenches were so badly
damaged that they could not be held. But the Germans, caught
by the French artillery fire, found it impossible to advance.
Having failed to reach the plateau from the north, an attempt
was made through the ravine and behind the woods west and
northwest of Hill 304. This plan was frustrated by the French,
who repulsed them with the bayonet.
The German attacks having failed everjrwhere. Hill 304 was
subjected to continuous and violent bombardment. In the after-
noon of the 7th they attacked again. With the exception of a
strip of trench east of the hill, which was retaken the following
night, they did not register any advance.
Among the German regiments participating in these attacks
the following were identified: Regiments of the Eleventh Ba-
varian Division, a regiment of the Hundred and Ninety-second
Brigade, the Twelfth Reserve Division, the Fourth Division, and
the Forty-third Reserve Division.
From the 13th to the 16th of May, 1916, the Germans con-
tinued their attacks on the Camart Wood west of Hill 304. In
these operations they employed a fresh corps, the Twenty-second
Reserve Corps, for the first time.
After a lull lasting a few days the battle assumed an increas-
ing violence on the left bank. In the afternoon of the 20th the
Germans threw four divisions to the assault of Mort Homme.
During the night and on the following day the battle raged with
undiminished fury. At a heavy cost the Germans succeeded at
last in capturing some trenches north and west of Mort Homme.
At one time the French second lines were seriously threatened,
but a spirited defense scattered the attackers. After intense
fighting the French won back some of the ground they had lost
on Hill 287, and during May 21 and 22, 1916, succeeded in re-
gaining other positions captured by the enemy.
BATTLES OF HILL 304 AND DOUAUMONT 363
The recovery of Fort Douaumont which had been occupied by
Brandenburgers since February 25, 1916, was now the aim of
the French. General Mangin, one of the youngest officers of that
rank in the French army and commanding the Fifth Division,
directed operations. The French brought into action their
heaviest artillery, which opened a terrific fire on the German
lines.
The French soldiers accepted it as an omen of success when
about 8 o^clock in the morning of May 22, 1916, six captive bal-
loons stationed over the right bank of the Meuse exploded, thus
depriving the German batteries of their observers on whom they
counted to get the range.
At about 10 in the morning the French infantry by a brilliant
charge captured three lines of German trenches. The fortress
of Douaumont was penetrated, and during the entire night a
fierce struggle was continued within its walls. In spite of the
most violent efforts of the Germans to dislodge the French they
maintained their positions within the fort.
Throughout the morning of May 23, 1916, the Germans rained
shells on French positions defended by the Hundred and Twenty-
ninth Regiment. The bombardment spread destruction among
the French troops, but they still clung to the terrain they had
won and refused to yield or retreat.
Throughout the night of May 23, 1916, the bloody struggle
continued unabated. On the morning of May 24, 1916, the for-
tress was still in the hands of the French, with the exception of
the northern salient and some parts to the east. On the follow-
ing day two new Bavarian divisions were thrown into the fight
and succeeded in retaking the lines of the fortress, driving back
the French as far as the immediate approaches; that is, to the
places they occupied previous to their attack.
On the left bank of the Meuse the fighting slowed down, de-
creasing gradually in intensity. The Germans were reacting
feebly in this territory, concentrating their greatest efforts on
the right bank. Throughout the whole region of Thiaumont,
Douaumont, and Vaux they pressed the fighting and were en-
gaged in almost continuous attacks and bombardments.
164
THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
BATTLES OF HILL 304 AND DOUAUMONT 365
On the 1st of June, 1916, all the French front in this sector
was attacked. The Germans, disregarding their heavy losses,
returned repeatedly to the charge. It was ascertained through a
document found on a prisoner that General Falkenhayn, chief of
the German General Staff, had given the order to advance at
all costs.
The Germans attacked fearlessly, but the only progress they
succeeded in making was through the Caillette Wood to the
southern edge of Vaux Pool.
For fiwe days this battle continued, one of the most desperately
fought around Verdun, and yet the Germans made insignificant
gains, out of all proportion to their immense losses. The Ba-
varian Division which led the attack displayed an "unprecedented
violence,'* according to a French communique issued at the time.
The Germans, repulsed again and again, returned to the charge,
and succeeded in obtaining a foothold in the first houses of
Damloup.
The struggle was continued without pause during the night
from June 2 to June 3, 1916. By repeated and vigorous attacks
the Germans at last entered the ditches to the north of the
fortress of Vaux, but were unable to penetrate the works oc-
cupied by the French.
About 8 o'clock in the evening of June 3, 1916, the Germans
attempted to surprise the fortress at the southeast by escalading
the ravine which cuts the bank of the Mouse near Damloup.
This was foiled by the French, who drove them back in a
sharp counterattack. The Germans did not make the attempt
again at this time, but continued to bombard the fort with
heavy guns.
On June 4, 1916, at 3 in the afternoon, several German bat-
talions advancing from Vaux Pool attempted to climb the slopes
to the* wood of Fumin, but were swept back by French machine-
gun fire. In the evening and during the night the Germans re-
peatedly attacked without gaining any advantage. The wood of
Fumin remained in French possession.
There were no attacks on the following day, owing to weather
conditions and the general exhaustion of the German troops.
866
THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
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BATTLES OF HILL 304 AND DOUAUMONT 367
But the Sixth German Artillery resumed its firing on the for-
tress, throwing such an avalanche of shells that every approach
to the place became impassable. Inside the works a mere hand-
ful of French under Major Raynal firmly held its ground.
In the evening of June 6, 1916, the garrison of the fortress of
Vaux repulsed a savage German attack; but during the night,
owing to the tremendous bombardment which cut off all com-
munication with the fortress, the position of the French became
serious indeed. The brave garrison was now entirely sur-
rounded. Finally by means of signals they were able to make
their condition known to French troops at some distance away.
Unless they could get speedy assistance there was no hope of
their holding the fort. The struggle continued more desperately
than ever as the Grermans realized how precarious was the
French hold on the place.
On June 6, 1916, the French gunner Vannier, taking with him
some comrades, most of whom were wounded, succeeded in
escaping through an air hole and tried to reach the French lines.
The heroic garrison had now reached the limit of human en-
durance. Without food or water, it was hopeless for them to
continue their defense of the place. When the last hope was
gone. Major Raynal addressed this message to his men :
''We have stayed the limit. Officers and men have done their
duty. Long live France V
On June 7, 1916, the Germans took possession of the fortress
and its heroic garrison.
Major Raynal for his brave conduct was by order of General
Joffre made a Commander of the Legion of Honor. According
to a German report Raynal was permitted by the crown prince
to retain his sword in appreciation of his valorous defense of the
fort. It must be conceded that the capture of Fort Vaux, though
costly, was a valuable acquisition to the Germans, and served to
hearten and encourage the troops who had met with so many
disasters in this area.
By this victory they were brought into contact with the inner
line of the Verdun defenses, and now if ever were in a position
for a supreme effort which might decide the war, as far as
X— War St. 5
368 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
France was concerned. But if this desired end was to be ob^
tained, the crushing blow must be delivered at once, for time
threatened. Russian successes on the southeastern front had
created a new and serious problem. It was known that a Franco-
British offensive was imminent. The Germans were in a situa-
tion that called for heroic action: the capture of Verdun with
all possible speed.
During the month of June, 1916, the Germans used up men
and material on a lavish and unprecedented scale. On June 23,
1916, they started a general attack against the French positions
of Froideterre, Fleury, and Souville. From papers taken from
prisoners it was learned that a very great offensive was intended
which the Germans believed would carry them up to the very
walls of Verdun. The German troops were ordered to advance
without stopping, without respite, and regardless of losses, to
capture the last of the French positions. The assaulting force
that was to carry out this program was estimated to number
between 70,000 and 80,000 men.
Preceded by a terrific bombardment the Germans attacked at
8 o'clock in the morning of June 23, 1916, on a front of five
kilometers, from Hill 321 to La Lauffee. Under the fury of the
onslaught the French line was bent in at a certain point. The
Thiaumont works and some near-by trenches were carried by the
Germans. One of their strong columns succeeded in penetrating
the village of Fleury, but was speedily ejected. To the west in
the woods of Chapitre and Fumin all the German assaults were
shattered. During the night the French counterattacked ; th^
recaptured a. part of the ground lost between Hills 820 and 321
and drove the Germans back as far as the Thiaumont works.
The battle raged with varying fortunes to the combatants all
day long on June 24, 1916. The village of Fleury in the center
was directly under fire of the German guns, and they succeeded
in occupying a group of houses. The French delivered a dash-
ing counterattack, and were successful in freeing all but a small
part of the place. On the 25th the Germans doubled the violence
of their bombardment. Not since they assumed the offensive
had they launched such a tornado of destructive fire. Another
THE BATTLE OF MORT HOMME
369
VERDUN GAIN UP TO AUGUST, 1916
370 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
objective of the Germans besides Fleury was the fortress of
Souville. In the ravines of Bazile they suffered appalling losses,
but succeeded in gaining a foothold in the wood of Chapitre.
The French, counterattacking, regained most of the lost ground,
and still held the village of Fleury.
The struggle around Thiaumont works continued for days,
during which the place changed hands several times. It was
recaptured by the French on June 28, 1916, lost again on the
following day, retaken once more, and on July 4, 1916, it was
again in German hands. The struggle over this one position
will give some impression of the intensity of the fighting along
the entire front during this great offensive which the Germans
hoped and believed would prove decisive.
The general tactics pursued by the Germans in these attacks
never varied. They made their efforts successively on the ri^t
and on the left of the point under aim, so that they could en-
circle the point which formed in this manner a salient, and was
suitable for concentration of artillery fire.
The Germans failed to make any serious advance in the center
of the French lines, being halted by vigorous counterattacks.
On July 12, 1916, the Germans attacked with six regiments and
pushed their way to the roads to Fleury and Vaux within 800
meters of the fortress of Souville. This advance during the
next few days was halted by the French.
The Germans claimed to have captured thirty-nine French
officers and 2,000 men during their attack. They did not, ap-
parently, attempt to pursue their advantage and press on, but-
returned to bombarding the French works at Souville, Chenois,
and La Lauff ee. As the Allied offensive on the Somme developed
strength, the German attacks on Verdun perceptibly weakened^
and beyond a few patrol engagements in Chenois Wood, no
further infantry fighting was reported from Verdun on July 16,
1916. But the French continued to "nibble** into the German
positions around Fleury three miles from Verdun, and had im-
proved and strengthened their positions at Hill 304. Fleury
was now the nearest point to Verdun that the Germans had
succeeded in reaching, but here their advance was halted.
SPRING OPERATIONS IN OTHER SECTORS 371
The British had meanwhile been pressing forward on the
Somme, and by July 23, 1916, had penetrated the German third
line. The Russians too were winning successes, and had dealt
a destructive blow in Volhynia. The pressure from the east
and west forced the Germans to withdraw large bodies of troops
from the Verdun sector and send them to the relief of their
brothers on other fronts.
In the closing days of July, 1916, the Franco-British "push**
became the principal German preoccupation. The great struggle
for Verdun, the longest battle continuously fought in history,
from that time on became a military operation of only second
importance.
The magnitude of this great struggle may be illustrated by
a few statistics. In the six months* combat some 3,000 cannon
had been brought into action. About two millions of men
had attacked or defended the stronghold. No correct esti-
mate can be made of the losses on both sides, but it is stated
that at least 200,000 were killed, and the end was not yet in
sight.
The second anniversary of the war found the Germans on the
defensive. Twenty million fighters had been called to the colors
of twelve belligerent nations ; about four million had been killed,
and over ten million wounded and taken prisoners. For all this
vast expenditure in blood and treasure no decisive battle had
been fought since the German defeat on the Mame in Sep-
tember, 1914.
CHAPTER XLVII
SPRING OPERATIONS IN OTHER SECTORS
WHILE greater issues were being fought out in the Verdun
sector, from the beginning of the second phase of the Ger-
man attack during March, there was considerable sporadic "live-
liness" on other parts of the western front. Though the main
interest centered for the time around the apparently inpreg-
372 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
nable fortresses of which Verdun is the nucleus, a continuous,
fluctuating activity was kept in progress along the whole line
up to the opening of the big allied offensive on the last day of
June. March 1, 1916, found the battle line practically unchanged.
From Ostend on the North Sea it ran straightway south through
the extreme western comer of Belgium, crossing the French
frontier at a point northwest of Lille. From there it zigzagged
its way to a point about sixty miles north of Paris, whence
it then followed an eastern tangent paralleling the northern
bank of the River Aisne; thence easterly to Verdun, forming
there a queer half -moon salient arc with the points bent sharply
toward the center. From the south of Verdun the line extended
unbroken and rather straight south and a little easterly to the
Swiss frontier.
In the Ypres sector during the first four days of March the
fighting was confined to the usual round of violent artillery duels,
mine springing, hand grenade skirmishing, intermittent hand-to-
hand attacks and effective aircraft raids. On March 1, 1916,
twenty British aircraft set out seeking as their objective the
important German lines of communication and advanced bases
east and north of Lille. Considerable damage was inflicted with
high explosive bombs. One British aeroplane failed to return.
From all parts thrilling, tragic and heroic aerial exploits are
recorded. While cruising over the Beanon-Jussy road a German
Fokker observed a rapidly moving enemy transport. Re-
versing his course, the pilot floated over the procession and
dropped bombs. The motor lorries stopped immediately, when
the aeroplane dropped toward the earth, attacked the transport
at close range and got away again in safety. On the same day
also a French biplane equipped with double motors encountered
an enemy plane near Cemay, in the valley of the Thur, and
brought it down a shattered mass of flame. North of Soissons,
near the village of Vezaponin, a French machine was shot down
into the German lines; another French aero was struck by
German antiaircraft guns; with a marvelous dive and series of
loops it crashed to earth. Both pilot and observer were buried
with their machine. During the evening of March 1, 1916, the
SPRING OPERATIONS IN OTHER SECTORS 373
Grerman infantry, after a furious cannonading north of the
Somme, delivered a sharp assault on a line of British trenches,
but were held back by machine-gun fire. Along the Ypres sector
the same night violent gunfire took place on both sides with ap-
parently small effect or damage. In a previous volume it was
mentioned that the Germans had once more recaptured the
"international trench*' on February 14, 1916. For a fortnight
the British artillery constantly held the position under fire and
prevented the consolidation of the ground. At 4.30 a. m. the
British infantry suddenly emerged from their trenches. The
grenadiers dashed ahead, smothering the surprised Germans
with bombs. The general disorder was increased by the fact that
the trench parties were just being relieved. In a few minutes the
lost ground was recovered, the German line dangerously pushed
in and 254 prisoners, including five officers, fell to the British.
At midday the Germans bombarded the line with fifty batteries
for four hours. Then waves of assaulting columns were let
loose against the British. The latter noticed that the front line
of infantry hurled their bombs several yards behind the British
trenches and rushed forward with hands up. Immediately a
hurricane of shells from their own guns burst among the Ger-
man infantry. The survivors flung themselves on the ground
and crawled into the British trenches for protection. This ac-
tion was the more significant in that the men who thus sur-
rendered were all very young and belonged to a regiment which,
until then, had fought with conspicuous bravery. At the end
of the day the British counted more than 300 corpses, while
their own losses were slight and their entire gains maintained.
Most of the combats in the Artois and Ypres sectors consisted
of mine springing and crater fighting. What was once the
Hohenzollern Redoubt was particularly the scene of some vigor-
ous subterranean warfare. What happened there on March 2 is
thus described by an eyewitness: "Many huge craters have
been made, won, and what is more, retained by a rare com-
bination of skill, courage, and endurance. Men who fought all
through the war have seen nothing comparable with the largest
of these craters. They are amphitheaters, and cover perhaps
874 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
half an acre of ground. When the mine exploded at 5.45 p. m.
on March 2, 1916, a thing like a great black mushroom rose from
the earth. Beneath it appeared, with the ponderous momentum
of these big upheavals, a white growth like the mushroom's gills.
It was the chalk subsoil following in the wake of the black loam.
With this black and white upheaval went up, Heaven knows,
how many bodies and limbs of Germans, scattered everywhere
with the rest of the debris. And the explosion . sent up many
graves as well as the bodies of the living. One of the Britii^
bombers who occupied the crater and spent a crowded hour hurl-
ing bombs from the farther lip found that he was steadying
himself and getting a lever for the bowling arm by clinging on to
a black projection with his left hand. It was a Hessian boot. The
soil of the amphitheater was so worked, mixed, and sieved by the
explosive action and the effects of the melting snow that it was
almost impassable. A staff officer, among others, who went up to
help, had to be pulled out of the morass as he was carrying away
one of the wounded. There is no fighting so terrible and so con-
densed as crater fighting. The struggle is a veritable graveyard,
a perfect target for bomb and grenade and the slower attack of
the enemy's mine. The British held a circle of German trenches
on a little ridge of ground north of Loos. The capture meant that
they could overlook the plain beyond and win a certain projection.
At 6.00 p. m. on March 2, 1916, the engineers exploded four mines
under the nearer arc, and within a few minutes, while artillery
thundered overhead, the British infantry advanced in spite of
terrible mud and occupied each crater. Not a single machine gun
was fired at them as they charged — probably the mines had
destroyed them all — and their casualties were very small
indeed."
Germans counterattacking hurried up their communication
trenches, and as they came on some examples of prompt handi-
work stopped their advance. A sergeant and one man stopped
one rush ; a color sergeant and private, well equipped with sand-
bags, each holding a score of bombs, performed miracles of re-
sistance. Every night the Germans came on, capping a day of
continuous bombardment with showers of bombs, rifle grenades,
SPRING OPERATIONS IN OTHER SECTORS 875.
and artillery, mostly 5.9 howitzers, and with infantry onsets
at close quarters. They stormed with dash and determination,
backed by good artillery and an apparently inexhaustible stock
of grenades. The tale of the German losses was high. One
communication trench packed with men was raked from end to
end with a British Lewis gun till it was a graveyard. On this
occasion the British artillery was overwhelming in amount and
volume; sheik were not spared, and they fired ten to the Ger-
mans' one. Within less than a mile and a half there were eight
groups of mines.
On March 3, 1916, an intense artillery duel progressed for
possession of the Bluff, an elevated point above the Ypres-
Comines Canal. The Germans evidently regarded the point as
important, for they flung great masses of troops over the Bluff,
when the British attacked and captured more than their lost
lines of trenches running along an eastern hillock by the canal.
The next night and morning the British heavy artillery poured
a continuous stream of shell on the Bluff in well-marked time.
The men in the front trenches began cheering, as always before
an attack, but instead of advancing they shot over a heavy,
shower of bombs. One soldier alone was credited with having
flung more than 300 bombs into the German trenches. In the
obscurity of the gray dawn British troops quietly and suddenly,
dashed into the Germans and cleared the trenches with bayonets.
This was accomplished in two minutes, when the large guns
spread a curtain of fire over the Germans, inflicting severe
losses. The German soldiers then attempted resolute counter-
attacks, but were repulsed with machine-gun fire.
Between the 1st and 4th of March, 1916, there was sharp gre-
nade fighting southeast of Vermelles, in some mine craters. After
severe bombardment the Germans attempted to recapture the
craters by infantry attacks, but apparently without success. In
Artois they endeavored to drive the French from a crater they
occupied near the road from Neuville to La Folie, and failed in
the enterprise. In the Argonne the French bombarded the Ger-
man organizations in the region southeast of Vauquois and de-
moUshed several shelters, while in Lorraine, in the neighborhood
876 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
of the Thiauville Ponds, the French carried sections of German
trenches after artillery preparation, capturing sixty prisoners,
including two officers, and some machine guns. On March 4,
1916, a serious explosion occurred in the powder magazine known
as "Double Couronne,'' St. Denis, a fort used by the French as
a munitions store. The concussion was so terrific that a car a
considerable distance away and containing thirty-two passengers
was overturned and nearly all were injured. Altogether the
casualties amounted to about thirty-five killed and 200 wounded.
In the Ypres sector during March 4 and 5, 1916, the fighting
came to a standstill and the positions remained unchanged. In
the Champagne vigorous artillery action continued on both sides
with occasional infantry attacks and counterattacks of little con-
sequence. In the district about Loos and northeast of Ypres
heavy cannonading endured all day on the 6th, the Germans
hurling quantities of large caliber shells over the enemy's
trenches without any apparent object. On the Ypres-Comines
Canal the British still held the positions gained by storm on
March 2, 1916. Near Soissons the French heavily bombarded
the German works, and their terrific fire at Badenviller in Lor-
raine compelled a German retirement from the positions estab-
lished there February 21, 1916. In the Flanders sector, on the
Belgian front, concentrated artillery fire silenced German bomb
throwers in a futile attempt to capture a trench. In the Woevre
district the German troops, after a fierce assault, stormed the
village of Fresnes and captured it, the French retaining a few
positions on the outskirts. The German infantry advanced in
close formation and literally swarmed into the village, while
the French 75's and machine guns tore great gaps in their ranks.
Northeast of Vermelles small detachments of British troops pene-
trated the German trenches on March 6, 1916, but were com-
pelled to retire. Active engagements and furious hand-to-hand
fighting centered around Maisons de Champagne. The positions
the French had taken on February 11, 1916, were recaptured by
surprise bayonet attacks, the Germans taking two officers and
150 men prisoners. In the Argonne region attempts on the part
of the Germans to occupy some mine craters were repulsed.
BATTLE OF THE SOMME 877
CHAPTER XJLVIII
BATTLE OF THE SOMME — ALLIED PREPA-
RATIONS— POSITIONS OF THE
OPPOSING FORCES
PICARDY, where the great battle of the Somme was staged
in the summer of 1916, is a typical French farming region of
peasant cultivators, a rolling table-land, seldom rising more than
a few hundred feet, and intersected by myriad shallow, lazy-
flowing streams. Detached farms are few, the farmers congre-
gating in and around the little villages that stand in the midst of
hedgeless com and beet fields stretching far and wide. Here
the Somme flows with many crooked turns, now broadening into
a lake, now flowing between bluffs and through swamps. There
is, or rather was, an inviting, peaceful look about this country.
Untouched, remote from the scene of battle it seemed, yet here
in the spring of 1916 preparations were already going forward
for what was to prove one of the fiercest struggles of the
Great War.
In July, 1915, the British had taken over most of the line from
Arras to the Somme, and had passed a quiet winter in the
trenches. The long pause had been occupied by the active Ger-
mans in transforming the chalk hills they occupied into fortified
positions which they believed would prove impregnable. The
motives for the Allies' projected offensive on the Somme were
to weaken the German pressure on Verdun, which had become
severe in June, and to prevent the transference of large bodies
of troops from the west to the eastern front where they might
endanger the plans of General Brussilov.
The British had been receiving reenforcements steadily, and
were at the beginning of 1916 in a position to lengthen their
line sensibly. In the neighborhood of Arras they were able to
relieve an entire French army, the Tenth. The French on their
side had by no means exhausted their reserves at Verdun, but it
would prove a welcome relief to them if by strong pressure the
378 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
long strain were lifted in Picardy. Sir Douglas Haig, it was
stated, would have preferred to delay the Somme offensive a
little longer, for while his forces were rapidly increasing, the
new levies were not as yet completely trained. In view, how-
•ever, of the general situation of the Allies in the west it was
imperative that the blow should be delivered not later than mid-
summer of 1916.
The original British Expeditionary Force, popularly known as
the "Old Contemptibles," who performed prodigies of valor in
the first terrible weeks of the war, had largely disappeared. In
less than two years the British armies had grown from six to
seventy divisions, not including the troops sent by India and
Canada. In addition there were large numbers of trained men
in reserve sufficient, it was believed, to replace the probable
wastage that would occur for a year to come. It was in every
sense a New British Army, for the famous old regiments of the
line had been renewed since Mons, and the men of the new
battalions were drawn from the same source that supplied their
drafts. The old formations had a history, the new battalions had
theirs to make. This in good time they proceeded to do, as will
be subsequently shown.
In the Somme area the German front was held by the right
wing of the Second Army, once Von Billow's, but now com-
manded by Otto von Below a brother of Fritz von Below com-
manding the Eighth Army in the east. The area of Von Below's
army in the Somme region began south of Monchy, while the
Sixth Army under the Crown Prince of Bavaria lay due north.
The front between Gommecourt and Frise in the latter part of
June was covered in this manner. North of the Ancre lay the
Second Guard Reserve Division and the Fifty-second Division
(two units of the Fourteenth Reserve Corps raised in Baden,
but including Prussians, Alsatians, and what not) , the Twenty-
sixth and Twenty-eighth Reserve Divisions, and then the Twelfth
Division of the Sixth Reserve Corps. Covering the road to
Peronne south of the river were the One Hundred and Twenty-
first Division, the Eleventh Division, and the Thirty-sixth Divi*
sion belonging to the Seventeenth Danzig Corps.
BATTLES OF THE SOMME
379
SBCTOR WHERE GRAND OPFENSIYE WAS STARTED
380 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
The British General Staff had decided that the Fourth Army;
under General Sir Henry Rawlinson should make the attack.
General Rawlinson was a tried and experienced officer, who at
the beginning of the campaign had commanded the Seventh Divi-
sion, and at Loos the Fourth Army Corps. His front extended
from south of Gommecourt across the valley of the Ancre to the
north of Maricourt, where it joined the French. There were five
corps in the British Fourth Army, the Eighth under Lieutenant
General Sir Aylmer Hunter-Weston ; the Tenth under Lieutenant
General Sir T. L. N. Morland, the Third under Lieutenant Gen-
eral Sir W. P. Pulteney, the Fifteenth under Lieutenant General
Home, and the Thirteenth under Lieutenant General Congreve,
V. C. The nucleus for another army, mostly composed of cavalry
divisions, lay behind the forces along the front. Called at first
the Reserve, and afterward the Fifth Army under the command
of General Sir Hubert Gough, it subsequently won renown in
some of the hottest fights of the campaign.
The French attacking force, the Sixth Army, once commanded
by Castelnau, but now by a famous artilleryman, General Fayolle,
lay from Maricourt astride the Somme to opposite Fay village.
It comprised the very fk)wer of the French armies, including the
Twentieth Corps, which had won enduring fame at Verdun under
the command of General Balfourier. It was principally com-
posed of Parisian cockneys and countrymen from Lorraine, and
at Arras in 1914, and in the Artois in the summer of 1915, had
achieved memorable renown. There were also the First Colonial
Corps under General Brandelat, and the Thirty-fifth Corps under
General Allonier. To the south of the attacking force lay the
Tenth Army commanded by General Micheler, which was held
in reserve. The soldiers of this army had seen less fighting
than their brothers who were to take the offensive, but they
were quite as eager to be at the enemy, and irked over the
delay.
During the entire period of bombardment the French and
British aviators, by means of direct observation and by photo-
graphs, rendered full and detailed reports of the results obtained
by the fire. The British and French General Staffs thus followed
BATTLE OF THE SOMME S81
from day to day, and even from hour to hour, the progress made
in the destruction of German trenches and shelters.
During the bombardment some seventy raids were undertaken
between Gommecourt and the extreme British left north of
Ypres. Some of these raids were for the purpose of deceiving
the enemy as to the real point of assault and others to identify
the opposing units. Few of the raiders returned to the British
line without bagging a score or so of prisoners. Among thes€
raiding parties a company of the Ninth Highland Light In-
fantry especially distinguished themselves.
Fighting in the air continued every day during this prelim-
inary bombardment. It was essential that the Germans should be
prevented from seeing the preparations that were going forward.
The eyes of a hostile army are its aeroplanes and captive balloons.
Owing to the daring of the French and British aviators the
German flyers were literally prohibited from the lines of the
Allies during all that time. In five days fifteen German machines
were brought to the ground. Very few German balloons even
attempted to take the air.
On June 24, 1916, the bombardment of German trenches had
reached the highest pitch of intensity. The storm of shells swept
the entire enemy front, destroying trenches at Ypres and Arras
and equally obliterating those at Beaumont-Hamel and Fricourt.
By July 28, 1916, all the region subjected to bombardment
presented a scene of complete and appalling devastation. Only
a few stumps marked the spot where leafy groves had stood.
The pleasant little villages that had dotted ttie. smiling landscape
were reduced to mere heaps of rubbish. Hardly a bit of wall was
left standing. It seemed impossible that any living ttiing could
survive in all that shell-smitten territory.
As the day fixed upon for the attack drew near the condition
of the weather caused the Briti^ command some anxious hours.
The last week of June, 1916, was cloudy, and frequent showers
of rain had transformed the dusty roads into deep mud. But in
the excitement that preceded an assault of such magnitude the
condition of the weather could not dampen the feverish ardor
of the troops. There was so much to be done that there was no
882 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
time to consider anything but the work in hand. A nervous
exhilaration prevailed among the men, who looked eagerly and
yet fearfully forward to the hour for the great offensive from
which such great things were expected.
In the afternoon of the last day of June, 1916, the sky cleared
and soon the stars shone brightly in the clear, blue night. Orders
were given out to the British commanders to attack on the follow-
ing morning three hours after daybreak.
CHAPTER XLIX
THE BRITISH ATTACK
THE first day of July, 1916, dawned warm and cloudless.
Since half past 5 o'clock every gun of the Allies on a front
of twenty-five miles was firing without pause, producing a steady
rumbling sound from which it was difficult to distinguish the
short bark of the mortars, the crackle of the field guns, and the
deep roar of the heavies. The slopes to the east were wreathed
in smoke, while in the foreground lay Albert, where German
shells fell from time to time, with its shattered church of Notre
Dame de Bebrieres, from whose ruined campanile the famous
gilt Virgin hung head downward. At intervals along the Allies'
front, and for several miles to the rear, captive kite balloons,
tugging at their moorings, gleamed brightly in the morning light.
The Allies' bombardment reached its greatest intensity about
7.15, when all the enemy slopes were hidden by waves of smoke
like a heavy surf breaking on a rock-bound coast. Here and
there spouts and columns of earth and debris shot up in the
sunlight. It seemed that every living thing must perish within
the radius of that devastating hurricane of fire.
At 7.30 exactly there was a short lull in the bombardment —
just long enough for the gunners everywhere to lengthen their
range, and then the fire became a barrage. The staff officers,
who had been studying their watches, now gave the order, and
THE BRITISH ATTACK 383
lalong the twenty-five mile front the Allies' infantry left the
trenches and advanced to attack.
In this opening stage of the battle the British aim was the
German first position. The section selected for attack ran from
north to south, covering Gommiecourt, passing east of Hebuterne
and following the high ground before Serre and Beaumont-
Hamel, crossed the Ancre northwest of Thiepval. From this
point it stretched for about a mile and a quarter to the east of
Albert. Passing south around Fricourt, it turned at right angles
to the east, covering Mametz and Montauban. Midway between
Maricourt and Hardecourt it turned south, covering Curlu,
crossing the Somme at a marshy place near Vaux, and finally
passed east of Frise, Dompierre, and Soyecourt, to leave east of
Lihons the sector in which the Allied offensive was in progress
which we are describing.
The disposition of the British forces on the front of attack
was as follows : The right wing of Sir Edmund Allenby*s Third
Army and General Hunter-Weston's Eighth Corps lay opposite
Gommecourt, and down to a point just south of Beaumont-
Hamel. North of Ancre to Authuille was General Morland's
Tenth Corps, and east of Albert General Pulteney's Third Corps,
a division directed against La Boiselle, and another against
Ovillers. Adjoining the French forces on the British right flank
lay General Congreve's Thirteenth Corps.
The Allies' attack was not unexpected by the Germans, and
they were not entirely wrong as to the area in which the blow
would be delivered. From Arras to Albert they had concentrated
large forces of men and many guns, but south of Albert they were
less strongly prepared. Their weakest point was south of the
Somme, where the Allies had all the advantage. In recording
the history of the day's fighting two separate actions must be
described, in the north and in the south. The Allies failed in
the first of these, but in the second they gained a substantial
victory over the German hosts. The most desperate struggle of
the day was fought between Gommecourt and Thiepval.
Three of the British divisions in action here were from the
New Army; one was a Territorial brigade and the two others
Y— War St. 5
384 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
had seen hard fighting in Flanders and Gallipoli. They con«
fronted a series of strongly fortified villages — Gommecourt
Serre, Beaumont-Hamel, and Thiepval — ^with underground caves,
that could shelter whole battalions. A network of underground
passages led to sheltered places to the rear of the fighting line,
and deep pits had been dug in which, in time of bombardment,
the machine guns could be hidden. The Germans had also direct
observation from the rear of these strongholds, where their guns
were massed in large numbers.
Occupying such strong positions with every advantage in their
favor, it is easy to understand why the British troops that at-
tacked from Gommecourt to Thiepval failed to attain their
objective. If the British bombardment had reached a high pitch
of intensity on the morning of July 1, 1916, the German guns
were no less active, and having the advantage of direct observa-
tion, their explosive shells soon obliterated parts of the British
front trenches, compelling the British to form up in the open
ground. A hot barrage fire of shrapnel accurately directed fol-
lowed the British troops as they advanced over no-man's-land.
Into a very hell of shrapnel, high explosives, rifle and machine-
gun fire they pushed on in ordered lines. Soon the devastating
storm of German artillery fire cut great gaps in their formation,
yet not a man hung back or wavered. And this destructive Ger-
man fire, accurate and relentless, the British soldiers faced un-
flinchingly from early dawn to high noon. Here and there fhe
German position was penetrated by the more adventurous spirits,
some detachments even forcing their way through it, but they
could not hold their ground. The attack was checked every-
where, and by evening what was left of the British troops from
Gommecourt to Thiepval struggled back to their old line.
The British had failed to win their objective, but the day had
not been wholly wasted ; they had struck deep into the heart of
the German defense and inspired in the enemy a wholesome
respect for their fighting powers. In this stubborn attack nearly
every English, Scotch, and Irish regiment was represented — a
Newfoundland battalion, a little company of Rhodesians, as well
as London and Midland Territorials — ^all of whom displayed high
THE BRITISH ATTACK 385
courage. Again and again the German position was pierced.
Part of one British division broke through south of Beaumont-
Hamel and penetrated to the Station road on the other side of the
quarry, a desperate adventure that cost many lives. It was at
Beaumont-Hamel, under the Hawthorne Redoubt, that exactly
at 7.30 a. m., the hour of attack, the British exploded a mine
which they had been excavating for seven months. It was the
work of Lancashire miners, the largest mine constructed thus far
in the campaign. It was a success. Half the village and acres of
land spiiang into the air, blotting out for a time the light of the
sun on the scene and hiding in a pall of dust and smoke the
rapidly advancing British troops.
In the day's fighting the Irish soldiers were especially dis-
tinguished for many remarkable acts of bravery. The Royal
Irish Fusiliers were the first to leave the trenches. To the north
of Thiepval the Ulster Division broke through the German posi-
tion at a point called "The Crucifix," holding for a time the
formidable Schwaben Redoubt, and some even penetrated the
outskirts of Gnandcourt. The Royal Irish Rifles swept over the
German parapet^ and, assisted by the Inniskillings, cleared the
trenches and destroyed the machine gunners. Through the
enemy lines they swept, enfiladed on three sides, and losing so
heavily that only a few escaped from the desperate venture.
But the gallant remnant that struggled back to their own line
took 600 prisoners, one trooper alone bringing in fifteen through
the enemy's own barrage.
The village of Fricourt, as will be seen by the map, forms a
prominent salient, and the British command decided to cut it off
by attacking on two sides. An advance was planned on the
strongly fortified villages of Ovillers and La Boiselle. The
British on the first day won the outskirts and carried all the
intrenchments before them, but had not gained control of the
ruins, though a part of a brigade had actually entered La Boiselle
and held a portion of the place. To complete the operation of
cutting off Fricourt it was necessary to carry Mametz on the
south ; this accomplished, the forces would unite in the north at
La Boiselle and Ovillers and, following the long depression
386 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
popularly known as Sausage Valley toward Contalmaison, would
be able to squeeze Fricourt so hard that it must be abandoned
by the enemy. The British plans worked out successfully. A
division that had been sorely punished at Loos and was now
occupying a position west of Fricourt had now an opportunity
to avenge its previous disaster. With grim determination to
clean up the old score against the Germans, they advanced rapidly
into the angle east of Sausage Valley, carrying two small woods
and attacking Fricourt from the north and occupying a formi-
dable position that threatened Fricourt.
The strongly fortified village of Montauban fell early in the
day of July 1, 1916. Reduced to ruins, it crowned a ridge below
the position of the British lines in a hollow north of tiie Peronne
road at Camoy. The British artillery had done effective work,
and the attack on Montauban resulted in an easier victory than
had been expected. The Sixth Bavarian Regiment which de-
fended the place was said to have lost 3,000 out of the 8,500 who
had entered the battle. Here for the first time in the campaign
was witnessed the advance in line of the soldiers of Britain and
France.
It was a moving sight that thrilled and heartened all the
combatants. The Twentieth Corps of the French army lay on
the British right, while the Thirty-ninth Division under Gen-
eral Nourisson marched in line with the khaki-clad Britons.
Only after surveying the captured ground did the French and
British realize what a seemingly impregnable stronghold had
been won. Endless labor had been expended by the Germans not
only in fortifying the place but in constructing dugouts that were
well furnished and homelike. The best of these were papered,
with linoleum on the floor, pictures on the wall, and contained
bathrooms, electric lights and electric bells. There were also at
convenient points bolt holes from which the occupants could
escape in case of surprise. Some of the dugouts had two stories,
the first being reached by a thirty-foot staircase. Another stair-
way about as long communicated with the lower floor. Every
preparation seemed to have been made for permanent occupation.
The Germans ha4 good reasons fdr believing that their position
THE FRENCH ATTACKS 387
was impregnable. The utmost ingenuity had been employed to
fortify every point. Carefully screened manholes used by the
snipers were reached by long tunnels from the trenches. The
most notable piece of military engineering was a heavily timbered
communication trench 300 feet long, and of such a depth that
those passing through it were safe from even the heaviest
shells.
Late in the afternoon Mametz fell, after it had been reduced
to a group of ruined walls, above which rose a rough pile of
broken masonry that represented the village church. The Ger-
mans who occupied trench lines on the southern side had shat-
tered the British trenches opposite Mametz so completely that
the British infantry were forced to advance over open ground.
CHAPTER L
THE FRENCH ATTACKS NORTH AND
SOUTH OF THE SOMME
TjlROM the hamlet of Vaux, ruined by German artillery, on the
■^ right bank of the Somme, part of the battle field, with the
configuration of a long crest, looks like a foaming sea stretching
away to the horizon.
Against the whitish yellow background the woods resolve into
dark patches and the quarries into vast geometric figures. In
the valley the Somme zigzags among the poplars ; its marshy bed
is covered with rushes and aquatic plants; on the left stand
crumbled walls surrounding an orchard whose trees were shat-
tered by German shells. This is the mill of Fargny through
which the French line passes. A little beyond at a place called
Chapeau-de-Gendarme was the first German trench, and farther
still in the valley stands the village of Curlu, its surrounding
gardens occupied by Bavarian troops. To the eastward, half
hidden by the trees, a glimpse could be had of the walls of the
village of Hem. In the distance a solitary church spire marked
388 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
the site of P^ronne, a fortress surrounded by its moat of three
streams.
General Foch had planned his advance in the same methodical
manner as the British command. At half past 7 on the morning
of July 1, 1916, the French infantry dashed forward to assault
the German trenches. During a period of nearly two years the
Germans had been allowed leisure to strongly fortify their posi-
tions. At different points there were two, three and four lines
of trenches bounded by deep ditches, with the woods and the
village of Curlu organized for defense. But the magnificent
driving power of the French infantry carried all before it, and by
a single dash they overran and captured the foremost German
works. Mounting the steep ascent of the height that is called
Chapeau-de-Gendarme the young soldiers of the class of 1916,
who then and there received their baptism of fire, waved thein
hats and handkerchiefs and shouted "Vive la France!"
The French troops had reached the first houses of the village
of Curlu occupied by Bavarian troops, who offered a most stub^
born resistance. Machine guns and mitrailleuses, which the
French bombardment had not destroyed, appeared suddenly on
the roofs of houses, in the ventholes of the cellars, and in every
available opening.
The French infantry, obedient to the orders they had received,
at once stopped their advance and crouched on the ground while
the French artillery recommenced a terrible bombardment of the
village. In about half an hour most of the houses in the place
had been razed to the ground, and the enemy guns were silenced.
This time without pause the French infantry went forward and
Curlu was captured without a single casualty. The Germans
later attempted a counterattack, but the village remained in
French hands.
There were found in the ruined houses a large number of
packages which had been put together by the Bavarians, con-
sisting of articles of dress, pieces of furniture, household orna-
ments, and a great variety of objects stolen from the inhabitants
of the village. The sudden attack of the French troops did not
allow the Bavarians time to escape with their loot.
THE FRENCH ATTACKS 389
During the three days that followed the French were entirely
occupied with organizing and consolidating the positions they
had conquered.
At 7 a. m. on July 5, 1916, they began a fresh offensive. In
a few hours' fighting the village of Hem and all the surrounding
trenches had been captured. About noon the few houses in the
village to which the Germans had clung tenaciously were
evacuated.
Thanks to the prudence of the French command and the wis-
dom of their plans and the rapidity with which the attack had
been carried out, the casualties were less than had been antici-
pated and out of all proportion to the value of the conquered
positions.
While the French were thus forcing the pace and winning
successes north of the Somme, their brothers in arms south of
the river were carrying out some important operations with
neatness and dispatch.
In this area the French launched their attack on July 1, 1916,
at 9.30 a. m., on a front of almost ten kilometers from the village
of Frise to a point opposite the village of Estrees.
Here it was that a Colonial corps that had especially dis-
tinguished itself during the war delivered an assault that was
entirely successful. The Germans were taken by surprise. The
French captured German officers engaged in the act of shaving
or making their toilet in the dugouts; whole battalions were
rounded up, and all this was done with the minimum of loss.
One French regiment had only two casualties, and the total for
one division was 800. The villages of Dompierre, Becquincourt,
and Bussu were in French hands before nightfall, and about five
miles had been gouged out of the German front. Southward the
Bretons of the Thirty-fifth Corps, splendid fighters all, had cap-
tured Fay. Between them the Allies had captured on this day
the enemy's first position without a break, a front of fourteen
miles stretching from Mametz to Fay. They had taken about
6,000 prisoners and a vast quantity of guns and military stores.
On July 2, 1916, the French infantry attacked the village of
Frise, and by noon the Germans were forced to evacuate the
390 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
place. Here the French captured a battery of seventy-sevens
which the enemy had not had time to destroy. Pushing rapidly
on, the French took the wood of Mereaucourt. The village of
Herbecourt, a little more to the south, was captured by the
French after an hour's fighting. By early dark the entire group
of German defenses was taken, thus linking Herbecourt to the
village of Assevillers.
Between this last place and the river they broke into the
German second position. Fayolle's left now commanded the
light railway from Combles to P^ronne, his center held the
great loop of the Somme at Frise village, while his right was
only four miles from P^ronne itself.
During the day of July 3, 1916, the French continued their
victorious advance, capturing Assevillers and Flaucourt. During
the night their cavalry advanced as far as the village of Barleux,
which was strongly held by the Germans. On the day following,
July 4, 1916, the Foreign Legion of the Colonial Corps had taken
Belloy-en-Santerre, a point in iihie third line. On July 5, 1916, the
Thirty-fifth Corps occupied the greater part of Estrees and were
only three miles distant from P^ronne.
The Germans attempted several counterattacks, aided by their
Seventeenth Division, which had been hurried to support, but
these were futile, and finally the German railhead was moved
from Peronne to Chaulnes.
There followed a few days* pause, employed by the French in
consolidating their gains and in minor operations. On the night
of July 9, 1916, the French commander Fayolle took the village
of Biaches, only a mile from Peronne. The German losses had
been very great since the beginning of the French offensive, and
at this place an entire regiment was destroyed. On July 10,
1916, the French succeeded in reaching La Maisonette, the
highest point in that part of the country, and held a front from
there to Barleux — a position beyond the third German line. In
this sector nothing now confronted Fayolle but the line of the
upper Somme, south of the river. North of the stream some
points in the second line had been won, but it had been only
partly carried northward from Hem.
THE FRENCH ATTACKS 391
The French attacks north and south of the Somme had at al
points won their objectives and something more. In less than
two weeks Fayolle had, on a front ten miles long and having a
maximum depth of six and a half miles, carried fifty square miles
of territory, containing military works, trenches, and fortified
villages. The French had also captured a large amount of booty
which included 85 cannon, some of the largest size, 100 mitra-
illeuses, 26 "Minenwerfer," and stores of ammunition and war
material. They took prisoner 236 officers and 12,000 men.
It might well be said that this was a very splendid result
But it only marked the first stage in the French assault.
The measured and sustained regularity of this advance, the
precision and order of the entire maneuver, are deserving of a
more detailed description. If we examine what might be called
its strategic mechanism, it will be noted that south of the Somme
the French line turned with its left on a pivot placed at its right
in front of Estrees.
The longer the battle continued the more this turning move-
ment became accentuated. On July 3, 1916, the extreme left
advanced from Mericourt to Buscourt, the left from Herbecourt
to Flaucourt, which was taken, while the center occupied
Assevillers.
On the 4th the right, abandoning in its turn the role of fixed
point, moved forward and took the two villages of Estrees and
Belloy. Thus in the first four days of July, 1916, the French
forces operating south of the Somme constantly marched with
the left in advance.
After a pause for rest and to consolidate positions won, the
attack was again resumed by the left wing on the 9th, and car-
ried before Peronne, Biaches, and La Maisonette.
It will be seen by this outline of operations that the maneuver,
which began early in an easterly direction, developed into a
movement toward the south. The object as stated in the official
communique was to clear the interior of the angle of the Somme
and to cover the right of the French troops operating north of
the river. This delicate maneuver involved great difficulty and
risk, inasmuch as the French right flank became the target for
392 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
an enfilading fire from the south. By consulting the map it will
be seen that the artillery positions south of Villers direct an
enfilading fire on the plateau of Flaucourt and points near by.
The French General Staff showed keen foresight in parrying this
danger by advancing the right at the proper moment.
By these operations the French had reached the actual suburbs
of the old fortified city of Peronne, occupying a strong strategic
position above the angle made by the Somme between Bray
and Ham.
It is a natural and necessary road of passage for all armies
coming from the north or south that want to cross the river.
Blucher in his pursuit of the French armies after the Battle of
Waterloo crossed the Somme exactly at this point.
As a matter of fact at this time both adversaries were astride
of the river, the Allies facing the east and the Germans facing
toward the west. It is interesting to note that this is exactly
the situation that prevailed in the war of 1870, but with the
roles reversed. At that time the Germans were attacking
Peronne as the French forces were attacking it in July, 1916;
they came, however, from the direction of Amiens, precisely as
the French came on this occasion.
The French, on the other hand, were in the positions of the
Germans — ^they came from the north. The army of Faidherbe
had its bases at Lille and Cambrai as the Crown Prince of
Bavaria had his in the present war.
CHAPTER LI
THE BRITISH ATTACK (CONTINUED)
rpHE British captured the fortified villages of Mametz and
-*- Montauban on July 1, 1916. This success, as will have been
noted, put the British right wing well in advance of their center ;
and to make the gap in the German position uniform over a
broad enough front it was necessary to move forward the left
THE BRITISH ATTACK (CONTINUED) 393
part of the British line from Thiepval to Fricourt. At this timfe
the extreme British left was inactive, in the circumstances it
seemed doubtful that a new attack would be profitable, so what
was left of the advanced guard of the Ulster Division retired
from the Schwaben Redoubt to its original line. The front had
now become too large for a single commander to manage success-
fully, so to General Hubert Gough of the Reserve, or Fifth Army,
was given the ground north of the Albert-Bapaume road, includ-
ing the area of the Fourth and Eighth Corps.
Sunday, July 2, 1916, was a day of steady heat and blinding
dust, and the troops suffered severely. At Ovillers and La
Boiaelle the Third Corps sustained all day long a desperate
struggle. Two new divisions which had been brought forward to
support now joined the fighting. One of these divisions success-
fully carried the trenches before Ovillers and the other in the
night penetrated the ruins of the village of La Boiselle.
The Germans had evidently not recovered from their surprise
in the south, for no counterattacks were attempted, nor had any
reserve divisions been brought to their support. Throughout
the long, stifling July day squadrons of Allied aeroplanes were
industriously bombing depots and lines of communication back
of the German front. The much-lauded Fokkers were flitting
here and there, doing little damage. Two were sent to earth by
Allied airmen before the day was over. The Allies had a great
number of kite balloons ("sausages") in the air, but only one
belonging to the Germans was in evidence.
With the capture of Mametz and positions in Fricourt Wood
to the east, Fricourt could not hold out, and about noon on July
2, 1916, the place was in British hands. Evidently the Germans
had anticipated the fall of the village, for a majority of the
garrison had escaped during the night. But when the British
entered the village, bombing their way from building to building,
they captured Germans in suflficiently large nunxbers to make the
victory profitable.
On Monday, July 3, 1916, General von Below issued an order
to his troops which showed that the German officers appreciated
the seriousness of the Allied offensive :
394
THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
^ tn
THE BRITISH ATTACK (CONTINUED) 395
"The decisive issue of the war depends on the victory of the
Second Army on ttie Somme. We must win this battle in spite
of the enemy's temporary superiority in artillery and infantry.
The important ground lost in certain places will be recaptured
by our attack after the arrival of reenforcements. The vital
thing" is to hold on to our present positions at all costs and to
improve them. I forbid the voluntary evacuation of trenches.
The will to stand firm must be impressed on every man in the
army. The enemy should have to carve his way over heaps of
corpses. . . ."
To understand the exact position of the British forces on July
3, 1916, the alignment of the new front must be described in
detail.
The first section extended from Thiepval to Fricourt, be-
tween which the Albert-Bapaume road ran in a straight line
over the watershed. Thiepval, Ovillers, and La Boiselle were
positions in the German front line. East of the last place the
fortified village of Contalmaison occupied high ground, forming
as it were a pivot in the German intermediate line covering their
field guns.
The British second position ran through Pozieres to the two
Bazentins and as far as Guillemont. Thiepval and Ovillers had
not yet been taken, and only a portion of La Boiselle, but the
British had broken through the first position south of that place
and had pushed well along on the road to Contalmaison. This
northern section had been transformed by warfare into a scene
of desolation, bare, and forbidding, seamed with trenches and
pitted with shell holes. The few trees along the roads had been
razed — ^the only vegetation to be seen being coarse grass and
weeds and thistles.
The southern section between Fricourt and Montauban pre-
sented a more inviting prospect. A line of woods extended from
the first village in a northeasterly direction, a second line run-
ning from Montauban around Longueval. In this sector all the
German first positions had been captured. The second position
ran through a heavily wooded country and the villages of the
Bazentins, Longueval, and Guillemont.
396 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
During the night of July 2, 1916, the British had penetrated
La Boiselle, and throughout the following day the battle raged
around that place and Ovillers. The fighting was of the most
desperate character, every foot of ground being contested by the
opposing forces. The struggle seesawed back and forth, here
and there the Germans gaining a little ground, only to lose it a
little later when a vigorous British attack forced them to fall
back, and so the tide of battle ebbed and flowed.
On July 4, 1916, the heat wave was broken by violent thunder-
storms and a heavy rain that transformed the dusty terrain into
quagmires, through which Briton and German fought on with
(undiminished spirit and equal valor. On the morning of July 5,
1916, the British, after one of the bloodiest struggles in this
sector, captured La Boiselle and carried forward their attack
toward Bailiff Wood and Contalmaison.
In the five days' fighting since they assumed the offensive the
British had been hard hit at some points, but at others had
registered substantial gains. They had captured a good part
of the German first line and carried by assault strongly fortified
villages defended stubbornly by valiant troops. The total num-
ber of prisoners taken by the British was by this time more than
6,000. These first engagements had for the British one exceed-
ingly important result: it gave to the troops an absolute con-
fidence in their fighting powers. They had shown successfully
that they could measure themselves with the best soldiers of
the kaiser and beat them.
During the day of July 5, 1916, the British repulsed several
counterattacks and fortified the ground that they had already
won. On this date Horseshoe Trench, the main defense of
Contalmaison from the west, was attacked, and here a battalion
of West Yorks fought with distinction and succeeded in making
a substantial advance.
There was a pause in the fighting during the day of July 6,
1916, as welcome to the Germans as to the British, for some rest
was imperative.
On Friday, July 7, 1916, the British began an attack on
Contalmaison from Sausage Valley on the southwest, and from
;THE BRITISH ATTACK (CONTINUED) 397
the labyrinth of copses north of Fricourt through which ran the
Contalmaison-Fricourt highroad.
South of Thiepval there was a salient which the Germans had
organized and strongly fortified during twenty months' prepara-
tion. After a violent bombardment the British attacked and
captured this formidable stronghold. More to the south they
took German trenches on the outskirts of Ovillers.
The attack ranged from the Leipzig Redoubt and the environs
of Ovillers to the skirts of Contalmaison. After an intense
bombardment the British infantry advanced on Contalmaison
and on the right from two points of the wood. Behind them the
German barrage fire, beating time methodically, entirely hid
from view the attacking columns.
By noon the British infantry, having carried Bailiff Wood by
storm, captured the greater part of Contalmaison. There they
found a small body of British soldiers belonging to the North-
umberland Fusiliers who had been made prisoners by the Ger-
mans a few days before and were penned up in a shelter in the
village. The British were opposed by "die Third Prussian Guard
Division — the famous "Cockchafers'* — ^who lost 700 men as pris-
oners during the attack. In the afternoon of the same day, July
7, 1916, the Germans delivered a strong counterattack, and the
British, unable to secure reenforcements, and not strong enough
to maintain the position, were forced out of the village, though
able to keep hold of the southern comer.
On the following day, July 8, 1916, the British struggled for
the possession of Ovillers, now a conglomeration of shattered
trencihes, shell holes and ruined walls. Every yard of ground
was fought over with varying fortunes by the combatants.
While this stubborn fight was under way the British were driving
out the Germans from their fortified positions among the groves
and copses around Contalmaison, and consolidating their gains.
In the night of July 10, 1916, the British, advancing from
Bailiff Wood on the west side of Contalmaison, pressed forward
in four successive waves, their guns pouring a flood of shells
before them, and breaking into the northwest comer, and after a
desperate hand-to-hand conflict, during which prodigies of valor
398 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
were performed on both sides, drove out the Germans and
occupied the entire village. The victory had not been won with-
out considerable cost in casualties. The British captured 189
prisoners, including a commander of a battalion.
Ovillers, where the most violent fighting had raged for some
days, continued to hold out, though surrounded and cut off from
all relief from the outside. Knowing this the German garrison
still fought on, and it was not until July 16, 1916, that the
brave remnant consisting of two officers and 124 guardsmen
surrendered.
We now turn to the British operations in the southern sector
where they were trying to clear out the fortified woods that
intervened between them and the German second line.
On July 3, 1916, the ground east of Fricourt Wood was clear of
Germans and the way opened to Mametz Wood. During the
day the (Jermans attempted a counterattack, and incidentally
the British enjoyed "a good time." A fresh German division
had just arrived at Montauban, which received such a cruel
welcome from the British guns that it must have depressed their
fighting spirit. East of Mametz a battalion from the Champagne
front appeared and was destroyed, or made prisoner, a short
time after detraining at the railhead. The British took a thou-
sand prisoners within a small area of this sector. An eyewitness
describes seeing 600 German prisoners being led to the rear by
three ragged soldiers of a Scotch regiment *'like pipers at the
head of a battalion."
The British entered the wood of Mametz to the north of
Mametz village on July 4, 1916, and captured the wood of
Bamafay. These positions were not carried without stiff fight-
ing, for the Germans had fortified the woods in every conceivable
manner. Machine-gun redoubts connected by hidden trenches
were everywhere, even in the trees there were machine guns,
while the thick bushes and dense undergrowth impeded every
movement. In such a jungle the fighting was largely a matter of
hand-to-hand conflicts. The German guns were well served, and
every position won by the British was at once subjected to a
heavy counterbombardment. Indeed from July 4, 1916, onward,
THE BRITISH ATTACK (CONTINUED) 399
there was scarcely any cessation to the German fire on the entire
British front, and around Fricourt, Mametz, and Montauban in
the background.
On July 7, 1916, the British General Staff informed the French
high command that they would make an attack on Trones Wood
on the following morning, asking for their cooperation. Assisted
by the flanking fire of the French guns, the British penetrated
Trones Wood, and obtained a foothold there, seizing a line of
trenches and capturing 130 prisoners and several mitrailleuses.
On the same day the French on the British right were pushing
forward toward Maltzhorn Farm.
Trones Wood which for some days was to be the scene of the
aottest fighting in the southern British sector, is triangular in
[orm and about 1,400 meters in length, running north and south.
Its southern side is about forty meters. The Germans directed
against it a violent bombardment with shells of every caliber.
Owing to its peculiar position every advantage was in favor
of the defense. Maltzhorn Ridge commanded the southern part,
and the German position at Longueval commanded the northern
portion. The German second line in a semicircle extended around
the wood north and east, and as the covert was heavy, organized
movement was impossible while the German artillery had free
play.
The British, however, continued to advance slowly and
stubbornly from the southern point where they had obtained a
foothold, but it was not until the fire of the German guns had
been diverted by pressure elsewhere that they were able to make
any appreciable gains on their way northward.
On July 9, 1916, at 8 o'clock the Germans launched desperate
counterattacks directed from the east to the southeast. The first
failed; the second succeeded in landing them in the southern
part of the wood, but they were ultimately repulsed with heavy
losses. During the night there was a fresh German attack
strongly delivered that was broken by British fire. Of the six
counterattacks delivered by the Germans between Sunday night
and Monday afternoon, July 9-10, 1916, the last enabled them
to gain some ground in the wood, but it was at a heavy cost.
Z— War St. 5
400 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
They did not long enjoy even this small success, for on Tuesday,
July 11, 1916, the British had recaptured the entire wood except-
ing* a small portion in the extreme northern comer.
On the same date the British advanced to the' north end of
Mametz Wood, and by evening of July 12, 1916, had captured
virtually the whole of it, gathering in some hundreds of German
prisoners in the operation. The place had not been easily won,
for while the whole wood did not comprise more than two hun-
dred acres or so, there was a perfect network of trenches and
apparently miles of barbed-wire entanglements, while machine
guns were everywhere. It was only after the British succeeded
in clearing out maohine-gun positions on the north side, and
enfiladed every advance, that they were able to get through the
wood and to face at last the main German second position. This
ran, as will have been noted, from Pozieres through the Bazentins
and Longueval to Guillemont. The capture of Contalmaison was
a necessary preliminary to the next stage of the British advance.
After the fall of this place Sir Douglas Haig issued a summary
of the first of the gains made by the Allies since the beginning
of the offensive :
"After ten days and nights of continuous fighting our troops
have completed the methodical capture of the whole of the
enemy's first system of defense on a front of 14,000 yards. This
system of defense consisted of numerous and continuous lines of
fire trenches, extending to various depths of from 2,000 to 4,000
yards and included five strongly fortified villages, numerous
heavily wired and intrenched woods, and a large number of im-
mensely strong redoubts. The capture of each of these trenches
represented an operation of some importance, and the whole of
them are now in our hands."
General Haig's summary of what had been accomplished in
the first stage of the battle of the Somme was modest in its
claims. The British had failed in the north from Thiepval to
Gommecourt, but in the south they had cut their way through
almost impregnable defenses and now occupied a strong position
that promised well for the next offensive. At the close of the
first phase of the battle the number of prisoners in the hands of
BATTLE OF THE SOMME— SECOND PHASE 401
the British had risen to 7,500. The French had captured 11,000.
The vigor with which the offensive had been pushed by the Allies
caused the Germans to bring forward the bulk of their reserves,
but they were unable to check the advance and lost heavily.
CHAPTER LII
THE SECOND PHASE OF THE BATTLE
OF THE SOMME
BRITISH commanders are methodical and believe in preparing
thoroughly before an attack, but they are ready at times to
take a gambler's chance if the moment seems opportune to win
by striking the enemy a sudden and unexpected blow.
At half past three in the morning of July 14, 1916, the British
started an attack with full Imowledge of the risk involved, but
hoping to find the Germans poorly prepared. At Contalmaison
Villa and Mametz Wood they held positions within a few hundred
yards of the German line. It was the section from Bazentin-le-
Grand and Longueval where the danger lay, for here there was
a long advance to be made, as far as a mile in some places, up
the slopes north of Caterpillar Valley.
French officers are not inclined to err on the side of over-
eaution, but on this occasion more than one of them expressed
a doubt that the projected British attack would succeed.
The 14th of July is a national holiday in France, the anni-
versary of the fall of the Bastille. Paris was in gala attire, the
scene of a great parade, such as that city had not witnessed in its
varied history, when the Allied troops, Belgians, Russians, Brit-
ish, and the blue-clad warriors of France, were reviewed by the
President of the Republic amid the frantic acclamations of de-
lighted crowds. On this day so dear to the heart of every French
patriot the British troops in Picardy were dealing hammer blows
to the German line with the rallying cry of "Vive la France" that
made up in sincerity what it lacked in Parisian accent.
402 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
The front selected for the British attack was a space of about
four miles from a point southeast of Longueval, Pozieres to
Longueval, and Delville Wood. The work cut out for the British
right flank to perform was the clearing out of Trones Wood still
partly occupied by the Germans. The two Bazentins, Longueval,
and the wood of Delville were either sheltered by a wood, or
there was one close by that was always a nest of cunningly
hidden guns. More than a mile beyond the center of the German
position, High Wood, locally known as Foumeaux, formed a 
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